{
 "name": "Pryv compliance matrix",
 "description": "Maps 15 regulations and standards (GDPR, HIPAA, Swiss nLPD, CCPA, PIPEDA, DiGA, MDR, HDS, ISO 27001, ISO 27701, ISO 13485, SOC 2 and more) requirement by requirement onto what Pryv, the platform built from open-pryv.io, implements, makes configurable, facilitates or documents, and what stays with the implementer. 439 requirements, each backed by evidence (tests, docs, configuration keys).",
 "disclaimer": "This matrix describes the software's contribution to compliance. It is not legal advice and not a certification: implementer organisations remain responsible for their own GDPR, HIPAA, ISO, MDR or HDS posture. Rows marked draft are authored but not yet reviewed.",
 "generated_at": "2026-11-20T16:02:36.930Z",
 "site": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/",
 "source": "https://github.com/pryv/compliance-matrix",
 "license": "BSD-3-Clause",
 "legend": {
  "coverage": {
   "implemented": "Pryv ships the control out of the box; it works with no configuration.",
   "configurable": "Pryv provides the control once the operator sets the configuration keys cited on the requirement.",
   "facilitated": "Pryv reduces the work; the implementer still does part of it (see the facilitation mode).",
   "documented": "Guidance only: the implementer does the work, following the cited documentation.",
   "out-of-scope": "No software contribution from Pryv; the obligation, if any, stays with the implementer."
  },
  "pryv_effort_saved": {
   "high": "Pryv carries most of the engineering and operational work.",
   "medium": "The work is roughly shared between Pryv and the implementer.",
   "low": "Pryv contributes a small technical substrate; most of the work is the implementer's."
  },
  "facilitation_mode": {
   "primitive": "Pryv's permissions, access versioning or system streams technically enforce the obligation; the implementer chooses the stream layout and permission scope.",
   "evidence": "Pryv generates structured data (audit log, access version chain, event history) that the implementer uses as proof in an artefact they produce.",
   "storage": "Pryv durably stores artefacts the implementer creates (notice text, consent records, policies) and makes them recoverable per subject and per time.",
   "infrastructure": "Pryv runs the technical layer the obligation depends on (TLS, encryption at rest, high availability, data residency, backup and restore).",
   "awareness": "Pryv has minimal direct contribution; the row reminds the implementer of the obligation."
  }
 },
 "primitives": [
  {
   "id": "CMC",
   "summary": "`components/cmc/`. Federation fabric: cross-platform consent flows, typed `consent/*` event lifecycle, capability accesses, bidirectional shared accesses, scope-update via composite-id `accesses.update`."
  },
  {
   "id": "MFA",
   "summary": "Multi-factor authentication via the `mfa.*` API methods (`mfa.activate`, `mfa.confirm`, `mfa.challenge`, `mfa.verify`, `mfa.deactivate`, `mfa.recover`). **Enabled by default** (authenticator-app TOTP works out of the box, no configuration); set `services.mfa.active: false` to disable. Nothing is forced on users (login only challenges enrolled accounts). `service.info().features.mfa.methods` advertises the active methods."
  },
  {
   "id": "access",
   "summary": "A grant of permission to act on a user's data."
  },
  {
   "id": "account-auto-deletion",
   "summary": "Whole-account deletion at a date or after a period without use, with reminder mails (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66, `8521c8d5`; per-core block `account.autoDeletion.*`; `components/api-server/src/methods/helpers/autoDeletionSweep.ts`)."
  },
  {
   "id": "account-backup-tool",
   "summary": "`pryv-account-backup` (`@pryv/account-backup`) is the subject-driven export tool. **Distribution is git-clone-based, NOT on the npm registry**: clone the tagged release, `npm install`, `npm start`, supply service-info URL + username + password, and get a `./backup/<apiEndpoint>/` folder. As of v0.6.0 it is also a programmatic, browser-isomorphic library (`require('@pryv/account-backup').Backup` over pluggable `StorageWriter` + `StateStore` adapters), and a sample browser webapp (`pryv-account-backup-webapp`) ships on the same core modules."
  },
  {
   "id": "app-web-auth3",
   "summary": "The customer-facing consent / auth / register / password-reset web page template. Forked + rebranded per platform."
  },
  {
   "id": "audit",
   "summary": "Records API method invocations per user."
  },
  {
   "id": "audit-event-stream",
   "summary": "A separate, append-only audit channel emitted into the user's own streams (configurable). Distinct from the per-method audit DB."
  },
  {
   "id": "backup-payload-encryption",
   "summary": "`bin/backup.js` can encrypt its output on demand so plaintext PHI/PII never touches the backup destination disk, the bytes written to the media are ciphertext only. Opt-in; absent the flags, output is plaintext as before."
  },
  {
   "id": "backup-restore",
   "summary": "`bin/backup.js` produces per-user backups; `--restore` rebuilds a user from a backup file."
  },
  {
   "id": "clientData",
   "summary": "Free-form structured metadata slot present on accesses, streams, and events."
  },
  {
   "id": "data-residency",
   "summary": "Per-user data-residency choice across a Pryv platform that spans multiple hostings (different countries / cloud regions / on-premise locations)."
  },
  {
   "id": "data-types",
   "summary": "Canonical `class/format` JSON Schemas at `https://raw.github.com/pryv/data-types/master/dist/event-types.json`. Includes `consent/*`, `notification/*-cmc`, `message/chat-cmc`."
  },
  {
   "id": "delegation",
   "summary": "Owner-equivalent control of one account by one or more **delegate accounts**, implemented as a plugin (reserved `:_delegation:*` stream-id namespace + guard hooks; `open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`), not a storage engine — all state lives in the controlled account's standard per-user storage."
  },
  {
   "id": "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
   "summary": "AES-256-GCM encrypted storage for operator-supplied secrets in the platform DB (rqlite). HKDF-derived key from `auth.adminAccessKey`, per-key purpose label (TLS certificate and ACME account keys: from `letsEncrypt.atRestKey`)."
  },
  {
   "id": "encryption-at-rest-user-data",
   "summary": "Modular encryption-at-rest for the full user-data surface (events, attachments, series, audit, platform DB), delivered by the `container-encrypted-volume` companion. It provisions and mounts an encrypted volume inside the container on boot and points the data roots at it, so the application stores ciphertext at rest. Two pluggable seams: storage **backend** (LUKS reference + gocryptfs; near-native AES-NI) and **key provider** (`env` / `file` / `exec` / `clevis` for TPM2·Tang·PKCS#11 / `aws-kms` envelope). Layered onto the stock image at build time; opt-in via one switch; no application code change."
  },
  {
   "id": "event",
   "summary": "The atomic data record."
  },
  {
   "id": "external-id-index",
   "summary": "A platform-wide \"one account per record id\" index for a third-party identifier (an EHR patient id, for example), without the platform ever seeing the identifier. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58 (https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/161)."
  },
  {
   "id": "letsEncrypt-integration",
   "summary": "Built-in ACME client that issues + renews certificates, replicates across cluster via rqlite, hot-swaps via cluster IPC. Opt-in (`letsEncrypt.enabled`, off by default); the core serves HTTPS only when `http.ssl.keyFile` / `http.ssl.certFile` are set, and the integration keeps the certificate behind those paths issued and renewed. Without `http.ssl.*` the core serves plain HTTP and TLS belongs to your reverse proxy. The core sets no TLS version or cipher options of its own: Node.js defaults apply (TLS 1.2 floor on Node 24)."
  },
  {
   "id": "multi-core-mTLS",
   "summary": "Bootstrap CLI issues passphrase-encrypted bundles; new cores join over mTLS-protected Raft. PlatformDB pre-registration + DNS auto-publish. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86 a bundle's version, salt and nonce are authenticated with its content (pinned 16-byte tag); a joining core must run that release or later to read it, while bundles of earlier releases are still read `[BNEV1]`."
  },
  {
   "id": "observability-provider",
   "summary": "**Allow-list telemetry emitter**. The primitive is a single choke point at `components/business/src/observability/` that constructs every datapoint from a compile-time allow-list (`schema.ts`) and ships it over OTLP/HTTP. No vendor or OpenTelemetry SDK runs in the process and nothing is auto-instrumented, so the emitted surface is a property of our source rather than of an external agent's defaults. Any OTLP-ingesting backend can be the destination, including an OpenTelemetry Collector the operator hosts themselves; the posture is identical whichever is chosen, because the curation happens before egress."
  },
  {
   "id": "permissions",
   "summary": "The set of stream+level tuples carried by an access."
  },
  {
   "id": "randomAlias",
   "summary": "A routable, platform-unique de-identifying name substituted for the username."
  },
  {
   "id": "shared-secrets",
   "summary": "One-time hand-off of a secret to a third party, addressed by a random key instead of embedding the credential in a URL (`open-pryv.io/components/shared-secrets/`)."
  },
  {
   "id": "stream",
   "summary": "A hierarchical container for events, owned by one user."
  },
  {
   "id": "system-streams",
   "summary": "A privileged stream namespace managed by the core (not user-creatable)."
  },
  {
   "id": "webhooks",
   "summary": "Per-access HTTP POST notifications subscribed via the `webhooks.*` API methods. **Signal-only by design.** The webhook body contains a notification that something changed for the subscribing access; it does **not** contain the changed data."
  }
 ],
 "context_notes": [
  {
   "id": "access-versioning",
   "title": "Pryv access versioning: implementation findings",
   "summary": "Source-of-truth for the matrix's claims about access immutability + consent-contract preservation. Findings from reading the `open-pryv.io` master branch implementation directly.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/access-versioning.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "account-backup-coverage",
   "title": "pryv-account-backup: DSAR coverage matrix",
   "summary": "**Status:** implementer reference + audit of `pryv-account-backup` **v0.7.0** (`@pryv/account-backup`) against GDPR Art.15 / Art.20, CCPA §1798.110 / §1798.115, PIPEDA Principle 4.9, and Swiss nLPD Art.25. Originally recorded from the gap-probing session (Q10, 2026-05-20) against v0.2.3; refreshed 2026-05-27 (v0.4.0 DSAR-completeness), 2026-06-13 (v0.5.0 chunked-events + accesses-completeness), 2026-06-15 (v0.6.0 library + CLI split + incremental backup + audit-as-events + browser-isomorphic core + sample webapp), and 2026-06-15 (v0.7.0 attachments / HFS / webhooks browser-isomorphic + portable `sync-state.json` for browser cross-session incremental).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/account-backup-coverage.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "audit-archival-via-custom-datastore",
   "title": "Audit archival + tiering via custom `@pryv/datastore`",
   "summary": "**Status:** architectural pattern, Pryv's answer to \"audit grows unboundedly over a 5-10 year deployment\". No Pryv-shipped pruning primitive; the answer is \"use the `@pryv/datastore` extension hook + write a custom audit storage tier\". Recorded from the gap-probing session (Q16, 2026-05-20).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/audit-archival-via-custom-datastore.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned",
   "title": "Breach notification delivery: voluntarily missing at the platform, operator-owned",
   "summary": "GDPR Art.34 requires the controller to **communicate a personal data breach to the data subject without undue delay** when the breach is likely to result in a high risk to their rights and freedoms. Equivalent obligations: HIPAA-Breach §164.404 (notification to individuals, ≤60 calendar days), PIPEDA s.10.1 (notification to affected individuals + records for 24 months), Swiss nLPD Art.24 (conditional subject notification, only when necessary for the subject's protection or upon FDPIC request), Cal Civ Code §1798.82 (California breach-notification law, separate from CCPA proper).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "client-data-conventions",
   "title": "`access.clientData` conventions: consolidated reference",
   "summary": "Pryv's `access.clientData` field accepts arbitrary operator-owned JSON. Across the gap-probing session multiple GDPR / privacy conventions have crystallised that re-use this single primitive as the durable, audit-traceable, version-chained metadata store for compliance-relevant claims attached to an access.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/client-data-conventions.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "cmc-consent-primitives",
   "title": "CMC + `consent/*` event types: what the primary consent record is",
   "summary": "Source-of-truth for matrix claims about how Pryv carries consent across accounts. Findings from reading `open-pryv.io/components/cmc/` and `data-types/src/consent.json` directly.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/cmc-consent-primitives.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "code-security-review-2026",
   "title": "Code-level security review of open-pryv.io (2026-06 to 2026-10)",
   "summary": "Source-of-truth for every matrix claim that cites the 2026 security review of the open-pryv.io source as periodic-evaluation, security-testing or vulnerability-management evidence. Everything said here about individual fixes comes from the public release notes (`open-pryv.io/CHANGELOG-v2.md`, sections `2.0.0-rc.40` to `2.0.0-rc.51`) and from the public report.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/code-security-review-2026.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "content-query-audit-semantics",
   "title": "Content-query values in the audit log",
   "summary": "Status: design-rationale note, referenced by `gdpr.Art.30`, `hipaa-security.164.312(b)`, `iso-27001.A.8.15` and the `audit` primitive entry in `docs/pryv-primitives.md`.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/content-query-audit-semantics.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "core-affinity-architecture",
   "title": "Core-affinity architecture (data plane vs PlatformDB)",
   "summary": "**Status:** architectural fact, recorded from the gap-probing session (Q11, 2026-05-20) after the implementer-perspective question on cross-core time-sync exposed a mental-model gap. This note exists so future matrix authors don't repeat the same miscalibration.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/core-affinity-architecture.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "cross-border-platformdb-implications",
   "title": "PlatformDB cross-border implications: the two-tier residency model",
   "summary": "Pryv's residency story (`context/core-affinity-architecture.md`, `context/account-backup-coverage.md`) is **two-tiered**, not single-tiered. The simplified narrative \"Pryv is core-affine\" is true for the data mass but incomplete for the identification + routing layer. This note carries the verified picture.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/cross-border-platformdb-implications.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "custom-event-type-catalogues",
   "title": "Custom event-type catalogues: the extension model",
   "summary": "**Status:** Pryv's documented extension surface for implementers needing event types beyond the upstream `pryv/data-types` catalogue. Recorded from the gap-probing session (Q14, 2026-05-20) after the implementer-perspective question on custom event-type support.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/custom-event-type-catalogues.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic",
   "title": "Data accuracy at ingest: structural vs. semantic",
   "summary": "GDPR Art.5(1)(d) requires personal data to be **accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date**, with reasonable steps to ensure inaccurate data is **erased or rectified without delay**. For a health-data platform, this is a natural regulator-priority question: \"how does the platform prevent garbage data from polluting the record?\"",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "data-masking-projection-vs-transformation",
   "title": "Data masking: projection vs transformation (Pryv's deliberate scope)",
   "summary": "**Status:** Pryv's design boundary. Recorded from the implementer-perspective gap-probing session (Q9, 2026-05-20).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/data-masking-projection-vs-transformation.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "data-retention-operator-owned",
   "title": "Data retention: voluntarily missing at the platform, operator-owned",
   "summary": "> **Account-level auto-deletion shipped in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66 > (2026-10-30):** an account is deleted at a date its holder picks, > or after a period without use, with reminders. It changes the > account level of this note only; the event and stream levels stay > operator-owned. See \"Account-level auto-deletion\" below, the > operator page `customer-resources/account-auto-deletion` and > `proposals/account-auto-deletion.md`. Transfer to a beneficiary > is implemented and merged, not released yet (last section).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/data-retention-operator-owned.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "delegation-model",
   "title": "Account delegation: owner-equivalent control with an authoritative, genuine-login-gated teardown",
   "summary": "Pryv lets one account be controlled by one or more **delegate accounts**. A delegate holds an **owner-equivalent personal token** over the controlled account — it can do everything the account owner can do through the standard API — with a single, deliberate exception: **a delegate can never remove a delegation**, not its own and not a co-delegate's. Removing a delegation (detach) requires a **genuine interactive login on the controlled account itself**. This note describes the model the matrix rows cite; the implementation is the `delegation` plugin at `open-pryv.io/components/delegation/` (shipped on the account-delegation feature line; skeleton `46ae0c23`, handshake `1a797815`, delegate token + audit/accessInfo `6f220187`, authoritative detach `6c618f24`, create-from- delegate `42c4b7d8`, internal-read hardening + same-core audit parity `e75f2155`, wildcard-read exclusion `00edf2a1`).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/delegation-model.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "event-history",
   "title": "Event history is opt-in; what the audit log records without it",
   "summary": "Source-of-truth for every matrix claim about the prior values of an event (rectification trails, amendment trails, document-control history, \"compare against the history\"). Findings from reading open-pryv.io master after 2.0.0-rc.38 directly: `config/default-config.yml`, `storages/engines/postgresql/src/dataStore/localUserEventsPG.ts`, `storages/engines/sqlite/src/dataStore/localUserEventsSQLite.ts`, `storages/shared/DeletionModesFields.ts`, `components/api-server/src/methods/events.ts`, `components/audit/src/Audit.ts`.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/event-history.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "operator-backup-coverage",
   "title": "Operator backup vs subject DSAR backup: symmetry audit",
   "summary": "**Status:** implementer reference + audit of the two backup paths Pryv ships, the operator-side `bin/backup.js` (server-side, raw-row disaster-recovery snapshot) and the subject-facing `@pryv/account-backup` (public-API DSAR / portability tool, currently v0.5.0). Companion to `account-backup-coverage.md`, which covers the subject side per-data-type. Last updated 2026-06-13 against `@pryv/account-backup` v0.5.0; operator-side series coverage re-checked against open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 (2026-10-03); operator incremental backups re-checked against open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51 (2026-10-14); operator backup integrity and authenticity re-checked against open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86 (2026-11-17).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/operator-backup-coverage.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "per-engine-isolation",
   "title": "Per-engine user-data isolation semantics",
   "summary": "Several matrix rows describe Pryv's \"per-user storage isolation\" as the substrate for compliance obligations like GDPR Art. 25 (data-protection by design), GDPR Art. 32 (security of processing), ISO 27001 A.5.34, HIPAA-Security §164.312(a)(1), PIPEDA Principle 4.7 safeguards, etc.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/per-engine-isolation.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "privacy-by-design-and-default",
   "title": "Privacy by design + by default: the Pryv-architectural reference",
   "summary": "GDPR Art.25 (and Swiss FADP Art.7, same principle, broader Swiss catalogue) requires controllers to **integrate data-protection principles by design** at architecture time and to **enforce them by default at runtime**. Auditors love this article because it's both meta (gives them a reason to question any architectural choice) AND concrete (the §2 \"by default\" test has teeth).",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/privacy-by-design-and-default.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "rate-limiting-and-dos-protection",
   "title": "Rate limiting / API throttling / DoS protection",
   "summary": "**Traffic shaping stays at the edge; Pryv enforces targeted in-code budgets.** General rate limiting and DoS protection (volumetric traffic, per-token request rates, WAF rules, DDoS scrubbing) are handled at the reverse-proxy / WAF / API-gateway layer, not inside open-pryv.io. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47 (updated 2026-10-13), Pryv does enforce **targeted budgets on the abuse paths it can count correctly**: failed passwords per account and per client address (counted across all cores), pending access requests per address, pending MFA sessions per account, batch, paging, upload and socket.io message sizes; 2.0.0-rc.50 added an invitation-check budget, a `webhooks.test` interval, a preview pixel cap and render concurrency, an SMS cost cap per core and a restart backoff for crashing workers; 2.0.0-rc.87 bounds password checks per API worker and, on PostgreSQL, the database time of an API request; the release after it caps the calls running at once per account, per access and per socket.io connection, socket.io connections per access and per account, the nesting and size of call parameters, the depth and size of an account's stream tree, the stream ids of one event, idle connections, streamed audit reads per access and the mail a caller can make a core send. The rc.47 and rc.50 budgets came out of the 2026 code-level security review (`code-security-review-2026.md`). Before 2.0.0-rc.47 the only in-process throttle was the per-account MFA backoff (2.0.0-rc.27). See \"What is in Pryv-side scope today\" below; the edge recipes remain the recommended front.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/rate-limiting-and-dos-protection.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "service-info-conventions",
   "title": "`serviceInfo` conventions: operator metadata propagation to client apps",
   "summary": "`GET /service/info` is the platform's **operator-controlled metadata surface** for client apps + SDKs + the auth UI. The fields are declared by the operator in their core config and served unchanged to any caller; the values propagate to every `app-web-auth3` consent screen, every SDK that fetches service info, every audit log entry that cites the URL.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/service-info-conventions.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "special-categories-operator-facilitated",
   "title": "Special-category data: voluntarily missing at platform layer, highly facilitated for vertically-integrated operators",
   "summary": "GDPR Art.9 (and Swiss nLPD Art.5's broader \"sensitive personal data\" definition, and HIPAA's \"PHI\" notion) requires enhanced protection for health data, biometric data for ID, genetic data, etc. A natural regulator question for a Pryv-based health deployment: \"how does the platform enforce Art.9 protection?\"",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/special-categories-operator-facilitated.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "subprocessor-posture-and-data-flow",
   "title": "Subprocessor posture + data-flow guarantees",
   "summary": "For an operator running Pryv as a processor (or as a controller's own software, where \"subprocessor\" still applies to the third parties their deployment talks to), the Art.28 / Art.30(1)(f) question is: **which external services does my Pryv deployment touch, and what data flows to each?**",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/subprocessor-posture-and-data-flow.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "transfer-basis-convention",
   "title": "`access.clientData.transfer_basis`: convention for GDPR Art.46 / cross-border transfer recording",
   "summary": "GDPR Art.46 requires \"appropriate safeguards\" for transfers outside the EEA absent an adequacy decision (Art.45). The §2 catalogue, SCCs, BCRs, approved codes / certifications, ad-hoc supervisory- authority-approved clauses, defines six mechanisms. Implementers must record which mechanism applies to each cross-border flow they operate.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/transfer-basis-convention.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "webhooks-signal-only",
   "title": "Webhooks: signal-only by design",
   "summary": "A note on Pryv's webhook semantics, recorded during the implementer-perspective gap-probing session (Q7, 2026-05-19) because the design choice is non-obvious + has substantive security implications worth surfacing.",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/webhooks-signal-only.md"
  },
  {
   "id": "workforce-access-patterns",
   "title": "Workforce access patterns: group access + sub-access derivation",
   "summary": "Several matrix rows describe Pryv's access-control surface as \"per-stream permissions; access is the unit of authorization\":",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/context/workforce-access-patterns.md"
  }
 ],
 "scopes": [
  {
   "id": "ccpa",
   "title": "California Consumer Privacy Act (as amended by CPRA)",
   "short": "CCPA / CPRA",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "US, California (extraterritorial via business-nexus thresholds)",
   "version": "Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100 - 1798.199.100 (CPRA amendments operative)",
   "version_date": "2023-01-01",
   "canonical_url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?division=3.&part=4.&lawCode=CIV&title=1.81.5",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/ccpa",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/ccpa.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "1798.100",
     "title": "Right to know what personal information is collected",
     "text": "Consumer has the right to request that a business that collects\npersonal information about the consumer disclose the categories,\nsources, business / commercial purposes, and specific pieces\ncollected.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same Pryv mechanism as GDPR Art. 15: the consumer holding a\npersonal token reads events, streams, accesses, audit data via\nthe standard API. Categories + sources are encoded in the event\nclass/format (data-types) and event.clientData.source.\nBusiness / commercial purpose is encoded in\n`access.clientData.purpose` per access.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.15"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "stream",
       "event",
       "audit",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.105",
     "title": "Right to delete personal information",
     "text": "Consumer has the right to request deletion of personal information\ncollected from the consumer; with statutory exceptions (Section\n1798.105(d)).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same primitive as GDPR Art. 17: `system.users.delete` is the\nper-consumer erasure call. Backup-completeness of the deletion\ndepends on the chosen storage engine (SQLite per-user file vs\nPG row deletion), same notes as gdpr.Art.17 apply. Since\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58 the deletion also releases the\nconsumer's external ids (links to third-party record ids) at\nonce, on the home core and in the platform index `[XIDD2]`. The\n§1798.105(d) statutory exceptions (warranty, security, legal\ncompliance, etc.) are your programmatic determination; if an\nexception applies you suppress the deletion and document why.\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`, see gdpr.Art.17): the consumer can schedule the\ndeletion of their own account, at a date or after a period\nwithout use, from the reference account app, where your\n`user-account.delete` lets them delete it directly\n(`[ACST10]`; arming needs the password, `[ACST3]`); reminders\nprecede it (`[ACRM1]`) and the deletion is the same as\n`system.users.delete`, guards included (`[ADSW8]`). It has no\nhook for a §1798.105(d) exception: if one applies to a consumer\nwhose deletion is scheduled, that is still your determination,\nmade before the deadline (for example by turning the feature off\non the core with `account.autoDeletion.enabled: false`, or by\nyour own process outside it).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "USAD",
       "XIDD2",
       "ACST3",
       "ACST10",
       "ADSW8",
       "ACRM1"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine",
       "user-account.delete",
       "account.autoDeletion.enabled"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.17"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "external-id-index",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.106",
     "title": "Right to correct inaccurate personal information",
     "text": "Consumer has the right to request that a business correct\ninaccurate personal information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`events.update` is the correction primitive, and the audit log\nrecords who corrected which event and when. The prior\n(inaccurate) value is kept for traceability only if your\ndeployment sets `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by\ndefault; see `context/event-history.md`). The §1798.106 process\n(consumer request → reasonable efforts → action) is yours to run;\nthe technical correction is shipped, and keeping the history is\nyour configuration choice.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "PTU1"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.16"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.110",
     "title": "Right to know, categories and specific pieces",
     "text": "Consumer has the right to request specific categories of personal\ninformation and the specific pieces of personal information the\nbusiness has collected about the consumer.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Categories surface from the canonical event-type schemas\n(`event.type` = `<class>/<format>`); specific pieces are the\nevents themselves. A consumer-portal app wrapping\n`events.get`+`streams.get` delivers both in one response.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.15"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "data-types",
       "account-backup-tool"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.115",
     "title": "Right to know about sale or sharing",
     "text": "Consumer has the right to know whether personal information was\nsold or shared, the categories sold or shared, and the categories\nof third parties to whom it was sold or shared.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Every \"sale\" or \"sharing\"\nyou do, in CCPA's broad sense, which includes cross-context\nbehavioural advertising, happens through a Pryv access granted\nto the recipient. The access's `clientData` can carry the\n§1798.115 classification (sale vs share, category of third\nparty); audit records anchor the transaction in time. What's\nnot the software's job: deciding when a use qualifies as \"sale\"\nor \"sharing\" under the CCPA definition (Civ. Code §1798.140(ad)\n+(ah)), that's a contractual / classification decision you\nrecord on the access.\n",
     "detail": "Pattern: when minting an access for a counterparty:\n`access.clientData = {`\n`  type: \"share\",          // or \"sale\", per §1798.140`\n`  third_party_category: \"ad_partner\",`\n`  contract_id: \"...\"`\n`}`\nThe consumer-side §1798.115 response then queries\n`accesses.get ?includeHistory=true` filtered on\n`clientData.type ∈ {sale, share}` and surfaces the third-party\ncategories.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.120",
     "title": "Right to opt out of sale or sharing",
     "text": "Consumer has the right, at any time, to direct a business that\nsells or shares personal information about the consumer to third\nparties not to do so.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Opt-out is implemented by revoking or narrowing the access\npowering the sale/share, `accesses.delete` for full opt-out,\n`accesses.update` for narrowing, both versioned and audit-\nanchored. A `consent/opt-out-sale-cmc` event (or custom\n`optout/*` event) gives the consumer-side artefact alongside\nthe technical effect.\n",
     "detail": "Honoring Global Privacy Control signals (which CPPA regulations\nrequire treating as a §1798.120 opt-out request) is your\napplication-layer responsibility, detect the GPC header on the\nconsumer's browser session and trigger the access revoke flow\nautomatically. Pryv has no opinion on the signal source.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "access.permissions"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.21"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.121",
     "title": "Right to limit use of sensitive personal information",
     "text": "Consumer has the right to direct a business that collects\nsensitive personal information to limit its use to what is\nnecessary to perform the services or provide the goods\nreasonably expected (with statutory exceptions in CPPA\nregulations).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The limit-use directive is operationalized by narrowing the\nrelevant accesses' `permissions[]` to the minimum-necessary\nstreams. The \"reasonably expected use\" classification is your\nprogrammatic decision; the technical control is the access\nmutation. Sensitive personal information (per §1798.140(ae))\ncan be segregated onto designated streams up front so the\nnarrowing operation is a known-shape transformation.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "access.permissions"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.18"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.125",
     "title": "Non-discrimination",
     "text": "Business shall not discriminate against a consumer because the\nconsumer exercised any rights under CCPA.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Non-discrimination is a business-policy commitment, pricing,\nservice levels, marketing eligibility, not a software control.\nPryv has no role in pricing or product gating; if your app\nenforces tier-based feature access, the non-discrimination\nanalysis happens at your app's pricing-policy layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.130",
     "title": "Notice and response procedures",
     "text": "Business must provide notice of categories of PI collected,\npurposes, sources; respond to verifiable consumer requests within\n45 days (one extension permitted, 90 day total max).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Notice text lives on\n`access.clientData.privacy_notice` or on a dedicated\n`consent/notice` event, preserved per consumer per time,\nrecoverable later. The 45-day response window is your\noperational target. Pryv's read APIs respond in milliseconds,\nso the rate-limit on the response is your fulfilment workflow,\nnot a software latency.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.12"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "app-web-auth3",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.135",
     "title": "Methods for opt-out",
     "text": "Business must provide a clear \"Do Not Sell or Share My Personal\nInformation\" link / mechanism; CPRA additionally requires\nhonoring opt-out preference signals (Global Privacy Control).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "The opt-out UI surface is\nyour app, a CCPA-required link or an automated GPC-signal\nhandler. When the opt-out is exercised, the Pryv mechanism is\nthe access revoke / narrow flow from §1798.120. Implementer's\njob: detect the opt-out, call the Pryv revoke flow, surface\nconfirmation.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.140",
     "title": "Definitions",
     "text": "Defines key terms including \"personal information\", \"sensitive\npersonal information\", \"sale\", \"sharing\", \"service provider\",\n\"third party\".\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Pryv primitives map\ncleanly to most CCPA-defined terms (event = personal-information\nstorage; access + permissions = the consent / authorization\nlayer; CMC = sharing across distinct operators). The\n§1798.140(ae) sensitive-personal-information category drives\nstream layout (segregate sensitive categories onto designated\nsubtrees for clean §1798.121 limit-use operation).\n",
     "detail": "Service-provider vs third-party (§1798.140(ag) vs (ai))\nclassification is contractual, record it on the access's\n`clientData.role` so the consumer-side §1798.115 response\nsurfaces the right category.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.150",
     "title": "Civil action for breach",
     "text": "Consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information\nis subject to an unauthorized access, exfiltration, theft, or\ndisclosure as a result of failure to maintain reasonable security\nmay bring a civil action for statutory damages ($100-$750 per\nconsumer per incident or actual damages).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Two contributions:\n(1) TLS-in-transit + operator-side at-rest encryption move ePHI\n/ personal-information out of the \"nonencrypted and nonredacted\"\ntrigger zone for §1798.150; (2) audit + access-version data are\nthe technical evidence layer when defending a \"reasonable\nsecurity\" claim. The \"reasonable security\" determination remains\na fact-specific legal question; Pryv provides the substrate.\n",
     "detail": "The §1798.150 trigger is narrow, encrypted-and-redacted PI\nthat leaks doesn't ground a statutory-damages claim. Pryv's\nposture (TLS in the core or at your proxy, as you configure it\n+ operator-side at-rest encryption + per-\naccess access-control + audit) substantially constrains the\nsurface where §1798.150 can attach. Encryption-at-rest is\noperator-side (LUKS, PG TDE, etc.) for event content today;\nPryv-managed at-rest encryption covers platform secrets.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "End-to-end encryption narrows the §1798.150 nonencrypted-PI trigger zone further",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=180707914&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C34"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.81.5",
     "title": "Reasonable security procedures (Cal. Civ. Code §1798.81.5)",
     "text": "Business that owns, licenses, or maintains personal information\nabout a California resident shall implement and maintain\nreasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the\nnature of the information, to protect the information from\nunauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or\ndisclosure.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Statute predates CCPA\nbut provides the \"reasonable security\" basis the §1798.150 civil\naction attaches to. Pryv's multi-aspect technical baseline (TLS,\nmTLS, at-rest secrets, audit, MFA, backup-restore, permissions)\nconstitutes the software-layer \"reasonable security\" inventory.\nThe organizational-side reasonable-security programme is the\noperator's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "ccpa.1798.150",
       "gdpr.Art.32"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "MFA",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.130(a)(5)",
     "title": "Notice, content elements",
     "text": "Privacy-policy notice must include categories of PI collected,\ncategories of sources, business / commercial purposes, categories\nof third parties with whom PI is shared, sale / sharing\npractices, and consumer rights.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Notice content is editorial.\nPryv preserves the notice text per individual consumer (on\n`account.clientData.privacy_notice` or a dedicated event), so\nthe precise wording shown at the moment a particular consumer\nfirst interacted is recoverable later. Drafting the wording\nremains the implementer's editorial work.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "ccpa.1798.130"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.135(a)",
     "title": "Methods for opt-out, Do Not Sell / Share + Limit Use links",
     "text": "Business that sells or shares PI shall provide a clear and\nconspicuous link titled \"Do Not Sell or Share My Personal\nInformation\" on its homepage. Business that uses sensitive PI for\npurposes beyond those listed in §1798.121(a) shall provide an\nadditional link titled \"Limit the Use of My Sensitive Personal\nInformation\".\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The UI link is part of the implementer's homepage; Pryv is the\nbackend the link's handler talks to (revoke / narrow the\nrelevant access). Surface itself is app-layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "ccpa.1798.135",
       "ccpa.1798.120"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.140(ad)",
     "title": "Definition, \"Sale\"",
     "text": "\"Sale\" / \"Sell\" includes selling, renting, releasing, disclosing,\ndisseminating, making available, transferring, or otherwise\ncommunicating orally, in writing, or by electronic / other\nmeans, a consumer's personal information by the business to\nanother business or a third party for monetary or other valuable\nconsideration.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Whether a given access\nconstitutes a \"sale\" under §1798.140(ad) is a classification the\nimplementer applies + records on the access's\n`clientData.type = \"sale\"`. The consideration test (monetary or\nvaluable) is fact-specific and editorial; Pryv preserves\nwhatever classification you record.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "ccpa.1798.140"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.140(ae)",
     "title": "Definition, \"Sensitive personal information\"",
     "text": "Enumerated categories: SSN, drivers license, account log-in\nwith password, precise geolocation, racial / ethnic origin,\nreligious / philosophical beliefs, union membership, contents\nof mail / email / text messages not directed at the business,\ngenetic data, biometric identifier, health, sex life or\nsexual orientation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Sensitive-PI enumeration\ndrives stream-layout design, dedicate subtrees per sensitive\ncategory (`sensitive/health/`, `sensitive/precise-location/`,\netc.) for clean §1798.121 limit-use enforcement. The\nclassification of whether a specific event qualifies as\nsensitive PI is editorial. An alias-only deployment pattern is now\navailable: issue accesses with `randomAlias:true` so counterparties\nhold a routable `r-XXXXXXXX` alias instead of a linkable username,\nkeeping linkable identifiers off the sensitive-PI access path.\nSince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.69 the token is accepted under its\nalias only, so a counterparty that suspects the username cannot\nconfirm it with the token; earlier releases accepted the token\nunder every name of the account.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "ccpa.1798.121",
       "gdpr.Art.9"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "event",
       "randomAlias"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "1798.155",
     "title": "Enforcement",
     "text": "California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) + California Attorney\nGeneral may bring civil actions for CCPA violations; statutory\npenalties up to $2,500 per violation ($7,500 for intentional\nviolations + violations involving minors).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Enforcement is regulator-side. No software role; Pryv's audit\nlog + access-version chain are the evidence pack the implementer\nsurfaces in response to inquiries.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "data-governance",
   "title": "Data Governance (DAMA-DMBOK knowledge areas)",
   "short": "Data Governance",
   "type": "discipline",
   "jurisdiction": "International (framework)",
   "version": "DAMA-DMBOK 2 (framing) + ISO/IEC 38505-1",
   "version_date": "2017-07-01",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.dama.org/cpages/body-of-knowledge",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/data-governance",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/data-governance.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "DG-01",
     "title": "Data Governance (framework / accountability)",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv gives you the governance substrate, every datum is owned by a\nuser (per-user storage isolation), every privileged action is auditable,\nand cross-organization sharing is consent-managed (CMC). What Pryv does\nNOT give you is the governance *program*: the policies, stewardship\nroles, decision rights and oversight cadence. Those are organizational,\nstart from the QMS templates and the ISO/IEC 38505 Evaluate-Direct-\nMonitor model.\n",
     "detail": "ISO/IEC 38505-1 frames governance as accountability for the value, risk\nand constraints of data. Pryv's primitives map to the \"constraints\"\npillar (ownership, access, audit); value and risk decisions remain the\ngoverning body's. The matrix itself is a governance artefact, it makes\n\"which control covers which obligation\" mechanical.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/01-policies/quality-policy.md",
       "qms/pryv/01-policies/information-security-policy.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "CMC",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-04",
     "title": "Data Storage & Operations",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv stores each user's data in isolation, lets you choose the storage\nengine (PostgreSQL or SQLite) and keep data in-region per core\n(residency), and ships backup/restore primitives. Capacity planning,\nSLAs, monitoring and the operational runbook are yours (see the QMS\nbackup-and-recovery + change procedures).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-05",
     "title": "Data Security",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "This is Pryv's strongest data-governance contribution: scoped accesses,\nper-stream permissions, privileged-data separation via system streams,\nand an audit trail are the enforcement primitives. You still own the\nclassification-to-control policy (which streams are sensitive, who may\nhold which access), Pryv enforces the decisions you encode.\n",
     "detail": "Cross-references the regulation scopes: the same primitives back\ngdpr.Art.32, iso-27001 Annex A.5/A.8 access-control rows, and\nhipaa-security technical safeguards. Use those rows for the\nrequirement-level evidence.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/01-policies/information-security-policy.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-06",
     "title": "Data Integration & Interoperability",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv moves data between parties through consented channels, CMC for\ncontroller-to-controller sharing with a consent record, webhooks for\nevent propagation, and a shared event-type catalogue (data-types) for\nsemantic interoperability. Pipeline orchestration, transformation\ngovernance and data-contract management remain yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "CMC",
       "webhooks",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-10",
     "title": "Metadata Management",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Streams classify data into a navigable hierarchy, clientData carries\nbusiness metadata alongside each access/event, and the data-types\ncatalogue is a schema registry for event formats. The metadata\n*management process* (curation, ownership, glossary upkeep) is yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "clientData",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-02",
     "title": "Data Architecture",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Enterprise data architecture (target-state models, data-flow design\nacross systems) is the operator's. Pryv is one component within it; its\nper-core residency topology is described under DG-04, not here.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-03",
     "title": "Data Modeling & Design",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Logical/physical data modelling is an operator design activity. Pryv's\nevent/stream model is fixed substrate, not a modelling tool.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-07",
     "title": "Document & Content Management",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv stores events and attachments, not a document-management system\n(records lifecycle, content workflow, e-discovery). Out of software\nscope here.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-08",
     "title": "Reference & Master Data Management",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "MDM (golden records, match/merge, reference-data distribution) is an\noperator capability layered above Pryv, not provided by it.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-09",
     "title": "Data Warehousing & Business Intelligence",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Analytics warehousing and BI are downstream of Pryv; the operator\nbuilds them from exported/streamed data.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "DG-11",
     "title": "Data Quality",
     "text": null,
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Typed events (data-types) give light structural validation, but a data-\nquality program (profiling, rules, remediation, scorecards) is the\noperator's. Recorded as out-of-scope rather than overclaiming.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "diga",
   "title": "Digital Healthcare Act (DVG) + DiGA Ordinance (DiGAV)",
   "short": "DiGA",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "Germany",
   "version": "DiGAV (Digitale-Gesundheitsanwendungen-Verordnung), current consolidated text",
   "version_date": "2020-04-21",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/digav/index.html",
   "layered_on": [
    "gdpr",
    "mdr"
   ],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/diga",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/diga.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "4",
     "title": "§ 4 Data protection and information security",
     "text": "The digital health application must demonstrate compliance with\nrequirements on data protection (per GDPR + Bundesdatenschutzgesetz)\nand information security (per current state of the art, including\nBSI guidelines).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "The data-protection\nhalf of § 4 derives directly from the GDPR coverage already\nauthored (see GDPR Art. 5, Art. 25 by-design, Art. 32 security\nof processing). The information-security half aligns with the\nBSI TR-03161 + BSI C5 baseline; Pryv's primitives (TLS-default\n+ AES-256-GCM secrets at rest + audit by default + multi-core\nmTLS + MFA + data-residency) carry most of the manufacturer's\n\"state of the art\" claim without additional software work.\n",
     "detail": "For BfArM review, expect to provide:\n  - Data-protection concept (Datenschutzkonzept), reuse the\n    GDPR rows from this matrix as evidence per concept item.\n  - Information-security concept (BSI TR-03161-aligned),\n    Pryv's Annex 1 row mappings (below) feed this.\n  - Penetration test certificate within 1 year of submission\n    for the backend (Pryv) + app sides. Required at listing.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "gdpr.Art.25",
       "gdpr.Art.32"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "MFA",
       "data-residency",
       "system-streams",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "5",
     "title": "§ 5 Interoperability",
     "text": "The digital health application must support interoperable data\nexchange with other systems, in particular electronic patient\nrecords (ePA / TI), based on the semantic and technical standards\nnamed in the BfArM interoperability annex.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's data-types\nschemas (canonical `class/format` JSON Schema) give you a\nstable in-platform data model that you can map to FHIR R4 (the\nstandard BfArM expects). The FHIR-mapping layer is app-side or\nimplemented as a Pryv data-type extension, not shipped today.\nSee `proposals/fhir-data-type-mapping.md` if filed, or treat as\na per-app integration concern.\n",
     "detail": "BfArM lists specific HL7 FHIR profiles (KBV / gematik) the device\nmust consume / produce for ePA interoperability. Pryv's event +\nstream model is structurally adequate (events carry typed\ncontent; streams provide hierarchical categorization) but the\nmapping is an app-layer transformation today.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "data-types",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "6",
     "title": "§ 6 Robustness",
     "text": "The digital health application must be robust against failure,\ninterruption and manipulation, with appropriate processes to\naddress security incidents.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes the\noperational baseline: multi-core HA with Raft replication;\ncluster-CA mTLS between cores; encrypted bootstrap bundles;\ndaily-renewed TLS certs; backup + restore; audit-log for\nforensic review. The manufacturer's incident-response procedure\n(detection, escalation, communication) sits on top of this and\nis the regulatory artefact BfArM reviews.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-restore",
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "7",
     "title": "§ 7 Consumer protection",
     "text": "Information must be provided to users in a manner that is\ncomprehensible to laypersons; pricing, intended use, contra-\nindications, supported devices + operating systems, data\ncategories collected, and other minimum elements must be\ndisclosed in advance.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Same artefact set as GDPR\nArt. 13 (notice at collection): Pryv stores the text shown to\nthe user, durably, versioned, per subject, typically on\n`access.clientData.privacy_notice` or in a `consent/notice`\nevent. Drafting the actual text in \"lay-comprehensible\"\nlanguage is the manufacturer's editorial work, not Pryv's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.13"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "app-web-auth3",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "8",
     "title": "§ 8 Patient safety",
     "text": "The digital health application must, in its intended use, not\npose unacceptable risks to patient safety. Medical-device\nclassification + conformity assessment per MDR remain the\nmanufacturer's process.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Patient-safety classification is the manufacturer's regulatory\ntask per MDR; Pryv has no software role at this layer.\nDerives_from points at the MDR Art. 51 (classification) + Art. 52\n(conformity) rows where Pryv is similarly out-of-scope.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "mdr.Art.51",
       "mdr.Art.52"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "14",
     "title": "§ 14 Positive supply effects (Nutzennachweis)",
     "text": "The manufacturer must demonstrate positive supply effects,\nmedical benefit and/or patient-relevant structural and procedural\nimprovements, through a comparative study (typically RCT) or,\nunder specified conditions, real-world evidence.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Clinical evidence is the manufacturer's regulatory work. Pryv is\nnot in scope at the trial design / statistical analysis layer.\nFor the data-collection substrate during the study, Pryv events\n+ audit log are an option, but the regulatory burden of § 14\nsits entirely on the manufacturer's clinical team.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.1.1",
     "title": "Annex 1.1, Data protection, legal basis declared per processing",
     "text": "For each processing purpose, the manufacturer must declare the\nArt. 6 + (if applicable) Art. 9 GDPR legal basis used.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv pattern:\n`access.clientData.legal_basis` captures the Art. 6 basis per\naccess; for sensitive data,\n`clientData.special_category_basis` captures the Art. 9\nparagraph. Both travel with the access into the audit log so\nthe declaration is auditable per processing instance, not just\nper system.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.6",
       "gdpr.Art.9"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.1.7",
     "title": "Annex 1.1, Data minimisation",
     "text": "Only data necessary for the intended use shall be processed; data\nmust be deleted as soon as the purpose is fulfilled.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-stream permissions are the technical minimisation primitive:\neach access carries only the streams + levels needed; the holder\ncannot see more than granted. Deletion-when-purpose-fulfilled is\nthe manufacturer's retention policy, executed via\n`system.users.delete` (full erasure) or event/stream-level\ndeletion (partial).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2.1",
     "title": "Annex 1.2, Information security, TLS at all interfaces",
     "text": "All communication interfaces of the digital health application\nshall employ Transport Layer Security at current state of the art.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "TLS is configured, not default: the core terminates it when\n`http.ssl.*` is set (the built-in ACME integration issues, renews\nand replicates certificates across the cluster when\n`letsEncrypt.enabled` is set), otherwise it serves plain HTTP and\nyour reverse proxy terminates TLS. Inter-core Raft traffic runs\nover mTLS with a cluster-private CA once `bin/bootstrap.js` has\nwritten `storages.engines.rqlite.tls` (default plain TCP). The\ncore sets no TLS version or cipher options of its own, so\n\"current state of the art\" in the core rests on Node.js defaults\n(on the Node 24 the image runs: TLS 1.2 floor, TLS 1.3 when the\nclient supports it); if BfArM expects a TLS 1.3-only or narrower\ncipher policy, enforce it at your proxy.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ACMEORCH",
       "CERTUTILS",
       "FORCERENEWIPC"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled",
       "storages.engines.rqlite.tls"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.32"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2.7",
     "title": "Annex 1.2, Penetration test within 12 months",
     "text": "A penetration test performed by an independent third party within\n12 months before listing application is required; findings of\n\"critical\" severity must be remediated; \"high\" findings must have\na mitigation plan.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv supports the\nmanufacturer's pentest by providing a reproducible deployment\nartefact (Docker image), a structured audit log for\nverification, and documentation of the security surface. The\ntest commissioning + remediation cycle is the manufacturer's.\nFor repeat customers, Pryv-side findings already remediated\nupstream reduce repeat test scope.\n",
     "detail": "The 2026 code-level security review of open-pryv.io (fixes in\n2.0.0-rc.40 to 2.0.0-rc.51; public report `SECURITY-AUDIT.md`,\npublished 2026-10-14,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md;\n`context/code-security-review-2026.md`) does **not**\nsatisfy this requirement: it was performed by the maintainers of the\ncode, not by an independent third party, and it reviewed source code,\nnot your running application. It helps your penetration test: run a\nrelease that carries the fixes before the test, and hand the tester\nthe report and release notes so known, fixed platform findings are\nnot re-reported against your listing.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.3.1",
     "title": "Annex 1.3, Interoperability, FHIR R4 export of treatment-relevant data",
     "text": "The digital health application must export treatment-relevant\ndata using HL7 FHIR R4 profiles approved in the BfArM\ninteroperability annex.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Same status as § 5:\nPryv's event model is structurally adequate; the FHIR-mapping\ntransformation is app-side today. A\n\"compliance-matrix/proposals/fhir-data-type-mapping.md\" entry\ntracks the potential Pryv-side mapping primitive for cleaner\ndownstream coverage.\n",
     "detail": "The implementer's natural extension path is a **FHIR-flavoured\ncustom event-type catalogue**, a sibling data-model repo\nthat defines Pryv event types mapping 1-to-1 (or 1-to-many)\nto BfArM-approved FHIR resources, published via the standard\n`service.eventTypes` extension model (see\n`context/custom-event-type-catalogues.md`). The mapping\ntransformation (Pryv event ↔ FHIR Bundle) still runs\napp-side, but the schemas being mapped are first-class\nPryv types validated by the same z-schema pipeline as the\nlegacy catalogue.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "diga.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "data-types",
       "stream"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "custom-event-type-catalogues"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.6.1",
     "title": "Annex 1.6, Patient safety, usability tested with target group",
     "text": "Usability of the digital health application shall be tested\nagainst the intended user group prior to listing application;\nresults documented.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Usability testing is the manufacturer's process (UX research +\nprotocols + documentation). Pryv has no software role at the\nusability layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.1.5",
     "title": "Annex 1.1, Data subject rights at the BfArM-specified level",
     "text": "Mechanisms must be provided to allow data subjects to exercise\ntheir rights under GDPR Art. 15-22 directly within the digital\nhealth application or via a clearly named contact.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The personal-token Pryv API gives the data subject direct access\nto events, streams, accesses, audit data. Implementer wraps it\nin a UI section (\"Your data + your rights\") inside the DiGA app;\nno separate portal needed. Each GDPR Art. 15-22 right has a\nsingle API call behind it.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV",
       "PTU1",
       "USAD"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.15",
       "gdpr.Art.16",
       "gdpr.Art.17",
       "gdpr.Art.20"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2.4",
     "title": "Annex 1.2, Authentication of users and devices",
     "text": "Strong authentication of users (and where applicable devices)\nmust be implemented; passwords alone are not sufficient when\nsensitive health data is processed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "MFA via the `mfa.*` API methods (live by default since\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.14 with authenticator-app TOTP,\n`services.mfa.active`; the legacy `services.mfa.mode` is still\nhonoured); failed second factors hit a per-account backoff, not a\nlockout, since 2.0.0-rc.27 (see HIPAA §164.312(d));\npersonal-token + access-token model gives separation of user\nidentity from app identity. The BfArM \"strong authentication\nwhere sensitive health data is processed\" bar maps to MFA on by\ndefault for DiGA-listed apps.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "MA15A",
       "MA15C",
       "MA10A",
       "MA11A",
       "MA3A",
       "MA12A"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "services.mfa.mode"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.312(d)",
       "iso-27001.A.8.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "MFA",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "enhancement",
       "summary": "Reference WebAuthn plugin meets the BfArM 'strong authentication for sensitive health data' bar without SMS-OTP weakness",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467852&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C78"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2.10",
     "title": "Annex 1.2, Logging of security-relevant events",
     "text": "Security-relevant events must be logged with sufficient detail\nto support incident investigation and audit; logs must be\nprotected against tampering.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-user audit log records every API method invocation; storage\nis SQLite directly (decoupled from data-path engine) so log\nintegrity is independent of primary engine state. The\naudit-event-stream optional channel additionally emits audit\nrecords into the subject's own streams when surface-side\nvisibility is required.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT02",
       "AT51",
       "AT61",
       "AT65"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.15",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(b)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.3.6",
     "title": "Annex 1.3, Use of established healthcare data standards",
     "text": "Where established standards exist for the data domain (FHIR R4,\nLOINC, SNOMED CT, ICD-10, etc.), the application shall use them\nto encode treatment-relevant data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv stores whatever event\ncontent the application writes. For LOINC / SNOMED / ICD-10\ncodings, the implementer encodes the code system + value as\nevent content fields (typically `event.content.code` +\n`event.content.codeSystem`) per the `data-types` schema chosen.\nThe semantic-standard choice is app-side; Pryv preserves it.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "data-types",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.4.3",
     "title": "Annex 1.4, Availability and continuity",
     "text": "The digital health application must be designed to be available\nto users during its specified use periods, with documented\nprocedures for handling unavailability.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv-side availability:\nmulti-core HA (cluster topology + Raft replication); TLS\nauto-renewal preventing cert-expiry outages; backup-restore for\ncatastrophic recovery; observability gives uptime metrics. The\napplication-layer continuity procedures (offline mode,\ndegraded-service messaging, support channels) are\nmanufacturer-side.\n",
     "detail": "Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47 and 2.0.0-rc.50 the core also\nbounds what one client can consume (batch, paging, upload,\nsocket.io and preview limits; per-address budgets on the\nunauthenticated entry points) and replaces a crashing worker after\na growing delay instead of in a tight loop, so a single misbehaving\nclient is less likely to make the service unavailable for others.\nSince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87, a flood\nof password checks no longer stalls a worker's other requests\n(a bounded number run at a time, the rest refused with\n`Retry-After`), and on PostgreSQL a runaway database statement of an\nAPI request is stopped after a time limit instead of holding its\nconnection for as long as it takes. From the release after\n2.0.0-rc.87, one account, one access or one socket.io connection\ncan hold only a bounded number of calls and connections at once on\na worker (the extra ones answer `429 too-many-requests`), and\noverly nested or oversized call parameters are refused up front.\nThe same release bounds the depth and size of an account's stream\ntree and the stream ids of one event, closes a connection a client\nstopped reading after an idle timeout, and caps the mail a caller\ncan make a core send (registration codes per client address,\nverification mails per account, an hourly breaker per core that\nkeeps password resets apart from registration codes).\nSee `context/rate-limiting-and-dos-protection.md` and iso-27001\nA.8.6. An edge layer in front of the cores remains your part.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/rate-limiting.md"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.23",
       "mdr.A1.17"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "backup-restore",
       "observability-provider"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "rate-limiting-and-dos-protection"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.5.1",
     "title": "Annex 1.5, Consumer protection, clear pricing + contractual conditions",
     "text": "The implementer shall provide users with clear information on\npricing model + contractual conditions (subscription duration,\ncancellation terms, renewal mechanics) in advance.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pricing + contract terms are editorial / commercial. No software\nrole; Pryv stores whatever notice text you present (per A1.1\ndata-protection notices pattern) but doesn't generate it.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.5.4",
     "title": "Annex 1.5, Consumer protection, barrier-free access (accessibility)",
     "text": "The digital health application shall meet relevant accessibility\nrequirements (WCAG 2.1 AA equivalent or higher, per BfArM\ninterpretation), supporting users with disabilities.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Accessibility is an app-layer UX concern. Pryv is a backend; the\napp's HTML / WAI-ARIA / contrast / keyboard-navigation posture\nis the manufacturer's frontend implementation.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.5.7",
     "title": "Annex 1.5, Consumer protection, clear language + age-appropriate UI",
     "text": "User-facing text shall be in clear, plain language; for\napplications targeting children or adolescents, the UI shall be\nage-appropriate.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Plain-language text + age-\nappropriate UI are app-layer responsibilities. Pryv contributes\nthe artefact storage: when different content variants are\nserved to different age cohorts,\n`access.clientData.target_audience` records the variant served,\nand `account.clientData.age_verification_method` (per GDPR\nArt.8) ties the variant to the verified age. Composition of\nthe text is editorial.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.8"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.6.5",
     "title": "Annex 1.6, Patient safety, alarm / escalation logic when applicable",
     "text": "Where the digital health application generates alarms or\nescalation messages (urgent clinical signal, abnormal value\ncrossing a threshold), the logic shall be documented + validated;\nescalation paths shall be tested + reliable.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Clinical-alarm logic is the manufacturer's software responsibility\n(and falls under MDR Art.61 clinical evaluation + Annex I §17.4\nverification). Pryv stores the alarm events; the logic that\nproduces them is app-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2.2",
     "title": "Annex 1.2, Documentation of architecture + components",
     "text": "Manufacturer shall document the application's architecture\nincluding all components, their role + interactions, and the\nsecurity boundary of each.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Pryv's architecture is\npublicly documented (open-pryv.io README, AGENTS.md,\ncomponent-level READMEs), the BfArM-required architecture\ndocument references Pryv as a sub-system. The app-layer\narchitecture (services, libraries, network topology) is the\nmanufacturer's documentation.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.27"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2.3",
     "title": "Annex 1.2, Hardening + secure configuration",
     "text": "The technical platform shall be hardened per current best\npractices; configuration shall minimize attack surface\n(disabled services, restricted ports, least-privilege defaults).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv ships secure-by-\ndefault (TLS on, mTLS between cores, no anonymous access path,\nsystem-streams isolating privileged data, at-rest secret\nencryption). Operator-side hardening (host OS, firewall,\nOS-level least-privilege) layers on top per their hardening\nguide.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.9"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "system-streams",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2.6",
     "title": "Annex 1.2, Incident response capability",
     "text": "Manufacturer shall have documented incident-response procedures,\nwith detection + escalation + containment + recovery + post-\nmortem phases defined.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes detection\n(observability anomalies, audit-log patterns) + containment\n(accesses.delete revokes implicated tokens) + recovery\n(backup-restore + multi-core HA) + post-mortem (audit-log\nforensic trail). The manufacturer's IR runbook ties these\nprimitives together with people + decisions.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(6)(i)",
       "iso-27001.A.5.23"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "gdpr",
   "title": "General Data Protection Regulation",
   "short": "GDPR",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "EU + EEA (extraterritorial via Art. 3)",
   "version": "Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (consolidated)",
   "version_date": "2016-04-27",
   "canonical_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02016R0679-20160504",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/gdpr",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/gdpr.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "Art.1",
     "title": "Subject matter and objectives",
     "text": "Regulation lays down rules on the protection of natural persons with\nregard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the\nfree movement of personal data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "GDPR's purpose is to protect\nnatural persons in how their personal data is processed, while\nkeeping that data freely movable. Pryv is designed for exactly\nthat: your subjects own their data, and technical controls enforce\nthe consent they granted, and the API is open so data can move\nwithout lock-in. The per-article rows below describe how each\nobligation maps to the primitives Pryv gives you.\n",
     "detail": "Protection of natural persons (re: processing of their personal data):\n  - Subject-centric storage, each of your users has dedicated\n    storage; you host but don't commingle subjects.\n  - Technical access control, permissions per stream are enforced\n    at the API surface; processing only happens within the scope\n    the subject granted.\n  - Versioned consent record, access + clientData + consent events\n    form a tamper-evident chain of what was authorised, when, with\n    which contract text.\n  - Accountability by construction, audit rows reference the\n    specific access version used at processing time.\n\nFree movement of personal data:\n  - Open HTTP API, events / streams / accesses consumable without\n    vendor SDKs.\n  - Canonical event-type schemas, structured JSON with stable\n    class/format semantics; portable across deployments.\n  - Cross-platform sharing, independent Pryv operators can\n    exchange data + consent without shared trust, shared user\n    namespace, or federation auth.\n  - No vendor lock-in; you can move data + consent contracts\n    between operators using the same primitives an end-user would\n    use to read them.\n\nA Pryv deployment cannot, on its own, make you GDPR-compliant,\nbut it gives you the technical substrate on which the per-article\nobligations below can be discharged.\n",
     "technical": "Primitives carrying this row:\n  - `access` (versioned, immutable per version), see\n    `context/access-versioning.md`\n  - `permissions` (per-stream, per-level, enforced in\n    `open-pryv.io/components/api-server/src/methods/`)\n  - `audit` (per-API-call rows tagged with `accessId` + `accessSerial`)\n  - `data-types` (canonical class/format schemas at\n    `https://raw.github.com/pryv/data-types/master/dist/event-types.json`)\n  - `CMC` plugin (`open-pryv.io/components/cmc/`, shipped 2.0.0-pre.3)\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream",
       "audit",
       "data-types",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "access-versioning"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.2",
     "title": "Material scope",
     "text": "Applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by\nautomated means and to the processing other than by automated means\nof personal data which form part of a filing system.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Your Pryv deployment is\nfully inside Article 2's material scope. Every event you store\nand every API call your apps make is automated processing\ncovered by GDPR. Pryv does not exempt you from any per-article\nobligation; it gives you the technical primitives that make\nthose obligations addressable (see Art.5+). Branch 2 (non-\nautomated processing inside a \"filing system\", structured\npaper records) doesn't surface at the Pryv layer; your own\npaper records, if any, are outside the software boundary.\n",
     "detail": "GDPR Art.4(6) defines \"filing system\" as any structured set of\npersonal data accessible by specific criteria, alphabetised\ncustomer cards, dated patient folders, indexed application forms.\nRandom unstructured paper or spoken-only data is not in scope.\n\nPryv is fully digital, so branch 1 always applies; branch 2 is moot.\nIf you also keep paper records as part of the same business process,\nthose fall under branch 2 but as a separate process you manage\noutside Pryv.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "event",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.3",
     "title": "Territorial scope",
     "text": "Applies to processing in the context of an establishment in the\nUnion, or where processing relates to data subjects in the Union.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Whether GDPR applies\nto your Pryv deployment depends on where you're established and\nwhere your data subjects are, not on the software. Pryv is\nself-hosted, so you control data residency directly: the multi-\nhosting feature lets you choose which jurisdiction each core\nruns in, and either let end-users pick their hosting at\nregistration or auto-route them by your policy. If any of your\nsubjects are in the EU/EEA, GDPR applies to your deployment in\nfull.\n",
     "detail": "Pryv supports a single logical platform spanning multiple hostings\n(different countries / cloud regions / on-premise). Two routing\npolicies you can apply:\n\n- **End-user choice**: your registration UI presents the available\n  hostings (via `auth.hostings`); user picks. Useful for consumer\n  apps where subjects assert their own residency preference.\n- **Operator / regulatory routing**: your app auto-routes based on\n  the subject's jurisdiction or contract terms (e.g., EU subjects →\n  EU hosting; French health data → HDS-certified French hosting).\n\nThe chosen hosting binds the user's data to that core permanently.\n`system.users.get` exposes the per-user hosting so you can surface\nit in the app (\"your data is stored in <region>\").\n\nNote: even with EU-only hosting, if you have a non-EU establishment\noffering services to EU subjects, Art.3(2) still pulls you into\nGDPR.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.4",
     "title": "Definitions",
     "text": "Defines key terms: personal data, processing, controller, processor,\nconsent, profiling, pseudonymisation, etc.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Article 4 defines GDPR\nvocabulary. Pryv's primitives map cleanly to most of these\nterms, easier for you to point auditors at concrete artefacts\nrather than abstract concepts.\n",
     "detail": "Approximate mapping of key GDPR terms to Pryv primitives:\n\n| GDPR term | Pryv primitive |\n|---|---|\n| personal data | `event` content + attachments on a user's account |\n| data subject | the user (account owner) |\n| controller | typically you, the implementer |\n| processor | the Pryv operator (when distinct from you) |\n| recipient | a counterparty holding an `access` to the data |\n| third party | another deployment / app accessing via shared/app `access` |\n| consent | app/shared `access` with `permissions` + `clientData` carrying the contract (see Art.7) |\n| processing | any API call on `events.*` / `streams.*` / `accesses.*` (audit-recorded) |\n| filing system | N/A, Pryv is fully automated |\n| personal data breach | event/audit anomaly + post-mortem (see Art.33) |\n| pseudonymisation | `accesses.create {randomAlias:true}` (platform-unique routable alias hides the username per access from its holder; since 2.0.0-rc.69 the token is accepted under its alias only, so a holder who guesses the username cannot confirm it with the token, see Art.32) + external ids (a third-party record id held only as a value the caller blinds with its own key, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58) + system-streams + custom event-type design |\n| profiling | application-side concern (out for Pryv) |\n| restriction of processing | scope-down via `accesses.update` (see Art.18) |\n\nThe controller/processor distinction is contractual; you assign\nthe roles. Pryv lets you record the assignment explicitly in\n`access.clientData` if you want it traceable.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream",
       "event",
       "system-streams",
       "randomAlias",
       "external-id-index"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.5",
     "title": "Principles relating to processing of personal data",
     "text": "Lawfulness, fairness, transparency; purpose limitation; data\nminimisation; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity and\nconfidentiality (security); accountability.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Several Art.5 principles are technically enforced for you by Pryv\nrather than left to policy: purpose limitation (per-stream\npermissions), accountability (audit chain to the consent state),\naccuracy (schema validation at ingest; the prior value of a\ncorrected event is kept when you turn on event history with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`, off by default). Lawfulness,\nfairness and transparency\nstay on your shoulders; Pryv stores the notice/consent text you\npresent but doesn't generate it for you.\n",
     "detail": "Per-principle breakdown, what Pryv does for you, what you do:\n\n- Lawfulness, fairness, transparency (§1(a)), DOCUMENTED. You\n  write the notice and present it; Pryv carries the text in\n  `access.clientData` or a `consent/request-cmc` event so the\n  same text is recoverable later.\n- Purpose limitation (§1(b)), IMPLEMENTED. `permissions` per\n  stream technically restrict reads/writes to the granted scope;\n  an app cannot access streams outside its granted permissions.\n- Data minimisation (§1(c)), FACILITATED. Permissions + stream\n  design let apps see only what's in their scope; the rest is\n  invisible to them.\n- Accuracy (§1(d)), FACILITATED + IMPLEMENTER-OWNED.\n  Pryv enforces **structural** accuracy at ingest: every\n  `events.create` and `events.update` validates against the\n  declared event-type's JSON Schema (ajv-draft-04 via\n  `components/utils/src/jsonValidator.ts`), rejecting\n  out-of-shape or out-of-range payloads with HTTP 400.\n  Numerical bounds (`minimum`/`maximum`), string patterns,\n  and length limits are expressible per type, the HDS\n  data-model exemplar declares 28 `minimum`/23 `maximum`\n  constraints across health-data types. The built-in\n  catalogue uses bounds sparingly (operator opts into\n  strictness by extending via `service.eventTypes` URL,\n  Q14 pattern). **Semantic** accuracy, \"is this medication\n  right for THIS patient?\", is out of scope by design;\n  the implementer's app layer carries the clinical /\n  domain context Pryv intentionally doesn't see.\n  `events.update` rectifies events (Art.16). The prior\n  value is kept, and returned by `GET\n  /events/:id?includeHistory=true`, only on a deployment\n  with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (default\n  `false`: the update overwrites it); set it if your\n  accuracy trail must show the value before correction.\n  The audit log records who rectified which event and when\n  either way, not the prior value (see\n  `context/event-history.md`). Full split\n  in `context/data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic.md`.\n- Storage limitation (§1(e)), CONFIGURABLE for whole accounts\n  (account auto-deletion) + VOLUNTARILY MISSING and\n  OPERATOR-OWNED for event-level and stream-level retention +\n  CONFIGURABLE at the erasure-mechanics layer. Pryv exposes no\n  TTL / auto-delete / scheduler primitive for events and\n  streams (whole accounts are covered by account auto-deletion\n  since 2.0.0-rc.66, below): event-level and stream-level\n  automatic retention is the operator's external job, composing\n  `events.get toTime=<cutoff>` + `events.delete` (two-stage)\n  + `streams.delete` + `auth.delete` + the audit log as\n  inactivity oracle. Every retention deletion is captured\n  by the audit log automatically (Q9 audit-by-construction).\n  Engine-dependent backup-tail considerations apply (see\n  Art.17). Full pattern + cron-job recipe + audit-trace\n  treatment + \"why not built-in\" rationale in\n  `context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`. One narrow\n  built-in purge exists since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56: the\n  deletion records of accesses, opt-in with\n  `accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays` (default 0, kept\n  until the account is deleted).\n\n  Account auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n  (`8521c8d5`): an account is deleted at a date its holder\n  picks, or after a period without use of its personal\n  accesses (a sign-in counts, `[LGLU3]`; a delegate's own token\n  included, shared accesses never, `[ACAC1]`, `[ACAC2]`,\n  `[ACAC7]`; since 2.0.0-rc.81 app accesses count only with\n  `account.autoDeletion.inactivity.countAppUse`, default false,\n  `[ACST20]`). Two sources: the holder's own schedule (their\n  erasure request, see Art.17), or your inactivity preset\n  (`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays`, default none).\n  A preset is your storage-limitation rule: state the period and\n  what counts as use in your privacy notice (Art.13 §2(a)).\n  Reminder mails before the deletion (60, 30, 7 and 1 days by\n  default, `[ACXP3]`), no deletion less than 7 days\n  after the first notice actually sent (`[ACXP8]`); a preset\n  applies only to plain accounts with an email address on a core\n  that sends mail (`[ACST14]`, `[ADSW9]`), and its clock starts\n  the day it first applies, so turning one on never deletes\n  dormant accounts by surprise (`[ACXP2]`, `[ACXP10]`); a dry run\n  shows the numbers first (`[ADSW13]`). Inactivity needs\n  `accessTracking.isActive`: a preset without it refuses the\n  boot (`[CVAD3]`), and a holder's inactivity schedule is\n  suspended, never erased, while tracking is off (`[ACXP19]`).\n  The erasure is `auth.delete`'s, guards included (`[ADSW8]`).\n  Event-level and stream-level retention stays your retention\n  job. See `context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`,\n  \"Account-level auto-deletion\", and the operator page\n  `customer-resources/account-auto-deletion`.\n\n  Leftovers of unfinished registrations (the release after\n  open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87; merged, unreleased at this walk). A\n  registration that fails, or whose process dies midway, can\n  leave personal data that no finished account owns: account\n  fields (the email included) under an id the users index lacks,\n  an indexed account with no password, or an email still\n  reserved on the platform for a name that never got its\n  account. From that release a failed registration's\n  compensation removes its account fields on PostgreSQL too\n  (earlier, a failed first registration in a freshly started\n  worker kept them, email included, with no owner) `[URB2]`. For\n  what an earlier failure or a crash left, run\n  `bin/reconcile-user-cores.js --registrations` on each core. It\n  only reports unless given `--apply`; it clears an orphan id\n  (PostgreSQL) only when the id holds account fields alone, no\n  erasure record, and is older than `--grace` (default 24 hours)\n  `[RCRG1]`, `[RCRG2]`; it erases an indexed account with no\n  password (both engines) only when you name it with `--user-id`\n  and it still passes every check, through the account\n  deletion's erasure, recorded in the erasure ledger and\n  resumable `[RCRG3]`, `[RCRG5]`, keeping the platform rows of a\n  name another core holds now `[MCUR2]`; an empty users index\n  facing account rows is refused (exit 3) `[RCRG7]`. The default\n  username pass of the same tool now releases the email and\n  other unique values a stale name held, before its routing row\n  `[RCRG6]`, `[MCUR1]`. Run both as a dry run first: a name whose\n  account is missing for another reason (a partly lost users\n  index) loses its reserved email too. The pass's own log lines\n  carry ids and counts, never an email or field value; the\n  account erasure it runs logs the account name, as every\n  account erasure does.\n  Procedure: open-pryv.io `INSTALL.md`, \"Unfinished\n  registrations\".\n- Data minimisation, planned with the account transfer (the\n  release after the deletion one; implemented, not released): a\n  holder may name a beneficiary who receives control of the\n  account at the deadline. Only the beneficiary's email is\n  required; a name and date of birth are optional, kept\n  encrypted, unreadable before the transfer starts, and erased\n  with the transfer (§1(c)).\n- Integrity & confidentiality (§1(f)), covered separately at Art.32.\n- Accountability (§2), IMPLEMENTED. Every API call audited with\n  the access reference + version; access carries the consent state\n  at that version → end-to-end accountability chain you can point\n  auditors at.\n",
     "technical": "- Purpose limitation: enforcement in\n  `open-pryv.io/components/api-server/src/methods/` permission-checks.\n- Accountability: audit row schema includes\n  `(accessId, accessSerial)`; access-version snapshot includes\n  `clientData` (consent state), see `context/access-versioning.md`.\n",
     "draft": false,
     "reviewed_at": "2026-06-19",
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "GLHP",
       "UZEV",
       "ACXP2",
       "ACXP3",
       "ACXP8",
       "ACXP10",
       "ACXP19",
       "ACAC1",
       "ACAC2",
       "ACAC7",
       "ADSW8",
       "ADSW9",
       "ADSW13",
       "ACST14",
       "LGLU3",
       "CVAD3",
       "URB2",
       "RCRG1",
       "RCRG2",
       "RCRG3",
       "RCRG5",
       "RCRG6",
       "RCRG7",
       "MCUR1",
       "MCUR2"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.countAppUse",
       "account.autoDeletion.userOverride",
       "account.autoDeletion.allowUserOptOut",
       "account.autoDeletion.reminders.leadDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.reminders.minNoticeDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.dryRun",
       "accessTracking.isActive"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "stream",
       "audit",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "samples": [
       "scheduled-retention-job"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history",
       "data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic",
       "data-retention-operator-owned",
       "access-versioning"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Account transfer to a beneficiary (release after the deletion one): §1(c) minimisation of the beneficiary's data (email required; name and date of birth optional, encrypted, erased with the transfer)",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": null
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.6",
     "title": "Lawfulness of processing",
     "text": "Processing lawful only if at least one of six bases applies (consent,\ncontract, legal obligation, vital interests, public interest,\nlegitimate interests). §4, further processing for a purpose other\nthan the original is lawful only if compatible per the five-factor\ntest OR a fresh lawful basis applies.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "You decide which Art.6 basis\nyou're relying on for each processing activity. Pryv doesn't\nimpose or check the basis. You can record your chosen basis in\n`access.clientData.lawful_basis` so it travels alongside the\ntechnical authorization and lives in the audit trail, handy\nwhen an auditor asks \"under what basis was this access made?\".\nFor Art.6(4) further processing (purpose pivot), Pryv exposes\nfour composable patterns + a clear decision rule for when the\npurpose pivot demands fresh consent vs. an in-place update,\nsee detail.\n",
     "detail": "Recording the basis on the access gives you a durable, versioned\nartefact tying the basis to the specific processing scope it\njustifies. Determination of which basis applies remains your\nresponsibility, Pryv neither enforces nor refuses on the basis\nclaim.\n\n**§4, further processing (purpose pivot).** Four composable\npatterns; choose per the compatibility-vs-fresh-consent\ndecision rule below.\n\n**Pattern A, Mint a new access for the new purpose.** The\ncleanest fit when the new purpose is **outside** the original\nOR is not covered by a fresh override-by-law basis (Art.6(4)(a)\ncompatibility test fails). The subject sees a fresh auth flow;\n`app-web-auth3` presents the new notice + new purpose explicitly;\nthe new access carries `clientData.purpose: <new>` +\n`clientData.lawful_basis: <fresh>`. Old access keeps operating\nfor its original purpose (or is revoked separately if\nwithdrawn). This pattern is the **mandatory** path when the\ncompatibility test fails, fresh consent is required.\n\n**Pattern B, Update existing access** (`accesses.update`).\nSuitable when the purpose change is narrow / compatible (e.g.,\nscope-down or compatible expansion). The pre-mutation\n`permissions` + `clientData` snapshot into a history row\nautomatically (see `context/access-versioning.md`), preserving\nthe purpose-history chain end-to-end. The bumped `accessSerial`\nthreads through the audit log so post-pivot rows correctly\nattribute to the new purpose state.\n\n**Pattern C, Separate compatibility-assessment event.** When\nthe operator wants the Art.6(4) 5-factor analysis itself\nrecorded as a first-class artefact, write a\n`compliance/compatibility-assessments/<id>` event on a\ndedicated stream (operator-authored format via Q14 custom\ncatalogue) capturing the §6(4)(a)-(e) reasoning + the affected\ndata scope + the decision outcome. The relevant access(es)\nthen reference it via\n`clientData.compatibility_assessment_event_id`. This pattern\ncomposes with A or B (the assessment artefact justifies the\npattern choice).\n\n**Pattern D, Sub-access derivation from an `app` access**\n(`createdBy` mechanism, see `context/workforce-access-patterns.md`\nPattern 2). When the operator's app holds an `app`-type access\nwith broad scope; it can mint per-purpose **sub-accesses**,\neach carrying its own narrower `permissions[]` +\n`clientData.purpose`: and the audit log records each\nsub-access's id independently, **feeding purpose-driven access\nmatching into the audit trail at query time** (`audit.get` →\ngroup by `accessId` → distinct purposes touched). Especially\nclean when the same app legitimately operates under multiple\ncompatible-purpose facets, each facet gets its own sub-access,\nso per-purpose disclosure accounting (Art.30 / §164.528)\nreconstructs from the audit log without operator-side\nbookkeeping.\n\n**Decision rule** (operator-side):\n\n1. New purpose is **inside** the original purpose's scope (a\n   compatible refinement / narrowing) → **Pattern B** update\n   existing access. No fresh consent. Update notice if material.\n2. New purpose is **alongside** the original (compatible\n   expansion, same app, multiple facets) → **Pattern D**\n   sub-access mint, OR **Pattern A** new access. No fresh\n   consent required if compatibility test passes;\n   transparency-notice update may be required under Art.13(3).\n3. New purpose is **outside** the original AND not covered by\n   a fresh override-by-law basis (Art.6(1)(c)/(d)/(e)) →\n   **Pattern A** mint new access + force fresh consent. The\n   subject's positive opt-in is mandatory under Art.6(4) when\n   compatibility fails. App-web-auth3's grant flow IS the\n   re-prompt mechanism.\n4. In **any** case where the 5-factor compatibility analysis\n   was non-trivial → **Pattern C** separate compatibility-\n   assessment event for audit-defensibility.\n\n**Re-prompt surface (§4 fallback):** Pryv has no built-in\n\"notice changed → automatically re-prompt subject\" workflow.\nThe operator's app layer triggers re-auth by minting a new\naccess (Pattern A), `app-web-auth3` presents the updated\nnotice; the subject's positive consent IS the fresh-basis\ncapture. For revocation of the old access alongside the\nnew mint, `accesses.delete` is the standard path (Q19 / Q28\nmechanism family).\n\n**clientData convention extension** for §4 purpose pivots:\n`compatibility_assessment_event_id` + `purpose_change_basis`\n(`compatible_purpose` / `new_consent` / `new_legal_obligation`\n/ `new_legitimate_interest`) + `previous_purpose` (the pivot\nrecord). See `context/client-data-conventions.md`.\n\n**Planned, implemented and not released: account transfer to a\nbeneficiary** (the release after account auto-deletion). A\nholder may name one person who receives control of the account\nat its deadline; the platform then stores that person's email\nand, if the holder gives them, their name and date of birth.\nThe beneficiary is not the one who gave the data, so the basis\nis yours to establish as operator. The reading recorded in\n`context/data-retention-operator-owned.md` (\"Planned: transfer\nto a beneficiary\") is Art.6(1)(f): the holder's legitimate\ninterest in arranging what happens to their own account, and\nyours in carrying out that instruction, balanced by\nminimisation (only the email required), encryption at rest, no\nread path before the transfer starts, and erasure with the\ntransfer. Unconfirmed: it needs your DPO's or counsel's reading\nbefore you offer the transfer.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "access-versioning",
       "workforce-access-patterns",
       "client-data-conventions",
       "data-retention-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Account transfer to a beneficiary (implemented, not released): the platform stores a third party's email, and optionally name and date of birth, on the holder's instruction; the operator needs a basis for that processing",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": null
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.7",
     "title": "Conditions for consent",
     "text": "Where processing is based on consent, controller must be able to\ndemonstrate consent. Request must be in intelligible form,\nwithdrawable.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The access Pryv mints when your user grants permission IS your\ndurable consent record, versioned permissions + clientData\ntogether prove what was authorised, with what text, at what time.\nWithdrawal is a single API call. For cross-account sharing, the\n`consent/*` events carry the negotiation state transitions. The\naccess keeps every previous version; an event keeps its previous\nversions only on a deployment with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default), and the\nserver-written parts of the accept event (who approved, the\nwithdrawal) cannot be changed by any client.\n",
     "detail": "Demonstrability (§1), `accesses.get ?includeHistory=true` returns\nthe full version chain; each version preserves the `permissions`\ngranted and the `clientData` (which can carry the consent contract\ntext) at that point in time. For cross-account flows, the original\n`consent/request-cmc` event on the requester's account holds the\nlocalised consent text presented.\n\nWhat a grant covers is a set of streams, and a release can widen\nwhat a stream carries. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.44, an\naccess holding a grant on the account email\nstream (`:system:email`, \"Read Email\") can also request, by type,\na read-only, server-derived `verification/email` event (whether\nthe primary address was proved, by which method, and when),\nincluding apps granted it before that release, without new consent. A read\nwithout that type returns the address only, as before. Other addresses of the\naccount are never returned. If the consent text you present should\nname this, rename the email field's `name` in\n`custom.systemStreams`.\n\nWithdrawal (§3), `accesses.delete` (full revoke) or `accesses.update`\nwith narrower `permissions` (scope-down). Both bump the access\nserial + snapshot the pre-mutation state. Cross-account:\n`consent/revoke-cmc` triggers symmetric teardown on both sides\nvia the CMC plugin. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53 every CMC and\ndelegation teardown (a `consent/revoke-cmc` revoke, a revocation\nreceived from the counterparty, an accept rolled back, a\ndelegation detach, the teardown at account deletion) is the\n`accesses.delete` deletion: the data grant is marked deleted and\nstays readable by name (never by token) with `includeDeletions`,\nits webhooks are deleted and its alias released `[GA30]`. Before\nthat release these paths removed the access row outright, so for\na withdrawal made then the record you demonstrate is the\n`consent/*` events (the accept on the subject's account, the\nrequest on the requester's) plus the audit trail, not the access\nversion chain. When the offer made the grant delegable\n(`request.accessType: 'app'`), every withdrawal path also deletes\nthe accesses the requester derived from it, since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.52 (`96af58ad`) `[MAAC]`, `[CMCHS-APPGRANT]`, `[GA24]`;\non earlier releases they stayed valid until their own expiry, and\n`bin/access-scope-audit.js` lists any left behind. The\nwithdrawal is effective on the withdrawing account at once; the\nnotice to the counterparty, when it cannot be reached, is queued\nand re-sent by the retry loop since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53\n(eight re-sends over about 27 hours, then marked failed for the\noperator, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/157)\n`[HR25]`, `[DH25]`, `[RQ20]`, `[RQ21]`, `[RQ22]`, `[RQ23]`, and a\nlate notice never tears down a relationship the parties\nre-established meanwhile `[CIR26]`, `[CIR27]`. Not re-sent: the\nnotices of an account being deleted (no account is left to hold\nthem), and any notice while `cmc.retryLoop.enabled` is `false`.\nNor, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56, a notice to an address Pryv\nrefuses to call (loopback, private or reserved, unless listed in\n`cmc.allowedPrivateHosts`; see Art.32): it is tried once and\nmarked failed at once `[HR41]`, `[RQ33]`. The same release has\nthe retry loop act only on records the server wrote into its\nqueue `[RQ32]`. The person's own accept event also records the\nend itself, whatever ended the consent: `content.withdrawal = { at, by,\naccessId, revokeEventId? }`, with `by: 'accesses.delete'` (the\ndata grant deleted through the API) `[CN58]`, `[DH16]`,\n`'revoke-cmc'` (the person wrote a `consent/revoke-cmc`) `[CN59]`,\n`[HR32]` or `'peer-revoke'` (the requester withdrew) `[CN60]`, in\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.36 (`1420fe72`,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/146); a delegation\ndetach has recorded `by: 'delegation-detach'` since 2.0.0-rc.31\n(see below). The marker is server-owned, written only once the\ngrant is gone and never overwritten once set `[DCH25]`. It is an ordinary\nevent update: with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` the accept\nevent's history keeps the version before it ended; otherwise the\nevents and audit trail above date the consent. Recording it is best-effort (a teardown never\nfails on it), so the events and audit trail stay the fallback\nrecord. A `consent/revoke-cmc` whose delete of the relationship\naccess (on the person's side, the data grant) fails no longer\nreads completed: it ends `failed`\n(`cmc-revoke-delete-failed`) and is retried without telling the\npeer twice, and nothing is recorded as withdrawn until the delete\nsucceeds `[HR34]`, `[CD26]`. If your app lists a person's\nconsents, treat an accept event carrying `withdrawal` as ended;\nthe `@pryv/cmc` client does so by default since 3.18.0.\nSince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.38 (merge `461f3c4c`) these\nserver-written records also survive a concurrent client write: a\nclient updating or trashing the accept event while the server\nstamps it no longer erases the stamp, because the update is\napplied onto the event as stored at write time `[ESR1]`,\n`[ESR4]`, and a CMC event's dispatch `status` and `failure` are\nserver-owned, so a client cannot make a failed delivery read\ncompleted `[ESR5]`, `[APB13]`.\nSee `context/cmc-consent-primitives.md`.\n\nWhat a cross-account consent covers, and between whom (§1,\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.38, merge `7aab1e85`): the channels a\nrelationship opens between the two parties (`features.chat`,\n`features.systemMessaging`) are resolved by Pryv from the\nrequester's offer, which the person's accept may only narrow, and\nthe resolved pair is recorded on the person's accept event and on\nboth relationship accesses `[HA43]`, `[HA44]`, `[CD28]`; an\nupdate keeps it `[APB16]`, and an accept claiming more than the\noffer is cut back on the requester's side too `[IA18]`, `[IA22]`\n(https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/149). An account can\nno longer accept its own offer: the accept fails with\n`cmc-self-accept-forbidden` before any stream or access is created\n`[HA46]`, `[HA48]`, `[CN67]`, so every recorded consent is given\nby one account to another; a self-relationship created earlier\nrecords its withdrawal when its access is deleted `[CN69]`,\n`[DH23]` (https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/150). If\nyour consent text describes chat or system messages, keep it\nconsistent with the `features` your offer sets.\n\nIntelligible form (§2): you write the UX (app-web-auth3 template\nis a starting point). Pryv enforces the technical contract; your\nUI presents it.\n\nGranular consent (§4), different processing purposes can be\nexpressed as separate accesses with different permissions, each\nindependently withdrawable. Within ONE request, a requester also\nstates what each permission means to the user: required, optional\nand offered pre-selected, or optional and offered unselected\n(`mandatory` / `optIn`, the consent-form annotations in\n`open-pryv.io/components/business/src/accesses/permissionSet.ts`).\n`optIn` is the Recital 32-aligned choice for an optional permission\nwhere consent is the lawful basis, because a pre-ticked box is not\nconsent; the published guidance recommends it explicitly. The\nannotations are display-layer only and are stripped before an\naccess is minted, so no stored permission carries one.\n\nThe SAME granularity now reaches the ORIGINAL authorization path,\nnot only OAuth2. An auth request (`POST {serviceInfo.access}`) may\ncarry a `consent` object beside its plain permissions; the\nauthentication page then presents each entry in the state the\nrequester asked for and mints only what the user kept. Crucially\nthe result is VERIFIED server-side: the accept\n(`open-pryv.io/components/api-server/src/routes/reg/consentCheck.ts`)\nreads the access actually created and refuses it unless it matches\nwhat was offered (`checkConsentGrant`, the same rule the OAuth2 and\ncross-account paths use, so there is one rule and three call\nsites). A check that cannot be performed is refused, never waved\nthrough. Requests that carry no `consent` object behave exactly as\nbefore, so this is additive for existing integrations.\n\nConsent invites in the same authorisation request (§2 \"clearly\ndistinguishable\", open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.32, `6496ffbb`): an app\nmay ask the user, in the one sign-in, to also answer the\ncross-account (CMC) consent invites it received, by adding\n`cmcInvites` (1 to 8 entries: the invite's capability URL,\n`mandatory`, and `for` the user's own account or an account the\nuser manages through delegation) to the auth request. Pryv\nvalidates the list when the request is created, stores it\nnormalised and echoes it on the 201 answer and on the poll the\nauthentication page reads `[RCI1]`, `[RCI2]`, `[RCI6]`. An invite\nmay also name the data grant the person mints by accepting it\n(`accessName`, 1 to 256 characters, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.36,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/147), so\neach consent carries a name you choose among the person's\naccesses; the authentication page passes it to the accept\n`[RCI10]`, `[RCI11]`. The\nreference account app (app-web-user-account 0.11.0) presents\neach invite as its own block with its own Approve and Decline,\nnever implied by approving the app access; it decides, then\naccepts the approved invites (mandatory ones first), then grants\nthe app access, and answers each declined invite to its requester\nwith `consent/refuse-cmc`. A declined mandatory invite ends the\nrequest refused with `reasonId: 'REFUSED_MANDATORY_CONSENT'`\nbefore anything is written, and a mandatory invite that could not\nbe accepted ends it with `reasonId: 'MANDATORY_CONSENT_FAILED'`\n(app-web-user-account tests `[ACI2]`, `[ACI14]`). The page posts\none outcome per invite with the acceptance; Pryv checks their\nnumber and shape before any write, refuses them on any other\nstatus, stores them under a name the poster cannot write\ndirectly, and serves them back to the app in the accepted answer\n`[RCI3]`, `[RCI4]`, `[RCI5]`, `[RCI7]`, `[RCI8]`, `[RCI9]`. These\noutcomes are a hint to the app: the record of each consent is the\naccept event on the subject's account and the request event on\nthe requester's, as for any CMC consent, and `mandatory` is\nenforced by the authentication page, not re-checked by the core.\nWhat stays on your plate: a deployment using its own auth UI must\npresent the invites the same way, and whether making an invite\n`mandatory` for an app access is compatible with consent being\nfreely given (Art.7(4)) is your determination.\n\nSecond consent path, OAuth2 authorization (§1, §4), where your\nuser authorises a delegated app through Pryv's OAuth2\nauthorization-code flow (`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`,\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8), the granular consent screen presents\nthe referenced offer's per-permission set and lets the user\nuntick individual permissions to downgrade the grant before\naccepting; the accepted subset (`grantedPermissions`, validated\n⊆ the signed offer) is what Pryv mints the app access from\n(`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/src/routes/accept.ts`). The\ndurable consent record is the same primitive as everywhere else,\na cross-account CMC data-grant access, versioned and revocable;\nrevoking it tears down the app's refresh chain. Withdrawal (§3)\nreaches the app at once since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.64: deleting\nthe grant also deletes the app's live sessions and the accesses\nthey created `[OE31]` (earlier releases let a live access token\nrun out its lifetime, up to `oauth.accessTokenTTL`, one hour by\ndefault). A partial withdrawal reaches it too: since rc.68 a\nnarrowed grant re-cuts every live session at once, and since\nrc.70 the accesses a session created are narrowed with it, or\ndeleted when nothing is left `[OSUB1]`, `[OSUB3]`. A re-consent\nshows what the app already holds and sets the grant to exactly\nwhat the user ticks, so it can narrow as well as widen; a change\nof subject (username to pseudonym or back) must be acknowledged\nand is recorded in `oauth.consent.granted` `[OCMP7]`, `[OCMP11]`.\nA consent the server refused for its permissions is final and is\nnever completed later by a retry (rc.65) `[RQAS1]`. Only the\naccount holder's personal token may accept (rc.68). For clients\nthe operator registers through an OAuth extension (registry\nclients, rc.68), the durable record is an app access\n`oauth-grant:<clientId>` on the user's own account instead of a\nCMC data-grant, with the same versioning and withdrawal (see\n`context/cmc-consent-primitives.md`). Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.80 that grant and every session of it also name the app\nin `clientData.oauth.client` (`{ name?, origin: \"operator\" }`,\nthe name the operator registered, never one taken from a\nrequest; a client metadata document's stamp carries its host and\nURL with `origin: \"metadata-document\"`), written by the server and\nrefused by `accesses.update`, so the record shows which app the\nconsent went to. A grant made before rc.80 gains it at its next\nconsent `[OCMP22]`, `[OREG12]`, `[OCMDE15]`. Demonstrability\nrests on that data-grant + the signed offer material (the access\n+ its version history), not on a separate event log.\n\nDelegate-account authorization (withdrawability, §3): where a\ndelegate holds an owner-equivalent token over an account\n(account delegation, `open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`), the\naccount holder never surrenders control, a delegate can never\nremove a delegation, and the holder withdraws it by a genuine\nlogin on their own account and detaching (the authoritative\nteardown, gated on a personal token carrying no forge-protected\ndelegation marker). Each delegate's actions are audited on the\ncontrolled account. See `context/delegation-model.md`.\n\nConsent given by a delegate for the account it controls (§1,\n§3): a delegate may grant an app access to the controlled\naccount through the auth request. The resulting access is the\nconsent record and it lives on the data subject's account,\ncarrying a server-stamped, non-forgeable lineage attribute\n(`clientData.delegation.kind: 'delegated-child'`) that names the\ndelegate; the grant is checked against the offer like any other\n`[DCH13]`. The subject can withdraw it like any access, and\nremoving the delegate withdraws every grant made through it\n`[DCH12]`. In open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23 (`91b06363`, `ef0a3f75`,\n`5943ca0b`).\n\nA delegate may also give a cross-account consent (CMC) for the\naccount it manages, writing `consent/accept-cmc` with its\ndelegate token (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.30, `9ba9c78c`). Pryv\nrecords it on the subject's account, in two places. The data\ngrant carries the same lineage attribute\n(`clientData.delegation`, naming the relationship and the\ndelegate, taken from the authenticated token, never from the\nrequest), and `access-info` with the grant's token reports it, so\nyour counterparty can tell a delegate gave the consent\n`[DCH15]`. The accept event records who approved in\n`content.approvedBy` (the delegate and the relationship), stamped\nby the server: a client cannot supply, change or remove it, and an\naccept the account holder writes carries none `[DCH16]`. The\nconsent ends with the delegation unless the account holder keeps\nit at detach (below): detaching the delegate deletes\nthe grant before the detach answers (since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.53 as the `accesses.delete` deletion, leaving a deletion\nrecord; earlier releases removed the row outright) and the\nrequester receives `consent/revoke-cmc` (never holding the\ndetach; re-sent by the retry loop when the requester cannot be\nreached, since rc.53) `[DCH18]`. An accept\nstill in progress when the delegation ends mints no grant\n(`cmc-handler-delegation-ended`). After a detach, the subject-side\nrecord of such a consent is the accept event (`approvedBy`,\n`dataGrantAccessId`, and the outcome of the review below) plus the\naudit row of `delegations.detachDelegate`.\n\nWithdrawability of a delegate's consents at detach (§3,\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.31, `b77320df`): before a delegate is\ndetached, the account holder reviews each cross-account consent\nthat delegate gave and keeps or withdraws it, with one call,\n`delegations.detachDelegate { username, keepAccessIds? }`.\nNothing is kept by default: a detach without `keepAccessIds`\nwithdraws every such consent. Every id in the list must be a\nconsent grant given through the relationship being removed,\notherwise the whole call is refused (`400`,\n`delegation-invalid-keep-list`) before anything is written\n`[DCH23]`. A kept consent loses its delegation lineage and becomes\nthe account holder's own (`access-info` no longer reports a\ndelegation, the requester is told nothing), and its accept event\nrecords `content.ownerConfirmedAt` `[DCH21]`. A consent not kept\nis deleted, its requester receives `consent/revoke-cmc`, and its\naccept event records `content.withdrawal = { at, by:\n'delegation-detach', relId }`, so every consent a delegate gave\ncarries its own end on the subject's account `[DCH22]`, `[DDK07]`.\n`approvedBy`, `ownerConfirmedAt` and `withdrawal` are written by\nthe server only: no token, the account holder's included, can\nwrite, change or erase them through the API (dropped on create,\nkept as stored on update, never added by an update) `[DCH24]`,\n`[APB08]` to `[APB12]`. The reference account app opens this\nreview with nothing preselected, and a consent whose delivery to\nthe requester never completed is listed as not delivered and\ncannot be kept, so it is withdrawn; if the consents cannot be\nlisted, nothing is removed (app-web-user-account tests `[DKP7]`,\n`[DKP8]`). A deployment using its own account UI must offer the\nsame review.\n\nThe paths that still cannot record the lineage refuse a\ndelegation-derived token, so a delegate cannot make a grant that\noutlives the delegation: publishing an offer\n(`consent/request-cmc`) and widening a grant\n(`consent/scope-update-cmc`) answer\n`delegation-grant-requires-owner` `[DCH17]`, and OAuth2 consent\nanswers `403 access_denied` `[OE27]`. Whether a given delegate may\nconsent for the account it manages remains your determination.\n\nConsent to a group account (§1, §3, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53,\nrelease commit `61fb28dd`,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158). A cross-account\noffer can make the grant delegable (`request.accessType: 'app'`,\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.9), so the requester can derive further\naccesses on the person's account from it. With group accounts, a\nteam sharing one account has its core derive one short-lived\naccess per member from that grant: each member access sits on the\nperson's account as a child of the grant, named by the server,\nwith the member and the group in its `clientData.cmc`, stamped by\nthe person's core from the authenticated grant, within the\noffer's stream permissions `[GA10]`, `[MB10]`; and withdrawing\nthe consent, on any path, removes the grant and every access\nderived from it (2.0.0-rc.52 or later on the person's core)\n`[GA24]`. The reference account app's consent page tells the\nperson, in one line, when an offer's grant is delegable (\"This\norganisation can share this access with its team members. Each\nmember's actions are recorded on your account.\"), from its first\nrelease after 0.21.0 (app-web-user-account); a deployment using\nits own consent UI writes that notice itself. Whether your consent\ntext names the members' access is yours to write. See\n`context/cmc-consent-primitives.md`, \"Group accounts\".\n",
     "technical": "- Snapshot semantics: `context/access-versioning.md` (full head\n  clone into history row per update).\n- CMC consent state machine: `context/cmc-consent-primitives.md`\n  (10 `consent/*` formats in the event-type catalogue 1.3.0\n  bundled with open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53).\n- `accesses.update` composite-id wire format requires `lib-js@3.1.0+`.\n",
     "draft": false,
     "reviewed_at": "2026-07-18",
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP",
       "USAD",
       "RA71",
       "RA72",
       "PS11",
       "PS13",
       "DCH12",
       "DCH13",
       "DCH15",
       "DCH16",
       "DCH17",
       "DCH18",
       "DCH21",
       "DCH22",
       "DCH23",
       "DCH24",
       "DCH25",
       "DDK07",
       "APB08",
       "APB09",
       "APB10",
       "APB11",
       "APB12",
       "RCI1",
       "RCI2",
       "RCI3",
       "RCI4",
       "RCI5",
       "RCI6",
       "RCI7",
       "RCI8",
       "RCI9",
       "RCI10",
       "RCI11",
       "CN58",
       "CN59",
       "CN60",
       "DH16",
       "HR32",
       "HR34",
       "CD26",
       "OE27",
       "HA43",
       "HA44",
       "IA18",
       "IA22",
       "CD28",
       "APB16",
       "HA46",
       "HA48",
       "CN67",
       "CN69",
       "DH23",
       "ESR1",
       "ESR4",
       "ESR5",
       "APB13",
       "SIB01",
       "SIB11",
       "MAAC",
       "GA10",
       "GA24",
       "GA30",
       "MB10",
       "HR25",
       "DH25",
       "RQ20",
       "RQ21",
       "RQ22",
       "RQ23",
       "CIR26",
       "CIR27",
       "HR41",
       "RQ33",
       "RQ32",
       "OE31",
       "OSUB1",
       "OSUB3",
       "OCMP7",
       "OCMP11",
       "RQAS1",
       "OCMP22",
       "OREG12",
       "OCMDE15"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "guides/consent.md",
       "customer-resources/auth-oauth2.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cmc.retryLoop.enabled",
       "cmc.allowedPrivateHosts"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "CMC",
       "event",
       "delegation"
      ],
      "samples": [
       "who-has-access-to-my-data",
       "cross-account-share"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "cmc-consent-primitives",
       "delegation-model",
       "access-versioning"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.9",
     "title": "Processing of special categories of personal data",
     "text": "Processing of special-category data (racial / ethnic origin,\npolitical opinions, religious / philosophical beliefs, trade-union\nmembership, genetic data, biometric data uniquely identifying a\nperson, health data, sex life or sexual orientation) is prohibited\nunless one of ten conditions in Art.9(2) applies.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv is content-agnostic at the platform layer, no\n`sensitivity:` flag on event-type schemas, no server-side hook\nthat refuses writes to \"health\" streams without a recorded\nArt.9(2) basis. **Classification is voluntarily missing at the\nplatform.** But for **vertically-integrated operators** (you\nrun the core AND ship the clients AND design the stream tree\nAND curate the event-type catalogue, typical for\nhealth deployments), Pryv exposes enough composable primitives\nthat you build a strong Art.9 enforcement layer without\nplatform-imposed assumptions. The Art.9(2) condition relied on\nlives in `access.clientData.special_category_basis` next to\nthe technical grant. Full operator-toolkit treatment +\ntwo-deployment-topologies framing in\n`context/special-categories-operator-facilitated.md`.\n",
     "detail": "Recommended stream-layout pattern for special-category-heavy\ndeployments:\n  - Reserve top-level subtrees per Art.9(1) category (`health/`,\n    `biometrics/`, `genetics/`, `political-opinions/`, etc.).\n  - Mint apps' / counterparties' accesses with explicit\n    `permissions[]` listing the subtree they may touch;\n    default-deny everything else.\n  - Record the Art.9(2) lit-letter in\n    `access.clientData.special_category_basis` (\"(a) explicit\n    consent\", \"(h) preventive / occupational medicine\", etc.).\n  - Audit log automatically captures every read / write under\n    the access.\n\n**Operator-toolkit composition** (vertically-integrated\ndeployments, operator controls both ends):\n\n1. **Stream-tree design**: operator's client code routes\n   sensitive writes exclusively to reserved subtrees;\n   Pryv enforces the per-stream permission boundary\n   (`AccessLogic`).\n2. **clientData.special_category_basis**: Art.9(2) lit-letter\n   recorded on every access touching a sensitive subtree;\n   access-versioning preserves the basis over edits.\n3. **Custom event-type catalogue annotations**: operator\n   extends `service.eventTypes` URL with\n   `x-art9-category` / `x-swiss-nlpd-sensitive` / etc. fields\n   the client code reads to gate writes; Pryv passes the\n   annotations through unchanged (Q14 / Q21 pattern).\n4. **Custom dataStore (`@pryv/datastore`)**: sensitive\n   subtree owned by a dedicated store with stricter at-rest\n   encryption + access controls (Q16 pattern;\n   `context/audit-archival-via-custom-datastore.md`).\n5. **Per-engine isolation**: sensitive tier on a separate\n   PostgreSQL instance / WAL / replicas (storage-engine plugins).\n6. **`customExtensions.customAuthStepFn`**: operator-side\n   gate that demands the Art.9(2) basis claim at\n   access-grant time before minting the access.\n7. **Audit log**: automatic capture of every read/write\n   under any access; audit-minimality (Q9: no request body)\n   is a feature for sensitive data, not a limitation.\n8. **Backup tiering (Q15)**: operator encrypts sensitive-tier\n   backups with a separate recipient key (`bin/backup.js\n   --recipient-pubkey`, built in since open-pryv.io\n   2.0.0-rc.5) and applies stricter retention than ordinary\n   tiers.\n\nThe toolkit's reach varies by deployment topology, full\nstrength for vertically-integrated operators, partial for\nopen Pryv platforms hosting third-party apps the operator\ndoesn't author. The two-topology framing is canonical in\n`context/special-categories-operator-facilitated.md`.\n\nCaveat: Pryv's permission model is per-stream, not per-field\nwithin an event. If an event mixes ordinary and\nspecial-category fields, you must split it or design your\nevent types so the special-category subset is its own\nevent-type.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "permissions"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "special-categories-operator-facilitated",
       "audit-archival-via-custom-datastore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.8",
     "title": "Conditions applicable to child's consent in relation to information society services",
     "text": "Where Art. 6(1)(a) consent applies in relation to the offer of\ninformation-society services directly to a child, processing\nshall be lawful only where the child is at least 16 years old\n(Member States may lower to no less than 13); below that age,\nparental holder of responsibility must consent.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv still neither knows nor validates a subject's age, age +\nparental-authority verification happens at your app's\nregistration / consent UX, and the platform is age-blind by\ndesign (verified: default `custom.systemStreams.account`\nships only `email`; no `birthDate` / `dateOfBirth` /\n`minor` field in the catalogue). What Pryv now DOES give you\nis a technical control for the \"parental holder of\nresponsibility\" case itself: **account delegation**. A\nparent or guardian holds an owner-equivalent delegate token\nover the child's account, every action is audited per\ndelegate on the child's account, and the child reclaims sole\ncontrol at the age of majority through a genuine login (which\nis what lets them detach the guardian). Age is still verified\nby you; delegation is the control mechanism, not the age\ncheck. The consent artefacts you keep travel alongside the\naccess via the `clientData` convention family (see\n`context/client-data-conventions.md`).\n",
     "detail": "**Parental holder of responsibility, as a technical control\n(delegation).** Pryv's account-delegation primitive\n(`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) lets a parent /\nguardian account hold an **owner-equivalent delegate token**\nover the child's account: full owner authority over the\nchild's data, EXCEPT the delegate can never remove the\ndelegation. Every delegate action is attributable on the\nchild's account (per-delegate audit stamping), which gives\nyou the \"who acted for the child, and when\" record Art.8\nimplies once parental consent is in force. Multi-holder cases\n(both parents / joint guardians) are expressed as multiple\ndelegates, each independently audited; no delegate can\nunilaterally shed a co-holder's oversight. **Owner reclaim at\nmajority** is intrinsic: because detach is gated on a\n*genuine login on the child's account* (a personal token with\nno forge-protected delegation marker, not any delegate\ntoken), the young person regains sole control simply by\nlogging in and detaching the guardian(s) — no operator\nintervention required. `create-from-delegate` (with an\noptional email/password seed) covers the \"guardian sets up\nthe account first\" flow while still leaving the child a\ngenuine login for later reclaim. See\n`context/delegation-model.md`.\n\n**The parent consents to an app for the child.** Through the\nauth request, a delegate can grant a third-party app access to\nthe child's account (the app never receives the delegate's\nowner-equivalent token). The consent record, the app access,\nlives on the **child's** account and carries a server-stamped\nlineage attribute naming the consenting delegate\n(`clientData.delegation.kind: 'delegated-child'`, reported by\n`accessInfo` as `grantedVia: 'app'`) `[DCH01]`, `[DCH02]`; the\napp's actions are audited on the child's account with the\ndelegate named `[DCH05]`. The young person sees the app among\ntheir own and can revoke it; when the guardian is detached,\nevery access granted through that delegation is revoked with it\n`[DCH12]`, so no parental consent outlives parental control.\nWhether a given parent may consent for a given app remains your\ndetermination. In open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23. An app meant only for\nthe managed account (for example a parent-facing app that should\nonly ever hold the child's data) can require that the access be\ngranted for an account the user manages, never for the user's own\n(`actAsManagedOnly: true` on the auth request, open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.36,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/148). Pryv validates,\nstores and echoes the field `[RAM01]`, `[RAM02]`, `[RAM03]`, but\nthe authentication page enforces it, not the core: a deployment\nusing its own auth UI must honour it.\n\n**The parent accepts a cross-account consent for the child.**\nWhen a study or another account asks the child's account to share\ndata through cross-account messaging (CMC), the parent can give\nthat consent with their delegate token, without signing in as the\nchild (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.30). The record is on the child's\naccount: the data grant carries the lineage attribute naming the\nparent, and the requester's `access-info` reports it `[DCH15]`;\nthe accept event names the parent in `content.approvedBy`,\nstamped by the server and impossible for a client to forge\n`[DCH16]`. An app's authorisation request can carry such consent\ninvites for the child's account (`cmcInvites` with `for:\n'target'`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.32) `[RCI1]`: the reference\naccount app accepts them with the parent's delegate token on the\nchild's account, so they are recorded exactly the same way, each\ndecided on its own.\n\n**Owner reclaim at majority covers the parent's consents.** When\nthe young person detaches the guardian, they review, consent by\nconsent, the cross-account consents the guardian gave, and keep\nonly the ones they choose (`delegations.detachDelegate` with\n`keepAccessIds`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.31). Nothing is kept by\ndefault, and a keep list naming anything but a consent this\nguardian gave is refused whole, before any change `[DCH23]`. A\nkept consent becomes the young person's own: the lineage is\nremoved and the accept event records `ownerConfirmedAt`, with\n`approvedBy` kept as history `[DCH21]`. Every other consent is\ndeleted at once, the requester is told (`consent/revoke-cmc`,\nre-sent by the retry loop when the requester cannot be reached,\nsince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53) `[DCH18]`, `[DCH22]`, and its\naccept event records\nthe withdrawal (`content.withdrawal`, naming the detach) `[DDK07]`.\nThese markers are server-written and cannot be forged or erased\nthrough the API by the parent or anyone else `[DCH24]`. The accept\nevents and the audit row of the detach stay on the child's account\nas the record of each consent, of who gave it, and of how it\nended. App accesses the guardian granted are not part of the\nreview: they end with the delegation, as above. Publishing offers\nand widening a grant stay with the account holder.\n\n**Consent-artefact conventions (operator-side editorial\ndiscipline; no Pryv enforcement) still apply on top of the\ndelegation control:**\n\n- `account.clientData.age_verification_method`,\n  free-text or structured record of HOW age was verified\n  (self-declaration / ID upload / parental-attestation /\n  government-eID-flow). Travels with the account; reachable\n  via the system-stream account event.\n- `clientData.parental_holder_consent_event_id` (singular,\n  single-holder case) or `clientData.\n  parental_holder_consent_event_ids` (array, dual /\n  multi-holder case, divorced parents, jurisdictions\n  requiring both biological parents, foster care, etc.),\n  pointer(s) to the actual `consent/parental-*` event(s)\n  recording the parental consent text + the holder's\n  identity / verification trail.\n\n**The `consent/parental-cmc` event format does NOT ship in\nthe built-in `data-types` catalogue.** Operators needing\nthis format author it themselves and publish via\n`service.eventTypes` URL (the Q14 custom-catalogue\nextension pattern). HDS-style data-model repos that target\npaediatric / adolescent use-cases are the natural home for\nthis format. Backlog candidate: if a critical mass of\nhealth deployments converges on a common shape, upstream\nit into `data-types` proper.\n\n**Re-verification on age-of-majority transitions**,\nvoluntarily missing at platform layer. Pryv has no\ncron / scheduler primitive. Operator runs an external job\nthat watches `birthDate` (extended-account-field) +\naccess `created` timestamp + chosen jurisdiction's age of\nmajority (typically 16 EU / 13 US under COPPA / etc.) and\ntriggers a re-consent prompt at the crossing date.\n\n**Multi-holder consent**: supported by the array form\nabove; the operator's app code at access-mint time\nenforces \"both parents must accept\" (or whichever\njurisdiction-specific rule applies) before calling\n`accesses.create`. Each parental-holder consent event\nindependently satisfies the access-history record;\nrevocation of any one of them is the operator's signal\nto revoke or scope-down the access (per Q19 + Q28\nmechanisms).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": false,
     "reviewed_at": "2026-09-15",
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "DCH01",
       "DCH02",
       "DCH05",
       "DCH12",
       "DCH15",
       "DCH16",
       "DCH18",
       "DCH21",
       "DCH22",
       "DCH23",
       "DCH24",
       "DDK07",
       "RCI1",
       "RAM01",
       "RAM02",
       "RAM03"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "delegation",
       "clientData",
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "client-data-conventions",
       "delegation-model"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.10",
     "title": "Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences",
     "text": "Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions /\noffences shall be carried out only under control of official\nauthority or when authorised by Union / Member State law\nproviding appropriate safeguards.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Same pattern as Art. 9\nspecial-category data: dedicate a `criminal-records/*` stream\nsubtree, scope every access tightly, record the Art. 10 legal-\nbasis-by-law citation in `access.clientData.art10_basis`. Pryv\nhas no role in deciding whether a given processing instance\nfalls under \"official authority\", that's your legal judgement.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.12",
     "title": "Transparent information, communication and modalities",
     "text": "Controller shall provide concise, transparent, intelligible\ninformation and respond to data subject requests within one month.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv keeps the\nnotice / consent text you presented to the subject, retrievable\nlater: versioned on every change when it lives on the access,\nand on an event only with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`. The response operations\n(Art.15-22) execute in sub-second; the 1-month rule is your\nprocess target, not a software limit.\n",
     "detail": "Information artefacts (notice, consent text, lawful-basis\nexplanation) can live in `access.clientData` and/or in\n`consent/request-cmc` events. The access keeps every previous\nversion of its `clientData`; a `consent/request-cmc` event keeps\nits previous versions only on a deployment with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default), so if your\napp may edit the request after it is sent, turn it on or never\nedit it. That way the subject can be shown the text that was\noriginally presented,\naddressing the \"concise, transparent, intelligible\" requirement\nat the artefact level. Whether the artefact itself is concise +\nintelligible is your editorial responsibility.\n\nAn operator action on the account is communicated by Pryv itself\nin this case: from 2.0.0-rc.60, when your administrator releases an external id the\naccount held (`external-id-index` primitive), the account gets the\n`external-id-released` mail with the namespace label and the\nreason your administrator gave, never the id, when mail is\nconfigured (`services.email.enabled.externalIdReleased`, default\non; template `services.email.externalIdReleasedTemplate`), and an\n`account.externalIds.adminRelease` entry in its own audit trail\n`[XIDAR1]`, `[XIDAR3]`. The subject reads the reason as written:\nthe wording is yours, keep it factual and free of anyone else's\ndata. A failed send does not undo the release (the answer then\nsays `audit-only`), so follow up by your own channel when the\nmail did not go out.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "XIDAR1",
       "XIDAR3"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "guides/consent.md",
       "customer-resources/audit-setup.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "services.email.enabled.externalIdReleased",
       "services.email.externalIdReleasedTemplate"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "event",
       "external-id-index"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.13",
     "title": "Information to be provided where data are collected from the data subject",
     "text": "Identity of controller, purposes, legal basis, recipients,\nretention, rights, must be provided at the time of collection.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The information items split across two operator-controlled\nsurfaces:\n\n- **Deployment-wide** (controller identity, DPO contact,\n  Terms of Service): the `serviceInfo` fields `home`,\n  `support`, `terms`, propagated to every client app via\n  `GET /service/info`; `app-web-auth3` renders them in its\n  consent UI by default. Full convention treatment in\n  `context/service-info-conventions.md`.\n- **Per-access** (purposes, lawful basis, recipients,\n  retention, the specific rights notice): `access.clientData`\n  per the convention family in\n  `context/client-data-conventions.md`,\n  `lawful_basis`, `purpose`, `transfer_basis`, `retention`,\n  `consent`, `consent_event_id`, etc. (or a\n  `consent/request-cmc` event when using CMC). Pryv keeps them\n  with their version chain (`?includeHistory=true`): every\n  version on an access, and on an event only with\n  `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`; your app surfaces them\n  at the right moment.\n",
     "detail": "**Account auto-deletion (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66, `8521c8d5`).**\nIf you set an inactivity preset\n(`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays`), it is a\nretention period of your platform: your privacy notice states\nit, with what counts as use of an account (sign-ins and the use\nof personal accesses, a delegate's own token included; app\naccesses only where you set\n`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.countAppUse`, since 2.0.0-rc.81;\nshared accesses never), as §2(a) requires. Pryv does not write that\nnotice. What Pryv tells the account holder directly: a\nconfirmation mail on every change of their schedule, clearing\nincluded (the deadline, or that nothing is scheduled,\n`[ACST15A]`, `[ACST15B]`), and reminder mails before the\ndeletion (`[ACRM1]`), with links to change the schedule and to\ndownload the data. `account.getAutoDeletion` shows the holder\nthe live schedule, its source and their last activity\n(`[ACST1]`, `[ACST2]`). See\n`context/data-retention-operator-owned.md` and the operator page\n`customer-resources/account-auto-deletion`.\n\n**Planned, implemented and not released: account transfer to a\nbeneficiary.** Where the holder names a beneficiary with an\noptional name and date of birth, the reference account app and\nthe setup confirmation are designed to tell the holder that\nthose two fields are used only to identify a beneficiary the\nemail cannot reach, are stored encrypted, can be read by the\noperator only after the transfer has started (each reading\nlogged and reported to the holder's address), and are deleted\nwith the transfer. The operator read method itself is deferred;\nwhoever builds it must honour that notice as published.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACST1",
       "ACST2",
       "ACST15A",
       "ACST15B",
       "ACRM1"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "guides/consent.md",
       "guides/privacy-by-design.md",
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.countAppUse",
       "services.email.enabled.accountDeletionScheduled",
       "services.email.enabled.accountDeletionReminder"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "event",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "service-info-conventions",
       "client-data-conventions",
       "data-retention-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Account transfer (implemented, not released): the holder is told, at entry and in the confirmation, when and how the operator may read a beneficiary's name and date of birth",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": null
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.14",
     "title": "Information to be provided where data have not been obtained from the data subject",
     "text": "Same disclosures as Art.13, provided within reasonable period\n(≤1 month, or at first communication / first disclosure if sooner).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "When you ingest data into\nPryv from third parties (not directly from the subject), you\nstill owe the same disclosures as Art.13. Pryv lets you record\nthe disclosure artefact alongside the data, same as direct\ncollection (`access.clientData` or a `consent/*` event), and\nthe audit log proves when disclosure happened, useful when\nthe 1-month / first-contact deadlines come into question.\n",
     "detail": "Where the data came from (the source) is an Art.14(2)(f) disclosure\nitem, record it in `event.clientData.source` or in a dedicated\nprovenance stream. Together with the access carrying the\ndisclosure-notice text, you have the full Art.14 artefact set\nretrievable per subject.\n\n**Planned, implemented and not released: account transfer to a\nbeneficiary** (the release after account auto-deletion). The\naccount holder, not the beneficiary, enters the beneficiary's\nemail and, optionally, name and date of birth: data not obtained\nfrom the data subject. The holder chooses when the beneficiary is\ntold:\n  - `notifyBeneficiary: atSetup`: an email when named, saying\n    who named them, what it means, the name / date-of-birth\n    conditions if given, with a single-use decline link. This is\n    the first-communication route of §3(b).\n  - `notifyBeneficiary: atTrigger`: the first contact is the\n    claim email at the deadline, which carries the same\n    information. Kept as an option by product decision, it rests\n    on §5(b) (informing earlier would defeat the holder's wish to\n    keep the arrangement private while they use the account),\n    with the safeguards that paragraph asks for: only the email\n    required, the rest optional, encrypted and unreadable before\n    the trigger, erased on cancellation, and the feature\n    described publicly in your privacy notice. **Unconfirmed**:\n    §5(b) is read narrowly by supervisory authorities; have your\n    DPO or counsel confirm it for the jurisdictions you serve\n    before your platform offers the transfer. The design has no\n    switch restricting holders to `atSetup`; ask for one before\n    the transfer release if you need it.\n\nFull analysis: `context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`,\n\"Planned: transfer to a beneficiary\".\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "event",
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-retention-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Account transfer to a beneficiary (implemented, not released): the beneficiary is informed when named (atSetup) or at the claim (atTrigger, resting on an Art.14(5)(b) analysis that is not yet confirmed)",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": null
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.15",
     "title": "Right of access by the data subject",
     "text": "Right to obtain confirmation, access, copy of personal data +\nsupplementary information (purposes, recipients, retention, rights,\nsource, automated decisions).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Your subject, holding a personal token, reads everything via the\nstandard Pryv API, events, streams, accesses (with full history),\naudit records. The supplementary information (purposes, recipients)\nis in `access.clientData` when you recorded it there. For\nready-made bundling, the `pryv-account-backup` npm tool walks the\nsubject's API endpoints and produces a downloadable folder,\noperator-independent (the subject runs it with their own\ncredentials).\n",
     "detail": "Subject-side reads via standard endpoints (all reachable on v2):\n  - `events.get`: all events\n  - `streams.get`: all streams\n  - `accesses.get ?includeHistory=true`: accesses + version chain\n    (deleted accesses with `includeDeletions`, kept until the\n    account is deleted unless the operator sets\n    `accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays`, opt-in since\n    open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56)\n  - `events.get ?streams=[':_audit:*']`: audit log (the dedicated\n    `/audit/logs` route was removed 2026-06-15; audit is a regular\n    datastore mounted on the `:_audit:*` streams)\n  - `webhooks.get`: webhook subscriptions\n  - `GET /events/<id>/series`: HF data points per series-event\nAttachments downloadable via the events API.\n\nRecipients that are OAuth2 apps are named by Pryv itself: the\ngrant and sessions of an operator-registered client carry\n`clientData.oauth.client` (`name`, `origin: \"operator\"`, since\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.80), as those of a client metadata document\ndo (`name`, `host`, `url`, since rc.74), written by the server and\nnot changeable by any client, so the subject's `accesses.get`\nnames the app, not only its `oauth-grant:<clientId>` access name\n`[OCMP22]`, `[OCMDE15]`.\n\nHow much each recipient used its grant: since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.84 the subject's `accesses.get` and `accesses.getOne`\nreturn, on each access and each deletion record, a `usage` object:\napproximate lifetime call counts per API method, also summed as\nreads, writes, session and other calls `[AUG1]`, `[AUG2]`,\n`[AUG4]`. Only the account owner's personal token (or a delegate's\npersonal access) receives it; an app or shared access never sees\nthe counts of other accesses `[AUG3]`. The counts need\n`accessTracking.isActive` (on by default) `[AUG6]`. They summarise;\nthe audit log stays the record of each call. The reference account\napp (app-web-user-account 0.34.0) shows them on each access's\nActivity card, with a link to an Audit trail tab filtered by app,\naccess, date or kind of call. Over time: since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.86 the same personal callers can call `audit.getSummary`,\nwhich counts the audited calls per hour, day or week over a period\n(reads, writes, session, other calls, errors), for the whole\naccount or for chosen accesses `[ASM1]`, `[ASM2]`, `[ASM3]`; app and\nshared callers are refused `[ASM4]`. It is computed from the audit\nlog, which stays the record.\n\n`pryv-account-backup` v0.6.0 (shipped 2026-06-15; preceded by\nv0.4.0 2026-05-27 + v0.5.0 2026-06-13) covers, via its CLI flavour,\nevery read-side resource: account, profiles, app profiles,\nstreams, accesses (current + revoked/expired + opt-in per-access\nversion history), events (monthly-chunked initial + incremental\nvia `modifiedSince`), audit-as-events, HF series data points,\nwebhooks, attachments, plus a per-file sha256 integrity manifest.\nThe Art.15(1)(c) disclosure-history elements are in the raw export\nby default. The DSAR-completeness work is fully shipped,\n`proposals/account-backup-dsar-completeness.md` is `Status:\nSHIPPED`, all chips discharged. (The browser-webapp flavour omits\nattachments / HF series / webhooks / manifest, route subjects\nneeding those to the CLI.)\n",
     "technical": "Personal-token scope is the user's full namespace; no special\nendpoint. Implementers typically wrap this with a small subject-\nportal app (see `samples/get-a-copy-of-my-data/` proposal in\n`samples/README.md`). For ad-hoc DSARs the `pryv-account-backup`\ntool is the no-code path. Coverage matrix +\noperational-guidance-for-today live at\n`context/account-backup-coverage.md`.\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV",
       "OCMP22",
       "OCMDE15",
       "AUG1",
       "AUG3",
       "AUG4",
       "ASM1",
       "ASM2",
       "ASM3",
       "ASM4"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays",
       "accessTracking.isActive"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "stream",
       "event",
       "audit",
       "account-backup-tool"
      ],
      "samples": [
       "who-has-access-to-my-data"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "account-backup-coverage"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.16",
     "title": "Right to rectification",
     "text": "Right to have inaccurate personal data rectified without undue delay.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`events.update` rectifies an event, and the audit log records who\nrectified which event and when. The prior (inaccurate) value is\nkept for traceability only if your deployment sets\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`; by default the update\noverwrites it. Set it if you must be able to show what was\ncorrected.\n",
     "detail": "Rectification mechanics:\n\n- **API**: `events.update` (PUT /events/:id) writes the new\n  value; with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` it first keeps\n  the previous version as a history row (both built-in stores,\n  PostgreSQL and SQLite; default `false`). The route validates\n  the updated payload through the same ajv-draft-04 pipeline\n  as `events.create` (`components/api-server/src/methods/\n  events.ts:564` middleware chain), so a \"rectification\"\n  that itself fails schema validation is rejected, you\n  can't replace one inaccurate value with another that\n  violates the type's structural constraints.\n- **History retrieval**: `GET /events/:id?includeHistory=true`\n  returns the version chain the store kept: the prior versions\n  on a deployment with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`, an\n  empty `history` otherwise. The history is queried via\n  `mall.events.getHistory(userId, eventId)` and exposed at the\n  implementer's API surface when requested.\n- **Audit trail**: every `events.update` call is in the\n  audited methods set (`components/audit/src/ApiMethods.ts`).\n  The audit row records the access, the time and the method,\n  plus the event's key (id and new modification time) and the\n  integrity hash of the event as written; per the\n  audit-minimality posture (Q9), the request body is NOT\n  captured. So who rectified which event and when is on\n  record on every deployment, but the prior value exists only\n  in the event history, which is opt-in. Where the value\n  before correction must be demonstrable, set\n  `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`, or have your app record\n  the correction as a new event that references the old one.\n  See `context/event-history.md`.\n- **Detection of inaccuracy**: out of scope at the platform\n  layer. Pryv enforces structural validity at ingest (ajv\n  schema validation); semantic inaccuracy detection is the\n  implementer's app responsibility. See\n  `context/data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": false,
     "reviewed_at": "2026-06-19",
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "PTU1"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history",
       "data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.17",
     "title": "Right to erasure (\"right to be forgotten\")",
     "text": "Right to obtain erasure without undue delay where one of six\nconditions applies (no longer necessary, withdrawn consent, no\nlegal basis, etc.).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-user erasure is a single API call (`system.users.delete`).\nWhether erasure extends to your backups depends on the storage\nengine you chose, SQLite per-user folders are deletable from\nfilesystem backups; PostgreSQL requires a backup-rotation\npolicy to complete erasure.\n",
     "detail": "Per-engine behaviour for the live data:\n  - SQLite, each user is a separate file under the user-data\n    directory. File deletion removes the user from filesystem\n    backups (depending on your backup tool's per-file semantics).\n  - PostgreSQL, row-level erasure only. Backups are\n    DB-engine-level snapshots; per-user erasure within a backup\n    file requires either backup rotation (oldest pruned per\n    policy) or a backup-rewriting procedure you build yourself.\n\nEvent attachments follow your `storages.file.engine` choice\n(filesystem / s3 / postgresql, the latter two since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.2). Account deletion routes attachment removal through\nthe fileStorage interface, so live copies are erased on all\nthree engines. Backup residue differs per engine: filesystem\nattachment directories follow your file-backup tool's semantics;\nS3 buckets may retain deleted-object versions (disable\nversioning or add a lifecycle rule if erasure must extend\nthere); PostgreSQL-stored attachments live in the same\n`pg_dump` artefacts as user rows, so the backup-rotation policy\nabove covers them with no extra step.\n\nErasure here is **caller-triggered**, the subject (or operator\non their behalf) issues the DELETE call, or **scheduled** by the\nsubject or by your inactivity preset (account auto-deletion,\nbelow). Event-level and stream-level scheduled erasure under\nArt.5(1)(e) \"storage limitation\" stays operator-owned by design,\nsee Art.5 detail + `context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`\nfor the retention-job pattern that composes `events.delete` +\n`auth.delete` + the audit log.\n\nAccount auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`). The data subject schedules the erasure of their\nown account (`account.setAutoDeletion`, from the reference\naccount app): at a date, or after a period without use. That is\ntheir own erasure request (§1(a): they judge the account no\nlonger necessary; §1(b): where your processing rests on consent,\nthe schedule is a withdrawal that takes effect at a date), not a\nretention rule of yours. Arming or bringing a deletion nearer\nneeds the account password (`[ACST3]`, `[ACST4]`); a delegate can\nread the schedule but not set it (`[ACST5]`); a holder can\nschedule only what they could do directly (the `delete` action\nis offered where `user-account.delete` lists `personalToken`,\n`[ACST10]`; a deletion the holder chose waits if self-deletion\nwas withdrawn since, `[ADSW27]`); every change is confirmed by\nmail (`[ACST15A]`) and reminders precede the deletion. At the\ndeadline the core's sweep re-reads the account's use (a use\nbetween evaluation and erasure wins, `[ADSW16]`), runs the same\ndeletion guards (a refusal holds the erasure and is mailed once,\n`[ADSW8]`) and the same erasure as `auth.delete` (relationships\ntorn down, audit per `audit.onUserDelete`), logs it\nbefore and after, and with `audit.onUserDelete: keep` writes an\n`account.autoDeletion.erase` row in the account's trail first\n(`[ADSW17]`). An erasure interrupted halfway, by the sweep or by\na direct `auth.delete`, is completed at a later pass\n(`[ADSW19]`); `account.autoDeletion.maxDeletionsPerPass` (20)\ncaps a pass (`[ADSW12]`). An operator preset (Art.5 §1(e)) uses\nthe same path. See `context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`,\n\"Account-level auto-deletion\", and the operator page\n`customer-resources/account-auto-deletion`.\n\n`bin/backup.js` supports per-user backup files alongside DB-engine\nbackups; using per-user backups improves erasure semantics\nregardless of engine.\n\nIncremental `bin/backup.js` chains (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51): a run\nmade without `--user` records that it covers the whole core, and a\nrestore drops any account such a run no longer lists, so an account\nerased between two runs is not re-created by restoring the chain\n(the dropped names are logged) `[BKCU1]`, `[BKIC4]`. The earlier\nruns still hold its data: `--through-run <runId>` of a run that held\nit restores it as of then, and `--inspect` lists the accounts deleted\nalong the chain. Erasure reaches the chain only when you retire the\nruns that hold the account, so put chain retention in the same\nrotation policy as the rest of your backups. Since 2.0.0-rc.86 an\naccount erased while a full backup runs is left out of that run\n(earlier releases backed it up empty and created its directory and\nempty databases again on disk) `[BKDU1]`.\n\nAudit-log erasure converges across engines (since 2026-05-27,\nopen-pryv.io master `891090d` + `853e1cb`). `auth.delete` now\nincludes an explicit `deleteAuditDataStorage` middleware that\ncalls `auditStorage.deleteUser(userId)` regardless of the\nconfigured audit engine. SQLite + PostgreSQL audit deployments\nconverge on the same end-state: zero audit rows for the deleted\nsubject. The `[USAD]` test suite asserts engine-agnostically via\n`auditStorage.forUser(userId).countEvents() === 0`.\n\nOperator setting `audit.onUserDelete` (shipped in `405b3a1`)\ngates the behaviour:\n  - `erase` (default), runs the audit erasure (GDPR Art.17 /\n    CCPA §1798.105 / PIPEDA Principle 4.5 default).\n  - `keep`: skips the wipe with an info-log. For HIPAA\n    §164.316(b)(2)(i) (6-year audit retention), MDR Art.10(8)\n    (10-year device-history retention), or any regime keeping the\n    audit under a separate lawful basis (GDPR Art.17(3)(b)). The\n    operator documents the retention in their DPIA.\n  - `pseudonymise`: REFUSED AT BOOT by `config/plugins/config-\n    validation.js`. The `auth.randomAlias` primitive it builds on\n    has now shipped (`accesses.create {randomAlias:true}`); the\n    audit-row PII null-out mode itself (composing the alias into\n    audit records while preserving forensic value) is still the\n    outstanding piece before this mode can be enabled.\n\n`keep` holds on both audit engines since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.46:\non the SQLite audit engine the per-user audit database file stays\nat its path in the user directory, readable by user id, and\neverything else in the directory is removed `[DKP1]` (before\n2.0.0-rc.46 the directory wipe erased it, so `keep` behaved like\n`erase` there; open-pryv.io#154).\n\nWhat an account deletion reaches, as of open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.50\n(fixes from the 2026 code-level security review,\n`context/code-security-review-2026.md`):\n  - **High-frequency series under every name of the account**: its\n    username, each alias and every former username (a username\n    change keeps the former name as an alias), whichever name the\n    deletion is addressed by (2.0.0-rc.47) `[DLN1]`, `[DLN4]`; the\n    series are dropped again as the last step, so points written\n    during the deletion do not survive it (2.0.0-rc.50) `[DLLW1]`.\n    Before 2.0.0-rc.47 a deletion addressed by an alias, or made\n    after a username change, left series behind.\n  - **Relationships with other accounts** (2.0.0-rc.47): as a\n    delegate, its tokens, control accesses and what it granted\n    through the delegation are removed on each controlled account\n    `[DADL02]`; each CMC counterparty receives the revocation a\n    consent withdrawal sends and deletes the access it held\n    `[CN82]`. Never holding the deletion; an account on another\n    core needs that core to run 2.0.0-rc.47 or later. Unlike a\n    consent withdrawal's notice, which the retry loop re-sends\n    since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53\n    (https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/157), these\n    notices are sent once and not queued (no account is left to\n    hold them): a counterparty that could not be reached keeps\n    the access it held (whose token the erased account held)\n    until it expires or is deleted there. A deleted group account\n    (group accounts over CMC, 2.0.0-rc.53) first has its members'\n    accesses on patient accounts deleted through the patients'\n    grants, with no record kept `[GA40]`, `[MR28]`.\n  - **Webhooks stop at once** (2.0.0-rc.50) `[DLWH1]`, and pending\n    password-reset requests of every name are destroyed\n    (2.0.0-rc.47) `[RPLC13]`.\n  - **One refusal** (2.0.0-rc.50): `DELETE /users/:username` with\n    the account's personal token is refused while the account is\n    the delegate of an account that has no email (that account\n    would be left with no way in); setting an email on it lifts\n    the refusal, and a deletion with the admin key goes through\n    and is logged `[DADL08]`.\n  - **External ids are released** (2.0.0-rc.58,\n    `external-id-index` primitive): the account's links to\n    third-party record ids are removed from its home core and from\n    the platform index at once, so the same record id can be\n    linked to another account, and the erasure keeps no trace of\n    them `[XIDD2]`. A failure at that step does not stop the\n    deletion: the rows it leaves point at an account that no longer\n    exists, and `bin/reconcile-user-cores.js --ext-ids` releases\n    them. The index never held the record id itself. From 2.0.0-rc.60 the per-user\n    backup carries the account's ids (namespace, blinded value,\n    claim date): restoring an erased account from such a backup\n    links them again, unless another account has claimed one\n    since, which keeps it `[XIDBK1]`, `[XIDBK2]`. Erasure reaches\n    those ids in your backups when you retire the backups that\n    hold the account, as for the rest of its data.\nIf you erased accounts on earlier releases after a username\nchange or through an alias, check the series storage for\nleftovers under the former names.\n\nPersonal data left by a failed or interrupted registration can\nsit under no finished account, out of reach of\n`system.users.delete`. From the release after open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.87, `bin/reconcile-user-cores.js --registrations`\nclears such account fields and, when you name it, erases an\nindexed account left without a password through the account\ndeletion's erasure `[RCRG1]`, `[RCRG3]`; use it when such a\nperson asks for erasure. Details and safeguards under Art.5\n§1(e).\n",
     "technical": "Tested via `[USAD]`\n(`open-pryv.io/components/api-server/test/deletion-seq.test.js`,\nexercises the `user-account.delete` config-dependent path).\nPipeline source: `components/business/src/auth/deletion.ts`\n(`deleteAuditData` step) + `components/api-server/src/methods/\nauth/delete.ts` (middleware registration).\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "USAD",
       "DKP1",
       "DLN1",
       "DLN4",
       "DLLW1",
       "DADL02",
       "CN82",
       "DLWH1",
       "RPLC13",
       "DADL08",
       "BKCU1",
       "BKIC4",
       "GA40",
       "MR28",
       "XIDD2",
       "XIDBK1",
       "XIDBK2",
       "ACST3",
       "ACST4",
       "ACST5",
       "ACST10",
       "ACST15A",
       "ADSW8",
       "ADSW12",
       "ADSW16",
       "ADSW17",
       "ADSW19",
       "ADSW27",
       "BKDU1",
       "RCRG1",
       "RCRG3"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine",
       "user-account.delete",
       "audit.onUserDelete",
       "account.autoDeletion.enabled",
       "account.autoDeletion.maxDeletionsPerPass"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "external-id-index",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "samples": [
       "scheduled-retention-job"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-retention-operator-owned",
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.18",
     "title": "Right to restriction of processing",
     "text": "Right to obtain restriction (data stored but not processed) in\ndefined circumstances.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Restriction is achieved by mutating the access, scope-down via\n`accesses.update` (narrower permissions) or full revoke via\n`accesses.delete`. Versioning preserves the pre-restriction state\nso the change is auditable. No dedicated \"restriction flag\", the\naccess mutation IS the restriction primitive.\n",
     "detail": "Article 18 envisions restriction as a temporary state where data\nis stored but not processed. With Pryv:\n  - Data continues to live in events / streams (unchanged).\n  - Processing (= API access through an access token) is restricted\n    by lowering the relevant access's `permissions` to `none` on\n    affected streams or by deleting the access.\n  - The access-version chain proves when the restriction took\n    effect and what state was in force before.\n\nYou may also surface a restriction flag in\n`access.clientData.restriction_reason` for record-keeping\n(Art.30 register entry).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "access.permissions"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.20",
     "title": "Right to data portability",
     "text": "Right to receive personal data concerning subject in structured,\ncommonly used, machine-readable format; right to transmit to\nanother controller.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`events.get` + `streams.get` return canonical JSON validated against\nthe data-types schemas, structured, commonly used, machine-readable.\nAttachments downloadable. No proprietary lock-in: another Pryv\noperator can import the data into a new account via standard\nwrite APIs.\n",
     "detail": "Export shape is the same JSON the data subject (or their delegated\napp) would see at any time via the API. You can wrap this in a\n\"download my data\" UI; the underlying primitive needs no special\nexport endpoint.\n\nAccount fields export as typed events too. Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.44 the account email stream returns the\naddress as `email/string` and, when requested by type, a\nread-only `verification/email` event that the server derives at\nread time (never stored, cannot be written). The latter is not portable: a\nwrite of it is refused, and the receiving deployment derives its\nown from how the address is proved there. Account events also carry the time their value was\nset (they carried the read time), so an incremental export with\n`modifiedSince` fetches them only when they changed.\n\nDirect controller-to-controller transmission (§2) is supported via\nthe CMC capability flow: a single-event-scoped capability access\nmints a URL the receiving controller can read once.\n\n**Portability of custom event types**: deployments using a\ncustom event-type catalogue (via `service.eventTypes`, see\n`context/custom-event-type-catalogues.md`) export the same\ncanonical JSON shape for custom types as for upstream\n`pryv/data-types` types, they're first-class in the\nvalidation + serialisation pipeline. Receiving Pryv.io\ndeployments that ship the same catalogue (or a superset)\ncan import the events without loss. A receiving deployment\nwithout the custom catalogue would reject unknown types at\nwrite-time validation, the implementer ensures schema\nalignment between transmitting + receiving operators when\nrelying on §2 controller-to-controller transmission.\n\n**Calendar interoperability (adapter):** beyond raw JSON, Pryv\ndata can be exposed in a ubiquitous interchange standard. The\ncalendar adapter serves selected events as an iCalendar\n(RFC 5545) subscription feed any calendar client can read, and\ningests an external iCalendar feed back into Pryv as\n`calendar/ical-event` events (well-known fields in structured\n`content`, the verbatim VEVENT in `clientData._raw`). Adapters\nare discoverable via the `/service/info` `adapters` field. This\nwidens portability from machine-readable JSON to a standard the\nsubject's existing tools already consume, lowering the\nimplementer's integration burden.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "EGSQ",
       "ATM03",
       "SIB08",
       "SIB10"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "data-types",
       "account-backup-tool"
      ],
      "samples": [
       "cross-account-share"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "custom-event-type-catalogues"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.21",
     "title": "Right to object",
     "text": "Right to object to processing based on legitimate interests or\npublic interest; absolute right to object to direct marketing.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv doesn't do profiling or marketing itself, but if your\napp does either using Pryv-stored data, your subjects have\nthe right to object. **The mechanism is the same as Art.7(3)\nwithdrawal (Q19)**, `DELETE /accesses/:id` or\n`accesses.update` to narrow permissions; Pryv's primitives\nare basis-agnostic. The legal distinction between Art.21\nobjection (legitimate-interests / public-interest basis) and\nArt.7(3) withdrawal (consent basis) is semantic, not\ntechnical. Record the objection on the access's `clientData`\nper the consolidated convention catalogue at\n`context/client-data-conventions.md`.\n",
     "detail": "For direct marketing (absolute right per §2), the typical pattern is:\n  - Subject submits objection (via your app's UI).\n  - You record the objection event (e.g., a custom\n    `consent/object-marketing` event or a flag in\n    `account.clientData.marketing_objection`).\n  - You revoke or narrow the access used by the marketing process\n    → versioned, auditable.\n  - Subsequent marketing-process runs see the access is gone /\n    narrowed → no processing happens.\n\nFor Art.21(1) objections (legitimate interests / public interest),\nsame pattern; you also need a \"compelling legitimate grounds\"\nreview process before deciding to override the objection.\nRecord the operator-side review outcome on the access's\n`clientData.objection_outcome` (one of `\"honoured\"`,\n`\"overridden_compelling_grounds\"`, `\"out_of_scope\"`) plus\na free-text `clientData.objection_rationale` pointing at\nthe legal-basis document, both versioned + audit-traceable\nvia access-versioning (`context/access-versioning.md`).\n\nFor Art.21(5) transparency (\"right to object presented\nclearly and separately from any other information at the\ntime of the first communication\"), same convention family\nas Art.7 consent text: persist the notice on\n`clientData.objection_notice` so the version chain proves\nwhat the subject was told when the access was minted.\nSee `context/client-data-conventions.md` for the full\ncatalogue.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "client-data-conventions",
       "access-versioning"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.19",
     "title": "Notification obligation regarding rectification / erasure / restriction",
     "text": "Controller shall communicate any rectification, erasure or\nrestriction of processing carried out per Art. 16-18 to each\nrecipient to whom the personal data have been disclosed, unless\nimpossible or disproportionate effort.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The recipients are derivable\nfrom Pryv data, the accesses the controller has minted to\nthird parties. When you exercise an Art. 16-18 action that\naffects events held by those recipients, iterate the active\naccesses and notify each holder out-of-band. For CMC-paired\ncounterparties, the `consent/revoke-cmc` or a custom\n`notification/rectification` event provides a structured\nnotification channel.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.16",
       "gdpr.Art.17",
       "gdpr.Art.18"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.22",
     "title": "Automated individual decision-making, including profiling",
     "text": "Data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision based\nsolely on automated processing (including profiling) which\nproduces legal effects concerning them or similarly significantly\naffects them. Three exceptions in §2 (contract, EU/MS law, explicit\nconsent); §3 + §4 add safeguards (human intervention, special-\ncategory restrictions).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv doesn't run automated\ndecisions, that's your application logic. What Pryv contributes\nwhen Art.22 applies: (1) the audit log proves which inputs were\nread for the decision; (2) the decision output can be written\nas a Pryv event with the input reference + the decision logic\nversion captured in `clientData`, making \"human intervention\"\nrequests tractable (the subject can locate the specific decision\nrecord); (3) the consent basis for §2(c) lives on the access's\nclientData like every other consent record.\n",
     "detail": "Recommended pattern when you run Art.22 processing:\n  - Mint a dedicated access for the automated-decision app with\n    `clientData.processing_purpose = \"automated_decision_making\"`\n    + `clientData.art22_basis = \"(a) contract\" | \"(b) law\" | \"(c) consent\"`.\n  - Write the decision output as an event on a designated\n    `decisions/*` stream with `clientData.input_audit_ref` pointing\n    back to the audit-row range that fed it + `decision_logic_version`.\n  - When a subject requests human intervention, your portal looks\n    up that event and presents the trail to the human reviewer.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "event",
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.24",
     "title": "Responsibility of the controller",
     "text": "Taking into account the nature, scope, context, purposes of\nprocessing + risks for rights and freedoms of natural persons,\ncontroller shall implement appropriate technical + organisational\nmeasures to ensure and demonstrate processing is performed in\naccordance with the Regulation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Art. 24 is the umbrella\ncontroller-accountability obligation that ties every other\nChapter-IV row together. Pryv contributes the technical-\nmeasures substrate (this matrix enumerates it explicitly) +\nthe technical-measures demonstrability (audit log + access\nversion chain are the evidence layer). The organisational-\nmeasures programme is yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "gdpr.Art.25",
       "gdpr.Art.32",
       "gdpr.Art.30"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "MFA",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.26",
     "title": "Joint controllers",
     "text": "Where two or more controllers jointly determine purposes and\nmeans of processing, they are joint controllers. They shall, in\na transparent manner, determine their respective responsibilities\nfor compliance with the Regulation by means of an arrangement.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "**CMC is NOT a joint-controller pattern by default.** Pryv's\nCMC primitive requires **subject validation**, User A's\n`consent/accept-cmc` event is what authorises any cross-account\ndata flow to User B's operator. Each operator remains the\n**sole controller** for their respective user's data; the\nlawful basis for B's processing of A's data is A's CMC\nconsent record (Art.6(1)(a)), not a controller-to-controller\nagreement. This is controller-to-controller transmission\n*via subject consent* (Art.20(2) lineage), not Art.26 joint\ncontrollership. Real Art.26 fires only if Operator-X +\nOperator-Y separately decide to jointly process a category\nof subjects' data, outside the CMC primitive.\n",
     "detail": "**Art.26 test**: \"two or more controllers JOINTLY determine\npurposes and means\". In a CMC share:\n  - The **purpose** is declared in A's\n    `consent/request-cmc` event (or accepted from B's\n    request), A determines whether to consent.\n  - The **means** are A's access permissions + B's access\n    scope, both anchored to A's accept event.\n  - Neither operator decides on behalf of both;\n    subject A is the determiner.\n\nSo a CMC share does NOT trigger Art.26. It's covered by:\n  - **Art.6(1)(a)** (consent), A's consent is the lawful\n    basis for B's operator to process A's data.\n  - **Art.20(2)** (data portability, transmit to another\n    controller), the act of CMC delivery is \"transmission\n    to another controller\" with subject's consent.\n  - **Art.13/14** (transparency), each operator carries\n    their own transparency obligation to their respective\n    user; A's operator informs A about who receives the\n    data; B's operator informs B about what data they\n    received + the lawful basis (A's consent).\n\n**Where Art.26 actually applies**: when two operators run a\njoint research programme, joint health platform, or\nshared-purpose service where both decide on processing\nindependently of subjects' individual choices. In that\ncase, the arrangement IS the operator-side contract;\nPryv's contribution is `clientData.joint_controller_arrangement`\non the relevant accesses (point to the written agreement)\n+ the \"essence\" of the arrangement in\n`clientData.privacy_notice` for Art.26(2). This is\noperator-edited metadata, no Pryv primitive enforces it.\n\nFull CMC-vs-Art.26 reasoning in\n`context/cmc-consent-primitives.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "cmc-consent-primitives"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.27",
     "title": "Representative of controllers / processors not established in the Union",
     "text": "Where Art. 3(2) applies, controller or processor not established\nin the Union shall designate in writing a representative in the\nUnion, except where processing is occasional, doesn't include\nlarge-scale special-category data, etc.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Representative designation is a contractual + regulatory\nregistration step. No software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.29",
     "title": "Processing under the authority of the controller or processor",
     "text": "Processor and any person acting under the authority of the\ncontroller or processor, who has access to personal data, shall\nnot process those data except on instructions from the controller.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "\"Only on instructions\" is\nenforced operationally through the access primitive, workforce\n/ contractor / app accesses are scoped to specific streams +\nlevels per the controller's instructions, and the audit log\nproves what was actually done. Violations show as out-of-scope\naccess attempts or unauthorized method calls in the audit data.\n",
     "detail": "Where a workforce shares one access, the audit log ties an action\nto a person through the `callerId` your app forwards; see\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 1.\n\n**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nFor a team sharing one account (the controller's or its\nprocessor's) that reaches data subjects through cross-account\nconsent, each member processes a subject's data under an access\nof their own: issued only through a membership the group's\nadministrator approved `[GA01]`, limited to the member's team\nstreams and to the stream permissions of the subject's consent\n`[GA12]`, `[GA15]`, named on the subject's account (the member\nand the group stamped by the subject's core) and audited under\nits own id `[GA10]`, and deleted when the membership ends\n`[GA20]`. The instructions themselves (who may join, which teams\nthey get) stay the controller's. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "CMCGA",
       "GA01",
       "GA10",
       "GA12",
       "GA15",
       "GA20"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.25",
     "title": "Data protection by design and by default",
     "text": "Controller shall implement technical + organisational measures\ndesigned to integrate data-protection principles; default settings\nshall be privacy-protective.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's whole\narchitecture leans privacy-by-design, per-user storage\nisolation, stream-scoped permissions, separate personal/app/\nshared access types, privileged data on system streams. Your\ndefaults (token scopes, audit-on, retention) are the part still\nin your hands.\n",
     "detail": "Pryv's architecture is privacy-by-design **by founding\npattern**, not retrofitted. Canonical treatment + the\n12-default catalogue:\n`context/privacy-by-design-and-default.md` (matrix-internal);\ncustomer-facing surface\n[`pryv.github.io/guides/privacy-by-design.html`](https://pryv.github.io/guides/privacy-by-design.html).\n\n**Architectural commitment (§1)**: the topology:\nData Governance + Access Control + Audit-per-Subject as\nseparate layers that every process traverses; not direct\npersonal-data access with after-the-fact audit (the PbD\nanti-pattern). Process registry is self-documented via\n`GET /accesses` + audit log (= the Art.30 records-of-\nprocessing register, derivable on demand).\n\n**Data-model commitment**: streams + events segregated\nby data-subject AND context. Granular consent (each\naccess targets a specific stream subtree, not a wall of\ntables); adapt data collection per subject without schema\nmigration. Substrate for Art.5(1)(c) minimisation +\nArt.7 granular consent + Art.17 erasure + Art.20\nportability.\n\n**By-default catalogue (§2)**: 12 platform defaults that\nsatisfy \"by default, only data necessary for each\nspecific purpose are processed\":\n\n1. **Default-deny on permissions** (empty `permissions: []`).\n2. **Audit-on by default** (invariant, no opt-out).\n3. **TLS enforced** (optional Let's Encrypt integration).\n4. **Hosting region pinned per user** (Q12 architectural\n   residency).\n5. **Stream-permission granularity** (Q22, no \"public\"\n   tier exists).\n6. **Data-minimal audit** (Q9, never captures request\n   body).\n7. **Schema validation at ingest** (Q21, ajv-draft-04\n   rejects out-of-shape payloads by default).\n8. **Zero mandatory subprocessors** (Q23, every\n   integration opt-in).\n9. **Audit-minimal logger** (Q23, `inspectAndHide`\n   credential redaction invariant, `[BIH1-6]` tests).\n10. **CMC requires explicit subject consent**\n    (`consent/accept-cmc` blocking). Since open-pryv.io\n    2.0.0-rc.38 the channels it opens are bounded by that\n    consent too: the person's accept may narrow the offer's\n    `features` but never widen them, and a relationship without\n    chat gets no chat stream or chat permission on either side\n    `[HA43]`, `[HA44]`, `[CN62]`, `[CN63]`. Chat and system\n    messaging are on unless your offer turns them off, so\n    leaving out a channel your purpose does not need is your\n    offer-design choice.\n11. **PlatformDB encrypted secrets** (LE + observability\n    patterns).\n12. **Withdrawal API exists by default** (Q19,\n    `DELETE /accesses/:id` always available).\n\n**Still in your hands (Art.25 §2, operator's\nby-default settings)**:\n  - Are app tokens minted with the smallest possible scope?\n  - Is your subject's notice-of-collection on by default?\n  - Is data retention set to the shortest necessary period?\n    One retention Pryv applies for you on request: since\n    open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56 the deletion records of accesses\n    (kept by default until the account is deleted) are purged\n    once a day past `accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays`\n    `[ADP1]`, `[ADR5]`; past it an audit row names such an access\n    by id only, so weigh minimisation against attribution.\n    Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66 (`8521c8d5`), account\n    auto-deletion makes the retention of accounts a setting. Its\n    default deletes nothing (no operator preset, `[ACCF1]`;\n    accounts without a policy get no schedule, `[ACXP13]`); you\n    may set an inactivity preset\n    (`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays`) as your\n    retention rule, and each holder may schedule their own\n    account's deletion. A preset's clock starts the day it first\n    applies to an account (`[ACXP2]`), reminders and a 7-day\n    minimum notice precede every deletion (`[ACXP8]`),\n    `dryRun: true` shows what a preset would do before you arm it\n    (`[ADSW13]`), and `maxDeletionsPerPass` caps the deletions of\n    one pass (`[ADSW12]`).\n  - Is your auth UI surface using the opt-in pattern\n    (privacy-by-default UX from the dev-site\n    reference) rather than the standard \"by continuing\n    you agree\" anti-pattern?\n\nCross-service identity by design (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58,\n`external-id-index` primitive,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/161): when several\nof your services know a person by the same third-party record id\n(an EHR patient id), they can find the one account linked to it\nwithout the platform ever holding the id. Each service sends a\nvalue it blinds with its own namespace key; the replicated index\nmaps that value to a core, never to an account; only the\naccount's personal token can link or unlink it, and no response,\nlog line or audit record carries the value `[XIDC1]`, `[XIDC2]`,\n`[XIDG1]`. The lookup is unauthenticated and budgeted per address\n`[XIDLU1]`, `[XIDLU2]`. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.59 an\ninvitation can be record-bound (forced mode): the app receives a\ncredential only for the account that holds the id, checked by the\nserver when the sign-in is accepted, and the sign-in never links\nan id by itself `[XIDFF1]`, `[XIDFF3]`, `[XIDFF4]`. Whoever holds a\nblinded value before the person claims it can claim it first with\nanother account (a denial, never a data flow); from 2.0.0-rc.60 your administrator can\nremove such a link with the admin key, and the account that held\nit is told by mail and in its own audit trail `[XIDAR1]`,\n`[XIDAR3]`. What stays yours: who holds the namespace key (every\nholder can look up and claim ids of that namespace), the decision\nto release an id and the reason you give the holder, and, if you\nneed the plaintext record id, keeping it as ordinary data in the\nperson's own account. Public boundary statement:\n[External ids](https://pryv.github.io/customer-resources/external-ids/).\n\nPrivacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) catalogued in the\ndev-site guide: pseudonymisation (partial, `ALIASES`\nbacklog upgrades), proxy re-encryption (`E2E-ENCRYPTION`\nbacklog + the github.com/perki/test-proxy-re-encrypt PoC),\nhomomorphic encryption + differential privacy + MPC\n(out-of-scope at platform layer; implementer's enrichment\npath).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ADP1",
       "ADR5",
       "XIDC1",
       "XIDC2",
       "XIDG1",
       "XIDLU1",
       "XIDLU2",
       "XIDFF1",
       "XIDFF3",
       "XIDFF4",
       "XIDAR1",
       "XIDAR3",
       "ACCF1",
       "ACXP2",
       "ACXP13",
       "ADSW12",
       "ADSW13",
       "ACXP8"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.dryRun",
       "account.autoDeletion.maxDeletionsPerPass"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "external-id-index",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "privacy-by-design-and-default"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.28",
     "title": "Processor",
     "text": "Where processing is to be carried out on behalf of a controller,\nthe controller shall use only processors providing sufficient\nguarantees to implement appropriate technical + organisational\nmeasures. Processing by a processor shall be governed by a\ncontract setting out subject matter, duration, nature + purpose,\ntype of data, obligations and rights of the controller.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "When the Pryv operator and\nthe controller are distinct legal entities (typical SaaS\narrangement), the operator is the Art.28 processor. Pryv-the-\nsoftware provides the technical substrate the §1 \"sufficient\nguarantees\" evaluation rests on (this matrix enumerates it);\nthe data-processing-agreement (DPA) under §3 is the operator's\ncontract. Audit log + access primitives carry \"documented\ncontroller instructions\" (§3(a)) and the records that\ndemonstrate compliance (§3(h)).\n",
     "detail": "**Zero mandatory subprocessors.** Pryv-the-software ships with\nno required third-party-service relationships. The default\ndeployment (operator's chosen cloud provider only, opaque to\nPryv) has no sub-processors from the platform's perspective.\nEvery external integration is opt-in through config.\n\n**Opt-in integration inventory (§2 + §4 sub-processor list when\nactivated)**, see `context/subprocessor-posture-and-data-flow.md`\nfor code anchors + per-integration data-flow analysis:\n\n| Config gate | Subprocessor | What flows out |\n|---|---|---|\n| `letsEncrypt.enabled: true` | LE (or any `letsEncrypt.directoryUrl` ACME CA) | hostnames only for ACME challenges; **no user data** |\n| `services.email.smtp.*` | operator's SMTP relay | email + name + one-time tokens (templated bodies), PII. **Pryv recommends per-core SMTP configuration**, the `services.email.smtp.*` config block is per-core, so an EU core routes mail through an EU SMTP relay independently of a US core's relay. Use this when residency is a hard requirement (e.g., EU subjects' password-reset emails never touching a US-jurisdiction relay) |\n| `services.mfa.mode: enabled` + `sms.endpoints[*]` | operator's SMS provider | phone number + MFA code, PII |\n| `observability.enabled: true` + an OTLP endpoint | Whichever backend that endpoint belongs to, any OTLP-ingesting service, or none at all if it points at a collector the operator hosts | per-method metrics + sanitized error stack traces, built from a fixed allow-list before egress (see Layer 3 below) |\n| `service.eventTypes: https://...` | upstream catalogue host | **no personal data flows out**, fetch-only of JSON Schema fragments |\n\n**Let's Encrypt posture (operator clarification)**: ships as a\n**dev-platform facilitator**: the easy on-ramp for `*.pryv.me`-\nstyle dev clusters. **Production deployments should treat CA\nchoice as an operator decision.** Keep LE if its compliance\nposture matches yours, swap to a commercial CA / internal CA /\nair-gapped issuance pipeline if not. The ACME orchestrator\nreads `letsEncrypt.directoryUrl`, so any ACME-compatible CA\ndrops in without code changes.\n\n**Data-flow guarantees that limit subprocessor exposure**,\nthree real layers, each tested:\n\n1. **Audit-by-construction (Q9)**: audit captures method +\n   access ref + URL query (incl. content-query search values\n   on the GET path, see\n   `context/content-query-audit-semantics.md`) + integrity\n   hash; **never the request body**; `auth=` query-string\n   params stripped.\n   `components/audit/src/Audit.ts:151-166`.\n2. **Logger sanitization**: every `logger.{info,warn,error,\n   debug}` call passes args through `inspectAndHide`\n   (`components/boiler/src/logging.ts:253-298`): object keys\n   `password`/`passwordHash`/`newPassword` → `'(hidden\n   password)'`; string regex `auth=c[a-z0-9-]*` → `'auth=\n   (hidden)'`; serialised JSON password fields →\n   `'$1=(hidden)'`. Tested by `[BIH1]`-`[BIH6]` in\n   `components/api-server/test/boiler-inspectAndHide.test.js`\n   + `system-seq.test.js:533`. Honest scope: redacts\n   credentials, not PII broadly, emails / usernames / event\n   payloads only leak if a caller explicitly logs them.\n3. **Observability allow-list** (when observability is opted\n   into), telemetry is constructed by the platform from a\n   compile-time allow-list at\n   `components/business/src/observability/schema.ts` and\n   shipped over OTLP/HTTP. No vendor or OpenTelemetry SDK\n   runs in the process and nothing is auto-instrumented, so\n   the emitted surface is fixed in source rather than\n   filtered out of an agent's collection. Emitted:\n   per-API-method call counts, duration histograms and error\n   counts, labelled only with a method id from the platform's\n   own API registry, a status class and an error code from\n   the published error id list; service name and version,\n   core FQDN and worker index; and, for server-side faults,\n   the error class plus a stack trace with frames rewritten\n   repository-relative. Request URLs, query and route\n   parameters, bodies, headers, usernames, record identifiers,\n   log records and error **message** text have no key in the\n   schema and therefore no code path to the backend;\n   datapoints outside the vocabulary are dropped and counted.\n   Error reports are aggregated by fault and stamped at the\n   reporting interval rather than the instant of failure, and\n   the instance id is the machine hostname and never derived\n   from the service URL, so the two correlation handles that\n   would otherwise re-identify activity are removed. The\n   destination is a URL plus an auth header, so an operator\n   pointing it at a collector they host themselves has no\n   third-party processor here at all. Claim to rely on:\n   **anonymous by construction, with a residual correlation\n   risk at very low traffic volumes** (where one error in an\n   interval may be the only active user's). Where that\n   residual applies, treat the telemetry as personal data and\n   keep Art.28 in scope for an external destination.\n   ⚑ **Correction of record:** before 2026-07-27 this layer\n   was an in-process vendor agent whose scrubbing config lived\n   in a file the agent does not discover, so it was inert and\n   enabled deployments ran on vendor defaults (request URLs,\n   `Host`, route parameters carrying the username, forwarded\n   log records). That was fixed on 2026-07-27 and the agent\n   was then removed entirely, because a control that works by\n   enumerating what must not escape a collector that sees\n   everything is only as strong as that collector's defaults.\n   Full account:\n   `context/subprocessor-posture-and-data-flow.md`.\n\n**§3(g) deletion / return of personal data at the end of\nprovision**, `bin/backup.js` + `system.users.delete` cover\nboth directions.\n\n**§3(h) auditability**: the operator demonstrates compliance\npartly via Pryv's audit log + this compliance matrix\n(evidence-backed assertion structure).\n\n**Future: machine-readable subprocessor inventory**: the\nplanned `GET /system/admin/config/effective` admin route\n(`CONFIG-EFFECTIVE-EXPOSURE` per `UPDATE-TRIGGERS.md`) will\nexpose the merged effective config per core as a single JSON\nartefact the operator's DPA register + Art.30\nrecords-of-processing pipeline can consume directly. Until\nthen, the operator reads `override-config.yml` + per-host\noverlays + identifies non-default integrations by hand.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "observability-provider"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "subprocessor-posture-and-data-flow",
       "content-query-audit-semantics"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.30",
     "title": "Records of processing activities",
     "text": "Each controller + processor shall maintain a record of processing\nactivities under its responsibility (purposes, categories,\nrecipients, transfers, retention, security).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The combination of access + clientData + audit + (cross-account)\nCMC + data-residency IS your Article 30 register: who, what, why,\nwhen, recipients, transfers, retention, all derivable per-subject\nand per-time-window from primitives Pryv records continuously.\n",
     "detail": "Register field → Pryv data source:\n\n| Article 30 field | Pryv source |\n|---|---|\n| Controller / processor identity | your operator metadata + audit user identity |\n| Purpose | `access.clientData.purpose` (by convention) |\n| Categories of data subjects | derived from user-account metadata |\n| Categories of personal data | event `class/format` from data-types |\n| Categories of recipients | counterparty `access` (CMC pair) |\n| Transfers to third countries | CMC counterparty `apiEndpoint` host + chosen hosting |\n| Retention | `access.clientData.retention` + `access.expires` |\n| Security measures | covered in Art.32 |\n\nAudit row → access ref (with serial) → consent state at that moment.\nRecoverable per data-subject + per-time-window + per-purpose.\n",
     "technical": "Audit data lives in per-user SQLite\n(`open-pryv.io/components/audit/`); `audit.get` API method exposes\nit with access-time + method + access reference. Since\nopen-pryv.io `07b6d3b6`, OAuth2 authorization-server activity\n(`oauth.*`: consent granted, code exchanged, token issued /\nrefreshed / revoked) is recorded in the same per-user trail, so\nthe register's \"recipients\" derivation covers how a delegated\napp's access came to exist, not only its subsequent reads. The audit row\ncontent is data-minimal by construction, it carries action +\nsource (transport + ip) + URL query + access ref + integrity\nhash, never the request body. So the Article 30 register\nderived from audit doesn't itself raise Art.5(1)(c) data-\nminimisation concerns + survives Art.17 erasure of the\nunderlying events with no residual personal data attached to\nthe audit rows themselves (only opaque method names + access\nids remain). One caveat: content-query search values submitted\nover HTTP GET are part of the recorded URL query and survive\nerasure of the matching events; they are the caller's request,\nnot the subject's data. See\n`context/content-query-audit-semantics.md`.\n",
     "draft": false,
     "reviewed_at": "2026-06-19",
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "UZEV",
       "TJ8S",
       "AA01"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/audit-setup.md",
       "guides/audit-logs.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "CMC",
       "data-residency"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "content-query-audit-semantics"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained / signed audit log makes the Article 30 register tamper-evident",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      },
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Read-only effective-configuration endpoint turns the §1(g) description of technical security measures into emitable evidence",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=219705795&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C118"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.32",
     "title": "Security of processing",
     "text": "Controller + processor shall implement appropriate technical +\norganisational measures: pseudonymisation, encryption, ongoing\nCIA, restoration, regular testing.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Multi-aspect article,\nPryv implements several aspects for you (access control,\nrestoration) and provides configurable controls for others\n(encryption-in-transit, encryption-at-rest, pseudonymisation,\ndata residency). Organizational measures (regular testing, incident\nresponse procedures) stay in your court.\n",
     "detail": "Per-aspect:\n  - Encryption in transit: CONFIGURABLE, the core terminates TLS\n    when `http.ssl.*` is configured (certificates issued and\n    renewed by the built-in Let's Encrypt integration when\n    `letsEncrypt.enabled` is set), otherwise it serves plain HTTP\n    and your reverse proxy terminates TLS; the core sets no TLS\n    version of its own (Node.js defaults, a TLS 1.2 floor on Node\n    24). Between cores, Raft runs over mTLS once `bin/bootstrap.js`\n    has written `storages.engines.rqlite.tls` (default plain TCP).\n    Behind a proxy that terminates TLS, set\n    `hostedSites.<name>.hsts: always` so the sites the core hosts\n    (e.g. the account web app) still send\n    `Strict-Transport-Security` (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34; by\n    default the header is sent only when the core terminates\n    TLS).\n  - Encryption at rest: CONFIGURABLE, the\n    `container-encrypted-volume` companion (opt-in `CEV_ENABLED`)\n    provisions an encrypted volume covering the full user-data\n    surface (events, attachments, series, audit, and PlatformDB)\n    with a pluggable LUKS/gocryptfs backend and\n    env/file/exec/clevis/aws-kms key provider; operator secrets in\n    PlatformDB are additionally AES-256-GCM encrypted at the\n    application layer. CEV protects data on the storage medium\n    (stolen / decommissioned disks, off-host backups, snapshots);\n    it does not defend a running container, and a core running\n    rqlite outside a CEV container, or an external PostgreSQL,\n    falls back to operator-side full-disk encryption. Event\n    attachments inherit the at-rest controls of your\n    `storages.file.engine` choice: filesystem encryption, S3\n    server-side encryption (SSE), or, with attachments stored in\n    PostgreSQL, the same DB-level encryption that covers user rows.\n  - Pseudonymisation: FACILITATED, system streams + custom\n    event-type design; pseudonyms live in `clientData` or\n    dedicated streams. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58 a\n    third-party record id (an EHR patient id) can be linked to one\n    account platform-wide as a value your service blinds with its\n    own key (`HMAC(K_namespace, id)`); the platform index stores a\n    token of that value (keyed by the platform pepper in hashed\n    PII mode, the default) mapped to a core, never to an account,\n    and never the id or the key (`external-id-index` primitive)\n    `[XIDN4]`, `[XIDG1]`. A core alone learns only how\n    many ids each core holds; a core that also holds your\n    namespace key can test whether an id is on the platform and on\n    which core. Keep that key in your services, never on the\n    cores. For the account name itself, an access created with\n    `randomAlias:true` carries a platform-unique `r-XXXXXXXX`\n    alias in place of the username (`randomAlias` primitive):\n    nothing returned to that access names the account. Since\n    open-pryv.io `4547b32a` (2.0.0-rc.66) the\n    alias routes on every topology, a single core answering DNS\n    included (`[ALRT1]`), and survives a backup and restore\n    (manifest `aliases`, `[BKAL1]`); an account holds at most\n    `accesses.maxAliasesPerAccount` aliases (default 1000,\n    `[AL12]`), and a custom account field named `username` or\n    `usernameChangeCount` is refused at boot so no account\n    stream can expose the stored username to an aliased access\n    (`[SDB3]`, `[AL08]`). Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.69\n    (`784a9a47`) an aliased access is accepted under its own alias\n    only (alias-bound addressing): presented under the username,\n    a former username or another alias of the account it answers\n    like an unknown token, on HTTP and socket.io, and a sign-in or\n    password reset at an alias gets one fixed answer before any\n    password check `[AL13]`, `[AL03]`, `[OPSE5]`, `[OPSE16]`,\n    `[OPSE17]`. So a holder who suspects which account it is can\n    no longer confirm the guess with the token, and two aliases\n    of one account cannot be tested against each other. Earlier\n    releases accepted the token under every name of the account;\n    accesses an aliased app created before rc.69 kept an endpoint\n    naming the username. OAuth2 clients registered with pairwise\n    subjects get such an alias per user and client (see the\n    delegated-app bullet).\n  - Record-bound sign-in: IMPLEMENTED, since open-pryv.io\n    2.0.0-rc.59 (release commit `927919ba`) an auth request that\n    carries an external id in forced mode delivers the app's\n    credential only to the account holding that id. When the page\n    accepts, the server checks that the posted token is an app\n    access of the posted username, on that account's own core,\n    and that this account holds the id; otherwise `400\n    external-id-mismatch` and the request stays open for the\n    holder `[XIDFF1]`, `[XIDFF2]`, `[XIDFF3]`, `[XIDFF4]`. A\n    shared access the holder handed out does not complete it\n    `[XIDFFS]`; a grant for a controlled account is checked on\n    that account `[XIDFF7]`; a check that cannot run answers\n    `503 external-id-check-unavailable`, never a pass `[XIDFF9]`.\n    When the account lives on another core, the cores ask each\n    other with the admin key (`POST /system/ext-id/holds`, a yes\n    or no, not audited), over https unless\n    `cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl` `[XIDH1]`, `[XIDFC1]`,\n    `[XIDFC4]`; tested end to end across two running cores\n    (holder accepted, non-holder refused) `[2C56]`, `[2C57]`\n    (tests added after 2.0.0-rc.61; the behaviour is that of\n    2.0.0-rc.59). A forced registration refuses an id another\n    account holds before anything is reserved `[XIDFR7]`. The\n    guarantee binds the credential to the account holding the id,\n    which is whoever claimed it first: who receives a blinded value\n    before the person stays yours to protect (see Art.25 for the\n    residual and the administrator's release).\n  - Access control: IMPLEMENTED, `permissions` enforce stream-\n    level scope at every API call (technical control, not policy).\n    Expiry is enforced down the chain: a `shared` access managed\n    by an app access can no longer outlive it (it inherits the app\n    access's expiry at creation, clearing that expiry is refused,\n    and authentication refuses a never-expiring shared access once\n    its app access has expired, `5d609bfa`), and a webhook stops\n    firing and becomes `inactive` once its access has expired\n    (`3394b95f`), both in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23. A\n    cross-account (CMC) relationship whose consent excludes chat\n    gives neither side a chat stream or chat permission, and a\n    counterparty writing a chat (or, without system messaging, an\n    alert) directly with its relationship token is refused `403`\n    (`cmc-chat-disabled`, `cmc-system-messaging-disabled`)\n    (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.38, merge `7aab1e85`) `[CN63]`,\n    `[CN65]`, `[CH07]`, `[CH10]`. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53\n    (release commit `61fb28dd`,\n    https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158), members of\n    a group account get, from the group's core, their own\n    short-lived access on a patient account, bounded by their\n    membership, the patient's offer and the grant, stamped with\n    their identity by the patient's core, and deleted when the\n    membership ends `[GA10]`, `[GA12]`, `[GA14]`, `[GA20]` (see\n    `context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3). The same\n    release refuses a cross-account offer that asks a stream the\n    consent plugin manages on the accepter's account (its inbox,\n    which holds every grant endpoint the account received, or\n    its internal streams), at write and again at accept `[CN71]`,\n    `[MB35]`, `[VC09]`, and closes an invite link only from the\n    invite's own scope `[CN72]`. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56\n    the app that created a single-use invite can also withdraw it\n    while nobody has accepted it, so a link sent to the wrong\n    person stops working before its expiry (a withdrawal that\n    races an accept wins) `[CN100]`, `[CN102]`\n    (https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/160); earlier\n    releases accepted the withdrawal of an open link only.\n    Moving a stream (a new `parentId`) with an app or shared\n    access needs manage rights on every stream of the moved\n    subtree, since the same release `[SMV1]`, `[SMV10]`: before\n    it, a child granted to that access at a lower level moved\n    along under the target parent and took on the permissions\n    other accesses held there. The account-field guards (the\n    primary email, written only through `account.update`; the\n    non-editable and hidden fields; the level caps on\n    account-stream permissions) judge the canonical stream id\n    whatever spelling a request uses, on events and on access\n    creation and update `[ASA1]`, `[ASA6]`; before 2.0.0-rc.56 a\n    store-prefixed spelling of an account field was not\n    recognised by them, so an access holding `contribute` on the\n    email field could change the primary email (the\n    password-reset address) through the events API.\n  - Integrity of stored records: IMPLEMENTED for the built-in\n    stores, an `events.update`, a trash (a shared-secret event\n    excepted, trashed by compare-and-set) or an attachment\n    deletion is applied onto the event as stored at write time\n    (atomically on the PostgreSQL and SQLite stores: a row lock\n    on PostgreSQL, an immediate transaction on SQLite, its\n    lock-wait pinned by `[UEA1]`), so a concurrent client\n    write no longer erases a top-level field written meanwhile, by\n    the server or another client, that the request did not change\n    (a request that sends `content` replaces it whole, CMC\n    server-owned content fields excepted)\n    (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.38, merge `461f3c4c`) `[ESR1]`,\n    `[ESR4]`, `[ESR6A]`. A custom data store that does\n    not implement the atomic merge gets a read then an update.\n  - Authentication strength: IMPLEMENTED, `mfa.*` API methods,\n    opt-in per `services.mfa.mode`.\n  - Delegated-app authorization: IMPLEMENTED, the OAuth2\n    authorization-code + PKCE flow\n    (`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8)\n    hardens third-party access with mandatory PKCE (S256 only),\n    exact-match redirect-URI validation (single loopback-port\n    carve-out; fragment URIs rejected), curated-only client\n    registration, and short-TTL access tokens paired with\n    single-use rotating refresh tokens. Since open-pryv.io\n    2.0.0-rc.64 to 2.0.0-rc.77: withdrawing or narrowing a\n    consent reaches the app's live tokens and the accesses it\n    created at once `[OE31]`, `[OSUB3]`; operator-registered\n    clients declare `public` or `pairwise` subjects, and a\n    pairwise app sees each user only as an alias, never the\n    username, in its tokens, its OpenID Connect id token and\n    introspection `[OPSE1]`, `[OXD08]`; apps and resource servers\n    can revoke and introspect tokens; a resource server can\n    exchange a user's token for its own, no wider, only for a\n    token issued for it `[OTX05]` (since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.82\n    the replaced token is refused at the API by default,\n    `oauth.audienceBoundSessions: true` `[OTXE02]`; an operator may\n    set `false` on a core whose resource servers do not exchange\n    yet); client authentication by key is pinned to the key's\n    type and algorithm `[OCAK7]`; the consent flow's state is\n    signed with a per-core `oauth.stateKey`; and an authorization\n    for an account address, or at a per-user issuer\n    (`oauth.perUserIssuer`, opt-in), is bound to the account the\n    address names `[OPUE2]`, `[OPIU3]`. \"Curated-only\" holds while\n    `oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode` is `off` (the default):\n    with it on, a client may identify itself by a URL whose reach\n    your template sets (see `soc2.CC6.2`).\n  - Delegate-account control: IMPLEMENTED, account delegation\n    (`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) issues a delegate an\n    owner-equivalent personal token over another account while\n    keeping teardown authoritative and non-forgeable: a delegate\n    can never remove a delegation, and detach is gated on a\n    genuine login of the controlled account (a personal token\n    carrying no forge-protected delegation marker). The whole\n    `:_delegation:*` namespace is plugin-owned and guarded (no\n    user create/write/delete; internal subtree read-guarded and\n    excluded from wildcard reads). Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56\n    that holds for every token, the owner's included, whatever\n    spelling of the stream id a request uses, and also refuses\n    creating a stream under, or moving one into, the namespace\n    `[CNRP6]`, `[DSC05]`, `[DSU02]`; before it a store-prefixed\n    spelling (`:local:<id>`) was not recognised by these guards\n    and a stream could be placed under a namespace parent. The\n    plugin-managed regions of the cross-account (CMC) namespace\n    are closed the same way (`:_cmc:`, its inbox and internal\n    streams; `:_cmc:apps` stays open to apps) `[CNRP1]`,\n    `[CNRP7]`, and the CMC retry worker now acts only on records\n    the server wrote `[CNM2A]`, `[CNM2B]`, `[RQ32]`. Each\n    delegate's actions are audited on the controlled account (same-core +\n    cross-core). Apps a delegate grants access to the controlled\n    account receive an ordinary app access, never the\n    owner-equivalent token; that access carries a non-forgeable\n    lineage attribute and is revoked with the delegation, and the\n    grant paths that cannot record the lineage (OAuth2 consent,\n    CMC scope-update / offer) refuse delegation-derived tokens\n    (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23). Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.30 a\n    delegate may accept a CMC consent for the controlled account:\n    the data grant carries the same lineage and is deleted with\n    the delegation, unless the account holder, reviewing the\n    delegate's consents at detach, keeps it as their own\n    (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.31). See `context/delegation-model.md`.\n    Account auto-deletion (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66,\n    `8521c8d5`): a delegate can read the controlled account's\n    deletion schedule but cannot set it (`[ACST5]`), and arming a\n    schedule or bringing a deletion nearer needs the account\n    password even with the owner's token (`[ACST3]`, `[ACST4]`),\n    counted on the sign-in tally like a login (`[ACST18]`), so a\n    stolen session alone cannot schedule an account's deletion;\n    every change is confirmed to the account's email\n    (`[ACST15A]`).\n  - Planned, implemented and not released (account transfer to a\n    beneficiary): a beneficiary's optional name and date of birth\n    are stored AES-256-GCM encrypted in a field of\n    their own (key `account.autoDeletion.transfer.identitySecretsKey`,\n    or derived from the admin key; rotating the admin key without\n    a dedicated key makes stored values unreadable), unreadable by\n    any API before the transfer starts, and erased with every\n    version on claim, cancellation, decline or account deletion.\n    The claim and decline links are HMACs of (kind, account id,\n    salt) under the core's link key: only the salt is stored, so a\n    database dump holds no usable link. A claim binds the transfer\n    to the first account that claims it; failed links count on the\n    caller's per-address budget of failed secrets. The operator's audited read of those fields\n    is deferred.\n  - Credential hand-off: IMPLEMENTED, the shared-secrets\n    endpoints (`open-pryv.io/components/shared-secrets/`) hand a\n    credential to a third party by a one-time random key instead\n    of a URL-embedded token, which would persist in browser\n    history, referrer headers, and server access logs. The key is\n    redeemable exactly once, expires on a mandatory TTL, and Pryv\n    stores only the SHA-256 of its random half, so a database\n    dump cannot reconstruct a live credential. The payload is\n    scrubbed (including from event history) when the secret\n    leaves the pending state: on redemption, on a signature\n    mismatch, and on the first retrieval attempt after the TTL\n    has passed. Expiry is enforced when someone reaches for the\n    secret rather than by a background sweeper, so an expired\n    secret nobody touches again keeps its stored payload until\n    something reaches it or you delete it; schedule that\n    deletion yourself if your retention policy needs a deadline.\n    An optional signature (passphrase or client-computed HMAC\n    whose verifier secret never reaches the server) adds a\n    second factor to the redemption.\n  - Data residency: CONFIGURABLE, multi-hosting puts data where\n    your subjects (or your policy) require, bounding exposure\n    surface.\n  - Ability to ensure ongoing availability + resilience (§1(b)):\n    FACILITATED, a multi-core rqlite cluster in which joining\n    cores register as non-voters by default, so adding or losing a\n    core can never cost the cluster its quorum or take an existing\n    core's control plane offline. Leader-failover HA is an explicit\n    operator topology choice (run ≥3 voters; two voters are\n    rejected as a fragile 2-of-2 quorum); health-checks + audit log\n    round out the ongoing-CIA evidence. Platform DB integrity:\n    since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 the bundled rqlite (10.5.1)\n    keeps its snapshot store crash-safe, checksums its snapshot\n    files and stops a node on a node-local SQLite error rather\n    than letting its copy diverge; the master also re-checks\n    this node's copy every\n    `storages.platform.integrityCheckIntervalMs` (default 1 h,\n    2.0.0-rc.33) and logs an error on a failed check. The 9.x to\n    10.x upgrade is one-way for the rqlite data directory: follow\n    `open-pryv.io/INSTALL.md`, \"Upgrading the bundled rqlite (9.x\n    to 10.x)\", and keep rqlite's HTTP port (4001) closed to the\n    outside, as it is unauthenticated.\n  - Restoration (§1(c)): IMPLEMENTED, `bin/backup.js --restore`\n    per-user; single-node `peers.json` recovery restores cluster\n    availability after a quorum loss. Operator backups carry\n    high-frequency series data only since open-pryv.io\n    2.0.0-rc.34 (earlier backups silently held none, on every\n    series engine): take a new backup after upgrading. From 2.0.0-rc.60 the per-user\n    backup also carries the account's external ids and a restore\n    links them again `[XIDBK1]`; each blinded value in it can\n    claim the id, so protect the backup as a credential store\n    (encrypt it). Since 2.0.0-rc.86 a restore checks every file\n    of a run against the run's manifest (size and hash) and\n    refuses a run with a file added, removed, changed, cut short\n    or swapped between accounts; an optional Ed25519 signature\n    per run (`--signing-key`, `--signing-pubkey`) authenticates a\n    recipient-key backup, which encryption alone does not\n    `[BKSM2]`, `[BKSM4]`; and an account whose restore fails while\n    its data is written is cleared instead of left half-restored\n    `[RSFC1]`.\n  - Stored active content: IMPLEMENTED, an attachment whose\n    declared type a browser executes or renders as a document\n    (HTML, SVG and other XML, JavaScript) is served with\n    `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'` next\n    to `Content-Disposition: attachment`, so a file uploaded into\n    an account cannot run script on the API origin with the\n    viewer's session (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34,\n    `components/api-server/src/middleware/attachment-access.ts`).\n    Uploads are not refused for their type; an app that displays\n    HTML or SVG attachments renders them in its own sandbox.\n  - Calls to a counterparty: IMPLEMENTED, since open-pryv.io\n    2.0.0-rc.56 the calls Pryv makes to URLs the other side\n    supplies (cross-account consent deliveries, chat, revocations,\n    scope updates, the read of an offer, delegation notices,\n    OAuth revocation notices) are refused, before any connection,\n    when the host is or resolves to a loopback, private,\n    link-local or otherwise reserved address (the address rules of\n    webhooks, checked again at connect time), when the URL uses\n    `http:` (unless `cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl`, for\n    development and test clusters) or carries credentials, and\n    when the answer is a redirect or larger than 1 MiB `[PFR1]`,\n    `[PFR2]`, `[PFR4]`, `[PFR5]`, `[PFR6]`, `[CO22]`. The\n    platform's own host names are always allowed; a peer on a\n    private network, or a private `core.url` given as an IP, is\n    listed in `cmc.allowedPrivateHosts` (host names, IPs or CIDR\n    ranges, same grammar as `webhooks.allowedPrivateHosts`). A\n    refused delivery is permanent: the trigger reports\n    `cmc-handler-destination-refused` and it is not retried.\n    The OAuth2 key sets (`jwks_uri`, rc.70) and client metadata\n    documents (rc.74) Pryv fetches go through the same guard,\n    https only, size, time and per-host bounded `[OCMD03B]`,\n    `[OCMD03G]`; a host listed in `cmc.allowedPrivateHosts` is\n    allowed for them too. Keeping your own network's egress\n    filtering stays yours.\n  - Adapter routes: CONFIGURABLE, off by default. With\n    `adapterRoutes` set (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.73) the core\n    forwards `/adapter/<name>/…` to a sidecar you run without\n    authenticating the request, so the sidecar must authenticate\n    every request and check the token's audience; the core refuses\n    traversal paths, caps bodies and idle time, and since rc.75\n    names the addressed account in headers it sets itself (client\n    copies removed) `[ADRI09]`, `[ADRU3]`. See\n    `iso-27001.A.8.26`.\n  - Regular testing (§1(d)): FILLED BY EXISTING PRIMITIVES.\n    **Existing evidence (citable today)**:\n      - **Multi-engine CI test matrix**: ~2351 tests on\n        PostgreSQL and SQLite (matched baseline),\n        ~175 test files across `components/*/test/`; runs\n        on every commit + every PR.\n      - **Lint + typecheck gates** (`just lint` + `just\n        typecheck`), neostandard with `{ semi: true }`,\n        `noUnused*` strict.\n      - **Deploy-validation matrix** (an internal\n        release-validation artefact), 8-row scenario matrix\n        exercised on every release.\n      - **Conformance suite** (`lib-js` 168/169 baseline\n        against deployed core), runnable per-deployment\n        for operator-side verification (sample-app\n        proposal queued to package this as a customer-\n        facing \"verify your deployment\" runbook).\n      - **Supply-chain pipeline** (shipped, open-pryv.io\n        merge `9e2ee7ff`): a CI gate fails the build on\n        high or critical advisories in the runtime npm\n        tree (accepted advisories live in a documented\n        allowlist, not silenced), a CycloneDX SBOM is\n        emitted and Grype-scanned on every CI run, the\n        base image is digest-pinned with the rqlite\n        download checksum-verified, and release images\n        carry a keyless cosign signature plus a SLSA\n        build-provenance attestation. The pinned base\n        image still shows OS-level CVEs in scans (a\n        slimmer-base migration is a tracked follow-up);\n        the claim is detection, gating and attestation,\n        not a CVE-free image.\n      - **Vulnerability disclosure program**: a\n        coordinated disclosure policy ships in `SECURITY.md`:\n        private reporting via GitHub Security Advisories +\n        a `security-dev@` mailbox, a published scope,\n        response-time SLA, safe-harbor language, a 90-day\n        coordinated-disclosure timeline, and GHSA/CVE\n        issuance for confirmed reports. Private vulnerability\n        reporting is enabled on the published repositories,\n        so operators can cite Pryv's VDP + GHSA advisory\n        history as part of their Art.32(1)(d) evidence file.\n      - **Code-level security review** (2026-06 to\n        2026-10): a systematic review of the open-pryv.io\n        source by its maintainers (authentication,\n        authorisation and isolation, input handling, secrets\n        in logs, the admin / multi-core plane, the network\n        daemons, resource limits, deletion), each finding\n        confirmed by a second review and fixed with\n        regression tests; the fixes shipped in open-pryv.io\n        2.0.0-rc.40 to 2.0.0-rc.51, described in each\n        release note. Public report: `SECURITY-AUDIT.md`\n        (https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md),\n        published 2026-10-14, revised with every release\n        that carries a security fix. It\n        evaluates the code, not your deployment: run a\n        release carrying the fixes and keep testing your\n        own configuration and integrations. See\n        `context/code-security-review-2026.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "HSHT",
       "ACTY",
       "BKSR",
       "CN63",
       "CN65",
       "CH07",
       "CH10",
       "ESR1",
       "ESR4",
       "ESR6A",
       "GA10",
       "GA12",
       "GA14",
       "GA20",
       "CN71",
       "CN72",
       "MB35",
       "VC09",
       "CN100",
       "CN102",
       "CNRP1",
       "CNRP6",
       "CNRP7",
       "DSC05",
       "DSU02",
       "CNM2A",
       "CNM2B",
       "RQ32",
       "ASA1",
       "ASA6",
       "SMV1",
       "SMV10",
       "PFR1",
       "PFR2",
       "PFR4",
       "PFR5",
       "PFR6",
       "CO22",
       "XIDN4",
       "XIDG1",
       "XIDFF1",
       "XIDFF2",
       "XIDFF3",
       "XIDFF4",
       "XIDFFS",
       "XIDFF7",
       "XIDFF9",
       "XIDH1",
       "XIDFC1",
       "XIDFC4",
       "XIDFR7",
       "XIDBK1",
       "ALRT1",
       "BKAL1",
       "AL12",
       "SDB3",
       "AL08",
       "ACST3",
       "ACST4",
       "ACST5",
       "ACST18",
       "ACST15A",
       "AL13",
       "AL03",
       "OPSE5",
       "OPSE16",
       "OPSE17",
       "OE31",
       "OSUB3",
       "OPSE1",
       "OXD08",
       "OTX05",
       "OCAK7",
       "OPUE2",
       "OPIU3",
       "OCMD03B",
       "OCMD03G",
       "ADRI09",
       "ADRU3",
       "BKSM2",
       "BKSM4",
       "RSFC1"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/auth-oauth2.md",
       "customer-resources/adapter-routes.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "hostedSites.<name>.hsts",
       "storages.platform.integrityCheckIntervalMs",
       "cmc.allowedPrivateHosts",
       "cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl",
       "accesses.maxAliasesPerAccount",
       "oauth.audienceBoundSessions",
       "oauth.stateKey",
       "oauth.perUserIssuer",
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode",
       "adapterRoutes"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "randomAlias",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "encryption-at-rest-user-data",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "shared-secrets",
       "backup-restore",
       "MFA",
       "data-residency",
       "delegation",
       "CMC",
       "external-id-index",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns",
       "delegation-model",
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "End-to-end encryption shifts encryption from Configurable infrastructure to a Pryv-managed primitive",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=180707914&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C34"
      },
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Read-only effective-configuration endpoint strengthens the evidence narrative around operator-visible safeguards",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=219705795&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C118"
      },
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Account transfer to a beneficiary (implemented, not released): a beneficiary's name and date of birth encrypted at rest, unreadable before the transfer starts",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": null
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.33",
     "title": "Notification of personal data breach to the supervisory authority",
     "text": "Controller shall notify supervisory authority within 72 hours of\nbecoming aware of a breach (unless unlikely to result in risk).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv ships a breach-scoping toolchain: `bin/breach-scope.js`\nturns a compromised accessId + time window into an Art.33\n§1(b)-(d) input artefact (subject, methods invoked, streams in\nscope, record counts, integrity hashes) in one command on the\nsubject's home core. Encryption-at-rest may scope the \"unsecured\npersonal data\" definition relevant to the notification decision.\nThe risk assessment and the 72-hour process itself are yours to\nrun.\n",
     "detail": "Breach scoping is single-command (shipped in open-pryv.io\n`0b2874e0`):\n  - `GET /system/accesses/:accessId` admin lookup (PlatformDB\n    reverse-index) resolves a compromised accessId to its user +\n    home core in O(1), revoked accesses included (unless their\n    deletion records were purged after\n    `accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays`, an opt-in setting\n    since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56: choose it with breach\n    scoping in mind). Existing\n    deployments index pre-existing accesses once per core with\n    `bin/backfill-access-index.js`.\n  - Read audit rows carry `content.recordCount` and\n    `content.scopedStreamIds` (plus `scopedStreamCount` and\n    `recordCountIncomplete`). `scopedStreamIds` is the query's\n    resolved SCOPE: an upper bound on what the access could have\n    exposed, not the streams of the events actually returned.\n    State that nuance in the notification.\n  - `bin/breach-scope.js --access <id> --since <iso8601>\n    [--until <iso8601>]` walks the audit window on the subject's\n    home core and renders the scoping report (JSON or Markdown):\n    methods histogram, streams in scope, read/mutated/destroyed\n    record counts, time window, integrity hashes. Since\n    open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.49 an `--output` report file is written\n    readable by its owner only (`0600`) `[BRSC6]`: it names\n    the subject and the streams in scope, so keep it with your\n    incident records, not on a shared volume.\n  - access version chain → consent state at the moment of access\n    (was processing within authorised scope?).\n  - encryption-at-rest → if the leaked artefact is encrypted\n    operator backup, the data may qualify as \"secured\" and\n    notification may not be required per Art.33 §1.\nHonest bounds: the report classifies by stream + method and\nquantifies by record count; it does not derive event-type data\ncategories (event bodies never enter the audit log); HF/series\nreads and audit-filter-excluded methods are not visible; the\nreverse-index is advisory (home-core storage is authoritative).\nDetection-of-breach itself depends on monitoring + log review you\nrun around the audit data.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "BRSC6",
       "ADP1"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/audit-setup.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.34",
     "title": "Communication of a personal data breach to the data subject",
     "text": "Where breach likely to result in high risk, controller shall\ncommunicate to data subjects without undue delay.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Two-surface split. **Identification** is filled by the audit\nlog + the shipped `bin/breach-scope.js` scoping tool (per-subject\nroster derivable from the breached access's read/write history);\n**delivery** is voluntarily missing + operator-owned (Pryv's\nmail surface is transactional per-recipient, not bulk-send;\noperators compose with their existing CRM / SMS / push\npipeline). The audit-trace bridge that lands per-recipient\nsend-receipts inside Pryv's event chain (satisfying\n§164.414-equivalent burden-of-proof) uses an operator-\nauthored `compliance/breach-notification/sent-cmc` event\npattern. Full treatment in\n`context/breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned.md`.\nEncryption-at-rest may scope the high-risk determination\n(Art.34 §3(a) exemption).\n",
     "detail": "**Identification surface**: derive the affected-subject\nlist from `audit.get` filtered by (`breachedAccessId`,\ntime window). The shipped `bin/breach-scope.js`\n(open-pryv.io `0b2874e0`) packages this into one command\n+ adds the §164.404(c) content elements (`recordCount` +\nthe `scopedStreamIds` resolved query scope, an upper\nbound on exposure rather than the streams actually\nreturned) via audit-row extensions. Identification is\nsingle-command + audit-defensible.\n\n**Delivery surface**: operator-owned by design. Pryv's\ntransactional mail (`mail.send` / `email-templates`) is\ndesigned for welcome / password-reset / MFA-code emails,\nnot bulk breach broadcasts. Operators compose:\n  - Identification → the `bin/breach-scope.js` report\n    (JSON output).\n  - Operator's CRM / mail provider (SendGrid / Mailgun /\n    AWS SES / Mandrill) renders Art.34 §2 content\n    elements per recipient + sends with retries +\n    rate-limiting.\n  - Send-receipts captured back into Pryv as\n    `compliance/breach-notification/sent-cmc` events\n    (recipient.userId + email_hash + channel +\n    provider.message_id + notice_version + time) on a\n    dedicated compliance system stream, these become\n    the §164.414-equivalent burden-of-proof artefact.\n  - Operator's incident-response record on\n    `compliance/incidents/<id>/*` cross-references the\n    affected.json input + the per-recipient send-receipt\n    event tree.\n\n**Why voluntarily missing**: most regulated-market\noperators already run a CRM / mail / SMS pipeline with\nestablished rate-limiting + retry + send-receipt tracking\n+ legal-comms escalation; a Pryv-shipped breach-comm\nwould be redundant. Operators without one need legal/\ncomms expertise to use Art.34 §2 content + timing well\nanyway, beyond what a platform-side template can pre-\nfab. The Art.34 §3 exemptions (encryption-renders-\nunintelligible / subsequent-measures-eliminate-high-risk\n/ disproportionate-effort) are legal judgements operator-\ncounsel makes.\n\n**Multi-jurisdiction nuance**: subjects in different\njurisdictions face different timing regimes (GDPR \"undue\ndelay\" / HIPAA ≤60d / PIPEDA \"as soon as feasible\" /\nCalifornia ≤45d / Swiss nLPD Art.24 conditional).\nOperator's runbook derives per-subject timing from\n`clientData.jurisdiction` on the account.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/audit-setup.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "event",
       "system-streams"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.35",
     "title": "Data protection impact assessment",
     "text": "Where processing is likely to result in a high risk to the rights\nand freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to\nthe processing, carry out a data protection impact assessment.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The DPIA is a written\nassessment artefact; Pryv has no role in producing it. What\nPryv supplies as inputs: data-residency primitive lets you\nstate where each subject's data lives; audit + access-version\nprimitives describe the processing-flow technical layer\nconcretely; system-streams isolation gives a defensible \"scope\nof sensitive data\" boundary; this matrix itself enumerates the\ntechnical-organisational-measures (Art.35 §7(d)) for the\ndeployment.\n",
     "detail": "§7 prescribed content → Pryv-side artefacts feeding each item:\n  - (a) systematic description of processing → audit-log\n    method/path coverage + access purposes from clientData.\n  - (b) necessity / proportionality assessment → the\n    minimum-necessary stream + permission design (cross-link to\n    Art.5 §1(c)).\n  - (c) risk assessment → operator-side artefact; this matrix\n    contributes the technical-control inventory.\n  - (d) measures envisaged to address the risks → see the\n    Art.32 row of this matrix + cross-scope ISO 27001 A.8\n    control rows.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "data-residency",
       "access",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Read-only effective-configuration endpoint feeds the DPIA safeguards inventory from live per-core data instead of a hand-written list",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=219705795&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C118"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.36",
     "title": "Prior consultation",
     "text": "Controller shall consult the supervisory authority prior to\nprocessing where the DPIA under Art. 35 indicates the processing\nwould result in a high risk in the absence of measures taken by\nthe controller to mitigate the risk.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Prior consultation is the controller's procedural interaction\nwith a supervisory authority. No software role; the DPIA\nartefact under Art. 35 carries the technical evidence the\nauthority may request; Pryv contributes inputs there but not\nto the consultation itself.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.37",
     "title": "Designation of the data protection officer",
     "text": "Controller and processor shall designate a DPO where (a) processing\nis by a public authority, (b) core activities require regular and\nsystematic monitoring on a large scale, or (c) core activities\nconsist of large-scale processing of special categories or\ncriminal-conviction data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "DPO designation is an HR / organizational decision. No software\nrole. Where the deployment processes Art. 9 special-category or\nArt. 10 criminal data on a large scale (likely for healthcare\nPryv deployments), the Art. 37(1)(c) trigger applies and a DPO\ndesignation is required.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.38",
     "title": "Position of the data protection officer",
     "text": "DPO shall be involved properly + in a timely manner in all issues\nrelating to protection of personal data; given necessary resources;\nshall directly report to the highest management level; shall not\nreceive any instructions regarding exercise of those tasks;\ncannot be dismissed or penalised for performing tasks.\nData subjects may contact the DPO with regard to all issues\nrelated to processing (§4).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "DPO independence + reporting structure (§1-§3) is an\norganizational arrangement; no software role. **§4 DPO\ncontact-point for data subjects IS facilitated** by the\nexisting `serviceInfo.support` URL (returned by\n`GET /service/info` on every core). Operators publish DPO\ncontact details on the page that `support` points at, the\nsame surface that `app-web-auth3` already renders in its\nconsent UI. Zero extra platform code required. Full\nconvention treatment in\n`context/service-info-conventions.md`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "context_notes": [
       "service-info-conventions"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.39",
     "title": "Tasks of the data protection officer",
     "text": "DPO shall have, at minimum: informing + advising the controller +\nprocessor + employees; monitoring compliance; providing advice on\nthe DPIA + monitoring its performance; cooperating with the\nsupervisory authority; acting as contact point for the\nsupervisory authority.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "DPO duties are organizational. Pryv contributes the data\nsources the DPO uses for \"monitoring compliance\", the\naudit log, observability metrics, this matrix's evidence\ntrail. The DPO contact-point obligation per Art.38(4) is\ncovered separately via the `serviceInfo.support` URL\nconvention (see `context/service-info-conventions.md`).\nPryv equips the DPO; it doesn't replace them.\n",
     "detail": "Practical DPO-monitoring patterns:\n\n- **Audit-log access** for the DPO is currently bound to\n  per-user-scoped permissions; no built-in \"cross-account\n  audit reader\" personal-token tier exists. Operators\n  granting DPOs platform-wide audit visibility typically\n  use `auth.adminAccessKey` style admin auth, OR run a\n  side-process that exports audit events into the DPO's\n  observability / SIEM stack (Q23 observability-provider\n  primitive, pluggable façade).\n- **Compliance matrix as evidence trail**: this\n  compliance-matrix repository itself is the structured\n  artefact the DPO references for \"what does the platform\n  contribute to each regulatory control?\", see how\n  scopes / requirements / pryv_primitives / planned chips\n  / context notes interlink for the auditable claim graph.\n- **DPIA / breach-scope tooling** the DPO consumes when\n  active: `bin/breach-scope.js` for the breach scoping\n  artefact (shipped), and the future\n  `CONFIG-EFFECTIVE-EXPOSURE` effective-config endpoint\n  for DPIA Section (d).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "service-info-conventions"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.40",
     "title": "Codes of conduct",
     "text": "Member States, supervisory authorities, the Board and the\nCommission shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct\nintended to contribute to the proper application of the\nRegulation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Codes of conduct are sector-\nlevel instruments (drafted by associations of controllers /\nprocessors, approved by competent supervisory authority). No\nsoftware role at the code-drafting layer. When a code applies\nto your sector, adherence is recorded as one of the Art. 24 /\nArt. 32 \"appropriate measures\"; the audit log + this matrix\ndemonstrate the technical-control side of code adherence.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.42",
     "title": "Certification",
     "text": "Member States, supervisory authorities, the Board and the\nCommission shall encourage the establishment of data-protection\ncertification mechanisms, seals and marks.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Certification (e.g.,\nEuroPrivacy seal, GDPR-certified processor schemes) is sector-\nand jurisdiction-specific. Pryv operators pursuing certification\nconsume this matrix as the technical-control inventory. ISO\n27701 + (where applicable) HDS are adjacent certifications\nalready represented in this matrix.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27701.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.82",
     "title": "Right to compensation and liability",
     "text": "Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a\nresult of an infringement of the Regulation shall have the right\nto receive compensation from the controller or processor for the\ndamage suffered.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Liability + compensation are\nlegal proceedings. Pryv contributes defense evidence: the audit\nlog + access-version chain support the controller / processor\nin demonstrating compliance with the relevant obligations (or,\nwhere compliance failed, in scoping the actual damage). The\nlegal outcome is fact-specific.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.83",
     "title": "General conditions for imposing administrative fines",
     "text": "Each supervisory authority shall ensure that the imposition of\nadministrative fines is in each case effective, proportionate\nand dissuasive. Fines up to €20 million or 4% of total worldwide\nannual turnover, whichever is higher.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Fines are regulator-side. Pryv has no role in fine calculation\nor imposition. Pryv-side data + this matrix help the controller\nargue for mitigation under Art. 83(2) factors (degree of\ncooperation, technical + organisational measures implemented,\netc.).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.44",
     "title": "General principle for transfers",
     "text": "Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or\nare intended for processing after transfer to a third country or\ninternational organisation shall take place only if the controller\nand processor comply with the conditions in Chapter V.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "The Art.44 framework\nis operational, every Art.45-49 path is conditional. Pryv's\ndata-residency primitive is the technical enforcement layer:\nwhen you bind a subject's data to a hosting inside the EU/EEA,\nno Chapter-V analysis is needed (no transfer happens). When\ntransfer is intentional, the CMC capability flow records the\nrecipient hosting + the legal basis on the originating access's\nclientData, making Chapter V compliance auditable per transfer\nrather than per system.\n",
     "detail": "The residency guarantee is **two-tiered**:\n\n**Tier 2, Content + audit layer (residency-pinned).**\nCores share no event / stream / audit / attachment / access-\nmetadata data with each other. A subject assigned to an EU\ncore has ALL their Tier-2 data exclusively on that EU\ncore's storage. \"Transfer\" would require a deliberate\noperator backup-restore between cores (not a runtime\nprimitive). See `context/core-affinity-architecture.md`.\n\n**Tier 1, Identification + routing layer (cluster-\nreplicated).** PlatformDB rows (`user-core/<username>`,\n`user-unique-fields/email`, `dns/<subdomain>`,\n`access-state/` (hashed OAuth2 rows, no credentials), see\n`context/cross-border-platformdb-implications.md` for the\nverified keyspace inventory) replicate cluster-wide via\nrqlite Raft. In a multi-region cluster, this **is** a\ncontinuous cross-border transfer of personal data, an\nArt.46 mechanism (SCCs / BCRs / etc.) is legally required\neven though Tier-2 stays put. Mitigation options (filed as\nbacklog or shipped): at-rest encryption of PlatformDB\n(`PLATFORMDB-AT-REST-ENCRYPTION`), HMAC-pseudonymisation\nof PII at the PlatformDB layer (`PLATFORMDB-PII-HASHING`,\nshipped, opt-in via `platform.piiMode: hashed`),\ntokenisation with per-region mapping table (option C,\nbrainstorm-tier, not yet backlogged).\n\n**CMC counterparty nuance**: when an EU subject's stream is\nshared with a US-based counterparty via CMC, the US client\nconnects directly to the EU core's `apiEndpoint`. The EU\nTier-2 data does not replicate to the US core, it's\nfetched on-demand. From the EU subject's Art.44 perspective\nthis fetch IS a transfer (data crosses borders to reach the\nreader), so the operator records the recipient + lawful\nbasis on the access's `clientData.transfer_basis` per\n`context/transfer-basis-convention.md`. The data-at-rest\nresidency is preserved (no Tier-2 copy in the US); only\nthe access path + Tier-1 routing-state crosses.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "CMC",
       "access"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "core-affinity-architecture",
       "cross-border-platformdb-implications",
       "transfer-basis-convention"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.45",
     "title": "Transfers on the basis of an adequacy decision",
     "text": "A transfer may take place where the European Commission has\ndecided that the third country (or a territory / specified sector\nwithin it) ensures an adequate level of protection.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Configure your `auth.hostings` to declare only hostings that match\nadequate-protection regimes; route subjects to them as per your\ntransfer policy. The per-user `hosting` exposed via\n`system.users.get` proves residency for auditor questions.\nMaintenance of which countries currently hold adequacy (EU-US\nDPF, Switzerland, UK, etc.) is operator-side regulatory tracking.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "REGC",
       "RC01",
       "RC03"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.hostings"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.46",
     "title": "Transfers subject to appropriate safeguards",
     "text": "In the absence of an adequacy decision, a controller or processor\nmay transfer personal data to a third country only if appropriate\nsafeguards are provided (BCRs, SCCs, approved codes / certifications,\nad-hoc clauses authorised by supervisory authority, etc.).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv-side artefact: record the §2 mechanism on the\ntransferring access's `clientData.transfer_basis` (structured\nobject per `context/transfer-basis-convention.md`, same\npattern as `clientData.lawful_basis` from Art.6 + `clientData.\nspecial_category_basis` from Art.9). The Art.30(1)(e)\ntransfers register is then derivable in a single `jq` query\nagainst `GET /accesses`. The SCCs / BCRs / approved-code\ndocuments themselves remain operator/legal artefacts; Pryv\npersists the references + the metadata travels with the\naccess version chain.\n",
     "detail": "Three cross-border surfaces in a typical Pryv deployment:\n\n1. **Access-bound transfers** (CMC counterparty fetches,\n   third-party-app reads across jurisdictions). Convention:\n   `access.clientData.transfer_basis` per\n   `context/transfer-basis-convention.md`. Existing\n   primitives carry persistence + versioning + audit trail\n   for free (zero Pryv code change).\n\n2. **Multi-region cluster replication** (Tier 1 of the\n   two-tier residency model, PlatformDB rows for usernames,\n   emails, DNS subdomains, user-core mappings). See\n   `context/cross-border-platformdb-implications.md` for\n   the verified keyspace inventory + the A/B/C mitigation\n   options (at-rest encryption / PII hashing / tokenisation).\n   The strongest compliance posture combines an Art.46\n   mechanism (SCCs, BCRs, etc.) WITH at-rest encryption\n   (`PLATFORMDB-AT-REST-ENCRYPTION` backlog) AND\n   PII pseudonymisation at the PlatformDB layer\n   (`PLATFORMDB-PII-HASHING`, shipped, opt-in via\n   `platform.piiMode: hashed`).\n\n3. **Subprocessor outbound** (SMTP / SMS / observability\n   vendors). See `context/subprocessor-posture-and-data-\n   flow.md`. **Pryv recommends configuring per-core SMTP\n   endpoints** so the relay can match the core's region /\n   country when residency is a hard requirement, the\n   `services.email.smtp.*` config is per-core, so an EU\n   core routes mail through an EU SMTP relay independently\n   of a US core's relay. Same pattern applies to SMS\n   endpoints.\n\nFor the §2 mechanism field convention:\n`mechanism: \"art.46.2.c\"` for SCCs, `\"art.46.2.a\"` for\nlegally-binding-instrument-between-public-authorities,\n`\"art.46.2.f\"` for approved certification, etc. Or\n`\"art.45\"` with an `adequacy_decision` field if relying on\nan adequacy decision. Full field reference in the\nconvention note.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "data-residency"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "transfer-basis-convention",
       "cross-border-platformdb-implications"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.47",
     "title": "Binding corporate rules",
     "text": "Competent supervisory authority shall approve binding corporate\nrules (BCRs) provided they meet specified content + safeguarding\nrequirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "BCRs are organizational rules approved by a supervisory authority\nafter a formal process. No software contribution, when BCRs are\nthe chosen Art.46 safeguard, the operator records the BCR\nreference on the transferring access's clientData (per Art.46\npattern); the BCR document itself is the operator's legal\nartefact.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.48",
     "title": "Transfers or disclosures not authorised by Union law",
     "text": "Any judgment of a court / tribunal and any decision of an\nadministrative authority of a third country requiring a controller\nor processor to transfer or disclose personal data may only be\nrecognised or enforceable if based on an international agreement.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Resistance to extraterritorial subpoenas is a legal posture, not a\nsoftware control. Pryv's audit log will record any forced\ndisclosure executed under the access primitive (which is the only\nway data leaves the system), making the disclosure documentable\nafter the fact. The decision of whether to comply / contest is\nlegal counsel's, not Pryv's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.49",
     "title": "Derogations for specific situations",
     "text": "In the absence of an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards,\na transfer may take place only on the basis of one of nine\nenumerated derogations (explicit consent, contract performance,\nimportant public interest, vital interests, legal claims, register\naccess, etc.).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Each Art.49 derogation\nrequires per-instance recording. Pryv pattern: mint a purpose-\nspecific access per derogation invocation with\n`clientData.transfer_derogation = \"art_49_1_a_consent\"` etc.;\nexecute the transfer; revoke. The audit trail then anchors the\nderogation rationale to the specific data movement.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.50",
     "title": "International cooperation for the protection of personal data",
     "text": "Commission and supervisory authorities shall take appropriate\nsteps to develop international cooperation mechanisms for the\neffective enforcement of personal-data protection legislation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "International-cooperation development is a regulator-level\nactivity. No software contribution; no implementer obligation\narises from this Article alone.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "hds",
   "title": "Hébergement de Données de Santé (Health Data Hosting Certification)",
   "short": "HDS",
   "type": "hosting-cert",
   "jurisdiction": "France",
   "version": "HDS Référentiel, current consolidated edition",
   "version_date": "2018-06-19",
   "canonical_url": "https://esante.gouv.fr/produits-services/hds",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/hds",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/hds.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "Activity.1",
     "title": "Activity 1, Provision of physical infrastructure",
     "text": "Provision of physical computing infrastructure (servers, storage,\nnetwork equipment) used to host health data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Physical infrastructure provisioning is the data-centre operator's\ncertification scope, not Pryv's. Pryv-as-software doesn't ship a\ndata centre, when an HDS-certified hoster deploys Pryv on their\ncertified infrastructure, this activity is covered by their cert,\nnot by anything Pryv contributes.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.2",
     "title": "Activity 2, Provision of virtual infrastructure",
     "text": "Provision of virtual computing infrastructure (VMs, container\nhosts, virtual storage) used to host health data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Virtual infrastructure is the cloud / virtualisation provider's\ncertification scope. Pryv runs on whatever virtual infrastructure\nthe operator chooses; the cert for the virtual layer is the\nhoster's (typically a CSP that itself holds HDS Activity 2).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.3",
     "title": "Activity 3, Platform-as-a-service for health data",
     "text": "Provision of a software platform on which health-data applications\nare deployed and operated (runtime, libraries, middleware,\ndatabases).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "This is the activity\nwhere Pryv-as-software substantively contributes. An HDS-certified\nhoster running Pryv covers Activity 3 by inheriting Pryv's\nprimitive set: per-user storage isolation (system-streams +\nper-user files when SQLite engine), stream-scoped permissions,\nTLS in the core or at your proxy (configured, not default), mTLS\nbetween cores once bootstrapped, AES-256-GCM at-rest secrets,\nMFA, audit log, backup-restore, observability adapter. The\noperator still does the operational + organizational work the\nHDS audit checks (governance, incident response, ISMS).\n",
     "detail": "The HDS audit verifies the platform's actual operational state,\naudit logs available, vulnerability management, change control,\netc. Pryv-side artefacts feeding the audit: CHANGELOG-v2 +\nCHANGELOG-v2-back (change control evidence); audit-log per-user\nSQLite (forensic evidence); observability metrics (operational\nmonitoring evidence); release tags + Docker image SHAs\n(configuration management evidence). For vulnerability\nmanagement on the software side: the 2026 code-level security\nreview of open-pryv.io and its fix releases (2.0.0-rc.40 to\n2.0.0-rc.51; public report `SECURITY-AUDIT.md`, published\n2026-10-14,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md;\n`context/code-security-review-2026.md`). Running a release that\ncarries the fixes, and the vulnerability management of your own\nhosting, stay yours.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "system-streams",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "MFA",
       "data-residency",
       "backup-restore",
       "observability-provider"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.4",
     "title": "Activity 4, Sysadmin and operations of the information system",
     "text": "Administration of the platform: patching, configuration, change\nmanagement, incident response, operational monitoring.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Sysadmin is the certified operator's role. Pryv ships the\nsoftware; the operator runs it, monitors it, patches it,\nresponds to incidents. The HDS Activity 4 audit verifies the\noperator's ITSM practices (typically ISO 20000-1 aligned).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.5",
     "title": "Activity 5, Outsourced backup",
     "text": "Outsourced backup of health data: backup planning, execution,\nretention, restoration.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes the\nbackup primitive (`bin/backup.js` per-user backups + `--restore`).\nMulti-core cluster topology gives in-line Raft replication of\nplatform data. The backup tool can **encrypt its output on demand**\nso plaintext PHI never touches the destination disk: a recipient\npublic key (RSA-OAEP-wrapped per-backup data key, the backup host\nholds no decryption secret) or a passphrase, with per-file\nauthenticated AES-256-GCM. This covers backup-archive at-rest\nencryption directly; the operator may still layer\nLUKS / GPG / KMS at the volume level, and remains responsible for\nkey management, transport, retention, and the \"outsourced\"\n(separate physical location) element. Pryv provides the\nbackup-generation, payload-encryption, and restoration primitives.\n",
     "detail": "**Backups taken before open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 are incomplete:**\nthey carry no high-frequency series data, on every series engine,\nand nothing warned. Take a new backup after upgrading, and do not\ncount older archives as a full copy of series data. Since\n2.0.0-rc.34 the series are exported and restored (series move\nbetween any two series engines, InfluxDB included), and the\nmanifest's `coreVersion` reports the core's release, which you\ncan record in your backup register. Backup and restore round\ntrips are tested in open-pryv.io (`[BKSR]`, `[BKEV]`, `[BKVR]`).\n\n**Incremental backups (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51).** Before\n2.0.0-rc.51 an `--incremental` run overwrote the full backup it\ncontinued, leaving a directory that restores only the last delta;\n`node bin/backup.js --inspect <dir>` reports such a directory\n`DAMAGED` and a restore refuses it `[BKIC2]`: remove it from your\nbackup register and take a new full backup. Since 2.0.0-rc.51 each\nrun is written next to the full backup (`incrementals/<runId>/`,\nindexed by `chain.json`), each encrypted run with its own envelope\nand decrypt script, and a restore replays the chain, or stops at a\ngiven run with `--through-run` `[BKC1]`, `[BKC2]`, `[BKC5]`,\n`[BKIC1]`. Your retention schedule applies per chain: a run is only\nrestorable with the full backup and every run before it.\n\n**Outsourced copies you can check (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86).**\nEach run's manifest lists every file with its size and hash, and a\nrestore refuses a run whose files were added, removed, changed, cut\nshort or swapped between accounts `[BKSM1]`, `[BKSM2]`. With a\nrecipient public key, sign the runs (`--signing-key` at backup,\n`--signing-pubkey` at restore): whoever can write to the outsourced\ndestination and holds the public key can otherwise replace a run\n`[BKSM4]`, `[BKSM5]`. `--inspect --verify-files` checks every file\nof a backup without restoring it, a check you can schedule after\neach transfer to the backup host `[BKIS3]`. Keep the destination\ndirectory for the backup only: a file the backup did not write is\nrefused at restore, while files that storage appliances create by\nthemselves (`@eaDir`, `.snapshot`, `.zfs`, ...) are ignored with a\nnotice `[BKSM7]`. A backup written by 2.0.0-rc.86 or later restores\nwith that release or later; runs written earlier restore as\nbefore, reported as \"file list not verified\".\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "BKSR",
       "BKEV",
       "BKVR",
       "BKC1",
       "BKC2",
       "BKC5",
       "BKIC1",
       "BKIC2",
       "BKSM1",
       "BKSM2",
       "BKSM4",
       "BKSM5",
       "BKSM7",
       "BKIS3"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/backup.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "backup-payload-encryption",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.6",
     "title": "Activity 6, Archival of health data",
     "text": "Long-term archival of health data with verifiable integrity over\nthe archival period (typically 20+ years for medical records).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv stores events with\nretained `class/format` semantics (data-types schemas), and keeps\nper-event version history when you set\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default; with\n`versioning.deletionMode: keep-nothing`, the default, a deleted\nevent's history is removed with it). For long-term archival, the operator\ntypically combines Pryv's event store with an external archival\nsystem (WORM storage, blockchain-anchored hashes etc.), Pryv\nis not an archival product itself but feeds it. Integrity\nverification across long timescales is a separate certified\narchival service.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "cross.data-residency",
     "title": "Cross-cutting, data residency in France",
     "text": "Health data subject to HDS must remain on infrastructure located\nin France (or in a country offering equivalent protection per\nArticle L.1111-8 CSP).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv's data-residency primitive is the technical control: bind\neach French-health-data subject to a French hosting (declared\nin `auth.hostings`). Cross-core forwarding inside a multi-\nhosting Pryv platform respects the per-user hosting binding,\nso a user's data physically stays where assigned.\n",
     "detail": "Configuration pattern for HDS-targeting deployment:\n  - `auth.hostings` declares the French hosting(s), each backed\n    by a core or core-cluster running on HDS-certified\n    infrastructure.\n  - At registration, the implementer routes French-health-data\n    subjects to a French hosting (operator/regulatory routing,\n    not end-user choice).\n  - `system.users.get` exposes the per-user `hosting` field so\n    you can prove residency in audit responses.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "REGC",
       "RC01",
       "RC03",
       "RC07"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.hostings"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "cross.iso-references",
     "title": "Cross-cutting, ISO 27001 + 27018 + 20000-1 baseline",
     "text": "HDS certification requires the hoster to demonstrate alignment\nwith ISO/IEC 27001 (ISMS), ISO/IEC 27018 (PII in public clouds),\nand ISO/IEC 20000-1 (IT service management). These ISO certs\nmay be held independently and presented as part of the HDS\naudit pack.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Pryv's primitive set\ncarries a substantial share of the ISO 27001 Annex A technical\ncontrols (A.5 information security policies derives_from\noperator, A.8 asset management is operational, A.9 access\ncontrol = permissions, A.10 cryptography = TLS + at-rest\nsecrets, A.12 operations security = audit + monitoring, A.13\ncommunications security = TLS + mTLS, A.17 BCM = backup +\nmulti-core HA). See the `iso-27001.*` rows of this matrix for\nthe detailed per-control mapping; the per-Activity-3 sub-control\nrows below name the specific A.5/A.8 controls.\n",
     "detail": "The detailed control-by-control mapping will land in the\n`iso-27001` scope. HDS audit pack\nreferences the ISO 27001 certificate(s) the hoster holds; the\nPryv-side contribution is the same set of primitive evidence\neither way.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "MFA",
       "data-residency",
       "backup-restore",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "cross.hds-vs-gdpr",
     "title": "Cross-cutting, HDS ≠ GDPR compliance",
     "text": "HDS certifies the hosting infrastructure; GDPR compliance for\nconsent, data-subject rights, breach notification, lawful basis,\nand the records of processing remains the data controller's\nseparate responsibility.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "A common misconception in\nFrench health-tech: holding an HDS certificate is sometimes\nmistaken for GDPR-compliance. It isn't. The HDS scope above\ncovers infrastructure security; the GDPR scope (see this\nmatrix's `gdpr.*` rows) covers the controller's obligations\ntoward data subjects. Pryv carries the technical substrate for\nboth, but they're distinct compliance burdens.\n",
     "detail": "Reference content for this point: Pryv published\n\"pourquoi-la-certification-hds-ne-garantit-pas-votre-conformite-au-rgpd\"\nin `www`. The matrix expresses the same point structurally,\nseparate scopes, no scope is the other's proxy.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "cross.subcontracting",
     "title": "Cross-cutting, subcontracting chain",
     "text": "Where the HDS-certified hoster subcontracts any HDS activity,\nthe subcontractor must also be HDS-certified for that activity\n(or operate under the hoster's own certificate per the\nRéférentiel's subcontracting clauses).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Subcontracting + certification chain are organizational. Pryv as\na software supplier sits below the hoster's certification scope,\nthe hoster's contract with the Pryv operator (often the same\nentity) declares the scope, but Pryv-the-software isn't itself\ncertified.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.3.access",
     "title": "Activity 3, Access control (sub-control)",
     "text": "Logical access to ePHI shall be restricted to authorized users\nvia authentication + authorization controls; access shall be\nmanaged across the user lifecycle.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "HDS Activity 3 sub-control aligning with ISO 27001 A.5.15 +\nA.5.18: the Pryv access + permissions primitive enforces\nper-stream access control across the access lifecycle\n(create / read / update / delete). Cross-link to ISO 27001 +\nHIPAA-Security for the parallel control rows.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.15",
       "iso-27001.A.5.18",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(a)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.3.audit",
     "title": "Activity 3, Audit logging (sub-control)",
     "text": "All access to ePHI shall be logged with sufficient detail for\nforensic investigation; logs shall be retained per the\napplicable retention policy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "HDS Activity 3 audit sub-control inherits the Pryv audit\nprimitive (per-user SQLite, every API method captured with\naccess reference + timestamp). The retention period + log-\nreview cadence are operator policy per the HDS audit pack.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT02",
       "AT51",
       "AT61"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.15",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(b)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Activity.3.cryptography",
     "title": "Activity 3, Use of cryptography (sub-control)",
     "text": "ePHI in transit shall be protected via TLS; cryptographic key\nmanagement shall follow the operator's documented procedures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "HDS Activity 3 cryptography sub-control: TLS in transit once you\nconfigure it, in the core (`http.ssl.*`, certificates from the\nbuilt-in ACME integration when `letsEncrypt.enabled` is set) or\nat your reverse proxy (the core then serves plain HTTP behind\nit); the core sets no TLS version of its own (Node.js defaults,\nTLS 1.2 floor on Node 24). mTLS between cores once\n`bin/bootstrap.js` has written `storages.engines.rqlite.tls`,\nAES-256-GCM at-rest for operator secrets. Cross-link to ISO 27001 A.8.24 +\nHIPAA-Security §164.312(e)(1) for the parallel control rows.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ACMEORCH",
       "CERTUTILS",
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "ATRENC"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled",
       "letsEncrypt.atRestKey",
       "storages.engines.rqlite.tls"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.24",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(e)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "hipaa-breach",
   "title": "HIPAA Breach Notification Rule",
   "short": "HIPAA-Breach",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "US",
   "version": "45 CFR Part 164 Subpart D (HITECH 2013 Omnibus Final Rule)",
   "version_date": "2013-01-25",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-C/part-164/subpart-D",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/hipaa-breach",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/hipaa-breach.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "164.400",
     "title": "Applicability",
     "text": "Subpart D applies to covered entities, business associates,\nsubcontractors and affiliated entities with respect to unsecured\nprotected health information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Subpart D applies only\nto \"unsecured\" PHI, PHI that has not been rendered unusable\nthrough encryption or destruction per HHS guidance (NIST SP\n800-111 / SP 800-88). Pryv's posture (TLS in transit in the core\nor at your proxy, as you configure it; operator-side\nencryption-at-rest; per-user backup files that `bin/backup.js`\ncan encrypt itself) lets you put PHI inside the\nsafe-harbor where you choose to, narrowing what §400 actually\nreaches in your deployment.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.402",
     "title": "Definitions, breach and unsecured PHI",
     "text": "Defines \"breach\" (acquisition / access / use / disclosure not\npermitted under Subpart E + four risk-assessment factors) and\n\"unsecured PHI\" (not rendered unusable per HHS guidance).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Two Pryv contributions to\napplying the §164.402 definitions: (1) the audit log is the data\nsource for the §402 risk-assessment factors, nature of PHI\ninvolved, unauthorized person, whether PHI was actually acquired,\nmitigation extent; and (2) Pryv's access + permission model\nmakes \"acquisition / access / use / disclosure not permitted\nunder Subpart E\" a queryable property (was the access within its\ngranted scope?) rather than an after-the-fact narrative.\n",
     "detail": "§402(2) safe-harbor, \"unsecured\" excludes PHI made unusable\nthrough encryption guidance. In transit: TLS once configured, in\nthe core (`http.ssl.*` / `letsEncrypt.*`) or at your proxy (the\ncore serves plain HTTP without that configuration); at rest:\noperator-side encryption (when configured).\nAES-256-GCM is the at-rest cipher for the Pryv-managed secrets\n(platform DB), aligning with the NIST SP 800-111 AES guidance,\nthough for ePHI content at rest, the operator-side encryption\n(LUKS / PG TDE / dm-crypt) is what governs the §402(2) status.\n\n§402(1) risk-assessment factors → Pryv data sources:\n  - Nature + extent of PHI involved → audit row → API method +\n    key request fields → infer streams + event types touched.\n  - Unauthorized person → audit row → accessId → access holder.\n  - Whether PHI was actually acquired or merely accessed → audit\n    row → method (read vs. download attachments etc.).\n  - Extent to which risk was mitigated → access version chain\n    (was access revoked? when?), audit on revocation timestamp.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "access",
       "permissions"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.404",
     "title": "Notification to individuals",
     "text": "Following discovery of a breach of unsecured PHI, covered entity\nmust notify each individual whose PHI has been breached without\nunreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days\nafter discovery.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The notification process splits into **identification**\n(Pryv-shipped, audit-log-driven per-subject roster, packaged\ninto the one-command `bin/breach-scope.js` report) and **delivery**\n(voluntarily missing + operator-owned, Pryv's transactional\nmail surface isn't bulk-send; operators compose with their\nexisting CRM / mail / SMS pipeline). The per-recipient\naudit-trace bridge uses operator-authored\n`compliance/breach-notification/sent-cmc` events on a\ncompliance system stream, satisfying the §164.414 burden-\nof-proof obligation. Full delivery-side treatment in\n`context/breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned.md`.\n",
     "detail": "Per-subject impact query: filter audit rows by (breachedAccessId,\ntimeWindow) → distinct user ids. That's your §164.404\nnotification list, with evidence. The shipped\n`bin/breach-scope.js` (open-pryv.io `0b2874e0`) packages this\ninto one command + adds §164.404(c)(1) (`recordCount` per read\naudit row) + the `scopedStreamIds` resolved query scope. Note:\n`scopedStreamIds` is an upper bound on exposure (the streams\nthe query could reach), not the streams of the events actually\nreturned, and the report does not derive PHI data categories\nfrom it; mapping streams to \"types of PHI\" stays editorial.\n\n§404(c) content elements (description of breach, types of PHI,\nsteps individual should take, what entity is doing, contact\ninfo) are editorial; Pryv has no opinion on the wording.\nDelivery, including rate-limiting + retries + send-receipt\ntracking, uses the operator's existing notification stack\n(`context/breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned.md`).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.406",
     "title": "Notification to media",
     "text": "Breach affecting more than 500 residents of a State or\njurisdiction requires notification to prominent media outlets in\nthat State or jurisdiction.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Media notification is an organizational / communications\nprocedure. No software contribution; the threshold determination\n(500 residents) is derivable from the §164.404 per-subject list,\nbut the notification itself is operational.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.408",
     "title": "Notification to Secretary",
     "text": "Covered entity must notify the Secretary of HHS following the\ndiscovery of a breach of unsecured PHI; timing depends on\nwhether ≥500 individuals are affected.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "HHS notification (via the OCR online portal) is procedural and\norganizational. Pryv's audit + access-version data inform the\ncontent (subjects affected, dates, root cause) but the\nsubmission itself is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.410",
     "title": "Notification by a business associate",
     "text": "Business associate must notify the covered entity of a breach\nwithout unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 days\nafter discovery.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "When you (the implementer)\nact as a business associate to a covered entity and store their\nPHI on your Pryv deployment, your BA-to-CE notification chain\nis operational. The CMC plugin's cross-platform consent +\nrevocation flow gives you the technical substrate for\ninter-organization handshakes; audit data lets you meet the\n\"without unreasonable delay\" element on the data-gathering side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "CMC",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.412",
     "title": "Law enforcement delay",
     "text": "A delay of notification (to individuals, media, or HHS) is\npermitted when a law-enforcement official states that\nnotification would impede investigation or cause national-\nsecurity damage.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Procedural, depends on receipt of the law-enforcement\nstatement (oral with 30-day cap, or written with the official's\ntime-limit). No software role beyond preserving the audit log\nacross the delay period (which happens by default).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.414",
     "title": "Administrative requirements and burden of proof",
     "text": "Covered entity / business associate must maintain documentation\nsufficient to demonstrate that all notifications were made or\nthat the impermissible use / disclosure did not constitute a\nbreach.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "\"Burden of proof\" is met\nwith evidence; Pryv's audit + access-version chain is the\ntechnical evidence layer (\"we know exactly what was accessed by\nwhich credential at what time\"), and the shipped\n`bin/breach-scope.js` bundles the audit walk + integrity hashes\nfor the affected window into one artefact. The organizational\ndocumentation (incident response records, notification records,\ndecisions to not notify with rationale) sits on top of that\ndata.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained audit log IS the burden-of-proof artefact (row could shift F:Evidence|Med → F:Evidence|High)",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.404(b)",
     "title": "Implementation specification, timeliness of notification",
     "text": "Covered entity shall provide the required notification without\nunreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days\nafter discovery of a breach.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The 60-day clock is procedural,\nthe covered entity owns the incident-response cadence. The\nshipped `bin/breach-scope.js` compresses the \"discovery\" +\n\"scoping\" steps that dominate the timeline: one command on the\nsubject's home core answers \"what was accessed, by whom, when,\nhow many records\", so the clock is dominated by editorial work,\nnot data-gathering. The discipline of acting on that data\nwithin the 60-day window is the operator's process.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-breach.164.404"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.404(c)",
     "title": "Implementation specification, content of notification",
     "text": "Notification to individuals shall include a brief description of\nwhat happened (date of breach + date of discovery), description\nof PHI involved, steps individuals should take, what the entity\nis doing, and contact procedures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Content of the notification is the covered entity's editorial\nartefact; Pryv has no opinion on the wording. The shipped\n`bin/breach-scope.js` report machine-derives inputs to two of\nthe five §404(c) content elements: the what-happened\ndescription (time window, methods invoked, record counts) and\nraw material for the PHI-involved description (streams in the\ncompromised access's query scope). The stream list is an upper\nbound on exposure, mapping streams to \"types of PHI\" is\neditorial, and the remaining elements (steps individuals\nshould take, what the entity is doing, contact procedures)\nstay operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-breach.164.404"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.404(d)",
     "title": "Implementation specification, methods of individual notification",
     "text": "Written notice by first-class mail (or email if requested by\nindividual); telephone or in-person where urgent due to imminent\nmisuse; substitute notice where contact information insufficient\n/ out-of-date (with web-posting + media-notice variants per\nthreshold).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Notification method choice is operational. Pryv has no software\nrole in actually delivering the notice (Pryv is not a mailer).\nWhen the entity uses Pryv events to record the notice-delivery\nattempt (e.g., a `breach-notice/sent` event per affected\nindividual), the audit chain proves the delivery attempt.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-breach.164.404"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.402(1)",
     "title": "Definition of \"breach\", four-factor risk assessment",
     "text": "\"Breach\" means the acquisition, access, use or disclosure of PHI\nin a manner not permitted under Subpart E, which compromises the\nsecurity or privacy of the PHI. Compromise is determined via a\nfour-factor risk assessment: (i) nature + extent of PHI involved,\n(ii) unauthorized person, (iii) whether PHI was acquired or\nviewed, (iv) extent risk has been mitigated.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The four risk-assessment\nfactors all draw on Pryv data:\n  (i) nature + extent: audit-row method + key request fields +\n      derived event-type set from the touched streams.\n  (ii) unauthorized person: audit-row accessId → access holder\n      with clientData.role + clientData.purpose.\n  (iii) actually acquired vs merely accessed: method-level\n      distinction in audit (events.get vs attachments.get,\n      success vs unauthorized error).\n  (iv) mitigation extent: access-version chain showing\n      revoke / scope-down timestamps relative to the incident.\nThe risk-assessment write-up is the operator's analytical\nartefact; Pryv supplies the structured inputs.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-breach.164.402"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.402(2)",
     "title": "Definition of \"unsecured protected health information\", safe-harbor",
     "text": "\"Unsecured PHI\" means PHI not rendered unusable, unreadable or\nindecipherable to unauthorized persons through use of a\ntechnology or methodology specified in HHS guidance (NIST SP\n800-111 for at-rest encryption; NIST SP 800-52 / SP 800-77 /\nSP 800-113 / FIPS 140-2 for in-transit encryption; NIST SP 800-88\nfor destruction).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "The safe-harbor\nnarrows what triggers Subpart D notification: PHI that's\nactually secured per HHS guidance is outside §164.402's\n\"unsecured PHI\" definition and a leak of it doesn't compel\nnotification. With TLS configured (in the core via `http.ssl.*`\nand the built-in ACME integration, or at your proxy), plus\nAES-256-GCM for platform secrets at rest, the in-transit half\nsits inside the safe-harbor; without that configuration the\ncore serves plain HTTP, so make sure no hop carries it. The at-rest\nhalf for ePHI content itself depends on the operator's chosen\nat-rest encryption (operator-side LUKS / PG TDE / dm-crypt).\n",
     "detail": "Practical guidance: pair `letsEncrypt.enabled: true` with operator-\nside full-disk encryption on every node + encrypted backup archives\nto maximize §402(2) safe-harbor reach. NIST SP 800-111-equivalent\nat-rest encryption applies whether the PHI is in the primary\nengine, an attachment file, or a `bin/backup.js` output.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-breach.164.402",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(a)(2)(iv)",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(e)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "End-to-end encryption broadens safe-harbor coverage to bulk event data",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=180707914&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C34"
      }
     ]
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "hipaa-privacy",
   "title": "HIPAA Privacy Rule",
   "short": "HIPAA-Privacy",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "US",
   "version": "45 CFR Part 160 + Part 164 Subparts A + E (as amended through the HITECH 2013 Omnibus Final Rule)",
   "version_date": "2013-01-25",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-C/part-164/subpart-E",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/hipaa-privacy",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/hipaa-privacy.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "164.502",
     "title": "Uses and disclosures of PHI, general rules",
     "text": "A covered entity may not use or disclose protected health\ninformation, except as permitted or required by the Privacy Rule.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv's permission model\nis the technical enforcement layer for Article 502: an app or\ncounterparty can only read or write streams its access permits.\nThe \"permitted or required by the Privacy Rule\" determination,\nwhich use cases are TPO, when authorization is required, what\nminimum-necessary means in your workflow, is your programmatic\ndecision; Pryv enforces whatever scope you grant.\n",
     "detail": "Workforce, apps, and counterparties act on PHI only by holding an\naccess whose `permissions[]` allows the specific stream + level.\nDisclosures to third parties (via shared accesses or CMC capability\nflows) inherit the same enforcement model. The audit log makes\nevery use / disclosure attributable to a specific access at a\nspecific time, which is the substrate for §164.528 accounting.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.506",
     "title": "Uses and disclosures for treatment, payment, healthcare operations (TPO)",
     "text": "Permits use and disclosure of PHI for the entity's own TPO, and\nunder defined conditions for another entity's TPO.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "TPO is the largest category\nof permitted uses. Pryv lets you mint accesses tagged with the\nTPO purpose in `clientData` (e.g., `purpose: \"treatment\"`); the\npermission model enforces the scope. The TPO-vs-not\nclassification of any specific workflow is your programmatic\njudgement; Pryv carries it forward into the audit trail.\n",
     "detail": "A common pattern: separate accesses per purpose (one\n\"treatment-app\" access; one \"billing-app\" access; one\n\"ops-analytics\" access), each independently revocable and\nauditable. `access.clientData.purpose` makes the\nclassification an artefact rather than a verbal claim.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.508",
     "title": "Uses and disclosures requiring authorization",
     "text": "Uses and disclosures not otherwise permitted require a written\nauthorization from the individual that meets defined content\nrequirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The authorization Pryv mints when your subject grants an access IS\nthe §164.508 authorization record, versioned, immutable per\nversion, with the granted scope (permissions) and the authorization\ntext (clientData or a `consent/request-cmc` event) inseparable.\nThe access keeps every previous version; a request event keeps\nits previous versions only with `versioning.forceKeepHistory:\ntrue` (off by default), so do not edit it after sending unless\nthat is on.\nWithdrawal is a single API call. For cross-account / cross-entity\nauthorizations, the CMC plugin carries the negotiation state.\n",
     "detail": "Section 508(c) elements (description, identification, signature\nequivalent, expiration, right to revoke, etc.) map naturally to\naccess + clientData fields:\n  - description of information disclosed → `permissions[]`\n  - description of authorized recipients → access type +\n    counterparty (CMC pair)\n  - signature equivalent → the act of granting the access through\n    the auth flow (auditable)\n  - expiration → `access.expires`\n  - right to revoke → `accesses.delete` + audit row at revocation;\n    for a cross-account (CMC) authorization, the individual's own\n    accept event also records the revocation, whichever party\n    ended it (`content.withdrawal`, open-pryv.io\n    2.0.0-rc.36) `[CN58]`, `[CN59]`, `[CN60]`\n  - re-disclosure statement → `clientData.redisclosure_notice`\nImplementer responsibility: ensure the consent UX presents the\n§508(c) elements at the grant moment.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP",
       "CN58",
       "CN59",
       "CN60"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "CMC",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.510",
     "title": "Uses and disclosures requiring opportunity to agree or object",
     "text": "Disclosures to family / friends or for facility-directory purposes\nmay proceed if the individual is given the opportunity to agree or\nobject, and the entity reasonably infers no objection.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The opportunity-to-agree-or-\nobject construct is operational. Pryv lets you record the\noffered choice and the individual's response as durable\nartefacts (clientData on the relevant access, or a\n`consent/notice-cmc` / custom event), so the §164.510\nreasonable-inference becomes a record rather than recollection.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.512",
     "title": "Uses and disclosures for which authorization or opportunity not required",
     "text": "Twelve categories of permitted disclosures without authorization\n(public health, law enforcement, etc.), each with specific\nconditions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Section 512 disclosures are\noperationally driven by the circumstances (subpoena, public-\nhealth request, etc.). Pryv's contribution is durability: every\nsuch disclosure must still go through an access, and the audit\nlog captures it. Recording the §512 category and rationale in\n`access.clientData.legal_basis` makes the disclosure\njustification recoverable later.\n",
     "detail": "Recommended pattern: mint a purpose-specific access per §512\ninvocation (`clientData.disclosure_category: \"law_enforcement\"`,\n`clientData.statute: \"...\"` etc.), execute the disclosure, and\nrevoke the access. The audit trail then shows the full lifecycle\nattached to the legal-basis claim.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.514(a)",
     "title": "De-identification of PHI",
     "text": "PHI that has been de-identified (Safe Harbor method or\nExpert Determination) is no longer subject to the Privacy Rule.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv stores whatever event\ncontent you write; de-identification is a transformation you\nperform on the data before storage (or before disclosure).\nCustom event types + the per-stream design let you keep an\nidentified and a de-identified copy under separate permission\nscopes, simplifying §514(a) workflows.\n",
     "detail": "A typical pattern: identified events on a `clinical/*` stream tree\nwith restricted access; a parallel `research/*` stream tree\nholding de-identified projections, accessible to a broader analyst\ngroup. The de-identification logic itself (e.g., Safe Harbor's\n18-identifier list) is your application code; Pryv stores the\noutput.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "event",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.514(d)",
     "title": "Minimum necessary use, disclosure, and requests",
     "text": "Covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit PHI to the\nminimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-stream permissions are the minimum-necessary primitive: each\naccess carries only the streams + levels needed for its purpose,\nso by construction the holder cannot see more PHI than granted.\nYour stream layout + permission-design choices determine the\ngranularity at which \"minimum necessary\" can be enforced\ntechnically.\n",
     "detail": "Practical guidance:\n  - Design stream topology so distinct purposes live on distinct\n    subtrees (treatment / billing / research / ops).\n  - Mint per-purpose accesses with `permissions[]` pointing at the\n    smallest necessary subtree.\n  - Avoid blanket `*` permissions except for personal-token /\n    admin roles where unrestricted access is the stated need.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.520",
     "title": "Notice of privacy practices",
     "text": "Covered entity must provide a notice that adequately describes its\nuses and disclosures of PHI and the individual's rights.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The notice itself is your\neditorial content. Pryv preserves the notice text shown to each\nsubject, typically on `access.clientData.privacy_notice` or as\na dedicated event, so the same words presented are recoverable\nper subject per time. The customer-facing `app-web-auth3`\ntemplate is the surface where the notice typically appears.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "app-web-auth3",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.522",
     "title": "Right to request restriction; confidential communications",
     "text": "Individual has the right to request restrictions on uses and\ndisclosures and to receive confidential communications by\nalternative means or at alternative locations.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "A granted restriction is a scope-down on the relevant access\n(`accesses.update` to narrower permissions) or a revocation\n(`accesses.delete`). The access-version chain proves what state\nwas in force before the restriction and from when it applies.\nConfidential-communications choices (alternate address, phone)\nlive in `account.clientData` or a dedicated event.\n",
     "detail": "Note that §522(a)(1)(vi) (post-HITECH) made restrictions on\ndisclosures to a health plan for out-of-pocket-paid services\nmandatory on request. The Pryv pattern is the same, mint /\nnarrow the access tied to the health-plan workflow, but you\nmust apply it without operational discretion when this specific\ncondition is met.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "access.permissions"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.524",
     "title": "Right of access by the individual",
     "text": "Individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of\ntheir PHI in a designated record set, in the form and format\nrequested if readily producible.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Your subject, holding a personal token, reads everything via the\nstandard Pryv API, events, streams, accesses (with history),\naudit records, attachments, in the canonical event-type schemas.\nWrap that in a subject-portal app and you have §164.524 covered\nend-to-end. The 30-day response timeline is your process target,\nnot a software latency.\n",
     "detail": "Form-and-format: events return as canonical JSON validated against\n`data-types` schemas, structured, machine-readable, and arbitrary\nJSON-consumer-friendly. Attachments download in their stored\nMIME-type. If a subject requests a specific format Pryv doesn't\nnatively produce (e.g., CDA C-CDA), your portal layer transforms.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "stream",
       "event",
       "audit",
       "data-types",
       "account-backup-tool"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.526",
     "title": "Right to amend",
     "text": "Individual has a right to have a covered entity amend PHI or a\nrecord about the individual in a designated record set.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`events.update` is the amendment primitive, and the audit log\nrecords who amended which event and when. The prior content is\nkept, so the amendment trail shows what changed, only on a\ndeployment with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by\ndefault; see `context/event-history.md`): set it, or record each\namendment as a new event linked to the one it amends. Configurable\nrather than implemented: §164.526(c)(1) asks you to append the\namendment to, or link it from, the record it amends, and on the\ndefault configuration an update overwrites that record; one\nsetting (or that modelling convention) gives you the trail. The\n§164.526 process (request → decision → action → notice) is yours\nto run.\n",
     "detail": "For denied amendments where the individual files a statement of\ndisagreement (§526(d)), store the statement as a separate event\non a designated-record-set stream linked back to the original\nvia `clientData.amends_event_id`, so the disagreement travels\nwith the data on subsequent disclosures.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "PTU1"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "versioning.forceKeepHistory"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.528",
     "title": "Accounting of disclosures",
     "text": "Individual has a right to receive an accounting of disclosures of\nPHI made by the covered entity in the 6 years prior to the\nrequest, with specified exceptions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv's audit log is the §164.528 substrate: every API method call\nattributed to an access (with version) is recorded. Filtering by\naccess category, TPO accesses, §164.512 disclosures, etc., lets\nyou derive the §164.528-eligible subset (which excludes TPO).\nSix-year retention of the audit log is your operator-side\nconfiguration.\n",
     "detail": "The accounting must include: date, recipient, brief description\nof PHI disclosed, purpose. Each field has a Pryv source:\n  - date → audit row timestamp\n  - recipient → access holder (`access.id`) or counterparty (for\n    shared / CMC accesses)\n  - description → API method + URL query/path params recorded\n    in audit. **The audit log does NOT capture the request\n    body**, so the description is \"what was disclosed\" at the\n    API-shape level (e.g., `events.get` on a given stream),\n    not the per-event content, sufficient under §164.528 and\n    favourable for data minimisation (the audit row carries\n    no residual PHI when the underlying event is later erased).\n    See `docs/pryv-primitives.md` audit entry for the full\n    capture catalogue.\n  - purpose → `access.clientData.purpose` recorded at grant time\nPre-computing per-subject accounting reports periodically (and\nstoring them on a dedicated stream) is a useful operational\npattern for fast response to requests.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "AT61",
       "AT65"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(a)",
     "title": "Privacy officer / contact person",
     "text": "Covered entity must designate a privacy official and a contact\nperson responsible for receiving complaints.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Designation is organizational.\nPryv's contribution is indirect: the audit log gives the\nprivacy official a concrete artifact to review when investigating\ncomplaints or auditing internal use.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(b)",
     "title": "Training",
     "text": "Covered entity must train all members of its workforce on its\nprivacy policies and procedures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Training itself is your\nprogramme. Pryv's contribution to operationalizing it: the\naudit log + observability data make training-effectiveness\nmeasurable (e.g., does role X exercise access patterns matching\npolicy after training?). The training content + record-keeping\nare yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(c)",
     "title": "Safeguards",
     "text": "Covered entity must have appropriate administrative, technical,\nand physical safeguards to protect the privacy of PHI.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Section 530(c) is the\nPrivacy Rule's pointer to the Security Rule and to physical /\nadministrative safeguards. See the HIPAA-Security rows for the\ntechnical safeguards Pryv contributes; §164.310 (Physical) for\nthe operator's hosting environment. Together those rows\nconstitute the §530(c) answer for this Pryv deployment.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(1)(i)",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(a)(1)",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(e)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(f)",
     "title": "Mitigation",
     "text": "Covered entity must mitigate, to the extent practicable, any\nharmful effect of a use or disclosure in violation of its policies\nor the Privacy Rule.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Audit log + access version\nchain let you scope what was disclosed to whom and when, the\nfirst step in any mitigation. `bin/backup.js --restore` is\navailable if mitigation involves rolling back data state;\n`accesses.delete` is the primitive to revoke access from the\noffending counterparty.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.502(b)",
     "title": "Minimum necessary uses, disclosures, requests",
     "text": "Covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit PHI to the\nminimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose, with\nenumerated exceptions (treatment disclosures, disclosures to the\nindividual, authorized disclosures, required-by-law disclosures).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same primitive mapping as §164.514(d) minimum-necessary: per-\nstream permissions are the technical control; the holder cannot\nsee more PHI than the granted scope permits. §502(b)(2)\nexceptions are programmatic, the implementer leaves those\naccesses unscoped per the exception's permission, and the audit\nlog records the broader access for accountability.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.514(d)",
       "gdpr.Art.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.502(e)(1)",
     "title": "Disclosures to business associates",
     "text": "Covered entity may disclose PHI to a business associate (BA) and\nmay allow a BA to create, receive, maintain, or transmit PHI on\nits behalf only with satisfactory assurances (typically via a\nwritten contract, the BAA) that the BA will appropriately\nsafeguard the information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The technical disclosure is\nmediated by the access primitive, mint a BA-specific access\nwith `clientData.role = \"business_associate\"` + `clientData.baa_id\n= \"<contract-ref>\"`, scoped to the subjects / streams covered\nby the BAA. Cross-platform BA arrangements (where the BA runs\ntheir own Pryv) inherit the CMC capability pattern for cross-\naccount flow.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.314(a)(1)",
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(d)",
     "title": "Complaints to the covered entity",
     "text": "Covered entity must provide a process for individuals to make\ncomplaints concerning the entity's policies + procedures or its\ncompliance with the Privacy Rule; document complaints received\nand disposition.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "A complaint-intake workflow\nstores each complaint as an event on a designated\n`complaints/*` stream with `clientData.disposition` tracking\noutcome. The audit log captures the timestamp + actor on each\ndisposition update, making the §530(d)(2) documentation\nrequirement an automatic byproduct of normal record-keeping.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(e)",
     "title": "Sanctions",
     "text": "Covered entity must have and apply appropriate sanctions against\nmembers of its workforce who fail to comply with the privacy\npolicies + procedures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Sanctions are an HR / disciplinary process. No software role at\nthe sanction-decision layer; the audit log gives the underlying\nevidence (\"did this person actually access X?\") that HR\nprocesses evaluate.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(g)",
     "title": "Refraining from intimidating + retaliatory acts",
     "text": "Covered entity may not intimidate, threaten, coerce, discriminate\nagainst, or take other retaliatory action against any individual\nfor exercising any right under the Privacy Rule.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Anti-retaliation is an organizational policy + culture commitment;\nno software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.530(i)",
     "title": "Policies and procedures",
     "text": "Covered entity must implement policies and procedures with respect\nto PHI that are designed to comply with the standards,\nimplementation specifications, and other requirements of this\nSubpart E.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Same pattern as HIPAA-\nSecurity §164.316(a): policies-as-data on a\n`compliance/policies/*` stream get retention + audit, and\nversioning once `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` is set (off by\ndefault). The drafting + approval + review-cycle procedure is the\nprivacy officer's. Cross-link to §164.316(a) preserves the\nSecurity Rule's parallel obligation.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.316(a)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.510(b)",
     "title": "Disclosures for involvement in care + for notification purposes",
     "text": "Covered entity may, in accordance with §510(b)(2) standards,\ndisclose to a family member, other relative, close personal\nfriend or other person identified by the individual, PHI directly\nrelevant to that person's involvement with the individual's care\nor payment for care.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The §510(b) \"directly\nrelevant\" determination + relationship verification are\nclinical-workflow concerns. Pryv pattern: mint a time-bounded\naccess for the involved person with permissions narrowed to\n\"directly relevant\" streams + `clientData.relationship`\ncapturing the §510(b)(1) basis (family member name, role,\nindividual's opportunity-to-object record).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.510"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.512(b)",
     "title": "Uses + disclosures for public-health activities",
     "text": "Covered entity may disclose PHI for public-health activities to\npublic-health authorities authorized by law to collect or receive\nsuch information, including reporting of disease, injury,\nvital events, conduct of public-health surveillance.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Public-health-authority\nrecipient is recorded on the access's\n`clientData.recipient_authority` + `clientData.statute` for the\n§512(b) statutory basis. Audit log anchors the disclosure to a\nspecific timestamp + event range. The \"authorized by law\"\ndetermination is the covered entity's legal judgement.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.512"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.512(f)",
     "title": "Uses + disclosures for law enforcement purposes",
     "text": "Covered entity may disclose PHI for law-enforcement purposes\nunder specific conditions: court order / warrant, administrative\nrequest, identification + location, victim of crime, decedent,\netc.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "§512(f) categories drive\nvocabulary for `clientData.law_enforcement_basis` (e.g.,\n`\"f_1_i_court_order\"`, `\"f_2_ii_subpoena\"`, `\"f_4_victim\"`).\nPer-instance disclosure access minted + revoked; audit log\npreserves the chain. The decision of whether the request\nqualifies under §512(f) is legal counsel's, not Pryv's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.512"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.524(b)",
     "title": "Right of access, requests + responses",
     "text": "Covered entity may require individuals to make access requests\nin writing (within reasonable limitations); must act on request\nwithin 30 days (with one 30-day extension permitted with\nwritten notice).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Request-intake workflow\nstores each request as an event on a designated\n`access-requests/*` stream with `clientData.due_by` computed\nfrom receipt timestamp. The 30/30-day operational cadence is\nthe covered entity's process; once the response is ready, the\nindividual exercises §524 directly via the standard Pryv API\n(see the §164.524 parent row).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.524"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.524(c)",
     "title": "Right of access, provision of access",
     "text": "Covered entity must provide access in the form + format requested\nif readily producible; in a readable hard-copy form or other\nform as agreed; must provide a summary if the individual agrees\nin advance + agrees to applicable fees.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The Pryv API delivers events in canonical JSON (data-types\nschemas), \"readily producible\" in the §524(c) sense.\nImplementer's portal can transform to PDF / printed format\nwhere requested. Summaries are application-layer constructions\nfrom the same source events.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.524"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.502(g)",
     "title": "Personal representatives",
     "text": "Covered entity must treat a personal representative as the\nindividual with respect to uses + disclosures of PHI, subject to\nenumerated exceptions (abuse / neglect concerns, endangerment).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv's account-delegation primitive\n(`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) is the technical\nmechanism for \"treat the personal representative as the\nindividual\": the representative holds an **owner-equivalent\ndelegate token** over the subject's account, full owner\nauthority over the data, with the single exception that a\ndelegate can never remove its own delegation. Every action the\nrepresentative takes is **audited per delegate on the subject's\naccount**, so uses and disclosures made under the\nrepresentative's authority are attributable. The individual\n**revokes** the representative by a genuine login on their own\naccount and detaching (the authoritative teardown; a delegate\ncannot block it), which is the technical shape of §164.502(g)'s\nexceptions (abuse / neglect / endangerment) once the covered\nentity makes that clinical / legal determination. Same-core and\ncross-core (same platform) both carry the audited attribution;\nsee `context/delegation-model.md`.\n\nThe representative can also authorize an app for the individual\nthrough the auth request: the app receives an ordinary app\naccess on the individual's account (never the representative's\nowner-equivalent token), stamped by the server with a\nnon-forgeable lineage attribute naming the representative, and\nits uses and disclosures are audited on the individual's account\nwith the representative named on every record. Revoking the\nrepresentative revokes every app access granted that way\n(open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23).\n\nA lighter-weight alternative where full owner-equivalence is not\nwanted: the representative holds a scoped `app` / `shared`\naccess instead, with `clientData.representative_relationship` +\n`clientData.legal_basis` capturing the relationship and\n`accesses.update` / `accesses.delete` narrowing or removing it.\nThe \"abuse / neglect / endangerment\" determination is clinical /\nlegal judgement either way.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": false,
     "reviewed_at": "2026-09-15",
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "DCH01",
       "DCH05",
       "DCH12"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.502"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "delegation",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "delegation-model"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.512(a)",
     "title": "Uses + disclosures required by law",
     "text": "Covered entity may use or disclose PHI to the extent that such\nuse or disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure\ncomplies with and is limited to the relevant requirements of\nsuch law.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "\"Required by law\" disclosures\nstill ride on accesses; record the statutory basis in\n`clientData.statute` so the audit chain ties the disclosure to\nthe legal authority. The compliance burden of the cited law is\nseparate.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.512"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.514(b)",
     "title": "De-identification, Implementation specifications",
     "text": "Two methods: (1) Expert determination that the risk is very small;\n(2) Safe Harbor, removal of 18 enumerated identifiers + no\nactual knowledge that residual information could re-identify.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Choice of method + execution are app-side. Pryv stores the\noutput of either method as ordinary events on the de-identified\nstreams.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.514(a)"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.514(c)",
     "title": "De-identification, Re-identification",
     "text": "Covered entity may assign a code or other means of record\nidentification to allow information de-identified under §514(b)\nto be re-identified by the covered entity, provided the code\nis not derived from / related to information about the\nindividual + the entity does not use / disclose the code for\nany other purpose.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "`accesses.create {randomAlias:true}` provides the re-identification\ncode directly: it mints a platform-unique `r-XXXXXXXX` alias that is\nrandom by construction (does not encode PHI), so it satisfies\n§514(c)(1)(ii) out of the box. The platform holds the alias-to-user\nmapping and the aliased access exposes only the alias, the covered\nentity re-identifies by resolving the alias, and the code is used for\nno other purpose. Since open-pryv.io `4547b32a` (2.0.0-rc.66) the alias survives a backup and restore (`[BKAL1]`)\nand routes on a single core answering DNS (`[ALRT1]`). The alias\nkeeps the username from the recipient, and since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.69 the token is accepted under its alias only, so a\nrecipient who suspects whose record it is cannot confirm the guess\nwith the token (`[AL13]`, `[OPSE5]`; earlier releases accepted it\nunder every name of the account). The data stays linked to the\naccount, so the alias does not by itself make it de-identified\nunder §514(b): that determination stays yours. When the workflow instead needs an explicit\ncode-to-PHI map, keep it on a dedicated `re-id-map/*` system-\nstream-adjacent subtree with access permitted only to the\nre-identification administrator role; the code generation method\n(random / hash-of-non-PHI) must not encode PHI per §514(c)(1)(ii).\nTo link an account to a record id your EHR already uses (a patient\nid), external ids (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58, `external-id-index`)\nkeep the re-identification means with you, not the platform: your\nservice sends `HMAC(K_namespace, recordId)` under a key it holds,\nand Pryv stores only a token of that value mapped to a core, never\nthe record id nor the key, and never returns the value `[XIDC1]`,\n`[XIDG1]`, `[XIDN4]`. The blinded value is derived from the record\nid, so it is not by itself a code \"not derived from\" information\nabout the individual (§514(c)(1)): whether your design meets\n§514(c) rests on your key custody (the key, the means of\nre-identification, is not disclosed nor used for another purpose,\n§514(c)(2)) and is your determination.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "XIDC1",
       "XIDG1",
       "XIDN4",
       "BKAL1",
       "ALRT1",
       "AL13",
       "OPSE5"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.514(a)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "randomAlias",
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "external-id-index"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.528(b)",
     "title": "Accounting of disclosures, Implementation specifications",
     "text": "Accounting must include, for each disclosure: date, name of\nentity / person who received PHI, brief description of PHI\ndisclosed, brief statement of the purpose or copy of written\nrequest.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Each §528(b)(2) field has a Pryv source (date / name / PHI\ndescription / purpose), see the §164.528 parent row for the\nmapping. The pre-computed accounting report pattern (storing\nresults on a dedicated stream) keeps the §528 response window\ntractable.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "AT61",
       "AT65"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.528"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.504(e)",
     "title": "Organizational requirements, business associate contracts",
     "text": "Covered entity may permit a business associate to create, receive,\nmaintain, or transmit PHI on its behalf only with satisfactory\nassurances via written contract meeting the BAA content\nrequirements of §164.504(e)(2).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The §164.504(e) BAA content\nis contractual. Pryv-side support for executing the contract\nterms: BA access tagged with `clientData.baa_id` +\n`clientData.role = \"business_associate\"`, scope narrowed to\nsubjects + streams covered by the BAA, audit-log accountability\nfor every action under the BA access.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.314(a)(1)",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.502(e)(1)",
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.504(g)",
     "title": "Organizational requirements, group health plans",
     "text": "Group health plan may disclose PHI to a plan sponsor only upon\nreceipt of certification that the plan documents have been\namended per §164.504(f) restrictions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Group-health-plan / plan-sponsor arrangements are organizational\n/ contractual. No software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.502(j)",
     "title": "Disclosures by whistleblowers + workforce member crime victims",
     "text": "Workforce member or business associate disclosure of PHI to a\nregulatory authority / law enforcement / health oversight agency\nis not a violation where the workforce member / BA believes in\ngood faith that the entity has engaged in unlawful conduct +\nmeets §502(j)(1) conditions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Whistleblower protections are legal framing. No software role;\nthe disclosing person's audit-trail evidence under their access\nmay be cited in subsequent proceedings.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "hipaa-security",
   "title": "HIPAA Security Rule",
   "short": "HIPAA-Security",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "US",
   "version": "45 CFR Part 164 Subpart C (as amended through the HITECH 2013 Omnibus Final Rule)",
   "version_date": "2013-01-25",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-C/part-164/subpart-C",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/hipaa-security",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/hipaa-security.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(1)(i)",
     "title": "Security Management Process, standard",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and\ncorrect security violations.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The Security Management\nProcess is a programme you run as the covered entity / business\nassociate, risk analysis, risk-management decisions, sanctions,\nactivity review. Pryv supplies the technical raw material\n(audit log, system-level observability) that several of those\nactivities draw on, particularly the §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D)\nInformation System Activity Review specification. The umbrella\nprogramme itself remains yours to define and run.\n",
     "detail": "The four implementation specifications under (a)(1)(ii), risk\nanalysis (R), risk management (R), sanction policy (R), and\ninformation system activity review (R), each have their own row\nwhere the Pryv contribution is more direct. This row covers the\numbrella standard itself: a written, maintained programme.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D)",
     "title": "Information system activity review, Required",
     "text": "Implement procedures to regularly review records of information\nsystem activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security\nincident tracking reports.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Every API call is captured by Pryv's per-user audit log; the\n`audit.get` method exposes it for periodic review. Observability\n(opt-in telemetry emitter) gives system-level activity reports for\nthe infrastructure side. The \"regular review\" cadence is your written\nprocedure.\n",
     "detail": "Audit records carry timestamp, user, access reference (accessId +\naccessSerial), API method, key request fields, success / error.\nThis is the raw material for both routine review (who accessed what,\nwhen) and incident-driven investigation. The audit-event-stream\noptional channel surfaces audit records into the subject's own\nstreams, useful when the subject participates in review.\n",
     "technical": "Audit storage: per-user SQLite in\n`open-pryv.io/components/audit/`. Access method: `audit.get`. Tests\nlive under `open-pryv.io/components/audit/test/`.\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT02",
       "AT03",
       "AT51"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C)",
     "title": "Termination procedures, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement procedures for terminating access to electronic protected\nhealth information when employment ends or workforce role changes.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Workforce access to ePHI is mediated by Pryv accesses. Termination\nis a single API call (`accesses.delete`) which immediately revokes\nthe token. The audit log proves the termination instant. For\nrole-change scenarios, `accesses.update` narrows permissions without\nfull revocation, preserving the version history of the change.\n",
     "detail": "The \"Addressable\" status means you must implement it, document why\nnot, or implement an equivalent. The Pryv primitives give you the\n\"implement it\" path directly:\n  - Full termination: `accesses.delete` revokes the token immediately\n    and snapshots the prior state into the access history.\n  - Role change / narrowing: `accesses.update` with reduced\n    `permissions` keeps the same access identity but enforces the\n    new scope from the version bump onward.\n  - Audit chain: every subsequent API call would fail authentication\n    (after delete) or fall outside the new scope (after update),\n    producing a verifiable termination boundary.\n  - Expiry-driven termination: A `shared` access managed by an app\n    access can no longer outlive it (it inherits the app access's\n    expiry at creation, clearing that expiry is refused, and\n    authentication refuses a never-expiring shared access once its\n    app access has expired, `5d609bfa`), and a webhook stops\n    firing and becomes `inactive` once its access has expired\n    (`3394b95f`), both in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23.\n\nFor workforce-scale deployments (e.g., hospital with 100+ staff),\nPryv composes with two patterns covered in\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md` (a third, for teams sharing\none account, follows):\n  - Group access + `callerId` (auth header\n    `Authorization: <TOKEN> <CALLERID>`), termination = removing\n    the individual from the external IdP / IGA group, no Pryv-\n    side action; audit trail preserves the individual identity\n    via the recorded caller id.\n  - Seed access + sub-access derivation, termination =\n    `accesses.delete` on the individual's sub-access while the\n    seed + sibling sub-accesses remain untouched.\nRoles + groups are deliberately outside Pryv; the external IdP\nis the source of truth.\n\n**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nFor a team that shares one account and reaches patient data\nthrough cross-account consent, each member holds a membership on\nthe group account and short-lived accesses of their own on each\npatient account, minted by the group's core. However the\nmembership ends (an administrator revokes it, the member leaves,\nthe membership access is deleted or expires, the delegate who\napproved it is detached, the group account is deleted), the\ngroup's core deletes those accesses on every patient account\nthrough the patient's grant, reads each one back, and records the\noutcome per patient (`deleted`, `absent` or `residual`) on a\nserver-written `consent/member-revoke-cmc` event naming the member\n`[GA20]`, `[GA21]`, `[GA22]`, `[GA23]`. Narrowing a membership\n(fewer teams, or a team stream deleted for good) removes only the\naccesses outside what it still covers `[GA41]`. A residual (a\npatient core unreachable or refusing) is retried by the retry\nloop, then by the periodic ledger pass\n(`cmc.memberAccess.sweepIntervalMs`), and lasts at most until the\naccess's own expiry (24 h by default, 7 d at most,\n`cmc.memberAccess.maxTtl`). Retries and the periodic pass need\n`cmc.retryLoop.enabled`, `true` by default since this release;\nset to `false`, a warning is logged at boot and a residual stays\nuntil the access expires. The sweep and the periodic pass read the\nwhole ledger since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.79 `[MA32]`; earlier\nreleases read at most 100,000 ledger records per group account\n(with a warning in the log), so on a larger group an access beyond\nthem lasted until its own expiry. When the group account itself is\ndeleted, its members' accesses are deleted on the patient cores\nbefore the erasure, and no record is kept `[GA40]`. Terminating\nsuch a member is no longer your code's job; deciding who may join\nstays yours. Code: `open-pryv.io/components/cmc/src/memberSweep.ts`,\n`handleMemberRevoke.ts`,\n`components/api-server/src/methods/helpers/cmcMemberSweep.ts`;\nunit tests `[CMCMR]`. See `context/workforce-access-patterns.md`,\nPattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "LG20",
       "CMCGA",
       "CMCMR",
       "GA20",
       "GA21",
       "GA22",
       "GA23",
       "GA40",
       "GA41",
       "MA32"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cmc.retryLoop.enabled",
       "cmc.memberAccess.maxTtl",
       "cmc.memberAccess.sweepIntervalMs"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B)",
     "title": "Access authorization, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures for granting access to ePHI\nthrough, for example, access to a workstation, transaction,\nprogram, process, or other mechanism.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Granting access to ePHI in Pryv means minting an access with\nexplicit per-stream permissions. The technical authorization\ndecision is enforced at every API call. Documentation of the\nauthorization rationale lives in `access.clientData` next to the\ngrant itself, so the \"why\" travels with the \"what\".\n",
     "detail": "Access grants are creation events on the `accesses` collection,\nwith `permissions[]` listing the streamId + level tuples the\ngrantee may exercise. `clientData` carries free-form metadata\nsuch as the workforce-role label, the granting administrator,\nthe business reason. Together these form a per-grant record\nsatisfying both the technical control and the documentation\nhalf of the standard.\n\n**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nA member of a team sharing one account is authorized by a consent\nact: the member writes a membership request\n(`consent/request-cmc` with `request.membership: true`) on their\nown account, and an administrator of the group (the owner, or a\ndelegate of the group account) accepts it and picks the team\nstreams. The resulting membership access records who approved it\n(`clientData.cmc.membership.approvedBy`: the delegate and the\ndelegation, or `null` for the owner) and what the member asked\nfor (`requestedScopes`) `[GA01]`, `[MB30]`, `[MB32]`. The server\nlimits what a membership may ask for, at write and again at\naccept: team streams under `:_cmc:apps:*` only (never the inbox,\nthe chat or collector streams, nor `*`), `read` or `contribute`,\nno feature permission, never delegable\n(`cmc-membership-permissions-invalid`) `[GA02]`, `[MB31]`; a\ndelegate cannot approve a membership requested from their own\naccount `[MB34]`. Each access the member then gets on a patient\naccount is issued only through that membership and within the\npatient's consent (see 164.312(a)(1)). See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP",
       "CMCMB",
       "GA01",
       "GA02",
       "MB30",
       "MB31",
       "MB32",
       "MB34"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "stream",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)",
     "title": "Access establishment and modification, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures that, based upon the entity's\naccess authorization policies, establish, document, review, and\nmodify a user's right of access to a workstation, transaction,\nprogram, or process.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The access lifecycle (create / read / update / delete) is first-\nclass in Pryv. `accesses.update` writes a tamper-evident snapshot\nof the prior version into history on every modification, giving\nyou the documented review trail this standard expects.\n",
     "detail": "Modification semantics:\n  - `accesses.create`: establishes a new grant (see (a)(4)(ii)(B)).\n  - `accesses.get ?includeHistory=true`: review the version chain.\n  - `accesses.update`: modify permissions / clientData; bumps\n    `serial`, snapshots the old head into history.\n  - `accesses.delete`: termination (see (a)(3)(ii)(C)).\nEvery step appears in the audit log, with the timestamp and\nacting administrator's identity preserved.\n\n**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nFor a team sharing one account, a member's right of access is\nestablished by a membership the group's administrator accepts\n`[GA01]`, modified by updating that membership access (removing\nteams, or deleting a team stream for good, deletes the member's\npatient accesses that fall outside what remains) `[MR27]`,\n`[MR33]`, `[GA41]`, and reviewed from the group account: the\nmembership accesses (a revoked one stays readable as a deletion\nrecord with `includeDeletions`) `[GA22]`, the member's access\nrequests (`consent/member-access-cmc`) and the server-written\nsweep records (`consent/member-revoke-cmc`, with the outcome per\npatient and any residual) each name the member. A member cannot\nchange or delete these records; the owner can `[GA42]`. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "GF33",
       "CMCMR",
       "GA01",
       "GA22",
       "GA41",
       "GA42",
       "MR27",
       "MR33"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D)",
     "title": "Password management, Addressable",
     "text": "Procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv stores credentials on a privileged `system-stream`, separate\nfrom ordinary content. Password rules (complexity, rotation) are\noperator-configured. Adding `services.mfa.mode` raises the\nauthentication strength beyond a password alone, see §164.312(d).\n",
     "detail": "Password is one possible factor; MFA via the `mfa.*` API methods\n(authenticator-app TOTP by default since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.14\n`[MA15B]`, `[MA10A]`, SMS supported `[MA3A]`) is the second factor\nwhen enabled. Recovery flows live alongside (`mfa.recover`) so an\naccount is not lost when a device is `[MA7A]`. The implementer chooses whether MFA is required\nuniversally or per-role.\n\nAn operator may also enable federated sign-in through an external\nOpenID Connect provider (`sso.*`, beta, off by default). It is gated\nso an external identity cannot take over an account whose email was\nnever inbox-proved, and the minted session token is never carried in\na URL (delivered to the auth app via a one-time shared secret). MFA,\nwhen active, is still enforced on the federated path.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "MA15B",
       "MA10A",
       "MA3A",
       "MA7A"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "services.mfa.mode",
       "auth.passwordRules",
       "sso.enabled"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "system-streams",
       "MFA",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "enhancement",
       "summary": "Reference TOTP / WebAuthn plugins reduce dependence on SMS-OTP for the second factor",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467852&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C78"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)",
     "title": "Data backup plan, Required",
     "text": "Establish and implement procedures to create and maintain retrievable\nexact copies of electronic protected health information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`bin/backup.js` produces per-user backup files (account data,\nstreams, accesses, profile, webhooks, events, attachments, audit,\nhigh-frequency series). `--restore` rebuilds a user from a backup\nfile. The backup procedure (\"when, where, how often\") is yours to\nschedule; the underlying primitive is shipped.\n\n**Take a new backup after upgrading to open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34\nor later.** Earlier backups carry no high-frequency series data\non any series engine, with no warning: backup and restore\naddressed each user's series under a different key than the one\nthe series are stored under. Since 2.0.0-rc.34 the series are\nexported and restored, series move between any two series engines\n(InfluxDB backups could not be restored before), and the backup\nmanifest's `coreVersion` reports the core's release.\n\n**If you ever ran `bin/backup.js --incremental` before\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51, check those backup directories.** An\nincremental run overwrote the full backup it continued, and a\nrestore of such a directory reported success while restoring only\nthe last delta: it is not a retrievable exact copy and cannot be\nrepaired. `node bin/backup.js --inspect <dir>` reports it\n`DAMAGED` and `--restore` now refuses it `[BKIC2]`, `[BKC6]`.\nTake a new full backup into a new directory and continue the\nincrementals from there. Full backups written by earlier releases\nare not affected.\n\n**Three procedure points from open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86.** A backup\nwritten by 2.0.0-rc.86 or later restores with that release or\nlater: if you go back to an earlier release, start a new chain in\na new directory (a run an earlier release appends to the chain is\nrefused at restore) `[BKSM6]`. Keep each backup directory for the\nbackup only: a file the backup did not write is refused at restore,\nand a backup refuses to start in a directory holding other files\n`[BKSM7]`, `[BKSM8]`. With a recipient public key, sign the runs\n(`--signing-key` at backup, `--signing-pubkey` at restore; detail\nbelow), starting with a new full backup into a new directory.\n",
     "detail": "Per-user backup files are advantageous for HIPAA's \"exact copies\"\nlanguage because the backup unit matches the natural protected-\nhealth-information unit (the subject). They also play well with\nthe §164.310(d) media controls (you can encrypt + transport a\nsingle subject's backup file).\n\n**Backup encryption is built in, opt-in.** By default\n`bin/backup.js` writes plaintext (gzip-compressed) files. With\n`--recipient-pubkey <pem>` (recommended: a random per-backup data\nkey is RSA-OAEP-wrapped to your public key, so the backup host\nholds no secret that can decrypt its own output) or\n`--encrypt-passphrase` / `PRYV_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` (scrypt-derived\nkey), every file is encrypted with per-file authenticated\nAES-256-GCM before it reaches the destination disk, and the\nbackup carries a cleartext `encryption.json` envelope (crypto\nheaders only), a `RESTORE-README.md` and a standalone\n`decrypt-backup.mjs`, so the key holder can recover it without\nPryv. `--restore` takes `--private-key` or\n`--decrypt-passphrase`. Available since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.5.\nLosing the key or passphrase makes the backup unrecoverable:\nkey custody is yours, and so are volume- or bucket-level\nencryption (LUKS, S3 SSE-KMS, ...) if you add it on top.\nDocument the chosen key model in your backup-plan SOP for\n§164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A).\n\n**Backup handling hardened (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47 to\n2.0.0-rc.50).** A backup written without a key model prints a\nwarning that it is plaintext (it holds every account's data, access\ntokens included) `[BKPW1]`; `--passphrase-file` reads the passphrase\nfrom a file, so it shows neither in the process list nor in shell\nhistory `[BKPF1]`; backups are written with directories `0700` and\nfiles `0600` (2.0.0-rc.49). A restore refuses, before writing\nanything: a plaintext backup when a decryption secret was given\n(`--allow-plaintext` overrides, `--require-encrypted` refuses\nplaintext even without a secret) `[BKRE1]`, `[BKRE4]`; user ids or\nusernames that are not one safe file name, symbolic links where the\nbackup keeps its data `[BKRS1]`, `[BKRS4]`; names the platform\nroutes itself `[BKRN1]`; and a single-user restore onto a username\nanother account now holds, even with `--overwrite` `[RSOW1]`.\nAuthenticity bound: recipient-key (hybrid) encryption gives\nconfidentiality, not authenticity; whoever holds the public key and\ncan write to your backup destination can produce a backup that\nrestores, unless the runs are signed (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86,\nbelow). Protect write access to the destination, and prefer\n`--require-encrypted` on restore.\n\n**Incremental backups form a chain (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51).** A\n`--incremental` run writes only its own `incrementals/<runId>/`\ndirectory and the run index `chain.json`; no file of an earlier run\nis rewritten `[BKC1]`. A restore applies the full backup, then every\nrun in order, newer versions and deletions replacing older ones\n`[BKC2]`, `[BKIC1]`; `--through-run <runId>` restores the chain as\nof a given run, a chain with a missing or reordered run is refused\n`[BKC7]`, and two overlapping runs into the same directory leave the\nfirst in the chain and the second aside `[BKCC1]`. A run's window\nstarts at the previous run's snapshot time, so changes made while\nthat run was in progress are no longer lost `[BKC3]`, and the\ndeletion of streams, accesses and webhooks is carried `[BKC4]`.\nEach run of an encrypted backup has its own envelope and key, keeps\nthe chain's key model (a wrong secret is refused before anything is\nwritten) and carries the current `decrypt-backup.mjs` and\n`RESTORE-README.md` `[BKC5]`, `[BKCS1]`; with a recipient public key\nthe backup host still needs no private key to continue the chain\n`[BKIC3]`. Series emptied after a run stay empty on restore\n`[BKCE2]`. `--inspect <dir>` lists the runs and says whether the\ndirectory is sound. Up to 2.0.0-rc.85 the chain index and run\nmanifests are checked for consistency but not signed (the\nauthenticity bound above applies). Your backup-plan SOP should name\nthe chain you restore from and how long its runs are kept.\n\n**Authenticated files and signed runs (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86).**\nEach run's manifest lists every file of the run with its size and\nSHA-256 hash and is bound to its run; a restore refuses a run with\na file added, removed, resized or changed, and a `chain.json` entry\nthat disagrees with the run's manifest (users, scope, snapshot\ntime) `[BKSM1]`, `[BKSM2]`, `[BKSM3]`. An encrypted file ends with\na marked final block and each block is tied to its file, its\nposition and its run, so a file cut at a block boundary, an empty\nfile left in place of a real one, or a file swapped between two\naccounts is refused instead of restoring as valid. An account's\nfiles are checked before anything of the account is written.\n`--signing-key <ed25519 pem>` signs each run (`manifest.sig`);\ngiven `--signing-pubkey`, a restore or `--inspect` requires every\nrun to be signed by that key `[BKSM4]`, `[BKIS1]`. With a recipient\npublic key and no signature, a writer holding that public key can\nstill replace a run, and the backup warns that it is not signed\n`[BKSM5]`, `[BKIS2]`. `--inspect --verify-files` (with the backup's\nsecret) reads and checks every file without restoring `[BKIS3]`:\nput it in your backup verification step. New passphrase backups\nuse a stronger key derivation (scrypt N = 2^17). Runs written by\nearlier releases restore as before and are reported as \"file list\nnot verified\". A plaintext run's file table detects corruption,\nnot tampering. An account erased while a full backup runs is left\nout of that run `[BKDU1]`, and two runs finishing together no\nlonger race on `chain.json` `[BKLK1]`, `[BKLK2]`. Operator page:\n`customer-resources/backup` on the developer site.\n",
     "technical": "Backup chunking + integrity restored (see\n`open-pryv.io/CHANGELOG-v2-back.md`). Series namespace shared by\nbackup, restore, account deletion and the series server:\n`open-pryv.io/components/business/src/series/namespace.ts`\n(2.0.0-rc.34). `[BKSR]` runs series through backup and restore in\neach test matrix (PostgreSQL or SQLite base, with the default or\nthe InfluxDB series engine), `[BKEV]` the events store round trip,\n`[BKVR]` the manifest version; `just test-backup-roundtrip`\n(`open-pryv.io/tools/backup-roundtrip/`) backs a seeded user up\nand restores it PostgreSQL to SQLite and back, comparing the\nbundles. Backup options are CLI flags of `bin/backup.js`, not\nconfig keys. Encryption: `open-pryv.io/storages/interfaces/backup/BackupCipher.ts`\n(tests in `open-pryv.io/storages/test/backup-encryption.test.js`),\nreleased in 2.0.0-rc.5 (commit `ea27bf35`). File table, run\nbinding and signatures: `open-pryv.io/storages/interfaces/backup/FilesystemBackupWriter.ts`,\n`FilesystemBackupReader.ts`, `chain.ts`, released in 2.0.0-rc.86\n(tag commit `70e28786`); the block-level checks are tested by\n`[BKAD1]` to `[BKAD6]` in `open-pryv.io/storages/test/`.\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "BKSR",
       "BKEV",
       "BKVR",
       "BKPW1",
       "BKPF1",
       "BKRE1",
       "BKRE4",
       "BKRS1",
       "BKRS4",
       "BKRN1",
       "RSOW1",
       "BKC1",
       "BKC2",
       "BKC3",
       "BKC4",
       "BKC5",
       "BKC6",
       "BKC7",
       "BKCC1",
       "BKCS1",
       "BKCE2",
       "BKIC1",
       "BKIC2",
       "BKIC3",
       "BKSM1",
       "BKSM2",
       "BKSM3",
       "BKSM4",
       "BKSM5",
       "BKSM6",
       "BKSM7",
       "BKSM8",
       "BKLK1",
       "BKLK2",
       "BKIS1",
       "BKIS2",
       "BKIS3",
       "BKDU1"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/backup.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "backup-payload-encryption"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B)",
     "title": "Disaster recovery plan, Required",
     "text": "Establish (and implement as needed) procedures to restore any loss\nof data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Two layers Pryv gives you, covering different data: (1) cold\nrestore from `bin/backup.js --restore`, the only recovery path\nfor user data; (2) a multi-core cluster replicates the platform\nDB (user-to-core index, shared settings, certificates) over rqlite\nRaft with cluster-CA mTLS, so losing one core does not lose the\nplatform's control plane. User data is not replicated between\ncores: each user lives on one home core, so if that core's\nstorage is lost, its users' data comes back only from your\nbackups (or from replication you run under the storage engine,\ne.g. PostgreSQL streaming replication). You compose them per your\nRTO / RPO.\n",
     "detail": "Cluster topology is documented in the dev-site customer-resources\nguides. The bootstrap CLI (`bin/bootstrap.js new-core`) issues an\nencrypted bundle with the cluster CA + rqlite TLS material; the\njoining core boots via `bin/master.js --bootstrap`. Lets-Encrypt\ncertificates replicate across the cluster via rqlite keys, so a\nsurviving core can serve TLS without re-issuing.\n\n**Platform DB recovery (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34).** The bundled\nrqlite is 10.5.1: its snapshot store is crash-safe (under 9.x a\nnode killed while taking a snapshot could later restore stale\npages into its copy of the platform DB), its snapshot files are\nchecksummed, and a node stops on a node-local SQLite error\ninstead of diverging silently. The first start on 10.x converts\nthe rqlite data directory one way, so put the upgrade in your\nrecovery plan: back up every node (`/db/backup` plus an archive\nof the data directory taken while the core is stopped), check the\nsnapshot store, and upgrade the nodes of a cluster back to back;\na rollback to an older release needs that archived directory.\nProcedure: `open-pryv.io/INSTALL.md`, \"Upgrading the bundled\nrqlite (9.x to 10.x)\".\n\n**Restore your series too.** Operator backups taken before\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 carry no high-frequency series data, so\na restore from them loses every series point; take a new backup\nafter upgrading (see 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)).\n\n**Restore from an incremental chain (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51).**\n`--restore` rebuilds user data as of the latest run of a\n`bin/backup.js` chain, or as of an earlier run with\n`--through-run <runId>`, which gives your recovery plan a restore\npoint per run `[BKIC1]`, `[BKC7]`. A chain is refused when a run is\nmissing or reordered, and a directory damaged by an incremental run\nof an earlier release is refused unless you pass\n`--allow-incomplete` `[BKIC2]`. On SQLite, a core running while a\nrestore replaces an account's file now reads the restored file\n`[UASF1]`, `[UASF2]`. Your drill should restore from a chain, not\nonly from a full backup.\n\n**What a restore checks before it writes (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.86).** A restore refuses a run whose files were added,\nremoved, changed, cut short or swapped between accounts, and, given\n`--signing-pubkey`, a run not signed by that key `[BKSM2]`,\n`[BKSM4]`; `--inspect --verify-files` checks a whole backup without\nrestoring it `[BKIS3]`, so a damaged copy is found before the day\nyou need it. An account whose restore fails once its data is being\nwritten (a database error, a full disk) is no longer left\nhalf-restored: what was written is cleared and the account is\nremoved from the core's index and routing, so a new restore starts\nclean; with `--overwrite`, an account that was on the core before\nis left empty, and the restore's error is reported `[RSFC1]`,\n`[RSFC2]`, `[RSFC3]`; your recovery procedure re-runs the restore\nfor each account it names. On a multi-core platform the\nbootstrap bundle that rebuilds a core is authenticated with its\nversion, salt and nonce from 2.0.0-rc.86 on, and a joining core\nmust run that release or later to read it `[BNEV1]`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "BKSR",
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "BKIC1",
       "BKIC2",
       "BKC7",
       "UASF1",
       "UASF2",
       "BKSM2",
       "BKSM4",
       "BKIS3",
       "RSFC1",
       "RSFC2",
       "RSFC3",
       "BNEV1"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/backup.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cluster.discoveryEnabled",
       "letsEncrypt.certRenewer"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.310",
     "title": "Physical Safeguards, standard (framing)",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to\nelectronic information systems and the facility or facilities in\nwhich they are housed, while ensuring that properly authorized\naccess is allowed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Physical safeguards (facility\naccess, workstation security, device and media controls) are\nproperties of the hosting environment, not of the Pryv software\nitself. Pryv contributes two things: the data-residency\nprimitive lets you bind a user's data to a specific hosting\n(so you can certify the physical environment for that data\nexplicitly), and operator-supplied secrets are AES-256-GCM\nencrypted at rest so that a stolen disk doesn't leak the keys\nthemselves.\n",
     "detail": "For each implementation specification under §164.310 ((a)(1) facility\naccess controls, (b) workstation use, (c) workstation security,\n(d) device and media controls), the controls are physical and\noperational. Pryv's posture: the operator chooses + documents the\nhosting environment; for multi-hosting deployments, `data-residency`\nlets you certify the physical layer differently per region. Per-\nuser backup files (see §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)) are the unit of\ndevice-and-media-controls transfer when you need to move a single\nsubject's ePHI off-host.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(a)(1)",
     "title": "Access control, standard",
     "text": "Implement technical policies and procedures for electronic\ninformation systems that maintain ePHI to allow access only to\nthose persons or software programs that have been granted access\nrights as specified in §164.308(a)(4).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-stream permissions are enforced at every API call; an access\ncan read or write only the streams its `permissions[]` lists, at\nthe level granted. There is no \"bypass on trust\" path, the\nenforcement is the API surface, not a downstream policy layer.\nSystem streams (account, password, MFA) sit on a separately\ncontrolled namespace.\n",
     "detail": "The standard's four implementation specifications below each map\nto a distinct Pryv concern. The standard itself is the umbrella:\nthe technical control system that prevents access by anyone /\nanything not granted it.\n\n**Cross-user isolation caveat:** the \"no bypass on trust path\"\nproperty holds at the API surface. The strength of the\nunderlying isolation depends on the chosen storage engine,\nSQLite gives physical per-user-file isolation; PG gives\nlogical app-code-enforced isolation against shared tables.\nSee `context/per-engine-isolation.md` for the per-engine\nbreakdown + operator mitigation patterns (PG row-level\nsecurity, per-schema, per-account-DB, per-tenant deployments).\n\n**Scope-gated OAuth2 grants.** The delegated-app access path\n(OAuth2 authorization-code + PKCE,\n`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8)\ninherits the same permission enforcement: an authorization-code\ngrant references exactly one consent offer and mints an app\naccess whose `permissions[]` are the user's granted subset of\nthat offer; it can touch nothing outside them. Presented\nredirect URIs are validated by exact string match (loopback-port\ncarve-out only; fragment-bearing URIs rejected,\n`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/src/clientRegistry.ts`), so an\nissued authorization code cannot be diverted to an unregistered\ncallback.\n\n**What an OAuth2 grant can reach (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.64 to\n2.0.0-rc.77).** Withdrawing a consent deletes the app's live\nsessions and the accesses they created at once (rc.64; earlier, a\nlive token ran out its lifetime) `[OE31]`; narrowing it re-cuts\nevery live session (rc.68) and the accesses a session created\n(rc.70) `[OSUB1]`, `[OSUB3]`. No app, shared or consent-derived\naccess can write account fields (rc.65) `[ACSW1]`, `[ACSW2]`. A\nconsent for an operator-registered client can never grant\naccount or system streams, `*` or `manage`, and by default its\nsessions cannot create accesses or webhooks or share secrets\n(`accessCreation`, `webhooks`, `secretSharing` forbidden unless the\noperator allows them per client) `[OACR1]`, `[OACR2]`. An aliased\nsession is accepted under its alias only (rc.69) `[AL13]`,\n`[OPSE5]`. An authorization for an account address\n(`https://{username}.<host>/…`, rc.75) is bound to the signed-in\naccount: another account's address is refused before anything is\nwritten `[OPUE2]`; address aliases (rc.76) are created, listed and\ndeleted with the personal token only `[OPAL2]`. A suspended client,\nor one under review after the operator changed its registration\n(rc.71), is refused at every OAuth2 step and on the data API within\n`oauth.clientRevokeCheckSeconds` (default 30 s) `[ORF1]`.\n**Token exchange** (RFC 8693, rc.73): only a client registered\n`--can-exchange` may trade a user's token for its own, only for a\ntoken issued for one of its registered audiences (checked before\nthe home core is named), never for a derived token; the derived\nsession is a session of the same grant, no wider and no longer-lived\nthan the token it replaces, and ends when that token's session is\ndeleted `[OTX05]`, `[OTXE04]`. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.82\n`oauth.audienceBoundSessions` is `true` by default: the token an app\nsent to such a resource server is refused directly at the API and\nworks only through that resource server's exchange `[OTXE02]`; an\noperator may set `false` on a core whose resource servers do not\nexchange yet (the boot log names the clients concerned; from rc.73\nto rc.81 `false` was the default). **Adapter routes** (rc.73, off unless\n`adapterRoutes` is set) forward `/adapter/<name>/…` to a sidecar\nyou run, with no authentication by the core: the sidecar must\nauthenticate every request (see `iso-27001.A.8.26`).\n\n**Delegate-account token class.** Account delegation\n(`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) adds a delegate token:\nan owner-equivalent personal token one account holds over\nanother. It is still bound by the same per-stream permission\nsurface, but its defining access-control property is the\nteardown rule, a delegate can never remove a delegation, and\ndissolving one requires a genuine login on the controlled\naccount (a personal token with no forge-protected delegation\nmarker; the marker is forge-guarded on create and update). The\n`:_delegation:*` namespace is plugin-owned and guarded end to\nend (no user create/write/delete, internal subtree read-guarded\nand excluded from wildcard reads), and each delegate's actions\nare audited on the controlled account. See\n`context/delegation-model.md`.\n\n**Plugin-managed and account streams, by every spelling of an\nid** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56). The guards of the delegation\nnamespace, of the plugin-managed regions of the cross-account\n(CMC) namespace and of the account fields (the primary email,\nwritten only through `account.update`; non-editable and hidden\nfields; level caps on account-stream permissions) judge the\nstream an id resolves to, whatever store-prefixed spelling a\nrequest uses, for every token, the owner's included, and refuse\ncreating a stream under, or moving one into, a plugin-managed\nparent `[CNRP1]`, `[CNRP6]`, `[CNRP7]`, `[DSC05]`, `[ASA1]`,\n`[ASA2]`, `[ASA3]`, `[ASA6]`. The CMC retry worker acts only on\nrecords the server wrote `[CNM2B]`, `[RQ32]`. Before this\nrelease a store-prefixed spelling was not recognised by these\nguards, so the separation of the system and plugin namespaces\nheld only for requests using the canonical ids; in particular an\naccess holding `contribute` on the email field could change the\nprimary email through the events API.\n\n**Moving a stream** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56). An app or shared\naccess moving a stream needs manage rights on every stream of the\nmoved subtree, trashed ones included `[SMV1]`, `[SMV4]`; before\nit, a child granted to that access at a lower level moved along\ninto the target parent's inherited permissions, reaching accesses\nthat had not been granted it.\n\n**Apps granted access through a delegation.** When a delegate\ngrants a software program access to the controlled account, the\nprogram receives an ordinary `app` access bound to the requested\npermissions, never the owner-equivalent token. The server stamps\nit with a lineage attribute no client can set, change or remove\n(`clientData.delegation.kind: 'delegated-child'`) `[DCH01]`,\n`[DCH03]`, and removing the delegate deletes every access granted\nthrough the delegation, at any depth, and nothing else `[DCH12]`.\nIn open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23. The same rule covers a cross-account\n(CMC) data grant a delegate accepts for the controlled account\n(open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.30): the grant carries the lineage\nattribute and `access-info` names the delegate `[DCH15]`, the\naccept event records the approving delegate, server-stamped and\nnot client-settable `[DCH16]`, and the detach deletes the grant\nbefore it answers, the requester being notified by\n`consent/revoke-cmc` `[DCH18]`. When such a data grant is\ndelegable (`request.accessType: 'app'`), the detach, like every\nother CMC withdrawal path (`consent/revoke-cmc`, the reference\naccount app, the requester withdrawing, account deletion), also\ndeletes the accesses the requester derived from it, since\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.52 (`96af58ad`) `[MAAC]`,\n`[CMCHS-APPGRANT]`, `[GA24]`; on earlier releases they stayed\nvalid until their own expiry, and `bin/access-scope-audit.js`\nlists any left behind. The one exception is explicit:\nsince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.31 the individual, detaching the\ndelegate through a genuine login, may keep named CMC data grants\nthat delegate gave (`keepAccessIds`); a kept grant loses the\nlineage attribute and becomes the individual's own `[DCH21]`, a\nlist naming any other access is refused whole before any change\n`[DCH23]`, and every other access granted through the delegation\nis deleted as before. Grant paths that still cannot\nrecord the lineage (OAuth2 consent, publishing a CMC offer,\nwidening a CMC grant) refuse a delegation-derived token\n`[DCH17]`, `[OE27]`.\n\n**Cross-account relationship accesses are bounded by the\nnegotiated channels.** Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.38 (merge\n`7aab1e85`) a cross-account (CMC) relationship whose consent\nexcludes chat gives neither relationship access a chat permission\nand creates no chat stream `[CN62]`, `[CN63]`, and the\ncounterparty's access is refused (`403`, `cmc-chat-disabled`) if\nit writes a chat directly; alerts are refused the same way when\nsystem messaging is off (`cmc-system-messaging-disabled`)\n`[CN65]`, `[CH07]`, `[CH10]`. Relationships accepted earlier keep\ntheir chat stream; the refusal applies to them when their recorded\nfeatures exclude chat.\n\n**Member accesses of a group account** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53,\nrelease commit `61fb28dd`,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158). A team sharing\none account lets each member obtain, from the group's core, a\nshort-lived `shared` access on a patient account, derived from\nthe patient's delegable grant (`consent/member-access-cmc`; the\naccess's endpoint is returned once in the `events.create`\nanswer, never stored, logged or retried) `[GA10]`, `[GA11]`.\nThree bounds apply. The group's core issues it only to a\nmembership access (personal and delegate tokens are refused\ntoo, `cmc-member-access-not-member`), only for a patient\nrelationship under the member's team streams, only for named\ndata streams within what the patient's offer granted (never\n`*`, never a `:_cmc:` stream), with a lifetime within per-core\nbounds and never beyond the membership's own expiry, and one mint\nat a time per membership and patient (per worker process)\n`[GA12]`, `[GA14]`, `[GA15]`, `[CMCMA]`. Two budgets per\nmembership, counted for the whole core, pace the asks: new member\naccesses (`cmc.memberAccess.mintBurst` 5000, then `ratePerMinute`\n1000 a minute) and requests of any kind (`askBurst` 10000, then\n`askRatePerMinute` 3000 a minute, by default); asking\nagain for a live access spends no new-access budget, and past\neither budget the ask is answered `429` with `Retry-After`\n(open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.79; before it, every ask counted against\n`ratePerMinute`, per worker process) `[GA16]`, `[GA17]`, `[MA20]`,\n`[MA22]`. The budgets pace a membership, they do not narrow its\nreach: what ends it is its expiry and its revocation. The\npatient's core refuses anything beyond the grant, and accepts\nfrom a delegable grant only the exact member stamp, which it\ncompletes itself `[MB10]`, `[MB12]`. The access cannot manage\naccesses, cannot outlive the grant and expires (24 h by default,\n60 s to 7 d, `cmc.memberAccess.*`); when the patient withdraws\non any path it is deleted with the grant `[GA24]`. A membership\naccess is not exempt from the personal-token gate, so it cannot\naccept consents or widen grants on the group's behalf `[GA01]`.\nAn app token may delete only the `shared` accesses it created\n`[GA31]`, and no update can remove the plugin's record\n(`clientData.cmc`) from an access `[MB13]`. Code:\n`open-pryv.io/components/cmc/src/handleMemberAccess.ts`,\n`memberAccessHooks.ts`, `memberMintRegistry.ts`,\n`memberLedger.ts`. See `context/workforce-access-patterns.md`,\nPattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "DCH01",
       "DCH03",
       "DCH12",
       "DCH15",
       "DCH16",
       "DCH17",
       "DCH18",
       "DCH21",
       "DCH23",
       "OE27",
       "CN62",
       "CN63",
       "CN65",
       "CH07",
       "CH10",
       "MAAC",
       "CMCGA",
       "CMCMA",
       "GA01",
       "GA10",
       "GA11",
       "GA12",
       "GA14",
       "GA15",
       "GA16",
       "GA17",
       "MA20",
       "MA22",
       "GA24",
       "GA31",
       "MB10",
       "MB12",
       "MB13",
       "CNRP1",
       "CNRP6",
       "CNRP7",
       "DSC05",
       "ASA1",
       "ASA2",
       "ASA3",
       "ASA6",
       "CNM2B",
       "RQ32",
       "SMV1",
       "SMV4",
       "OE31",
       "OSUB1",
       "OSUB3",
       "ACSW1",
       "ACSW2",
       "OACR1",
       "OACR2",
       "AL13",
       "OPSE5",
       "OPUE2",
       "OPAL2",
       "ORF1",
       "OTX05",
       "OTXE04",
       "OTXE02"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cmc.memberAccess.defaultTtl",
       "cmc.memberAccess.minTtl",
       "cmc.memberAccess.maxTtl",
       "cmc.memberAccess.ratePerMinute",
       "cmc.memberAccess.mintBurst",
       "cmc.memberAccess.askRatePerMinute",
       "cmc.memberAccess.askBurst",
       "cmc.memberAccess.maxInFlightPerMembership",
       "cmc.memberAccess.allowNameOnly",
       "cmc.retryLoop.enabled",
       "oauth.clientRevokeCheckSeconds",
       "oauth.audienceBoundSessions",
       "adapterRoutes"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "delegation",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "per-engine-isolation",
       "delegation-model",
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(a)(2)(i)",
     "title": "Unique user identification, Required",
     "text": "Assign a unique name and/or number for identifying and tracking\nuser identity.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Every Pryv account has a unique username + cuid; every access\nderived from it carries a unique access id (cuid) and version\nserial. Audit records cite the (accessId, accessSerial) tuple,\nso each tracked action ties back to a unique identity.\n",
     "detail": "Where several people share one access (a group token), the\nper-person identifier is the `callerId` your app forwards with\neach call, a label Pryv records but does not authenticate; see\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 1.\n\n**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nFor a team sharing one account that reaches patient data through\ncross-account consent, each member signs in to their own Pryv\naccount and reads a patient's data under an access of their own,\nwhose `clientData.cmc` names the member and the group: the group's\ncore sends only the member's identity, and the patient's core\nstores it beside the group identity, the grant id, the scope and\nthe app code copied from the authenticated grant; any other\n`clientData.cmc` is refused (`cmc-member-stamp-invalid`,\n`cmc-clientdata-cmc-forbidden`) `[GA10]`, `[MB10]`, `[MB11]`,\n`[MB12]`. The patient's audit then identifies the member by a\nunique access tied to a unique account, without a forwarded\nlabel. Against a patient core older than 2.0.0-rc.53, which\nrefuses the stamp, the group's core mints the access with the\nmember in its name only and reports `attribution: 'name-only'`,\nwhile `cmc.memberAccess.allowNameOnly` is `true` (the default for\nnow) `[GA13]`; set it to `false` to refuse such mints. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n",
     "technical": "Account model: see `open-pryv.io/components/business/src/users/`.\nAccess ids are cuids; composite ids `<cuid>:<serial>` appear once\n`accesses.update` is exercised (see `context/access-versioning.md`).\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "UZEV",
       "GA10",
       "GA13",
       "MB10",
       "MB11",
       "MB12"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cmc.memberAccess.allowNameOnly"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "system-streams",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns",
       "access-versioning"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(a)(2)(ii)",
     "title": "Emergency access procedure, Required",
     "text": "Establish (and implement as needed) procedures for obtaining\nnecessary ePHI during an emergency.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The operator-held admin access key (`auth.adminAccessKey`) is the\nbreak-glass mechanism: it grants administrative reads not\nrequiring an ordinary user's consent. You document the\ncircumstances under which it may be exercised and the audit-trail\nreview that must follow.\n",
     "detail": "The admin access key is operator-side and rotates only at\noperator-supplied cadence, treat it as a privileged credential\nunder custody controls equivalent to a root password. Every API\ncall made under the admin key is audited like any other, so\npost-emergency review is concrete.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "LG20",
       "GF33"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.adminAccessKey"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(a)(2)(iii)",
     "title": "Automatic logoff, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement electronic procedures that terminate an electronic\nsession after a predetermined time of inactivity.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Two configurables: personal-token session lifetime\n(`auth.sessionMaxAge`) and per-access expiry (`access.expires`).\nThe latter is per-grant (the access is automatically inert after\nthe timestamp passes), useful for clinical-workflow accesses\nwhose validity is bounded by the case.\n",
     "detail": "Note that HIPAA's \"automatic logoff\" is workstation-centric in\norigin (workforce members stepping away from a terminal). In a\nPryv-mediated workflow, the analogous control is the validity\nwindow of the access token. Combining `auth.sessionMaxAge` (for\ninteractive workforce sessions) with per-grant `access.expires`\n(for app-driven background processes) covers both shapes.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.sessionMaxAge",
       "access.expires"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(a)(2)(iv)",
     "title": "Encryption and decryption, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt ePHI.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The \"mechanism to encrypt and decrypt ePHI\" is delivered as\nswitch-on Pryv software. User PHI/PII at rest (events,\nattachments, series, audit, platform DB) is encrypted by the\n`container-encrypted-volume` companion\n(`encryption-at-rest-user-data`), layered onto the image, it\nmounts an encrypted volume on boot so the application stores\nciphertext at rest. The operator enables it (`CEV_ENABLED`) and\nchooses a key source. Pryv additionally encrypts operator-supplied\nsecrets at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF-derived) and provides\nTLS-in-transit via the built-in ACME integration.\n",
     "detail": "`container-encrypted-volume` (v0.1.0, shipped 2026-06-23) provisions\nand mounts a LUKS-encrypted volume inside the container and points\nthe data roots at it, verified end-to-end (an event written through\nthe API is unreadable in the stopped container file). Pluggable\nbackend (LUKS reference + gocryptfs) and key provider (`env` /\n`file` / `exec` / `clevis` for TPM2·Tang·PKCS#11 / `aws-kms`\nenvelope). With an identity-bound provider no copyable key is held;\nkey custody is intrinsic to the control, not a Pryv gap. Rotation\nuses LUKS key-slots (no bulk re-encrypt). Volume encryption also\ngrounds the breach-notification safe harbor (NIST SP 800-111).\nCoverage is `configurable`, Pryv's software performs the encryption\nonce enabled, a step above the operator-implements-it tier. Caveats:\nan external PostgreSQL data dir and remote object storage (S3) are\noutside the mount (encrypt operator-side / via bucket SSE); LUKS\nneeds `--privileged`. See `proposals/container-encrypted-volume.md`.\n\nThe platform-secret at-rest encryption (Let's Encrypt account keys,\nobservability tokens, cluster bootstrap bundles) remains on by\ndefault (`encryption-at-rest-secrets`).\n\nLonger-term direction: end-to-end encryption where the server never\nholds plaintext, research direction tracked under internal backlog\nslug `E2E-ENCRYPTION` (proxy re-encryption); per-row impact in\n`proposals/e2e-encryption.md`.\n",
     "technical": "AES-256-GCM at-rest module: `open-pryv.io/components/business/src/acme/AtRestEncryption.ts`.\nBootstrap-bundle encryption: `open-pryv.io/components/business/src/bootstrap/BundleEncryption.ts`.\nSince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86 both read a second envelope version\nthat authenticates its context (the at-rest row it is stored in;\nthe bundle's version, salt and nonce) with a pinned 16-byte tag\n`[AREV1]`, `[BNEV1]`. Bundles are written in it from that release;\nat-rest rows from the release after open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87\n`[AREV3]` (2.0.0-rc.86 and rc.87 still write them in the first\nversion, so a core of the previous release keeps reading them).\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "CERTUTILS",
       "AREV3"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "CEV_ENABLED",
       "letsEncrypt.atRestKey",
       "storages.engines.postgresql.ssl"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "encryption-at-rest-user-data",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "End-to-end (server-blind) encryption via proxy re-encryption brings CMEK / BYOK to the Pryv layer",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=180707914&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C34"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(b)",
     "title": "Audit controls, standard",
     "text": "Implement hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms that\nrecord and examine activity in information systems that contain\nor use ePHI.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv's per-user audit log records every API method invocation,\ntimestamp, user, access reference, method, success / error. The\n`audit.get` API method surfaces it for examination. The optional\naudit-event-stream channel additionally emits audit records into\nthe subject's own streams, so the subject (and any access they\nauthorise) can examine the history.\n",
     "detail": "Audit storage uses SQLite directly (not the engine-agnostic mall\nlayer), to keep the audit path independent of the data path. This\ndecouples integrity of the log from issues in the primary engine.\n\nAudit row content is data-minimal **by construction**: action +\nsource (transport + ip) + URL query + access ref + optional\nintegrity hash of the affected event. The request body is never\nstored. Consequence: an auditor reviewing the §164.312(b) log\nsees *who did what when* without the log itself becoming a\nsecond copy of PHI, favourable under §164.502(b) minimum-\nnecessary review. See `docs/pryv-primitives.md` audit entry.\n\nOne scoping nuance: `events.get` content-query conditions sent\nover HTTP GET are part of the URL query, so the **search\nvalues** your apps submit (which may reference PHI, e.g. a\ndiagnosis code) are recorded as-is, deliberately, since the\nsearch criteria are the auditable action. Tier the audit log's\nprotection accordingly. See\n`context/content-query-audit-semantics.md`.\n\nSince open-pryv.io `07b6d3b6`, the OAuth2 authorization server\nrecords its own activity in the same audit pipeline (`oauth.*`\nevents): consent lifecycle (shown / granted / refused),\nauthorization-code exchange including replay attempts, and token\nlifecycle (issued per grant type / refreshed / revoked /\nreuse-detected). User-resolved events land in the subject's\nper-user trail (`[OE07]` proves rows in `:_audit:`); the\npre-identification ones (consent shown / refused, code replay)\ngo to syslog. A detected refresh-token replay additionally\nrevokes the whole token chain and records both the detection\nand the resulting revocation (open-pryv.io `829f7238`), so the\n§164.312(b) trail covers delegated-app authorization activity,\nnot just data access. Federated sign-in (SSO, beta) emits into the\nsame pipeline: `sso.login` (user-resolved, in the account's trail)\nand `sso.refused` (pre-identification: no-account / unproved email /\nmint failure, syslog), so an attempted account takeover through an\nexternal identity is itself auditable.\n\n**OAuth2 audit additions (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66 to\n2.0.0-rc.77).** In the subject's trail: `oauth.nonce.reused` (an\nOpenID Connect nonce presented twice, never the nonce itself)\n`[OXN02]`; `oauth.token.exchanged` (a resource server traded the\nuser's token for its own, naming both clients); `oauth.consent.\nrefused` with its reason (`permission-level-conflict`,\n`wrong-core`, `audience-account-mismatch`, `audience-not-listed`,\n`address-alias-held` since rc.79 (the owner consenting at one of\ntheir address aliases another app's grant holds, formerly reported\nas `audience-account-mismatch`), and with `oauth.perUserIssuer` on,\n`issuer-account-mismatch`), no username or alias in the payload\n`[OPUE2]`, `[OPUE22]`, `[OPIU3]`. In syslog (no user\nresolved): `oauth.token.introspected` (which resource server asked\nabout which client's token, never the token) `[OXI06]`,\n`oauth.token.exchange_refused` with its reason (an unauthenticated\ncaller is not audited) `[OTX03]`, and `oauth.client.\nmetadata_fetched` / `metadata_refused` for client metadata\ndocuments, sampled per host and reason, never the document body\n`[OCMDE13]`. Refresh tokens are named by a hash since rc.69\n`[ORL12]`. Since rc.68 the session minted at consent is written by\nthe system, so the consent shows as `oauth.consent.granted` plus\nthe grant's own create or update row, no longer as an\n`accesses.create` row. Not audited: requests on adapter routes\n(the sidecar audits them) and the `421` answers for an account\nserved by another core (warning log only). The three address-alias\nmethods (rc.76) are audited like any API call `[OPAL2]`.\n**Correction, rc.77:** a streamed answer (for example `events.get`)\nthat the client stopped reading was recorded as a success; it is\nnow recorded as an error with id `client-closed-request`. The call\nwas always in the trail; only its outcome was wrong `[AUAB3]`.\n\nAccount delegation extends the per-record attribution: a record\nproduced by a delegate token, or by an app access a delegate\ngranted on the controlled account, carries\n`content.delegation = { delegateUsername, delegateHostSlug }`, so\nan app acting for a controlled account is traceable on that\naccount's trail to the person who authorized it `[DCH05]` (the\napp-grant case is in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23; see `context/delegation-model.md`).\n\n**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nWhen a member of a team sharing one account reads a patient's\ndata, the patient's trail records the member's own access id, an\naccess whose creator is the group's grant and whose\nserver-stamped `clientData.cmc` names the member and the group\n`[GA10]`. Since this release every CMC and delegation teardown is\nthe `accesses.delete` deletion, so a member access (or a grant)\nthat is gone stays readable by name as a deletion record\n(`accesses.get` with `includeDeletions`) and the audit rows that\ncite it can still be resolved `[GA22]`, `[GA30]`. That holds\nwhile the deletion record is kept: by default until the account\nis deleted; since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56 you may have them\npurged after `accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays`, past which\nan audit row shows such an access by id only `[ADP1]`, `[ADR5]`.\nSet it no shorter than your audit-review and retention needs\n(see 164.316(b)(2)(i)). The reference\naccount app's audit page shows such an access as \"<member\naccess> via <grant name>\", deleted accesses included, from its\nfirst release after 0.21.0 (app-web-user-account). On the\ngroup's trail, each member access asked for\n(`consent/member-access-cmc`, written through the member's own\nmembership access, with the server-owned outcome) and each sweep\nat offboarding (`consent/member-revoke-cmc`, server-written) is\nan event naming the member `[GA20]`, `[MA41]`. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n\n**External ids** (`external-id-index` primitive). The account's\nown claims, replacements and releases are audited on its trail\nlike any API call (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58). From 2.0.0-rc.60 an administrator's\nrelease of an id (`POST /system/admin/ext-id/release`, admin key)\nis recorded twice: the admin call itself without a user (syslog),\nand an `account.externalIds.adminRelease` entry in the trail of\nthe account that held the id, with the namespace and the\nadministrator's reason, when audit is active `[XIDAR1]`. The\nblinded value is in neither, nor in any log line `[XIDG1]`. Not\naudited, like `auth.cores`: the unauthenticated lookup\n`auth.extIdCores` and the core-to-core holder answer\n`system.extIdHolds` used by forced-mode sign-ins (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.59), both reads that name no account.\n\n**The account owner's examination (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.84).**\n`accesses.get` and `accesses.getOne` return to the owner's\npersonal token (or a delegate's personal access), on each access\nand each deletion record, `usage`: approximate lifetime call\ncounts per method, summed as reads, writes, session and other\ncalls; a batch counts as its inner calls `[AUG1]`, `[AUG2]`. App\nand shared callers never receive it `[AUG3]`; it needs\n`accessTracking.isActive` (on by default). The counts are written\nafter each reply and are a summary: the per-call record is the\naudit log, where a batch is one `callBatch` row beside the rows of\nits inner calls `[QK5F]`. The reference account app\n(app-web-user-account 0.34.0) shows the counts and the last error\non each access's Activity card, and an Audit trail tab lists every\naudited call on the account, linkable and filtered by app (the\nOAuth grant and its sessions), access, date or kind of call, each\nrow naming the access that made it, a revoked one included (app\ntests `[ACTV]`, `[TRLP]`), so the owner can examine the activity\non their account without an operator. Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.86 the same callers can also have the audit log counted\nover a period (`audit.getSummary`: calls per hour, day or week as\nreads, writes, session, other calls and errors, for the account or\nchosen accesses, a batch envelope not counted) `[ASM1]`, `[ASM2]`;\napp and shared callers are refused `[ASM4]`, and the call is itself\naudited `[ASM9]`. The account app's next release draws its Activity\nchart and an Audit trail chart over a chosen period from it.\n\n**socket.io calls running at the same time (fix, the release after\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87).** Every call on one socket.io connection\nused to share one context, so two calls running at once could swap\ntheir method id: the audit row (and the access usage count) of one\ncall could name the other call's method. Each call now runs with\nits own context and is audited under its own method `[SKMC]`.\n\n**Streamed audit reads per access (same release; on by default).**\nOne access reads its audit log (`events.get` on `:_audit:` streams)\none streamed read at a time per API worker\n(`limits.audit.maxConcurrentReadsPerAccess`, default 1, `0` turns it\noff). A read past it waits for a slot, oldest first, up to\n`limits.audit.maxReadWaitMs` (default 30000 ms; `0` refuses at\nonce), so parallel reads from one client (an account app loading\nseveral Activity cards, say) run one after the other and all\nsucceed `[RIDL4]`, `[RIDL5]`; only a read that gets no slot within\nthe wait answers `429 too-many-requests` `[RIDL3]`. Nothing is\ndropped from the log; the cap bounds the small audit read pool a\nstalled reader could hold.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT02",
       "AT51",
       "AT52",
       "AT53",
       "AT61",
       "AT65",
       "OE07",
       "DCH05",
       "GA10",
       "GA20",
       "GA22",
       "GA30",
       "MA41",
       "ADP1",
       "ADR5",
       "XIDAR1",
       "XIDG1",
       "OXN02",
       "OPUE2",
       "OPIU3",
       "OXI06",
       "OTX03",
       "OCMDE13",
       "ORL12",
       "OPAL2",
       "AUAB3",
       "OPUE22",
       "AUG1",
       "AUG2",
       "AUG3",
       "QK5F",
       "ASM1",
       "ASM2",
       "ASM4",
       "ASM9",
       "SKMC",
       "RIDL3",
       "RIDL4",
       "RIDL5"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays",
       "limits.audit.maxConcurrentReadsPerAccess",
       "limits.audit.maxReadWaitMs"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream",
       "external-id-index"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "content-query-audit-semantics",
       "delegation-model",
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained / signed audit log strengthens tamper-resistance evidence",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(c)(1)",
     "title": "Integrity, standard",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures to protect ePHI from improper\nalteration or destruction.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Integrity is multi-\nlayered: write authorization gated by `permissions`, event\nversioning preserves the prior value on every update (on a\ndeployment with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`; the default\nkeeps no event history), audit\npins the (who, when, via which access) attribution, and\n`bin/backup.js` provides the recovery path if a destruction\nevent needs to be reversed. The standard's overall programmatic\nobligation is yours; the technical substrate is Pryv's.\n",
     "detail": "Concurrent writes (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.38, merge `461f3c4c`):\nan `events.update`, a trash (`events.delete`; a shared-secret event\nis trashed by compare-and-set instead) or an attachment\ndeletion is applied onto the event as stored at write time, so a\ntop-level field written meanwhile (by the server or another\nclient) that the request did not change is kept rather than\nsilently overwritten with the copy the request read; `clientData`\nkeys merge onto the stored map `[ESR1]`..`[ESR4]`, `[ESR6A]`. The\nbuilt-in PostgreSQL and SQLite stores do the read-merge-write\natomically: a row lock (`SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`) on PostgreSQL, an\nimmediate transaction on SQLite, whose lock-wait is pinned by a\ntest `[UEA1]`; a custom data store that does not implement\nit gets a read then an update. A request that sends `content`\nstill replaces the content whole: two clients editing the same\nevent's content concurrently is last-writer-wins, which your app\nresolves if it matters.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ESR1",
       "ESR2",
       "ESR3",
       "ESR4",
       "ESR6A"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit",
       "permissions",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained / signed audit log enforces log integrity at the primitive layer",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(c)(2)",
     "title": "Mechanism to authenticate ePHI, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement electronic mechanisms to corroborate that ePHI has not\nbeen altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Every event carries an integrity hash (SHA-256 by default,\nSHA-512 optional, on by default; an unkeyed checksum, see detail),\nand the audit row of each create or update records that hash\nwith the event's key and the access that performed the write,\nanchoring the change to an authenticated actor `[WNWM]`: an\nevent whose stored state no longer hashes to the value its last\naudited create or update recorded was changed since by\nsomething other than an audited create or update: a trash or an\nattachment deletion (audited, but the row records no new hash),\na server-internal stamp, or an alteration at the storage layer.\n\"What was\nthe original?\" needs the prior versions, which Pryv keeps only\nwhen you set `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by\ndefault; see `context/event-history.md`). Tamper\ndetection beyond this (e.g., end-to-end content hashing under\na customer-held key) is on the implementer or an extension.\n",
     "detail": "**What the integrity value proves (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.50).** It\nis an unkeyed checksum, not a signature: it detects corruption, and\na change made outside the API is visible only by comparing against\nthe hash the audit row recorded, which itself sits in storage a\nsufficiently privileged party can also rewrite. The release notes now\ncall it a \"checksum\" for that reason. `integrity.algorithm` accepts\n`sha256` (default) and `sha512` only: `md5` and `sha1` refuse the boot\nand `bin/check-config.js` reports them `[CVIA1]`. Switching a core\naway from `md5` / `sha1` leaves the events and accesses written\nbefore with values that no longer match (`bin/integrity-check.js`\nreports them).\n\n**Accesses, and the configured algorithm (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.84).** An access carries the same kind of checksum. Since\n2.0.0-rc.84 it verifies on the form the API returns, also after an\nupdate (composite `id` and `modifiedBy`), on `accesses.update`,\n`accesses.get`, `accesses.getOne` (current and older versions,\n`includeHistory`) and deletion records `[AIWF]`, `[AIWG]`,\n`[AIWK]`, `[AIWM]` (a copy returned without its token, as a\ndeletion record is, verifies once a holder of the token restores\nit `[AIWN]`); before, the value of an updated access was\ncomputed on the stored form and a client could not verify it. The\nupgrade recomputes the stored values once (a PostgreSQL migration,\na one-shot pass on SQLite), rewriting a row only when it holds the\nprevious form's value; anything else is left for\n`bin/integrity-check.js` to report `[AIWR]`, `[AIWS]`, `[AIWU]`.\nThe owner-only `usage` counters are not part of it: a client\nstrips them before hashing, as it does `lastUsed` `[AIWW]`. The\nstorage-layer event checksum and every check by\n`bin/integrity-check.js` now use `integrity.algorithm` (they used\nsha256 whatever the setting) `[AIWZ]`; with `sha512`, events\nwritten before 2.0.0-rc.84 by that path are reported, not\nrecomputed. Run the migration before trusting the check when\n`migrations.autoRunOnStart` is `false`.\n\nAudit-log tamper resistance itself is **voluntarily missing\ntoday**: rows are append-only by convention in the audit-write\ncode path, but there is no software-side hash chain or\nsignature. Integrity rests on the operator's filesystem\nposture (immutable mounts, append-only flags, file-integrity\nmonitoring, out-of-band SIEM forwarding).\n\nFuture direction: chained / signed audit log (per-row prev_hash\n+ periodic operator-signed checkpoints). Tracked under internal\nbacklog slug `AUDIT-LOG-CHAINING` and\n`proposals/audit-log-chaining.md`. When shipped, this row\nmoves from `F: Evidence | Low` to `F: Evidence | Med`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "WNWM",
       "CVIA1",
       "AIWF",
       "AIWG",
       "AIWK",
       "AIWM",
       "AIWN",
       "AIWR",
       "AIWS",
       "AIWU",
       "AIWW",
       "AIWZ"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "integrity.algorithm"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained / signed audit log authenticates audit data (row moves F:Evidence|Low → F:Evidence|Med)",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(d)",
     "title": "Person or entity authentication, standard",
     "text": "Implement procedures to verify that a person or entity seeking\naccess to ePHI is the one claimed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Authentication is mediated by the access-token primitive: the\nbearer of a valid token has been authenticated. Strength of\nthat authentication is layered, username + password by default;\nMFA via `mfa.*` API methods when `services.mfa.mode` is set.\nRecovery paths preserve account ownership when a second-factor\ndevice is lost.\n",
     "detail": "**MFA is pluggable.** The `Service` base class\n(`components/business/src/mfa/Service.ts`) defines\n`challenge()` + `verify()` methods; two subclasses ship\n(`ChallengeVerifyService`, `SingleService`) targeting\nHTTP-callable external providers (SMS). An\noperator can plug in any provider matching the\nchallenge/verify shape via `services.mfa` config (Twilio Authy,\nAuth0 MFA, Duo Web push, …) without writing code, or extend\n`Service` to implement any in-process method. Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.14 (`b606b328`) an in-process authenticator-app factor\n(TOTP, RFC 6238, secrets encrypted at rest) is built in and is\nthe default method; SMS stays supported.\n\nNIST AAL framing: the achievable AAL depends on which method\nis configured. SMS-only is AAL1 under NIST SP 800-63B Rev 3.\nTOTP + push or WebAuthn-based providers reach AAL2. The\nremaining WebAuthn plugin is tracked under\ninternal backlog slug `MFA-MODERN-METHODS` (matrix-side mirror\nat `proposals/mfa-modern-methods.md`); the broader OAuth2\nauth-stack modernisation arc subsumes this work.\n\nMFA is opt-in per operator; once enabled, it can be required\nat login, at sensitive operations, or both. The MFA tests\n(`components/api-server/test/mfa.test.js`) exercise the activate\n`[MA3A]`, `[MA10A]`, confirm `[MA4A]`, challenge `[MA5B]`, verify\n`[MA5A]`, `[MA11A]`, deactivate `[MA6A]`, `[MA13B]` and recover\n`[MA7A]` paths, for the SMS and the TOTP method.\n\n**Second-factor guessing is throttled by Pryv itself (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.27).** A per-account backoff, not a lockout (open-pryv.io\n`6231a37c`, default in `aa445c43`): after\n`services.mfa.attempts.backoff.freeFailures` failed second factors\n(default 3) within `perAccountWindowSeconds` (default 900 s), each\nfurther failure delays the next attempt by `baseSeconds` (default\n2 s), doubling up to `maxSeconds` (default 300 s). During the delay\n`mfa.verify` / `mfa.confirm` / `mfa.challenge` answer 429\n`too-many-attempts` with `Retry-After`, and a code sent during the\ndelay is neither checked nor counted, so guessing stays slow while\nsomeone who only holds the password cannot lock the real user out.\nA success clears the tally; `backoff.maxSeconds: 0` turns it off\n(for example when you throttle at the edge instead). The `attempts`\nblock is platform-wide: set the same values on every core. The\nper-session ceiling (5 attempts) also counts parallel attempts\ncorrectly (`1d91696c`). A TOTP code is consumed with a storage\ncompare-and-set (`43293101`, `6231a37c`), so concurrent verifies of\none code release exactly one token, and impossible `services.mfa`\nsettings refuse the boot (`214b0b2b`). The former lockout keys\n(`attempts.perAccount`, `attempts.lockoutSeconds`) are no longer\nread; a boot warning names them. Tests: `[MA12A]`-`[MA12K]`,\n`[MBKF1]`-`[MBKF3]`, `[PCS1]`, `[MCHK1]`.\n\n**Password guessing is slowed the same way (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.47).** Failed passwords on sign-in, password change, the\nMFA step-up and `mfa.recover` share a per-account delay\n(`auth.passwordAttempts`, never a lockout) and a per-client-address\nbudget counted across all cores (`auth.passwordAttempts.perIp`);\nthe methods that take a password are refused inside batch calls and\nover socket.io, and every password hash carries its own salt. Tests\n`[CEPB1]`, `[CEPI1]`, `[CEDB1]`, `[PWSL1]`. See §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C)\nfor the monitoring side.\n\n**A busy worker refuses a password check rather than guessing an\nanswer (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87).** Password and OAuth\nclient-secret checks run at most\n`auth.passwordCheckConcurrency` at a time per API worker (default\n2), with `auth.passwordCheckQueue` calls waiting (default 50, at\nmost 10 s). A call refused past that is not checked: the API\nanswers `429 too-many-requests` with `Retry-After`, never\n`invalid-credentials`, and the refusal neither counts on the\naccount's failed-password tally nor delays it `[CLIB2]`,\n`[PCLM1]`, `[PCLM2]`. The OAuth token, introspection and\nrevocation endpoints answer `503 temporarily_unavailable` with\n`Retry-After`, never `invalid_client` (the uniform refusal below\nstays the answer to a failed client authentication) `[OPCL2]`,\n`[OPCL3]`. A refresh, client-credentials or token-exchange request\ncan be retried as is; an authorization code is single-use, so a\nrefused code exchange spends it and revokes its access, and the\nclient starts a new authorization `[OPCL4]`.\n\n**A second authentication path, OAuth2.** Beyond the token +\nMFA stack above, Pryv can authenticate delegated apps through a\nstandards-based OAuth2 authorization-code + PKCE flow\n(`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`, shipped in open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.8). PKCE is mandatory (S256 only,\n`code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256']` in\n`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/src/wellKnown.ts`); access tokens\nare short-lived (`oauth.accessTokenTTL`, default 1 h) and refresh\ntokens rotate single-use with a sliding TTL bounded by an\nabsolute cap (`oauth.refreshTokenTTL` /\n`oauth.refreshTokenAbsoluteTTL`). Correction (2026-11-09): earlier\nversions of this row said that `oauth.requireAppAccountMfa`\n(default true) made an app account enrol MFA before driving the\nOAuth2 write surface. That setting was never enforced and was\nremoved in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.71 (a core where it is still set\nlogs a warning at boot). The second factor protects the account\nholder's own sign-in, which is what grants consent; the app itself\nauthenticates as a client, as below.\n\n**Client authentication and identity tokens (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.68 to 2.0.0-rc.77).** Operator-registered clients\n(`bin/oauth-client.js create-registry`, curated, `--subject-type`\nmandatory) authenticate at `/oauth2/token` and `/oauth2/revoke`\nwith `none` (public, PKCE), a client secret or `private_key_jwt`;\n`/oauth2/introspect` takes confidential clients registered\n`--can-introspect` only. Assertions are verified only with a key of their\nown type and pinned algorithms (`ES256`, `ES384`, `RS256` since\nrc.74, `RS384`), a key set of several keys needs a `kid` on every\nkey and on the assertion, and a `jwks_uri` is fetched as a guarded\noutbound call (https only, private addresses refused, size and time\nbounded) `[OCAK2]`, `[OCAK7]`, `[OCAK23]`, `[OTPA1]`, `[OTPA3]`; a\nsecret rotation may keep the previous secret valid for at most 30\ndays `[OCAK14]`. Every refusal is one uniform `invalid_client`.\nOpenID Connect is on when `oauth.signingKeys` lists a key (RS256,\nper core, YAML only): the id token's `sub` is the user's internal\nid or a pairwise alias, never the username, its `nonce` is\naccepted once per client platform-wide, and since rc.70 its\n`auth_time` is the user's last completed sign-in (password,\npassword and second factor, or identity provider); `max_age` and\n`prompt` are not honoured `[OXD01]`, `[OXD04]`, `[OXN01]`,\n`[OREG17]`. The browser state of the consent flow is signed with a\nper-core `oauth.stateKey` (required since rc.70 when a consent page\nis configured; the admin-key fallback is gone), so the admin key no\nlonger lets anyone forge consent state `[OXSK1]`, `[OREG16]`.\nWith `oauth.perUserIssuer` (rc.77, opt-in, default off) each\naccount host is its own issuer: codes, refresh tokens, id tokens\nand client assertions are bound to that host, and only the account\nthe host names can consent there (`issuer-account-mismatch` in the\naudit trail) `[OPIS4]`, `[OPIS5]`, `[OPIS6]`, `[OPIU3]`.\n\n**Sender-constrained tokens (DPoP).** A delegated app may opt into\nRFC 9449 DPoP: it proves possession of a client-held key on each\nrequest, and the token is bound to that key's thumbprint (issued\n`token_type: DPoP`). A token stolen in transit or from storage is\nthen useless without the private key, it materially strengthens\n\"the entity seeking access is the one claimed\" for bearer tokens.\nOpt-in and additive (Bearer clients are unchanged). The proof's\nfreshness window is `oauth.dpop.clockSkewSeconds` (default 120 s);\nDEPLOYMENT NOTE: DPoP binds to the client-facing request URI, so a\ndeployment accepting it must sit behind a proxy that overwrites the\nX-Forwarded-Host / -Proto headers. Server-side landed in open-pryv.io\n`9a874599`; the client side ships in the `pryv` JS library 3.10.0\n(`SignedConnection`, `OAuth2Client` with `dpop: true`).\n\n**Operator key revocation.** When a bound key is compromised, you\nrevoke it platform-wide by its RFC 7638 thumbprint\n(`bin/oauth-client.js revoke-key <jkt> --yes`): every token bound\nto the key, including refresh rotations attempted after the\nrevoke, is rejected on all cores within\n`oauth.dpop.keyRevokeCheckSeconds` (default 30 s), and the token\nendpoint refuses to mint for it. An advisory per-client key\ninventory (`list-keys`) shows what a revocation will hit before\nyou run it (open-pryv.io `4c0a5ade`).\n\n**Delegate tokens authenticate AS the controlled account.** With\naccount delegation (`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`), a\ndelegate holds a session-backed, owner-equivalent personal token\nthat authenticates as the controlled account, but the two are\nnever conflated: `accessInfo` exposes an additive `delegation`\nfield naming the acting delegate, and audit attributes each\ndelegate's actions on the controlled account (same-core +\ncross-core). Authentication as the account is revocable by the\none party who can genuinely log in to it: detach is gated on a\npersonal token carrying no forge-protected delegation marker (the\nmarker is forge-guarded for every token class), so no delegate\ncan impersonate a genuine login or block a takeover. See\n`context/delegation-model.md`.\n\nThe same field identifies an app acting for a controlled account:\nan app access a delegate granted reports `delegation` with\n`grantedVia: 'app'` and the delegate's identity, from a\nserver-stamped attribute no client can forge `[DCH02]`, `[DCH03]`.\nThe auth-request result's own `delegation` block is a display\nhint only; `accessInfo` is the authoritative answer. An access\ngranted through a delegation cannot pass for a genuine login\neither: it cannot detach the delegation `[DCH11]`. In\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "MA3A",
       "MA4A",
       "MA5A",
       "MA5B",
       "MA6A",
       "MA7A",
       "MA10A",
       "MA11A",
       "MA13B",
       "MA12A",
       "MBKF1",
       "PCS1",
       "MCHK1",
       "DCH02",
       "DCH03",
       "DCH11",
       "CEPB1",
       "CEPI1",
       "CEDB1",
       "PWSL1",
       "OCAK2",
       "OCAK7",
       "OCAK14",
       "OCAK23",
       "OTPA1",
       "OTPA3",
       "OXD01",
       "OXD04",
       "OXN01",
       "OREG17",
       "OXSK1",
       "OREG16",
       "OPIS4",
       "OPIS5",
       "OPIS6",
       "OPIU3",
       "CLIB2",
       "PCLM1",
       "PCLM2",
       "OPCL2",
       "OPCL3",
       "OPCL4"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "services.mfa.mode",
       "services.mfa.attempts.backoff",
       "auth.passwordAttempts",
       "auth.passwordAttempts.perIp",
       "oauth.accessTokenTTL",
       "oauth.refreshTokenTTL",
       "oauth.refreshTokenAbsoluteTTL",
       "oauth.dpop.clockSkewSeconds",
       "oauth.dpop.keyRevokeCheckSeconds",
       "oauth.signingKeys",
       "oauth.idTokenTTL",
       "oauth.stateKey",
       "oauth.perUserIssuer",
       "auth.passwordCheckConcurrency",
       "auth.passwordCheckQueue"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "MFA",
       "system-streams",
       "delegation"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "delegation-model"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "enhancement",
       "summary": "Reference MFA plugins (TOTP / WebAuthn) + primitive-catalogue doc surface the pluggability",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467852&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C78"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(e)(1)",
     "title": "Transmission security, standard",
     "text": "Implement technical security measures to guard against unauthorized\naccess to ePHI that is being transmitted over an electronic\ncommunications network.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "You choose where TLS terminates, and you must choose. The core\nserves HTTPS when you configure it to: a certificate at\n`http.ssl.keyFile` / `http.ssl.certFile`, issued and auto-renewed\nby the built-in ACME integration when `letsEncrypt.enabled` is\nset. Without that configuration it serves plain HTTP (the default\n`http.ip` is 127.0.0.1) and your reverse proxy terminates TLS\n(`open-pryv.io/INSTALL.md`, \"Running behind nginx\";\n`open-pryv.io/docs/nginx-ingress-sample.conf`). Between cores,\nRaft traffic runs over mutual TLS on a cluster-private CA once\n`bin/bootstrap.js` has written `storages.engines.rqlite.tls`; with\nthe default `tls: null` it is plain TCP (single core, or a\nVPN-protected cluster).\n",
     "detail": "LE certificate replication uses rqlite keyspace `tls-cert/<host>` +\n`tls-acme-account`; rotation triggers `https.Server.setSecureContext`\nvia cluster IPC for live key swap without downtime. The cluster CA\nlives outside the LE chain, operator-rooted, used only between\ncores.\n\n**Webhook delivery is signal-only.** Outbound webhook POSTs\nfrom Pryv carry a notification that something changed, not\nthe changed data itself. Receivers fetch the current state via\nauthenticated GET back to Pryv (same access-token-protected\npaths as any other read). No PHI / PII / tokens transit the\nwebhook surface; the transmission-security attack surface\nnarrows accordingly. See `context/webhooks-signal-only.md` for\nthe full design rationale + operational caveats (TLS-on-\ndelivery, retry semantics, poison-pill protection).\n\n**Calls to a counterparty** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56).\nCross-account consent deliveries, which carry the endpoint of a\ndata grant, and the other calls Pryv makes to URLs a counterparty\nsupplies (chat, revocations, scope updates, delegation and OAuth\nrevocation notices) are refused over plain `http:` unless\n`cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl` is set (meant for development and\ntest clusters) `[PFR4]`, and refused toward a loopback, private,\nlink-local or otherwise reserved address unless it is listed in\n`cmc.allowedPrivateHosts` `[PFR1]`, `[CO22]`. Earlier releases\napplied neither check to these calls. The OAuth2 key sets\n(`jwks_uri`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.70) and client metadata\ndocuments (2.0.0-rc.74) are fetched over https only, whatever\n`cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl` says `[OCMD03B]`, `[OCMD03G]`.\nRequests forwarded on adapter routes (2.0.0-rc.73) go to the\n`upstream` you configure; Pryv warns at boot when it is `http:` to\na non-local address, since that traffic, credentials included,\ntravels in clear: use `https:` or keep the sidecar on the host\n`[ADRC03]`, `[ADRI13]`.\n\n**Credential hand-off between parties.** TLS protects the pipe;\nthe shared-secrets primitive\n(`open-pryv.io/components/shared-secrets/`) protects the\ncredential travelling over it. Handing an access credential to a\ncounterparty (e.g. inviting a care-team member) used to mean a\nURL-embedded token that lingers in browser history, referrer\nheaders, and intermediary access logs after the TLS session ends.\nInstead, the counterparty receives a one-time random key:\nredeemable exactly once, mandatory expiry, hash-only server-side\nstorage (the SHA-256 of the key's random half), optional\npassphrase / HMAC gate on redemption. An intercepted or logged\nlink therefore never carries a live, replayable credential to\nePHI. Expiry is enforced when someone reaches for the secret\nrather than by a background sweeper, so plan your own deletion\npass if ePHI retention rules require expired payloads to be gone\nby a fixed deadline.\n",
     "technical": "The core sets no TLS version or cipher options of its own\n(`open-pryv.io/components/api-server/src/server.ts`,\n`buildHttpsOptions`): Node.js defaults apply. On the Node 24 the\nDocker image runs, that is a TLS 1.2 floor, with TLS 1.3\nnegotiated when the client supports it. The sample nginx vhost\nallows TLS 1.2 and 1.3. Checked against open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34.\n",
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ACMEORCH",
       "CERTUTILS",
       "FORCERENEWIPC",
       "SHS02",
       "SHS12",
       "SHS13",
       "PFR1",
       "PFR4",
       "CO22",
       "OCMD03B",
       "OCMD03G",
       "ADRC03",
       "ADRI13"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled",
       "storages.engines.rqlite.tls",
       "cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl",
       "cmc.allowedPrivateHosts",
       "adapterRoutes"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "shared-secrets"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "webhooks-signal-only"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(e)(2)(i)",
     "title": "Integrity controls, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement security measures to ensure that electronically\ntransmitted ePHI is not improperly modified without detection\nuntil disposed of.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Once TLS is in place (in the core or in your proxy, see\n164.312(e)(1)), every TLS record is integrity-protected, so\nmodification in transit is detectable. The core does not enforce TLS on its own: without a\nconfigured certificate it serves plain HTTP, which is only safe\nbehind your TLS-terminating proxy. Endpoint-to-endpoint integrity\nacross multiple hops (e.g., proxy chains) requires your chain to\npreserve this property.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ACMEORCH"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.312(e)(2)(ii)",
     "title": "Encryption, Addressable (transmission)",
     "text": "Implement a mechanism to encrypt ePHI whenever deemed appropriate.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Encryption in transit is a configuration you set, not a default.\nTwo supported placements: the core terminates TLS itself\n(`http.ssl.keyFile` / `http.ssl.certFile`, with certificates\nissued and renewed by the built-in ACME integration when\n`letsEncrypt.enabled` is set), or your reverse proxy terminates\nTLS and the core serves plain HTTP behind it. Between cores, Raft\ntraffic is mutual TLS once `bin/bootstrap.js` has written\n`storages.engines.rqlite.tls` (default `tls: null`, plain TCP).\nFor ePHI, configure one of the two placements so no network hop\ncarries plaintext.\n",
     "detail": "With the default configuration (`letsEncrypt.enabled: false`, no\n`http.ssl.*`) the core serves plain HTTP on `http.ip` (127.0.0.1\nby default); keep it bound to the host your proxy runs on. The\ncore sets no TLS version or cipher options of its own, so Node.js\ndefaults apply (on the Node 24 the Docker image runs: a TLS 1.2\nfloor, TLS 1.3 when the client supports it); at a proxy, the\nproxy's own settings apply (the sample nginx vhost allows TLS 1.2\nand 1.3). The TLS requirement holds at the transmission boundary,\nwherever you place that boundary.\n\n**HSTS behind a TLS-terminating proxy (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.34).** Sites the core hosts (`hostedSites`, e.g. the\naccount web app) send `Strict-Transport-Security` by default\nonly when the core itself terminates TLS, so behind a proxy they\nused to send none. Set `hostedSites.<name>.hsts: always` when your\nproxy terminates TLS and the site is HTTPS-only (browsers only\nhonour the header received over HTTPS); `never` turns it off.\nThe setting comes from configuration only (no `X-Forwarded-Proto`\nis trusted), an invalid value refuses the boot, and the value is\n`max-age=31536000` for that host only. In dnsLess mode the site\nshares the API's host, so the header covers that whole host. The\ncore does not add HSTS to API answers on a separate API host: set\nit on your proxy if you want it there.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ACMEORCH",
       "CERTUTILS",
       "HSHT"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled",
       "storages.engines.rqlite.tls",
       "hostedSites.<name>.hsts"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.314(a)(1)",
     "title": "Business associate contracts, standard",
     "text": "Business associate contract or other arrangement between the\ncovered entity and its business associate must meet the\nrequirements of §164.314(a)(2).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The BAA itself is a contract,\nthe covered entity drafts it with legal counsel. What Pryv\ncontributes when you operate as a business associate: the audit\nlog makes \"implement administrative, physical and technical\nsafeguards\" (§164.314(a)(2)(i)(A)) auditable per the BAA's\nspecified terms; the access primitive bounds which subjects +\nwhich streams the BA may touch; CMC's cross-platform consent\nflow gives a structured channel for the §164.314(a)(2)(i)(C)\nbreach-notification pipe between BA and CE.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.314(a)(2)(i)(A)",
     "title": "BAC content, implement safeguards reasonably and appropriately",
     "text": "Business associate contract must provide that the business\nassociate will implement administrative, physical and technical\nsafeguards that reasonably and appropriately protect ePHI.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "The BAA's \"reasonable\nand appropriate safeguards\" obligation is satisfied by the\ntechnical-safeguards programme already enumerated across\n§164.308 + §164.310 + §164.312. The BA cites the relevant\nPryv-implemented rows when populating their BAA exhibit.\nMapping this Article to the existing technical-safeguards rows\nis the `derives_from` chain.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(1)(i)",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(a)(1)",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(e)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "MFA",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.314(a)(2)(i)(B)",
     "title": "BAC content, extend safeguards to subcontractors",
     "text": "Business associate contract must provide that the business\nassociate will, in accordance with §164.308(b)(2), ensure that\nany subcontractors that create, receive, maintain, or transmit\nePHI on its behalf agree to comply with the applicable\nrequirements of this subpart by entering into a contract or\nother arrangement that complies with this section. Applied down\nthe chain by §164.314(a)(2)(iii) (contracts between a business\nassociate and its subcontractor).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Subcontracting chains are contractual; no software role. The\nonly built-in subprocessor Pryv-the-software carries is the\nobservability-provider adapter (default disabled); when enabled,\nthe BA's subcontractor list adds the observability provider as\na sub-processor under both HIPAA-Security §164.314(a)(2)(i)(B)\nand GDPR Art.28(4). (Listed as §164.314(a)(2)(ii)(B) until\n2026-11-19: that paragraph is \"other arrangements\" and has no\nsubcontractor clause.)\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.314(a)(2)(i)(C)",
     "title": "BAC content, report security incidents",
     "text": "Business associate contract must provide that the business\nassociate will report any security incident of which it becomes\naware to the covered entity.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Detection of a security\nincident is the BA's operational concern (audit-log review +\nobservability). Reporting to the CE is the contractual flow.\nPryv's CMC plugin provides a structured cross-account\nmessaging substrate when both sides run Pryv, otherwise the\nreport channel is email / API / portal at the BA's choice.\nThe audit log supplies the forensic evidence the report cites.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "CMC",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.316(a)",
     "title": "Policies and procedures, standard",
     "text": "Implement reasonable and appropriate policies and procedures to\ncomply with the standards, implementation specifications, or\nother requirements of this subpart.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The policies-and-procedures programme is an organizational\nartefact owned by the covered entity / business associate's\nsecurity officer. Pryv has no software role in drafting them.\nPryv-side documentation (this matrix, CHANGELOGs, the QMS\nworkstream) feeds the operator's policy work but doesn't\nsubstitute for it.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.316(b)(1)",
     "title": "Documentation, Required",
     "text": "Maintain the policies and procedures implemented to comply with\nthis subpart in written (which may be electronic) form; if an\naction, activity, or assessment is required by this subpart to\nbe documented, maintain a written (which may be electronic)\nrecord of the action, activity, or assessment.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Where the required record\nis operational (activity logs, assessment outputs), Pryv events\non a designated `compliance/*` stream carry the documentation\nalongside the audit log's automatic operational record. Event\nversioning preserves the change history of policies-as-data\nonce you set `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by\ndefault, in which case an update overwrites the previous\nrevision: keep each revision as its own event instead);\nbackup-restore preserves them across the §164.316(b)(2)\nretention window.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.316(b)(2)(i)",
     "title": "Documentation, time limit, Required",
     "text": "Retain the documentation required by §164.316(b)(1) for 6 years\nfrom the date of its creation or the date when it last was in\neffect, whichever is later.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Six-year is a **minimum** retention period, not a maximum\n(the statute says \"retain … for 6 years\"; covered entities\nmay retain indefinitely). Pryv's audit log persists by\ndefault; retention beyond the minimum + any operational\npruning are operator-driven choices (operator schedules\narchival to cold storage per their policy). `bin/backup.js`\nproduces the artefact the §164.316 retention rule attaches\nto.\n",
     "detail": "**Minimum 6-year retention is the regulatory floor; there\nis no max.** Pryv never *requires* destruction at the 6-year\nmark, operators commonly retain indefinitely under\nGDPR Art.17(3)(b) \"compliance with a legal obligation\"\nlawful basis (the §164.316 retention itself, or sectoral\nregs) or Art.17(3)(e) \"legal claims\". The pressure to\nprune is operational (storage cost / DB performance over\n10B-row scales), not regulatory.\n\n**Tiering pattern for long-running deployments**: the audit\nlog is exposed via the `@pryv/datastore` abstraction\n(`auditDataStore` registered as `_audit` in the Mall;\n`components/audit/src/datastore/auditDataStore.ts`). An\noperator wanting to tier hot recent rows + cold archived\nrows writes a custom `auditStorage` engine plugin (per\n`storages/engines/*/manifest.json`) that routes writes to\na hot tier + reads to a union view across hot + cold.\nEnd users see one continuous log via `audit.getLogs`; the\nstorage backing it is the operator's choice. Full pattern\ndetail in\n`context/audit-archival-via-custom-datastore.md`.\n\n**Cascade with the Q8 erasure setting** (shipped 2026-05-27,\nopen-pryv.io master `405b3a1`): the `audit.onUserDelete:\nkeep` operator setting is the HIPAA-friendly path when a\ncovered entity deletes a subject's account while needing to\nretain the audit. The retention obligation runs under a\nlawful basis separate from the deletion itself (HIPAA\nPrivacy Rule §164.530(j) anchors documentation-retention\nindependently of subject account state).\n\nAudit erasure on `auth.delete` now converges across engines\n(SQLite + PostgreSQL, open-pryv.io `891090d` + `853e1cb`):\nwith `audit.onUserDelete: erase` (default), both engines\nreach zero audit rows for the deleted subject. With\n`keep`, both engines retain the audit since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.46: the PostgreSQL rows survive, and on SQLite the\nper-user audit database file stays at its path in the user\ndirectory, readable by user id, while everything else there is\nremoved `[DKP1]`. Before 2.0.0-rc.46 the SQLite directory wipe\nerased it, so `keep` behaved like `erase` on SQLite: if you\nrelied on `keep` there, audit of accounts deleted earlier is\ngone.\n\n**Access deletion records** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56). The\nrecord of a deleted access is what lets an audit row name the\naccess that acted. It is kept until the account is deleted unless\nyou set `accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays` above 0, in\nwhich case the master purges older ones once a day, whatever\n`audit.onUserDelete` says `[ADP1]`. The audit rows themselves are\nkept; past the purge they name such an access by id only. A\nretention shorter than six years shortens that attribution.\n\n**Account auto-deletion (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66, `8521c8d5`).**\nAn account erased because its holder scheduled it, or because\nyour inactivity preset applied, follows `audit.onUserDelete` like\nany account deletion: with the default `erase` its audit goes with\nit and a WARN log line before and after the erasure is what\nremains; with `keep` (and the audit active) the trail survives and\nan `account.autoDeletion.erase` row (username, trigger, whether\nthe holder or your preset set the schedule, deadline, when the\nnotices were sent) is written in it before the erasure starts\n(`[ADSW17]`). A covered entity that\nenables account auto-deletion keeps `audit.onUserDelete: keep`\nand keeps those log lines for the six-year period if they are\npart of its documentation.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "DKP1",
       "ADP1",
       "ADSW17"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "audit.onUserDelete",
       "accesses.deletionRecords.retentionDays"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "audit",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "audit-archival-via-custom-datastore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.316(b)(2)(iii)",
     "title": "Documentation, updates, Required",
     "text": "Review documentation periodically, and update as needed, in\nresponse to environmental or operational changes affecting the\nsecurity of the ePHI.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Periodic review cadence is\nthe operator's procedure. Pryv's contribution: when policies-\nas-data are stored as events on a `compliance/policies/*`\nstream, the audit log shows who updated which policy event and\nwhen, and, on a deployment with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default), the\nevent-version chain also shows what changed.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(2)",
     "title": "Assigned security responsibility, standard",
     "text": "Identify the security official who is responsible for the\ndevelopment and implementation of the policies and procedures\nrequired by this subpart.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Security-official designation is HR / organizational. No software\nrole. When the assigned official needs operational data, the\naudit log + observability + this matrix are the substrate they\ndraw on.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A)",
     "title": "Security reminders, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement periodic security updates / reminders.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Reminder cadence + content are organizational. Pryv has no role\nat the awareness-content layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B)",
     "title": "Protection from malicious software, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement procedures for guarding against, detecting, and\nreporting malicious software.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Guarding against, detecting and reporting malicious software is\nmostly a host / endpoint / network-layer control: Pryv-the-software\ndoesn't include AV, and your hosting environment carries that\npart. Pryv contributes one narrow guard on the files it stores:\nsince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 an attachment whose declared type\na browser executes or renders as a document (HTML, SVG and other\nXML, JavaScript) is served in a sandbox (`Content-Security-Policy:\nsandbox; default-src 'none'`), so it cannot run script on the API\norigin. Pryv does not scan attachment content or refuse uploads by\ntype: if ePHI workflows exchange files, scan them in your app or\nat your proxy, and keep the detection and reporting procedures in\nyour security program. Same reasoning as ISO 27001 A.8.7.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACTY"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.7"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C)",
     "title": "Log-in monitoring, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement procedures for monitoring log-in attempts and reporting\ndiscrepancies.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Login + authentication-\nfailure events are captured in the audit log (per `auth.*` API\nmethod calls). Observability data aggregates rate + anomaly\nsignals. The discrepancy-reporting cadence + threshold tuning\nare operator-side procedure.\n",
     "detail": "**Pryv surfaces the events and slows password guessing; you\nchoose the lockout policy.** Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47 Pryv\ndelays failed passwords itself, never locking an account:\nsign-in, `account.changePassword`, the MFA step-up by password\nand `mfa.recover` share a per-account tally (after\n`auth.passwordAttempts.freeFailures`, default 5, within 900 s,\nthe next attempt waits from 2 s doubling up to 300 s, answered\n429 `too-many-attempts` with `Retry-After`) `[CEPB1]`, and a\nper-client-address budget counted across all cores\n(`auth.passwordAttempts.perIp.maxFailures`, default 30 per\n900 s, an IPv6 /64 counting as one address) `[CEPI1]`. The\ncredential methods are refused inside batch calls and over\nsocket.io, so every guess is one HTTP request your edge sees\n`[CEDB1]`. Behind a reverse proxy, list it in\n`http.trustedProxies`, or every client shares the proxy's\naddress budget `[CEPI2]`. Locking accounts after N failures, and\nreporting discrepancies, stay your policy: operator pattern\n`fail2ban` watching the audit log and banning addresses that\nexceed N auth failures in T minutes, plus reverse-proxy\n`limit_req_zone` per-IP caps on `/auth/login`. (Before 2.0.0-rc.47\nPryv did not throttle passwords in-process.)\n\n**A busy refusal is not a failed attempt** (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.87). When the API\nworker's password checks are all taken\n(`auth.passwordCheckConcurrency`, `auth.passwordCheckQueue`), a\nsign-in is refused without checking the password: `429\ntoo-many-requests` with `Retry-After`, an error id distinct from\nthe `too-many-attempts` of the delay above. It does not count on\nthe account's tally and does not delay the account `[PCLM1]`,\n`[PCLM2]`. A monitoring rule that counts failed logins should key\non `invalid-credentials` and `too-many-attempts`, not on every\n429.\n\n**The second factor has its own tally.** Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.27 Pryv enforces a per-account backoff on failed MFA\nattempts (open-pryv.io `6231a37c`, `aa445c43`;\n`services.mfa.attempts.backoff`, default: after 3 failures within\n15 minutes, delays doubling from 2 s up to 5 minutes, answered 429\n`too-many-attempts` with `Retry-After`). It is a delay, never a\nlockout: a success clears it and the real user waits at most\n`maxSeconds`. The counter lives on the account's home core. Tests\n`[MA12A]`-`[MA12K]`, `[MBKF1]`-`[MBKF3]`. See §164.312(d).\n\nFull operator-side rate-limiting framing:\n`context/rate-limiting-and-dos-protection.md`. Enforcement\ncompanion on the authentication endpoints: the reference nginx +\nfail2ban configuration (`customer-resources/rate-limiting.md`)\nlimits password logins and MFA attempts per IP and bans an address\nafter repeated failed logins.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT02",
       "AT51",
       "MA12A",
       "MBKF1",
       "CEPB1",
       "CEPI1",
       "CEPI2",
       "CEDB1",
       "PCLM1",
       "PCLM2"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/rate-limiting.md#fail2ban"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "services.mfa.attempts.backoff",
       "auth.passwordAttempts",
       "auth.passwordAttempts.perIp",
       "http.trustedProxies",
       "auth.passwordCheckConcurrency",
       "auth.passwordCheckQueue"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.15"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "MFA"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "rate-limiting-and-dos-protection"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(6)(i)",
     "title": "Security incident procedures, standard",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures to address security incidents.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Incident-response procedure\nis the operator's organizational programme. Pryv contributes\nthe detection + scoping data layer: audit log shows who\naccessed what; observability gives system-level anomaly\nsignals; access primitives provide the containment mechanism\n(revoke or scope-down the implicated access). For\nsubstrate-vulnerability intake specifically (operator\nlearning that the Pryv version they run has a confirmed\nvulnerability), the upstream's vulnerability disclosure\nprogram is the externally-facing channel: `SECURITY.md`\npublishes a coordinated disclosure policy (private GitHub\nSecurity Advisories flow + `security-dev@` mailbox + scope +\nSLA + safe harbor), and private vulnerability reporting is\nenabled on the published repositories.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/rate-limiting.md#verify-the-limits-fire"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(1)(i)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(7)(ii)(C)",
     "title": "Emergency mode operation plan, Required",
     "text": "Establish (and implement as needed) procedures to enable\ncontinuation of critical business processes for protection of\nthe security of ePHI while operating in emergency mode.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's HA primitives\n(multi-core cluster + Raft replication + cluster-CA mTLS)\nsupport continued operation when a single facility fails. The\n\"critical business processes\" definition + emergency-mode\nrunbook are the operator's. See also Art.5+ of the Disaster\nRecovery row.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-restore",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D)",
     "title": "Testing and revision procedures, Addressable",
     "text": "Implement procedures for periodic testing and revision of\ncontingency plans.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Contingency-plan testing is an operational drill. Pryv has no\nsoftware role at the drill-execution layer. The drill's\nrestoration-from-backup phase exercises Pryv primitives but\nthe testing programme itself is the operator's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.308(a)(8)",
     "title": "Evaluation, standard",
     "text": "Perform a periodic technical and nontechnical evaluation in\nresponse to environmental or operational changes affecting the\nsecurity of ePHI to ensure security policies and procedures meet\nthe requirements of this subpart.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Evaluation is the operator's\ncyclical assessment. Pryv-side inputs: audit log (control-\neffectiveness sample), observability (operational stability\ndata), this matrix (control inventory to evaluate against),\nPryv's test matrix (~2351 PG and SQLite, matched baseline, passing on every\ncommit, concrete §164.308(a)(8) effectiveness evidence),\nPryv's supply-chain pipeline (shipped in open-pryv.io\n`9e2ee7ff`: CI dependency-audit gate, per-release CycloneDX\nSBOM, cosign-signed images; the SBOM + latest scan output\nare citable periodic-evaluation artefacts), Pryv's vulnerability\ndisclosure program + GHSA advisory history (coordinated\ndisclosure policy published in `SECURITY.md`; private\nvulnerability reporting enabled on the published\nrepositories), and the code-level security review of\nopen-pryv.io (2026-06 to 2026-10, fixes in 2.0.0-rc.40 to\n2.0.0-rc.51, public report `SECURITY-AUDIT.md` published\n2026-10-14). The assessment write-up is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": "**The 2026 security review is a technical-evaluation input you can\ncite for the platform layer.** The open-pryv.io maintainers ran a\nsystematic code-level security review of the source (authentication\nand sessions, authorisation and tenant isolation, input handling,\ncryptography and secrets in logs, the admin / multi-core plane, the\nnetwork-facing daemons, resource limits, deletion semantics), each\nfinding confirmed by a second review before it was accepted and fixed\nwith regression tests. The fixes shipped in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.40\nto 2.0.0-rc.51 (October 2026); each release note lists what changed\nand the operator steps it needs. The public report,\n`SECURITY-AUDIT.md`\n(https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md,\npublished 2026-10-14), gathers the method, each finding with its\nseverity, fix release and operator action, and the known residual\nrisks; it is revised with every release that carries a security fix.\nMethodology, scope and the fix areas:\n`context/code-security-review-2026.md`.\n\nWhat stays yours under §164.308(a)(8): running a release that carries\nthe fixes (2.0.0-rc.51 or later, with the operator steps of each\nrelease in between), and the evaluation itself. The review covered\nthe code, not your deployment: your configuration, network exposure,\nadded applications and procedures, and the \"in response to\nenvironmental or operational changes\" trigger, are evaluated by you.\nIt was performed by the maintainers, not an independent assessor.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.316(b)(2)(iii)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Read-only effective-configuration endpoint supplies the technical baseline snapshot the periodic evaluation is measured against",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=219705795&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C118"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.310(a)(1)",
     "title": "Facility access controls, standard",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to\nits electronic information systems and the facility or facilities\nin which they are housed, while ensuring that properly authorized\naccess is allowed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Facility access is physical. See the §164.310 framing row.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.310"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.310(b)",
     "title": "Workstation use, standard",
     "text": "Implement policies + procedures that specify the proper functions\nto be performed, the manner in which those functions are to be\nperformed, and the physical attributes of the surroundings of a\nspecific workstation or class of workstation that can access ePHI.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Workstation use + physical attributes are facility / HR\ncontrols.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.310"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.310(c)",
     "title": "Workstation security, standard",
     "text": "Implement physical safeguards for all workstations that access\nePHI, to restrict access to authorized users.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Physical workstation security (screen locks, kensington locks,\nprivacy filters) is endpoint-management scope.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.310"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "164.310(d)(1)",
     "title": "Device and media controls, standard",
     "text": "Implement policies and procedures that govern the receipt and\nremoval of hardware and electronic media that contain ePHI into\nand out of a facility, and the movement of these items within\nthe facility.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv-side contribution\nat the media-controls layer: per-user backup files are the\nnatural unit when an individual subject's ePHI moves off the\nproduction system (export, transfer, archive); operator-side\nat-rest encryption (LUKS / PG TDE) keeps the ePHI-on-media\nencrypted in motion + at rest. The physical movement procedure\nis the operator's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.310"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "iso-13485",
   "title": "ISO 13485, Medical devices, Quality Management Systems, Requirements for regulatory purposes",
   "short": "ISO 13485",
   "type": "standard",
   "jurisdiction": "International (ISO)",
   "version": "ISO 13485:2016 (Amd 1:2021)",
   "version_date": "2016-03-01",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.iso.org/standard/59752",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": true,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/iso-13485",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/iso-13485.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "4.1.6",
     "title": "Validation of software applications used in the QMS",
     "text": "Organization shall document procedures for validation of the\napplication of computer software used in the quality management\nsystem. Such software shall be validated prior to initial use,\nafter changes, as appropriate.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "When the manufacturer's QMS\nuses Pryv as one of its computer applications (e.g., storing\nCAPA records as events, design files as attachments, training\nrecords as stream content), 4.1.6 requires validation evidence.\nPryv-side artefacts that feed validation: test matrix results,\naudit log (proves the software's behaviour matches expectation\nunder real usage), CHANGELOG-v2 per release. The validation\nmethodology + acceptance criteria are the manufacturer's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "4.2.4",
     "title": "Control of documents",
     "text": "Documents required by the QMS shall be controlled, review,\napproval, identification of changes, current revision status,\nlegibility, identification of external-origin documents,\nprevention of obsolete-document misuse.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv as a document-control\nsurface: events on a designated `qms-docs/*` stream tree carry\nthe document content (or a reference to it); event versioning\npreserves change history once you set\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default, in which\ncase an update overwrites the previous revision: keep each\nrevision as its own event instead); audit log tracks who-accessed-what\nfor the \"prevention of obsolete-document misuse\" element. The\nmanufacturer's approval-workflow / review-cadence procedure\nsits on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/02-procedures/document-control.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "4.2.5",
     "title": "Control of records",
     "text": "Records shall be established and maintained to provide evidence of\nconformity to requirements and effective operation of the QMS;\nshall remain legible, readily identifiable + retrievable.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "QMS records stored as Pryv events get legibility (canonical\ndata-types schemas), retrievability (events.get with timestamp +\nstream filters), and durability (backup-restore + audit\nattestation of changes). The manufacturer's retention period +\nrecord-classification design are the policy half.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "UZEV"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "7.3.7",
     "title": "Design verification",
     "text": "Design and development verification shall be performed to ensure\ndesign + development outputs have met the design + development\ninput requirements; records of verification + actions shall be\nmaintained.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "When the device under\ndevelopment uses Pryv as backend, the verification activity\n(\"output meets input\") generates verification records, these\ncan be stored as Pryv events on a designated\n`design-verification/*` stream with attachments for reports.\nAudit log provides the timestamp + actor evidence the record\nwas actually produced when claimed.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/02-procedures/design-control.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "7.3.8",
     "title": "Design validation",
     "text": "Design and development validation shall be performed to ensure\nproduct is capable of meeting requirements for specified\napplication or intended use; records of validation + actions\nshall be maintained.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Same Pryv contribution as\n7.3.7, validation records stored as events with attachments;\naudit chain proves authenticity over time. Clinical validation\n(the typical method for medical-device design validation)\ncross-references the MDR Art. 61 clinical-evaluation row.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "mdr.Art.61"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "8.2.1",
     "title": "Customer feedback",
     "text": "Organization shall document procedures for feedback process,\nincluding provision for collecting + monitoring information from\nproduction + post-production phases; feedback shall be used to\nidentify input to risk management + maintain product requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Customer-feedback data\nsources: events written from the device itself (\"post-market\nreports\"), observability data (\"how is the system performing\nin the field\"), audit data (\"what activity patterns are users\nshowing\"). Pryv hosts and audit-trails these data flows; the\nmanufacturer's feedback-processing procedure analyses them and\nfeeds back into design + risk management.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "mdr.Art.83"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "8.5",
     "title": "Improvement",
     "text": "Organization shall identify and implement any changes necessary\nto ensure + maintain continued suitability + adequacy + effectiveness\nof the QMS; corrective + preventive action shall be documented.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "CAPA records stored as Pryv\nevents with attachments; audit chain provides the tamper-\nevidence layer. The corrective + preventive action workflow\nitself (root-cause analysis, effectiveness check, verification)\nis the manufacturer's process. Pryv carries the records.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "7.3.10",
     "title": "Design and development files",
     "text": "Organization shall maintain a design and development file for\neach medical device type. The file shall include or reference\nrecords generated to demonstrate conformity to the requirements\nfor design and development and records for design and development\nchanges.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The design history file\n(DHF in FDA QSR terms) is a curated set of records spanning a\ndevice's design lifetime. Pryv supports it by storing each\ndesign record as an event on a designated\n`design-history/<device-id>/*` stream, with event versioning\nfor change traceability (set `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`;\nit is off by default) + audit log for tamper evidence +\nbackup-restore for retention. The curation methodology (what's\n\"in\" the file vs ambient project history) is the manufacturer's\neditorial decision.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-13485.4.2.5",
       "mdr.Art.10"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "8.2.3",
     "title": "Reporting to regulatory authorities",
     "text": "Where applicable regulatory requirements require notification of\ncomplaints that meet specified reporting criteria of adverse\nevents or issuance of advisory notices, the organization shall\ndocument such reporting.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Adverse-event reporting\ndecisions + the actual reports are manufacturer-side (per MDR\nArt. 87 timelines for EU; equivalent timelines for FDA / other\nregulators). Pryv contribution: the events the report cites\nlive on Pryv with their original timestamps + access provenance\n+ audit trail; CMC plugin (if both parties run Pryv) supports\na structured manufacturer-to-authority handshake.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "mdr.Art.87"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "8.4",
     "title": "Analysis of data",
     "text": "Organization shall document procedures to determine, collect and\nanalyze appropriate data to demonstrate the suitability and\neffectiveness of the QMS; analysis shall provide information\nrelating to feedback, conformity to product requirements,\ncharacteristics + trends, suppliers, audits, service reports.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv supplies the data\nsources: audit log (per-method usage patterns), events on\ncustomer-feedback streams (per §8.2.1), observability metrics\n(system trend data). The analysis methodology + the resulting\nsuitability-of-QMS conclusions are management-review artefacts\nproduced by the manufacturer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "event",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": [
    {
     "ref": "4.1.1",
     "reason": "Top-management QMS scope + boundary definition, organizational.\nPryv has no software role at the scope-setting layer.\n"
    },
    {
     "ref": "4.1.3",
     "reason": "QMS process documentation requirements (sequence, interactions,\ncriteria, methods), organizational, drafted by the device\nmanufacturer.\n"
    },
    {
     "ref": "5",
     "reason": "Management responsibility (commitment, customer focus, quality\npolicy, planning, responsibility + authority, communication,\nmanagement review), entirely organizational.\n"
    },
    {
     "ref": "6",
     "reason": "Resource management (provision, human resources, infrastructure,\nwork environment, contamination control), physical / HR /\nfacility scope, outside Pryv's software boundary.\n"
    },
    {
     "ref": "7.4",
     "reason": "Purchasing process (controls on suppliers + purchased product),\norganizational. Pryv may be a purchased component but the\nmanufacturer's purchasing controls are not Pryv-side.\n"
    },
    {
     "ref": "7.5",
     "reason": "Production and service provision (control, cleanliness, installation\nactivities, servicing, particular requirements for sterile devices,\nlabelling, etc.), physical / process scope.\n"
    },
    {
     "ref": "8.2.6",
     "reason": "Monitoring and measurement of product (release activities, identity\ncheck, status, records), physical inspection scope.\n"
    },
    {
     "ref": "8.3",
     "reason": "Control of nonconforming product, process scope; Pryv's audit log\nmay document data anomalies but the nonconforming-product control\nitself is the manufacturer's CAPA process.\n"
    }
   ]
  },
  {
   "id": "iso-27001",
   "title": "ISO/IEC 27001, Information Security Management Systems, Requirements",
   "short": "ISO 27001",
   "type": "standard",
   "jurisdiction": "International (ISO/IEC)",
   "version": "ISO/IEC 27001:2022",
   "version_date": "2022-10-25",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.iso.org/standard/27001",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/iso-27001",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/iso-27001.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "4",
     "title": "Clause 4 Context of the organization",
     "text": "Organization shall determine external and internal issues relevant\nto its purpose that affect its ability to achieve the intended\noutcomes of the ISMS, and shall determine interested parties +\nrequirements + scope.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Clause 4 is the organization's strategic ISMS-scoping exercise.\nPryv has no software role at this layer, when an organization\nadopts Pryv, the matrix supports their Clause-6 risk assessment\nby enumerating Pryv-side controls explicitly, but Clause 4 itself\nsits at the operator/implementer level.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "6.1.2",
     "title": "Clause 6.1.2, Information security risk assessment",
     "text": "Organization shall define and apply an information security risk\nassessment process that establishes and maintains criteria for\nrisk acceptance, identifies risks associated with the loss of\nconfidentiality, integrity and availability.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The risk-assessment\nmethodology + the operator's specific findings are the\noperator's artefact. Pryv contributes the inventory of\ntechnical controls (this matrix, particularly Annex A.8 rows\nbelow), when the operator identifies a CIA risk, the matrix\nsurfaces which Pryv primitive addresses it (or does not), so\nAnnex A applicability is mechanical rather than judgemental.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/02-procedures/risk-management.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.15",
     "title": "A.5.15 Access control",
     "text": "Rules to control physical and logical access to information and\nother associated assets shall be established and implemented based\non business and information security requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Logical access control is enforced at the API surface by the\naccess + permissions primitives; every read/write request is\nchecked against the access's stream + level permissions. The\noperator's access-control rule definition (who gets what) is\nthe policy half; technical enforcement is Pryv-side.\n",
     "detail": "**OAuth2 redirect + scope enforcement.** Pryv's delegated-app\nauthorization path (OAuth2 authorization-code + PKCE,\n`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8)\nenforces access rules at two points: presented redirect URIs are\nvalidated by exact string match (single loopback-port carve-out\nper RFC 8252 / 9700; fragment-bearing URIs rejected,\n`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/src/clientRegistry.ts`), and the\nminted app access carries only the user's granted subset of the\nreferenced consent offer's permissions. PKCE (S256) is mandatory\nfor every client.\n\n**OAuth2 access rules added in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.64 to\n2.0.0-rc.77.** A consent for an operator-registered client never\ngrants account or system streams, `*` or `manage`, and by default\nforbids creating accesses or webhooks and sharing secrets; the\ngrant's reach follows withdrawal and narrowing at once, the\naccesses the app's sessions created included `[OE31]`, `[OSUB3]`,\n`[OACR1]`. An aliased session is accepted under its alias only\n`[AL13]`. An authorization for an account address is bound to the\nsigned-in account `[OPUE2]`. Token exchange gives a resource server\na token no wider than the one it replaces, only for a token issued\nfor one of its audiences `[OTX05]`; the replaced token is refused\nat the API by default since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.82\n(`oauth.audienceBoundSessions: true`; an operator may set `false`)\n`[OTXE02]`. Detail on\n`hipaa-security.164.312(a)(1)`.\n\n**Delegate-account token class.** Account delegation\n(`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) adds an owner-equivalent\ndelegate token one account holds over another. It is bound by the\nsame per-stream permissions as any token; its access-control\nproperty is the non-forgeable, authoritative teardown, a delegate\ncan never remove a delegation, and dissolving one requires a\ngenuine login on the controlled account (a personal token with no\nforge-protected delegation marker). The `:_delegation:*`\nnamespace is plugin-owned and guarded end to end (no user\ncreate/write/delete; internal subtree read-guarded and excluded\nfrom wildcard reads); each delegate's actions are audited on the\ncontrolled account. See `context/delegation-model.md`.\n\n**Plugin-managed and account streams, by every spelling of an id**\n(open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56). The guards of the delegation\nnamespace, of the plugin-managed regions of the cross-account\n(CMC) namespace (`:_cmc:`, its inbox and internal streams;\n`:_cmc:apps` stays open to apps) and of the account fields judge\nthe stream an id resolves to, whatever store-prefixed spelling a\nrequest uses, for every token, the owner's included; they also\nrefuse creating a stream under, or moving one into, a\nplugin-managed parent `[CNRP1]`, `[CNRP6]`, `[CNRP7]`, `[DSC05]`.\nOn access creation and update a permission naming an account\nfield through such a spelling is judged, and stored, as that\nfield, so an app holding only a `*` grant on the regular streams\ncannot hand one out `[ASA3]`, `[ASA6]`. Before this release a\nstore-prefixed spelling (`:local:<id>`, or the account store's\nprefix) was not recognised by these guards, so the rule above\nheld only for requests using the canonical ids.\n\n**Moving a stream** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56). A move (a new\n`parentId`) by an app or shared access needs manage rights on\nevery stream of the moved subtree, trashed ones included, as\ndeleting it does `[SMV1]`, `[SMV4]`; a parent inside the moved\nsubtree is refused for every access `[SMV10]`. Before it, a child\ngranted to the moving access at a lower level travelled into the\ntarget parent's inherited permissions.\n\nApps a delegate authorizes on the controlled account get a scoped\n`app` access, never the owner-equivalent token; the server marks\nit as granted through the delegation (no client can forge the\nmark) and removes it with the delegation `[DCH01]`, `[DCH03]`,\n`[DCH12]`. In open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23. Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.30 the rule also covers cross-account (CMC) data grants:\na delegate may accept one for the controlled account, the grant\ncarries the same mark (reported by `access-info`) `[DCH15]`, the\naccept event names the approving delegate, server-stamped\n`[DCH16]`, and the detach deletes the grant and notifies the\nrequester `[DCH18]`. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.31 the account\nholder, detaching the delegate, may keep named CMC data grants\nthat delegate gave (`keepAccessIds`): a kept grant loses the mark\nand becomes the holder's own `[DCH21]`, a list naming any other\naccess is refused whole before any change `[DCH23]`, and every\nother access granted through the delegation is removed as before.\nGrant paths that still cannot record the\nmark (OAuth2 consent, publishing a CMC offer, widening a CMC\ngrant) refuse delegation-derived tokens `[DCH17]`, `[OE27]`.\n\n**Member accesses of a group account** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53,\nrelease commit `61fb28dd`,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158). For a team\nsharing one account, the rule Pryv enforces is: a member obtains\nan access on a patient account only through a membership the\ngroup's administrator approved, only for patient relationships\nunder the member's team streams, only for named data streams\nwithin the patient's offer (the patient's core re-checks them\nagainst the grant and stamps the member on the access), and only\nfor a bounded time (24 h by default, 60 s to 7 d,\n`cmc.memberAccess.*`, never beyond the membership's expiry)\n`[GA12]`, `[GA14]`, `[GA15]`, `[MB10]`, `[CMCMA]`; the access\ncannot manage accesses and is deleted when the membership ends\n`[GA20]` or the patient withdraws `[GA24]`. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "DCH01",
       "DCH03",
       "DCH12",
       "DCH15",
       "DCH16",
       "DCH17",
       "DCH18",
       "DCH21",
       "DCH23",
       "OE27",
       "CMCGA",
       "CMCMA",
       "GA12",
       "GA14",
       "GA15",
       "GA20",
       "GA24",
       "MB10",
       "CNRP1",
       "CNRP6",
       "CNRP7",
       "DSC05",
       "ASA3",
       "ASA6",
       "SMV1",
       "SMV4",
       "SMV10",
       "OE31",
       "OSUB3",
       "OACR1",
       "AL13",
       "OPUE2",
       "OTX05",
       "OTXE02"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cmc.memberAccess.defaultTtl",
       "cmc.memberAccess.minTtl",
       "cmc.memberAccess.maxTtl",
       "oauth.audienceBoundSessions"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "delegation",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "delegation-model",
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.34",
     "title": "A.5.34 Privacy and protection of personal information",
     "text": "Privacy and protection of personally identifiable information\nshall be identified, documented and implemented in accordance\nwith applicable laws and contractual requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's primitive set\ncarries privacy-by-design (see GDPR Art. 25) and the technical\nsecurity controls (see GDPR Art. 32). What's on the operator's\nside: the identification of which laws apply, the documented\nprivacy commitments (notice texts, consent UX), and the\ncontractual side. Cross-scope link to the gdpr.* rows for the\ndetailed mapping.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.25",
       "gdpr.Art.32"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.6.7",
     "title": "A.6.7 Remote working",
     "text": "Security measures shall be implemented when personnel are working\nremotely to protect information accessed, processed or stored\noutside the organization's premises.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's API is remote-\nby-design, workforce access from off-premises traverses the\nsame TLS + access-token + MFA controls as any other access.\nThe operator's remote-working policy (devices, VPN, endpoint\nhardening) sits on top of this; Pryv provides the secure\ntransport + auth substrate.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "MFA",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.2",
     "title": "A.8.2 Privileged access rights",
     "text": "Allocation and use of privileged access rights shall be restricted\nand managed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv's privileged-access surface is small and explicit: the\noperator's `auth.adminAccessKey` is the root credential; system\nstreams (account, password, mfa) require an explicit grant in\n`permissions[]`. Both surfaces are auditable. The operator's\ncustody process for the admin key is the policy-side control.\n",
     "detail": "The account-field guards (the primary email, written only through\n`account.update`; the non-editable and hidden fields; the level\ncaps on account-stream permissions) judge the canonical stream id\nwhatever store-prefixed spelling a request uses, on\n`events.create` / `update` / `delete` and on `accesses.create` /\n`update`, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56 `[ASA1]`, `[ASA2]`,\n`[ASA3]`, `[ASA6]`. Before that release a store-prefixed spelling\nof an account field was not recognised by these guards: an access\nholding `contribute` on the email field could change the primary\nemail (the password-reset address) through the events API, and an\napp holding only a `*` grant on the regular streams could grant\nan account field to an access it created. Upgrading is the fix;\nno setting closes it on earlier releases.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "LG20",
       "GF33",
       "ASA1",
       "ASA2",
       "ASA3",
       "ASA6"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.adminAccessKey"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.3",
     "title": "A.8.3 Information access restriction",
     "text": "Access to information and other associated assets shall be\nrestricted in accordance with the established topic-specific\npolicy on access control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-stream permissions are the technical access-restriction\nprimitive. Stream design (which data lives where) is the\nimplementer's choice; permission scoping per access is\noperationally enforced at every API call.\n",
     "detail": "A permission on a stream reaches its descendants, so moving a\nstream changes who reaches its subtree. Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.56 an app or shared access may move a stream (a new\n`parentId`) only with manage rights on every stream of the moved\nsubtree, trashed ones included, in addition to manage on the\ntarget parent; otherwise `403 forbidden` and nothing moves\n`[SMV1]` to `[SMV5]`. A parent inside the moved subtree is refused\nfor every access `[SMV10]`. Before that release a child granted\nto the moving access at a lower level (`read`, `create-only`,\n`none`) moved along and took on the permissions other accesses\nheld on the target parent. Renames and updates that keep the\ncurrent `parentId` are unchanged.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "SMV1",
       "SMV2",
       "SMV3",
       "SMV4",
       "SMV5",
       "SMV10"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.5",
     "title": "A.8.5 Secure authentication",
     "text": "Secure authentication technologies and procedures shall be\nimplemented based on information access restrictions and the\ntopic-specific policy on access control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Token-based auth by default; multi-factor via `mfa.*` API methods,\nlive by default since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.14 (`services.mfa.active`;\nTOTP built in, SMS providers pluggable) `[MA15A]`, `[MA15C]`. The MFA\nacceptance series (`[MFAA]`) exercises activate `[MA3A]`,\n`[MA10A]`, confirm `[MA4A]`, challenge `[MA5B]`, verify `[MA5A]`,\n`[MA11A]`, deactivate `[MA6A]` and recover `[MA7A]`. Authentication strength tier is the\noperator's policy choice; technical primitives are shipped.\n",
     "detail": "**Failed second factors are throttled by Pryv (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.27).** A per-account backoff, never a lockout\n(open-pryv.io `6231a37c`, `aa445c43`): after\n`services.mfa.attempts.backoff.freeFailures` failures (default 3)\nwithin `perAccountWindowSeconds` (default 900 s), each further\nfailure delays the next attempt, doubling from `baseSeconds`\n(2 s) up to `maxSeconds` (300 s); `mfa.verify` / `mfa.confirm` /\n`mfa.challenge` answer 429 `too-many-attempts` with `Retry-After`\nmeanwhile, and a code sent during the delay is not checked. A\npassword holder cannot lock the real user out, and a success\nclears the tally. The `attempts` block is platform-wide policy\n(same values on every core); `backoff.maxSeconds: 0` disables it.\n\n**Failed passwords are delayed too (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47).**\nSign-in, `account.changePassword`, the MFA step-up by password and\n`mfa.recover` share a per-account tally\n(`auth.passwordAttempts`: after 5 failures within 900 s, delays\nfrom 2 s doubling up to 300 s, 429 with `Retry-After`, never a\nlockout) `[CEPB1]`, plus a budget per client address counted across\nall cores (`auth.passwordAttempts.perIp`, 30 failures per 900 s)\n`[CEPI1]`; these methods answer `400` inside a batch call or over\nsocket.io `[CEDB1]`. Each password hash gets its own salt (bcrypt,\ncost 10) `[PWSL1]`. SMS second factors carry send budgets per\nsession, per user, per destination across the platform and, since\n2.0.0-rc.50, per core (`services.mfa.methods.sms.sendLimits`,\nagainst toll fraud) `[MSSL1]`, `[MSSL11]`, and an account holds at\nmost `services.mfa.sessions.maxPendingPerUser` pending MFA logins\n`[MCPU1]`; since 2.0.0-rc.51 a login refused after its MFA session\nopened ends that session, so a failed login no longer holds one of\nthose places until it expires `[MLSX1]`.\n\n**Password checks under load (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87).**\nPassword checks run at\nmost `auth.passwordCheckConcurrency` at a time per API worker\n(default 2), `auth.passwordCheckQueue` waiting (default 50, at\nmost 10 s). A check refused past that is not performed: sign-in,\npassword change and reset, `mfa.recover`, the MFA step-up and\nregistration answer `429 too-many-requests` with `Retry-After`,\nnever `invalid-credentials`, and the refusal neither counts on the\naccount's failed-password tally nor delays the account `[PCLM1]`,\n`[PCLM2]`; a refused registration leaves the name and email free\nto retry `[PCLM3]`. OAuth client-secret checks answer `503\ntemporarily_unavailable`, never `invalid_client` `[OPCL2]`.\n\n**Single-use codes and safe configuration.** A TOTP code is\nconsumed with a storage compare-and-set (open-pryv.io `43293101`,\n`6231a37c`), so concurrent verifies of one code release exactly\none token; the per-session attempt ceiling counts parallel\nattempts (`1d91696c`); and impossible `services.mfa` settings\nrefuse the boot (`214b0b2b`). The private profile shows the MFA\nenrolment without its secrets and refuses writes to it\n(`25239783`, `7ce9ea6f`); recovery codes are stored hashed\n(`ef66853e`). Tests `[MA12A]`-`[MA12K]`, `[MBKF1]`-`[MBKF3]`,\n`[PCS1]`, `[MCHK1]`. Since 2.0.0-rc.51 two concurrent activations\nthat both fail at the provider keep the enrolment that was pending\nbefore them `[MACC2]`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "MFAA",
       "MA15A",
       "MA15C",
       "MA3A",
       "MA4A",
       "MA5A",
       "MA5B",
       "MA6A",
       "MA7A",
       "MA10A",
       "MA11A",
       "MA12A",
       "MBKF1",
       "PCS1",
       "MCHK1",
       "CEPB1",
       "CEPI1",
       "CEDB1",
       "PWSL1",
       "MSSL1",
       "MSSL11",
       "MCPU1",
       "MLSX1",
       "MACC2",
       "PCLM1",
       "PCLM2",
       "PCLM3",
       "OPCL2"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "services.mfa.mode",
       "services.mfa.attempts.backoff",
       "auth.passwordAttempts",
       "auth.passwordAttempts.perIp",
       "services.mfa.methods.sms.sendLimits",
       "services.mfa.sessions.maxPendingPerUser",
       "auth.passwordCheckConcurrency",
       "auth.passwordCheckQueue"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "MFA",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "enhancement",
       "summary": "Reference TOTP / WebAuthn plugins + AAL-tier mapping doc strengthen the A.8.5 evidence chain",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467852&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C78"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.10",
     "title": "A.8.10 Information deletion",
     "text": "Information stored in information systems, devices or in any\nother storage media shall be deleted when no longer required.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-user erasure: `system.users.delete` removes the user's data\nfrom the live store. Engine-dependent backup behaviour (SQLite\nper-user file vs PG row deletion + backup rotation)\ndetermines whether erasure extends to backups, same notes as\nGDPR Art. 17 + HIPAA-Security §164.310(d) media-controls. Event-\nlevel and stream-level deletion live alongside for per-record\ndeletion needs. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47 the deletion also\nerases the high-frequency series kept under the account's former\nusernames and aliases (earlier releases could leave them), and\nsince 2.0.0-rc.50 points written during the deletion do not\nsurvive it; see GDPR Art.17 for the full list.\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`, see gdpr.Art.5 §1(e) and gdpr.Art.17). Deleting a\nwhole account \"when no longer required\" is schedulable: by the\naccount holder (a date, or a period without use) or by your\ninactivity preset, with reminder mails (`[ACXP3]`) and a minimum\nnotice (`[ACXP8]`) before, through the same erasure as\n`system.users.delete`, guards included (`[ADSW8]`); an erasure\ninterrupted halfway is completed at a later pass (`[ADSW19]`).\n\nUnfinished registrations (the release after open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.87; merged, unreleased at this walk). Rows a failed or\ninterrupted registration left behind are no longer required by\nany account: a failed registration's compensation now removes\nits account fields on PostgreSQL too `[URB2]`, and\n`bin/reconcile-user-cores.js --registrations` lists, per core,\naccount fields under an id the users index lacks and indexed\naccounts with no password, and deletes only with `--apply`\n(orphan ids holding account fields alone, older than the grace;\na named account through the account deletion's erasure)\n`[RCRG1]`, `[RCRG3]`; the default username pass releases the\nemail a stale name held on the platform `[RCRG6]`. See\ngdpr.Art.5 §1(e) for the safeguards.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "USAD",
       "DLN1",
       "DLN4",
       "DLLW1",
       "ACXP3",
       "ACXP8",
       "ADSW8",
       "ADSW19",
       "URB2",
       "RCRG1",
       "RCRG3",
       "RCRG6"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine",
       "user-account.delete",
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.13",
     "title": "A.8.13 Information backup",
     "text": "Backup copies of information, software and systems shall be\nmaintained and regularly tested in accordance with the agreed\ntopic-specific policy on backup.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "`bin/backup.js`\nproduces per-user backup files, the only copy of user data Pryv\nmakes; a multi-core cluster replicates the platform DB only\n(rqlite Raft + mTLS), not user data, which stays on each user's\nhome core. The operator's\nbackup policy (cadence, retention, offsite) is layered on top.\n\"Regularly tested\" is the operator's drill. On the Pryv side,\nbackup and restore round trips are tested: `[BKSR]` (series\ndata), `[BKEV]` (events store), `[BKVR]` (manifest version), and\n`just test-backup-roundtrip` in open-pryv.io backs a seeded user\nup and restores it PostgreSQL to SQLite and back, comparing the\nbundles on counts and content (2.0.0-rc.34).\n\n**Take a new backup after upgrading to open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34\nor later.** Earlier `bin/backup.js` backups carry no\nhigh-frequency series data on any series engine, with no\nwarning, and series backed up from InfluxDB could not be\nrestored. Since 2.0.0-rc.34 the series are exported and restored\nand move between any two series engines.\n\n**Check every directory that received `bin/backup.js\n--incremental` before open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51.** Such a run\noverwrote the full backup it continued; the directory holds only\nthe last delta and cannot be repaired. `--inspect <dir>` reports it\n`DAMAGED` and `--restore` refuses it `[BKIC2]`, `[BKC6]`: take a\nnew full backup into a new directory. Since 2.0.0-rc.51 the\nincrementals form a chain next to the full backup (detail below).\n\n**From open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86, write three points into your\nbackup policy.** A backup written by 2.0.0-rc.86 or later restores\nwith that release or later; after going back to an earlier\nrelease, start a new chain in a new directory `[BKSM6]`. Keep each\nbackup directory for the backup only (a file the backup did not\nwrite is refused at restore) `[BKSM7]`, `[BKSM8]`. Sign the runs of\na recipient-key backup (`--signing-key` / `--signing-pubkey`),\nstarting with a new full backup into a new directory.\n",
     "detail": "**Backup encryption is built in, opt-in** (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.5 onward). Without flags `bin/backup.js` writes\nplaintext (gzip-compressed) files. `--recipient-pubkey <pem>`\n(recommended: the per-backup data key is RSA-OAEP-wrapped to\nyour public key, so the backup host cannot decrypt its own\noutput) or `--encrypt-passphrase` / `PRYV_BACKUP_PASSPHRASE`\n(scrypt) encrypts every file with per-file authenticated\nAES-256-GCM before it reaches the destination, and the backup\nships a standalone `decrypt-backup.mjs` plus `RESTORE-README.md`\nfor recovery without Pryv. A.8.13's \"protected at the same\nsecurity level as the source data\" expectation is met by\nenabling one of the two key models, or by your own layer\n(LUKS / S3 SSE-KMS / ...) on a plaintext backup; record the\nchoice and the key custody (a lost key or passphrase makes the\nbackup unrecoverable) in your backup-policy SOP.\n\n**Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47 to 2.0.0-rc.50**: a plaintext\nbackup is announced on stderr `[BKPW1]`; `--passphrase-file` keeps\nthe passphrase out of the process list `[BKPF1]`; backups are\nwritten owner-only (`0700` / `0600`); a restore refuses an\nunexpectedly plaintext backup `[BKRE1]` (`--require-encrypted` makes\nthat the rule `[BKRE4]`), unsafe names and symbolic links `[BKRS1]`,\n`[BKRS4]`, reserved names `[BKRN1]` and a username another account\nnow holds `[RSOW1]`. Recipient-key encryption gives confidentiality,\nnot authenticity: protect write access to the backup destination\n(and, from 2.0.0-rc.86, sign the runs, below).\nSee `context/operator-backup-coverage.md`.\n\n**Incremental chain (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51).** Each\n`--incremental` run writes its own `incrementals/<runId>/`\ndirectory, listed in `chain.json`, and rewrites no earlier file\n`[BKC1]`; a restore applies the full backup then each run in order,\ndeletions included `[BKC2]`, `[BKIC1]`, and `--through-run <runId>`\nrestores as of a given run `[BKC7]`. Runs no longer miss changes\nmade while the previous run was in progress `[BKC3]` and carry the\ndeletion of streams, accesses and webhooks `[BKC4]`. Each run of an\nencrypted backup has its own envelope and key under the chain's key\nmodel, plus its own decrypt script `[BKC5]`, `[BKCS1]`. Overlapping\nruns into one directory keep the first and set the second aside\n`[BKCC1]`. A whole-core run records the accounts it covers, so a\nrestore does not re-create an account deleted between runs\n`[BKCU1]`, `[BKIC4]`. The A.8.13 \"regularly tested\" drill should\ninclude a chain restore and `--inspect` of the chain you rely on.\nUp to 2.0.0-rc.85 the chain index and run manifests are checked for\nconsistency, not signed.\n\n**Authenticated files and signed runs (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86).**\nEach run's manifest lists every file with its size and SHA-256\nhash and is bound to its run; a restore refuses a file added,\nremoved, resized or changed and a `chain.json` entry that disagrees\nwith the run's manifest `[BKSM1]`, `[BKSM2]`, `[BKSM3]`. Encrypted\nfiles end with a marked final block, each block tied to its file,\nposition and run, so truncation at a block boundary, an emptied\nfile or a file swapped between accounts is refused; an account's\nfiles are checked before anything of it is written. Optional\nEd25519 run signatures (`--signing-key` at backup,\n`--signing-pubkey` at restore and `--inspect`) close the\nrecipient-key bound above: given the public key, every run must be\nsigned by it `[BKSM4]`, `[BKIS1]`; an unsigned recipient-key backup\nprints a warning `[BKSM5]`, `[BKIS2]`. For the \"regularly tested\"\nelement, `--inspect --verify-files` (with the backup's secret)\nreads and checks every file without restoring `[BKIS3]`. New\npassphrase backups use scrypt N = 2^17. Runs written by earlier\nreleases restore as before, reported as \"file list not verified\";\na plaintext run's file table detects corruption, not tampering. An\naccount erased during a full backup is left out of the run\n`[BKDU1]`, and an account whose restore fails while its data is\nwritten is cleared and removed from the core's index instead of\nbeing left half-restored `[RSFC1]`, `[RSFC3]`. Operator page:\n`customer-resources/backup` on the developer site.\n\n**External ids (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58).** The platform backup\ncarries the external-id namespace rows with their salts; a restore\nkeeps a live namespace whose salt differs and reports it `[XIDB1]`.\nThe index rows are rebuilt by `bin/reconcile-user-cores.js\n--ext-ids` on each core. The accounts' own links (the core's local\nexternal-id table) are not in the per-user backup in 2.0.0-rc.58\nand 2.0.0-rc.59: include that table in your database-level backup\nof each core and in the restore drill. See\n`context/operator-backup-coverage.md`. From 2.0.0-rc.60 the per-user backup carries\neach account's ids (`users/<userId>/external-ids.jsonl[.gz]`:\nnamespace, blinded value, claim date), also in incremental\nchains; a restore links them again after the platform rows, an\nid another account holds by then stays with it and is counted\n`lost`, an id of an unknown namespace is `skipped` `[XIDB2]`,\n`[XIDB3]`, `[XIDB4]`, `[XIDBK1]`, `[XIDBK2]`. A blinded value can\nclaim its id, so a per-user backup becomes as sensitive as a\nclaim credential: encrypt it (see above). An account rolled back\nby `--verify-integrity` keeps its restored ids; release them with\nthe admin release if the account is to be dropped.\n\n**Account aliases (open-pryv.io `4547b32a`, 2.0.0-rc.66).** Earlier backups did not carry an account's aliases\n(access aliases, former usernames): after a restore its aliased\naccesses and endpoints under a former username did not route and a\nformer username could be registered by someone else. From that\nrelease the per-user manifest lists them (`aliases`) and the restore\nreserves them again; an alias another account or core holds by then\nstays with it and is reported `[BKAL1]`. Series still held under a\nformer username are exported and restored under the username\n`[BKAL3]`. Take a new backup after upgrading.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "BKSR",
       "BKEV",
       "BKVR",
       "BKPW1",
       "BKPF1",
       "BKRE1",
       "BKRE4",
       "BKRS1",
       "BKRS4",
       "BKRN1",
       "RSOW1",
       "BKC1",
       "BKC2",
       "BKC3",
       "BKC4",
       "BKC5",
       "BKC6",
       "BKC7",
       "BKCC1",
       "BKCS1",
       "BKCU1",
       "BKIC1",
       "BKIC2",
       "BKIC4",
       "XIDB1",
       "XIDB2",
       "XIDB3",
       "XIDB4",
       "XIDBK1",
       "XIDBK2",
       "BKAL1",
       "BKAL3",
       "BKSM1",
       "BKSM2",
       "BKSM3",
       "BKSM4",
       "BKSM5",
       "BKSM6",
       "BKSM7",
       "BKSM8",
       "BKIS1",
       "BKIS2",
       "BKIS3",
       "BKDU1",
       "RSFC1",
       "RSFC3"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/backup.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "backup-payload-encryption",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "external-id-index"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "operator-backup-coverage"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.15",
     "title": "A.8.15 Logging",
     "text": "Logs that record activities, exceptions, faults and other\nrelevant events shall be produced, stored, protected and\nanalysed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-user audit log captures every API method invocation; access\nreference (accessId + accessSerial) ties each row to the\nauthenticated identity. Since open-pryv.io `07b6d3b6` this\nincludes the OAuth2 authorization server's own activity\n(`oauth.*` events: consent lifecycle, code exchange incl. replay\nattempts, token issued / refreshed / revoked / reuse-detected),\nauthorization decisions are logged alongside the data accesses\nthey enable. Audit storage uses SQLite directly to\ndecouple log integrity from data-path engine issues. The\n\"analysed\" element (review cadence, alerting thresholds) is the\noperator's procedure.\n",
     "detail": "**OAuth2 events added in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66 to 2.0.0-rc.77**:\n`oauth.nonce.reused`, `oauth.token.exchanged` (subject's trail),\n`oauth.consent.refused` reasons including\n`audience-account-mismatch` and `issuer-account-mismatch`;\n`oauth.token.introspected`, `oauth.token.exchange_refused`,\n`oauth.client.metadata_fetched` / `metadata_refused` (syslog, no\nuser resolved; never a token or a document body) `[OXN02]`,\n`[OXI06]`, `[OTX03]`, `[OCMDE13]`, `[OPIU3]`. Adapter-route\nrequests are not audited by the core. Since rc.77 a streamed\nanswer the client stopped reading is logged as an error\n(`client-closed-request`), not a success `[AUAB3]`. From the\nrelease after rc.87, calls running at the same time on one\nsocket.io connection are each audited under their own method;\nbefore, two such calls could swap their method id in the audit\nrow and the access usage counts `[SKMC]`. Full list on\n`hipaa-security.164.312(b)`.\n\n**Analysis by the account owner (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.84).**\nThe owner's `accesses.get` reports, per access, approximate\nlifetime call counts by method (`usage`; never returned to an app\nor shared caller) `[AUG1]`, `[AUG3]`, and the reference account\napp (app-web-user-account 0.34.0) adds a linkable, filterable\nAudit trail tab over the account's audit log. Since rc.86 the\nowner can also have that log counted per hour, day or week over a\nperiod (`audit.getSummary`, refused to app and shared callers)\n`[ASM1]`, `[ASM4]`. This helps your\nusers review their own activity; the operator-side analysis\n(review cadence, alerting) stays yours. Detail on\n`hipaa-security.164.312(b)`.\n\n\"Stored, protected\" caveat, the audit log is append-only by\nconvention in the write path, but there is **no software-side\ntamper-resistance signal** (no hash chain, no per-row\nsignature, no operator-signed checkpoint). Protection of the\nlog rests on the operator's filesystem hardening: immutable\nmounts, append-only flags (`chattr +a`), file-integrity\nmonitoring (AIDE / Tripwire), out-of-band SIEM forwarding to\na WORM store.\n\nFuture direction: chained / signed audit log (per-row prev_hash\n+ periodic operator-signed checkpoints). Tracked under internal\nbacklog slug `AUDIT-LOG-CHAINING` and\n`proposals/audit-log-chaining.md`. When shipped this row's\ncoverage stays Implemented but the cited primitives will\ninclude `audit-chain`.\n\nSeparate audit property worth flagging to the A.8.15 auditor:\nPryv's audit log is data-minimal by construction, it captures\naction + source + URL query + access ref + integrity hash, but\n**never the request body**. The log itself therefore qualifies\nas well-scoped under the \"logs that record activities\" framing\nwithout storing the data being acted on. Caller-supplied search\nvalues (`events.get` content-query conditions on the GET path)\ndo appear in the recorded URL query, see\n`context/content-query-audit-semantics.md`. See\n`docs/pryv-primitives.md` audit entry for the full capture\ncatalogue.\n\n**Server logs are protected from carrying credentials (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.43 to 2.0.0-rc.50).** The operational logs (`logs.file`,\n`logs.fileSync`, console, `DEBUG=pryv:*`) are separate from the audit\nlog, and they are what a log shipper or a support engineer reads.\nCredential values are masked wherever they are logged, including\ninside a logged `Error` (message, stack, cause) and the debug output;\nthe masked names cover access and refresh tokens, passphrases, the\nadmin key and the platform secrets; URL user info, access-request\nkeys, `readToken`, `key` / `poll` and authorization-code `code` /\n`state` values are hidden; a parameter validation error is logged\nwithout the rejected value; the request trace prints no Basic-auth\nuser name `[BLGM1]`, `[BLGM2]`, `[BLGM3]`, `[BLGM4]`, `[RDL5]`,\n`[RDL8]`, `[RDLA]`, `[RAL1]`. A server-side fault is answered to the\nclient as `Unexpected error (ref <8 hex>)`, its detail logged under\nthe same reference `[UNXR1]`. The boot log identifies the admin key\nby a keyed fingerprint, not a hash a log reader could test\ncandidate keys against `[PLFP1]`. Log files are created `0640`, and\nthe log directories the core creates `0750` (2.0.0-rc.50; existing\nfiles and directories keep their modes)\n`[BLFM1]`. Check the retention of logs written by releases before\n2.0.0-rc.43, which may hold credential values; log shipping,\nretention and access to the log host stay yours.\n\n**External ids** (`external-id-index` primitive): an\nadministrator's release of an id claimed by the wrong account\n(from 2.0.0-rc.60) is\nlogged on the admin side without a user (syslog) and, when audit\nis active, in the trail of the account that held it\n(`account.externalIds.adminRelease`: namespace and reason)\n`[XIDAR1]`, so the subject's own history shows the operator's\nact. The blinded value reaches no audit row and no server log\n`[XIDG1]`. The credential-free lookup and the core-to-core holder\nanswer of forced-mode sign-ins (`system.extIdHolds`, 2.0.0-rc.59)\nare not audited.\n\n**Long-running deployment tiering**: for the \"logs … stored,\nprotected, analysed\" portion of A.8.15 at multi-year scales,\nthe audit log is exposed via the `@pryv/datastore`\nabstraction. Operators write a custom `auditStorage` engine\nplugin to tier hot recent rows + cold archived rows (e.g.,\nS3 Object Lock, Glacier) behind the same `audit.getLogs`\nAPI. No Pryv-shipped pruning primitive, pressure to prune\nis operational, not regulatory (HIPAA-style retention floors\napply; there's no max-retention rule pushing destruction).\nFull pattern at\n`context/audit-archival-via-custom-datastore.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT02",
       "AT03",
       "AT51",
       "AT52",
       "AT53",
       "AT61",
       "AT65",
       "OE07",
       "BLGM1",
       "BLGM2",
       "BLGM3",
       "BLGM4",
       "RDL5",
       "RDL8",
       "RDLA",
       "RAL1",
       "UNXR1",
       "PLFP1",
       "BLFM1",
       "XIDAR1",
       "XIDG1",
       "OXN02",
       "OXI06",
       "OTX03",
       "OCMDE13",
       "OPIU3",
       "AUAB3",
       "AUG1",
       "AUG3",
       "ASM1",
       "ASM4",
       "SKMC"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "logs.file",
       "logs.fileSync"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream",
       "external-id-index"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "content-query-audit-semantics",
       "audit-archival-via-custom-datastore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained / signed audit log adds the software-side tamper-resistance signal A.8.15 expects",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.16",
     "title": "A.8.16 Monitoring activities",
     "text": "Networks, systems and applications shall be monitored for\nanomalous behaviour and appropriate actions taken to evaluate\npotential information security incidents.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The opt-in observability\nemitter (per-method metrics + error reports over OTLP) gives\nsystem-level monitoring; audit logs give application-level\nactivity. Operator chooses backend + thresholds + escalation\npaths.\nAnomaly-detection logic on the audit stream itself is a\npotential extension.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.20",
     "title": "A.8.20 Networks security",
     "text": "Networks and network devices shall be secured, managed and\ncontrolled to protect information in systems and applications.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "TLS in transit once configured: either the core terminates it\n(`http.ssl.*`, with the built-in ACME integration issuing,\nrenewing and replicating certificates across the cluster when\n`letsEncrypt.enabled` is set) or your reverse proxy does and the\ncore serves plain HTTP behind it (default `http.ip` 127.0.0.1).\nBetween cores, Raft runs over mutual TLS on a private cluster CA\nonce `bin/bootstrap.js` has written `storages.engines.rqlite.tls`\n(default `tls: null`, plain TCP). The core sets no TLS version of\nits own: Node.js defaults apply (TLS 1.2 floor on the Node 24 the\nimage runs). Operator-side network controls (firewalls, network\nsegmentation) sit on top.\n",
     "detail": "When a proxy in front of the core terminates TLS, set\n`hostedSites.<name>.hsts: always` on each HTTPS-only site the\ncore hosts so its answers carry `Strict-Transport-Security`\n(open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34). The default, `auto`, sends the header\nonly when the core itself terminates TLS; `never` turns it off.\nThe core does not add HSTS to API answers on a separate API\nhost, so set it on your proxy there.\n\nOutbound side (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56): the calls Pryv makes\nto URLs a counterparty supplies (cross-account consent\ndeliveries, chat, revocations, scope updates, delegation and\nOAuth revocation notices) cannot be turned toward your internal\nnetwork. A host that is or resolves to a loopback, private,\nlink-local or otherwise reserved address is refused before any\nconnection, and checked again at connect time `[PFR1]`, `[PFR2]`,\n`[CO22]`; plain `http:` is refused unless\n`cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl` (development and test clusters)\n`[PFR4]`. The platform's own host names are always allowed; list\npeers on a private network, and a private `core.url` given as an\nIP, in `cmc.allowedPrivateHosts` (host names, IPs or CIDR ranges,\nthe grammar of `webhooks.allowedPrivateHosts`; checked at boot)\n`[PFR3]`. Webhook deliveries apply the same address rules. Egress\nfiltering on your network stays yours.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ACMEORCH",
       "CERTUTILS",
       "FORCERENEWIPC",
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "HSHT",
       "PFR1",
       "PFR2",
       "PFR3",
       "PFR4",
       "CO22"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled",
       "storages.engines.rqlite.tls",
       "hostedSites.<name>.hsts",
       "cmc.allowedPrivateHosts",
       "cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.24",
     "title": "A.8.24 Use of cryptography",
     "text": "Rules for the effective use of cryptography, including\ncryptographic key management, shall be defined and implemented.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "TLS for transit (in the core when `http.ssl.*` / `letsEncrypt.*`\nis configured, otherwise in your proxy; the core sets no TLS\nversion of its own, so Node.js defaults apply, a TLS 1.2 floor on\nNode 24), AES-256-GCM for at-rest operator secrets\n(HKDF-derived per-key with purpose labels), AES-256-GCM\n(scrypt-derived) for bootstrap bundle encryption, per-file\nAES-256-GCM for `bin/backup.js` output when encryption is\nrequested, and, from open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86, optional Ed25519\nsignatures of backup runs. The operator's\ncryptography policy (key custody, rotation cadence, algorithm\nchoice for engine-side at-rest encryption) is layered on top.\n",
     "detail": "**Changes in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86.** Backups: encrypted files\ncarry authenticated data naming their file, run and chain, with a\nmarked final block; each run's manifest lists every file's\nSHA-256 hash; `--signing-key` (Ed25519) signs each run and\n`--signing-pubkey` makes the signature mandatory at restore\n`[BKSM4]`; new passphrase backups derive their key with scrypt\nN = 2^17. Add the signing key pair to your key inventory: the\nprivate key stays on the backup host, the public key with the\nrestore secret. Bootstrap bundles: the version, salt and nonce are\nauthenticated, with a pinned 16-byte tag `[BNEV1]`. Keys stored\nencrypted at rest (TLS and ACME keys, authenticator secrets,\nobservability credentials, transfer identities): a second\nenvelope version, bound to the row that holds it and with a\npinned tag, is read from this release `[AREV1]`, `[AREV2]`;\n2.0.0-rc.86 and rc.87 still write rows in the first version (no\nbinding) so that a core of the previous release can read them. The\nrelease after open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87 writes version 2 `[AREV3]`:\nevery core must have run 2.0.0-rc.86 or later before it is\ndeployed, and going back to a release before 2.0.0-rc.86 is not\npossible without restoring the rows. The configured\n`letsEncrypt.atRestKey` is unchanged.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ATRENC",
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "AREV1",
       "AREV2",
       "AREV3",
       "BNEV1",
       "BKSM4"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "letsEncrypt.atRestKey"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-payload-encryption"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "End-to-end encryption adds a customer-key flow (CMEK / BYOK) to the cryptography catalogue",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=180707914&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C34"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.25",
     "title": "A.8.25 Secure development lifecycle",
     "text": "Rules for the secure development of software and systems shall be\nestablished and applied.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Pryv's own SDLC is visible\n(public commit history, tagged releases, CHANGELOG-v2 +\nCHANGELOG-v2-back, multi-engine test matrix, dependency audit).\nFor the implementer, this transparency feeds supplier-\nassessment artefacts. The implementer's own SDLC for their app\n+ integrations remains their ISMS artefact.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/01-policies/software-development-lifecycle-policy.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.32",
     "title": "A.8.32 Change management",
     "text": "Changes to information processing facilities and information\nsystems shall be subject to change-management procedures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv-side change-management\nevidence: tagged releases, Docker image SHA-pinning,\nCHANGELOG-v2 + CHANGELOG-v2-back per release, release-notes\nper Dokku deploy. The operator's change-management procedure\n(approvals, deployment windows, rollback plans) sits on top.\nThe audit log gives the operational record of changes that\ntouched data.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/02-procedures/change-control.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.34",
     "title": "A.8.34 Protection of information systems during audit testing",
     "text": "Audit tests and other assurance activities involving assessment\nof operational systems shall be planned and agreed between the\ntester and appropriate management.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pen-tests, vulnerability\nscans, internal audits, all may generate elevated activity on\nthe system. Pryv's audit log keeps the testing activity\nattributable (any test access surfaces with its accessId +\naccessSerial in the audit rows). The plan + agreement element\nis the operator's procedure.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.10",
     "title": "A.5.10 Acceptable use of information and other associated assets",
     "text": "Rules for the acceptable use and procedures for handling\ninformation + associated assets shall be identified, documented\nand implemented.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Acceptable-use policies are operator-side editorial artefacts\n(workforce code-of-conduct, asset handling rules). Pryv has no\nsoftware role at the policy-content layer; the audit log\nsupports after-the-fact enforcement evidence but doesn't\nauthor the rules.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.12",
     "title": "A.5.12 Classification of information",
     "text": "Information shall be classified according to the information\nsecurity needs of the organization based on confidentiality,\nintegrity, availability + relevant interested party requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv supports\nclassification by stream layout, dedicate subtrees per\nclassification tier (e.g., `confidential/`, `restricted/`,\n`public/`) and gate them with distinct permission scopes.\nSystem streams add a privileged-data tier independent of the\noperator's classification scheme. The operator's classification\nscheme itself (tier labels, criteria, owner) is the policy\nartefact.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "event",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.13",
     "title": "A.5.13 Labelling of information",
     "text": "An appropriate set of procedures for information labelling shall\nbe developed and implemented in accordance with the information\nclassification scheme adopted by the organization.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Labels on event-level data\ncan ride on `event.clientData.classification` or on the parent\nstream's `clientData`; the canonical event-type schema\n(`data-types`) can be extended with a classification property\nwhen machine-readable labelling is needed downstream. Stream-\nlevel labels propagate to descendants by Pryv semantics.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "clientData",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.23",
     "title": "A.5.23 Information security for use of cloud services",
     "text": "Processes for acquisition, use, management and exit from cloud\nservices shall be established in accordance with the\norganization's information security requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "When the Pryv operator\nruns on a cloud provider (rather than on-premise), the cloud-\nservice security posture is the operator's contractual concern.\nPryv-side hooks that the operator's CSP-management process\nshould use: data-residency configuration locks subjects to\nchosen regions; bootstrap bundle export gives a clean cloud-\nexit path (re-issue the cluster onto new infrastructure);\noperator-side at-rest encryption isolates the cloud provider\nfrom plaintext. The per-release CycloneDX SBOM and\ncosign-signed image from the open-pryv.io supply-chain\npipeline travel with the workload, so a provider exit hands\nthe next environment a machine-readable composition manifest\nplus a verifiable image signature.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.6.3",
     "title": "A.6.3 Information security awareness, education and training",
     "text": "Personnel and relevant interested parties shall receive\nappropriate information security awareness, education and\ntraining and regular updates of the organization's information\nsecurity policy + procedures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Training is an organizational programme. No software role at\nthe training-content / training-delivery layer; the audit log\nlets you measure whether trained workforce actually applies\ntrained patterns (a defensible \"training effectiveness\"\nartefact for the ISMS).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.7",
     "title": "A.8.7 Protection against malware",
     "text": "Protection against malware shall be implemented and supported by\nappropriate user awareness.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Anti-malware is mostly a host / endpoint / network-layer control:\nPryv-the-software doesn't include AV or endpoint protection, and\nyour hosting environment carries that part (HDS Activity 1+2\ncertified hosters typically inherit it from the CSP). Pryv does\nstore and serve files your users upload, and contributes one\nnarrow control there: since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 an\nattachment whose declared type a browser executes or renders as a\ndocument (HTML, SVG and other XML, JavaScript) is served with\n`Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'` next to\n`Content-Disposition: attachment`, so it cannot run script on the\nAPI origin.\n",
     "detail": "What stays yours: Pryv does not scan attachment content and does\nnot refuse uploads by type, so a malicious PDF or executable is\nstored and served as uploaded. If your users exchange files,\nscan them (at upload in your app, or at your proxy) and cover the\nuser-awareness half of the control in your ISMS. Code:\n`open-pryv.io/components/api-server/src/middleware/attachment-access.ts`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACTY"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.8",
     "title": "A.8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities",
     "text": "Information about technical vulnerabilities of information\nsystems in use shall be obtained, the organization's exposure\nto such vulnerabilities shall be evaluated, and appropriate\nmeasures taken.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv-side vulnerability\nmanagement is upstream, public dependency-audit (npm audit\npipeline, dependabot on open-pryv.io master), versioned\nCHANGELOG announcing relevant fixes, reproducible Docker image\nSHA. The operator's vulnerability-management cadence (when to\nupgrade, how to verify) sits on top. Observability data feeds\nincident-correlated vulnerability hunting.\n",
     "detail": "**Vulnerabilities found in Pryv's own code.** Beyond dependency\nadvisories, the open-pryv.io maintainers ran a code-level security\nreview of the source in 2026 (2026-06 to 2026-10): findings were\nconfirmed by a second review, classified by severity and fixed with\nregression tests, critical and high ones first. The fixes shipped in\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.40 to 2.0.0-rc.51; most of those release notes\nopen with \"upgrade promptly\" and name the operator steps (a\nconfiguration check before restarting, a one-off repair tool). The\npublic report, `SECURITY-AUDIT.md`\n(https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md,\npublished 2026-10-14), lists each finding with its severity, the\nrelease that fixed it and the operator action, plus the known\nresidual risks; it is revised with every release that carries a\nsecurity fix. See `context/code-security-review-2026.md`.\n\nYour part of A.8.8: watch the release notes and `SECURITY.md`\nadvisories, assess your exposure (which release you run, which\nfeatures you enabled), and upgrade on your own schedule, running each\nrelease's operator steps. Image hygiene moved in the same releases:\nthe image installs the Debian security updates available at build\ntime and no longer ships `curl` (2.0.0-rc.42) nor `npm` / `npx`\n(2.0.0-rc.50), which removes the scan findings those tools carried;\nOS-level findings of the pinned base image remain visible to the\nscanners.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.9",
     "title": "A.8.9 Configuration management",
     "text": "Configurations, including security configurations, of hardware,\nsoftware, services and networks shall be established, documented,\nimplemented, monitored and reviewed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv configuration lives in\n`default-config.yml` + `override-config.yml` + `host-config.yml`\n(operator-side); a `config-validation` step on master start\nfails fast on unresolved variables or missing required service\nfields, giving a baseline \"configuration is well-formed\" check.\nThe operator's config-change procedure (versioning, approval,\ndeployment) sits on top. Audit log shows when config-driven\nbehaviour changed observably.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Read-only effective-configuration endpoint supplies per-core configuration-management evidence without host access",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=219705795&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C118"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.11",
     "title": "A.8.11 Data masking",
     "text": "Data masking shall be used in accordance with the organization's\ntopic-specific policy on access control + other related topic-\nspecific policies, and business requirements, taking applicable\nlegislation into consideration.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv enforces masking by **projection**, not transformation:\nstream-level isolation + permission-scoped access tokens hide\nwhole sub-trees from a given role. The \"rewrite a value before\ndisplay\" flavour of masking (e.g., `j***@example.com`) lives in\nthe calling application, by design.\n",
     "detail": "The boundary is recorded in\n`context/data-masking-projection-vs-transformation.md`:\n  - Stream-tree split + narrow access tokens = Pryv's\n    projection-side contribution. Auditor-visible via the\n    access permissions matrix.\n  - Field-substring rewrites, hash-on-read, faker substitution,\n    per-role redaction = application layer. Not Pryv's job by\n    design (storage layer stays deterministic; \"partially\n    redacted\" is not an API response).\n  - Username-side pseudonymisation is the one transformation\n    Pryv does natively: `accesses.create {randomAlias:true}` mints\n    a routable `r-XXXXXXXX` alias that hides the username per access\n    (`proposals/aliases-as-pseudonymization-primitive.md`); it\n    survives a backup and restore and routes on every topology\n    since open-pryv.io `4547b32a`. It masks the username from the\n    holder, and since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.69 the token is\n    accepted under its alias only, so a holder who guesses the\n    username cannot confirm it with the token (`[AL13]`,\n    `[OPSE5]`; earlier releases accepted it under every name of\n    the account).\n  - Third-party record ids are masked before they reach Pryv\n    (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.58, `external-id-index` primitive): your\n    service sends `HMAC(K_namespace, recordId)` with a key it keeps,\n    the platform index stores a token of it mapped to a core, and\n    no listing, error, log line or audit record returns the value\n    `[XIDC1]`, `[XIDC7]`, `[XIDG1]`, `[XIDN4]`. Key custody is\n    yours: every holder of `K_namespace` can look up and claim ids\n    of that namespace.\n  - Static masking for non-prod environments + field-level\n    encryption at the schema layer are both implementer\n    concerns today; end-to-end encryption\n    (`proposals/e2e-encryption.md`) is the natural future\n    primitive for both.\n  - The audit log itself is data-minimal by construction,\n    captures action + access + integrity hash, never the\n    request body (see `docs/pryv-primitives.md` audit entry).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "XIDC1",
       "XIDC7",
       "XIDG1",
       "XIDN4",
       "AL13",
       "OPSE5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "randomAlias",
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "event",
       "external-id-index"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-masking-projection-vs-transformation"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.12",
     "title": "A.8.12 Data leakage prevention",
     "text": "Data leakage prevention measures shall be applied to systems,\nnetworks and any other devices that process, store or transmit\nsensitive information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv's primary leakage-\nprevention surface is the permission model, an access only\nreads / writes the streams its scope permits, so a misconfigured\napp can't accidentally exfiltrate out-of-scope data. The audit\nlog surfaces anomalous access patterns post-facto. The\nshared-secrets primitive closes a classic leakage channel:\ncredentials handed to third parties travel as a one-time random\nkey instead of a URL-embedded token, so browser history, referrer\nheaders, and server access logs stop accumulating live\ncredentials. Network / endpoint DLP (browser-side copy-paste\nprotection, USB blocking, etc.) is the operator's\nendpoint-management scope.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "shared-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.22",
     "title": "A.8.22 Segregation of networks",
     "text": "Groups of information services, users and information systems\nshall be segregated in the organization's networks.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Multi-core Pryv\nclusters use mTLS over rqlite Raft for inter-core traffic, on\na cluster-private CA distinct from the Let's Encrypt user-\nfacing chain. This gives technical segregation between the\ncluster-internal control plane and the user-facing data plane.\nThe operator's network segmentation (VPCs, security groups,\nfirewall rules) layers on top.\n",
     "detail": "Keep rqlite's HTTP port (default 4001) closed to the outside: it\nis unauthenticated, and since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 (rqlite\n10.5.1) it also serves rqlite's web console. Cores replicate and\nforward writes over the Raft port (default 4002, mutual TLS);\nopen 4001 between cores only for admin tools you run against a\npeer (`open-pryv.io/INSTALL.md`, \"Upgrading the bundled rqlite\n(9.x to 10.x)\").\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.28",
     "title": "A.8.28 Secure coding",
     "text": "Secure coding principles shall be applied to software development.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Pryv's own secure-coding\nposture is visible in the public open-pryv.io repository,\ncoding standards (neostandard), linting enforced on PRs,\npre-commit hooks, dependency-audit pipeline. The implementer's\nown application-layer secure-coding programme remains their\nISMS artefact, drawing on the public Pryv-side practice as\nsupplier evidence. The 2026 code-level security review of\nopen-pryv.io (fixes in 2.0.0-rc.40 to 2.0.0-rc.51, each with\nregression tests; public report `SECURITY-AUDIT.md`, published\n2026-10-14,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md)\nis part of that evidence, see\n`context/code-security-review-2026.md`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.30",
     "title": "A.8.30 Outsourced development",
     "text": "Organization shall direct, monitor and review activities related\nto outsourced system development.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Outsourced development is the operator's contractual / supplier-\nmanagement concern. When the operator's \"supplier\" is Pryv\n(i.e., they consume open-pryv.io as a third-party platform),\nthis matrix + the CHANGELOGs + the public release process serve\nas the supplier-monitoring artefact set the operator\nreferences, now joined by the per-release CycloneDX SBOM and\nthe keyless cosign signature + SLSA provenance on published\nimages (open-pryv.io supply-chain pipeline, merge `9e2ee7ff`).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.31",
     "title": "A.8.31 Separation of development, test and production environments",
     "text": "Development, testing and production environments shall be\nseparated and secured.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv supports\nseparate environments via independent core deployments (each\nwith its own bootstrap bundle + cluster CA); the data-residency\nprimitive prevents accidental cross-environment data flow at\nthe user-binding layer. Operator's environment-management\nprocedure (test data hygiene, promotion gates, deployment\nautomation) sits on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.1",
     "title": "A.5.1 Policies for information security",
     "text": "Information security policy + topic-specific policies shall be\ndefined, approved by management, published, communicated to and\nacknowledged by relevant personnel + relevant interested parties,\nreviewed at planned intervals.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Information-security policy is the operator's organizational\nartefact. Pryv has no role in drafting policy text. The audit\nlog + observability data give the operator the means to verify\npolicy effectiveness post-facto.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.7",
     "title": "A.5.7 Threat intelligence",
     "text": "Information relating to information security threats shall be\ncollected and analysed to produce threat intelligence.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv-side contribution to\nthreat intelligence: dependabot alerts on master (Q24\nsupply-chain backlog ships the broader CI gate + SBOM +\nTrivy/Grype pipeline), CHANGELOG announcements of relevant\nsecurity fixes, observability data on anomalous request\npatterns. Vulnerability-disclosure intake: `SECURITY.md`\npublishes a coordinated disclosure policy (private GitHub\nSecurity Advisories flow + `security-dev@` mailbox + scope +\nSLA + safe harbor + GHSA/CVE issuance), and private\nvulnerability reporting is enabled on the published\nrepositories. That VDP + GHSA log is the substrate-\nvulnerability threat-intelligence feed downstream\noperators subscribe to. The operator's own threat-intel\nprogramme (threat-feed subscriptions, correlation logic)\nsits on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.16",
     "title": "A.5.16 Identity management",
     "text": "The full life cycle of identities shall be managed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv's account + access primitives implement the full identity\nlifecycle: create (registration), enable (login + access mint),\nmodify (accesses.update, account.update), suspend (access\nnarrowing), terminate (accesses.delete + system.users.delete).\nAudit log gives the per-stage evidence. The naming + assignment\npolicy is the operator's.\n",
     "detail": "For workforce / role-scale deployments, Pryv composes with an\nexternal IdP / IGA system via two patterns documented in\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`: (1) group access +\n`callerId` audit suffix, (2) seed access + sub-access\nderivation. **Roles + groups themselves are deliberately\noutside Pryv;** the IdP is the source of truth for identity\nlifecycle, and Pryv records the resulting access state +\nper-individual audit trail. A third pattern ships in\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53 (release commit `61fb28dd`,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158): for a team\nsharing one account that reaches patient data through\ncross-account consent, each member is their own Pryv account,\njoins through a membership request an administrator of the group\napproves `[GA01]`, acts on patient accounts under accesses the\ngroup's core issues and the patient's core stamps with their\nidentity `[GA10]`, and leaves (or is removed, including when the\ndelegate who approved them is detached) with those accesses\nswept by the platform `[GA20]`, `[GA21]`, `[GA23]`. Roles stay\noutside Pryv in that pattern too: a team is a stream, a\nmembership is a consent relationship. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n\n**Delegated-app identity via OAuth2.** For app identities, Pryv\nships an OAuth2 authorization-code + PKCE flow\n(`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8): each\nclient is a curated identity the operator registers through\n`bin/oauth-client.js` (create / rotate-secret / list, the full\ncredential lifecycle), authenticating with mandatory PKCE (S256\nonly) against an exact-match registered redirect-URI set. Open\nself-registration is disabled, so every client identity is\noperator-authorised before it exists. Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.74 that holds while `oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode`\nis `off` (the default); otherwise a client may identify itself by\nan https URL on a host your policy accepts, with its reach set by\nyour template only (see `soc2.CC6.2`) `[OCMDE06]`.\n\n**Identities an app sees (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.68 to\n2.0.0-rc.77).** An operator-registered client declares a subject\ntype, `public` or `pairwise`, with no default. A pairwise client\nsees each user as a pseudonymous alias, one per user and client,\nnever the username, in token responses, the OpenID Connect id\ntoken (`sub`, signed with a key of `oauth.signingKeys`) and\nintrospection `[OPSE1]`, `[OXD08]`; a public one sees the user's\ninternal id, also never the username. The account holder can mint\nup to 10 address aliases (rc.76, personal token only, names chosen\nby the server) that a consent can adopt as the app's address\n`[OPAL1]`, `[OPAL2]`, `[OPUE9]`. Changing a grant's subject type\nmust be acknowledged by the user `[OCMP11]`. With\n`oauth.perUserIssuer` (rc.77, opt-in) each account host is its own\nOAuth2 issuer `[OPIS5]`.\n\n**Delegate-account identity lifecycle.** Account delegation\n(`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) manages the lifecycle of a\ndelegate relationship between two accounts: a controlled-account-\ninitiated invite / accept handshake creates it (create-from-\ndelegate can provision the controlled account itself, optional\nemail/password seed), an owner-equivalent delegate token enables\nit, and an authoritative detach terminates it, reserved to a\ngenuine login on the controlled account (a delegate can never\nremove a delegation). Each delegate acts under its own\nattributable token, audited on the controlled account (same-core\n+ cross-core), and `accessInfo` names the acting delegate. See\n`context/delegation-model.md`.\n\nApp identities a delegate authorizes for the controlled account\ncarry that lineage for their whole life: `accessInfo` reports\nthem as granted through the delegation (`grantedVia: 'app'`,\nnaming the delegate) `[DCH02]`, and they end with the delegation\n`[DCH12]`. In open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "UZEV",
       "DCH02",
       "DCH12",
       "CMCGA",
       "GA01",
       "GA10",
       "GA20",
       "GA21",
       "GA23",
       "OCMDE06",
       "OPSE1",
       "OXD08",
       "OPAL1",
       "OPAL2",
       "OPUE9",
       "OCMP11",
       "OPIS5"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode",
       "oauth.signingKeys",
       "oauth.perUserIssuer"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.15",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "system-streams",
       "audit",
       "delegation",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns",
       "delegation-model"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.17",
     "title": "A.5.17 Authentication information",
     "text": "Allocation and management of authentication information shall be\ncontrolled by a management process, including advising personnel\non appropriate handling.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv stores\ncredentials on a privileged system-stream (`:_system:password`\netc.). MFA secrets stay server-side: the TOTP secret encrypted at\nrest in the private profile, recovery codes stored hashed, and\nneither is returned by the profile methods (open-pryv.io\n`7ce9ea6f`). Operator's\nsecret-distribution + secret-rotation policy is the\norganizational programme; Pryv provides the secure storage tier.\n",
     "detail": "**OAuth2 token + secret handling.** Where you delegate access to\napps, Pryv's OAuth2 flow (`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`,\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8) manages the authentication material for\nyou: access tokens are short-lived (`oauth.accessTokenTTL`,\ndefault 1 h), refresh tokens are single-use and rotate on every\nexchange with a sliding TTL bounded by an absolute cap\n(`oauth.refreshTokenTTL` / `oauth.refreshTokenAbsoluteTTL`), and a\nreplayed (already-rotated) refresh token fails the exchange\n(`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/src/grants/refresh_token.ts`).\nConfidential clients hold a rotatable `client_secret`\n(`bin/oauth-client.js rotate-secret`). The operator's broader\nsecret-distribution + rotation programme stays the organizational\nhalf; Pryv supplies the short-TTL + rotation mechanics.\n\n**Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.69 to 2.0.0-rc.74.** A refreshed\ntoken's predecessor expires after `oauth.refreshRetireGraceSeconds`\n(default 60 s) `[ORET1]`; a refresh refused for bad client\nauthentication no longer uses up the refresh token `[ORL04]`; audit\nrows name refresh tokens by a hash, never by their first\ncharacters `[ORL12]`. Per-client lifetimes may only shorten the\nplatform's (rc.70); a rotated secret can stay valid for at most 30\ndays `[OCAK14]`. `private_key_jwt` assertions are checked only\nwith a key of their type and a pinned algorithm, a multi-key set\nneeds a `kid` on each key, and a `jwks_uri` is fetched through the\noutbound guard `[OCAK2]`, `[OCAK7]`, `[OCAK23]`. The OpenID Connect\nsigning keys (`oauth.signingKeys`) and the per-core keys that sign\nthe consent flow's and third-party sign-in's browser state\n(`oauth.stateKey`, `sso.stateKey`, required since rc.70, no longer\nderived from the admin key) live in the YAML configuration, never\nin the platform DB `[OXK01]`, `[OXSK1]`, `[CKOC2]`.\n\n**Transmitting authentication information to a third party.**\n\"Appropriate handling\" includes how a credential travels when you\nhand it to someone else. Pryv's shared-secrets endpoints\n(`open-pryv.io/components/shared-secrets/`) replace the\nURL-embedded-token pattern with a one-time random key: redeemable\nexactly once, mandatory TTL, only the SHA-256 of the key's random\nhalf stored server-side, payload scrubbed when the item leaves\nthe pending state (on redemption, on a signature mismatch, and on\nthe first retrieval attempt after the TTL; expiry is enforced on\naccess, not by a background sweeper, so an untouched expired\nsecret keeps its payload until something reaches it or you delete\nit), optional passphrase / HMAC signature on redemption. Your handling policy\n(\"never send credentials in links or logs\") gains a shipped\nmechanism to point at instead of a prohibition alone. A\n`secretSharing: forbidden` feature permission, inherited by\nchild accesses, lets you exclude publicly-exposed tokens from\nthe mechanism entirely. The same one-time-key mechanism carries the\nsession token when an account holder signs in through an external\nOpenID Connect provider (`sso.*`, beta, off by default): the token\nis never placed in the redirect URL, and the federated login is\ngated so an external identity cannot claim an account whose email\nwas never inbox-proved.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ORET1",
       "ORL04",
       "ORL12",
       "OCAK14",
       "OCAK2",
       "OCAK7",
       "OCAK23",
       "OXK01",
       "OXSK1",
       "CKOC2"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "oauth.refreshRetireGraceSeconds",
       "oauth.signingKeys",
       "oauth.stateKey",
       "sso.stateKey"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "system-streams",
       "MFA",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "shared-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "enhancement",
       "summary": "Reference MFA plugins broaden the authentication-information catalogue",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467852&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C78"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.18",
     "title": "A.5.18 Access rights",
     "text": "Access rights to information and other associated assets shall be\nprovisioned, reviewed, modified and removed in accordance with\nthe organization's topic-specific policy on, and rules for,\naccess control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same primitive surface as A.5.15 + A.5.16, accesses.create /\n.update / .delete cover the lifecycle stages; access version\nhistory provides the review-evidence layer.\n\nWhen an access expires, what hangs off it ends too: a `shared`\naccess managed by an app access can no longer outlive it (it\ninherits the app access's expiry at creation, clearing that expiry\nis refused, and authentication refuses a never-expiring shared\naccess once its app access has expired, `5d609bfa`), and a webhook\nstops firing and becomes `inactive` once its access has expired\n(`3394b95f`), both in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23.\n",
     "detail": "**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nFor a team sharing one account, a member's rights on patient\naccounts follow their membership: provisioned only under an\napproved membership `[GA01]`, `[GA10]`, reviewable from the group\naccount (each access asked for and each removal is an event\nnaming the member; a revoked membership stays readable as a\ndeletion record) `[GA22]`, narrowed with it `[GA41]`, and removed\non every patient account when it ends `[GA20]`, with residuals\nrecorded, retried by the retry loop and the periodic pass\n`[MR25]`, and bounded by the access's own expiry. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "CMCMR",
       "GA01",
       "GA10",
       "GA20",
       "GA22",
       "GA41",
       "MR25"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.15",
       "iso-27001.A.5.16",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.19",
     "title": "A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships",
     "text": "Processes and procedures shall be defined and implemented to\nmanage the information-security risks associated with the use of\nsupplier's products or services.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "When the operator's\n\"supplier\" is Pryv (i.e., open-pryv.io as a third-party\nplatform), the public release process + CHANGELOGs + this\ncompliance matrix serve as the supplier-monitoring artefact\nset. The operator's supplier-management procedure (assessment\ncriteria, periodic review) sits on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.20",
     "title": "A.5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements",
     "text": "Relevant information-security requirements shall be established\nand agreed with each supplier based on the type of supplier\nrelationship.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Supplier agreements are contractual artefacts. No software role.\nWhen the operator's contract with Pryv (open-pryv.io is BSD-\nlicensed open source) requires security commitments, those map\nto public Pryv-side practices (release cadence, security-fix\nbackporting, etc.) but the contract itself is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.6.1",
     "title": "A.6.1 Screening",
     "text": "Background-verification checks on all candidates to become\npersonnel shall be carried out prior to joining the organization\nand on an ongoing basis taking into consideration applicable\nlaws, regulations and ethics.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Personnel screening is an HR process. No software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.6.4",
     "title": "A.6.4 Disciplinary process",
     "text": "A formal and communicated disciplinary process shall be in place\nto take actions against personnel and other relevant interested\nparties who have committed an information-security policy\nviolation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Disciplinary process is HR-side. Pryv's audit log gives the\nevidence pack the HR / legal team uses to substantiate an\nallegation, but the process itself is organizational.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.6.5",
     "title": "A.6.5 Responsibilities after termination or change of employment",
     "text": "Information security responsibilities + duties that remain valid\nafter termination or change of employment shall be defined,\nenforced and communicated to relevant personnel and other\ninterested parties.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Technical termination is\n`accesses.delete` (full revoke) + audit-log timestamp. The\npost-termination obligations (confidentiality, IP, NDA\nenforcement window) are contractual.\n",
     "detail": "**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nWhen a member leaves a team sharing one account, or is removed,\nending the membership deletes that member's accesses on every\npatient account and records the outcome per patient\n(`consent/member-revoke-cmc`, `deleted`, `absent` or `residual`)\n`[GA20]`, `[GA21]`, `[GA22]`, `[GA23]`. A residual is retried\nwhile `cmc.retryLoop.enabled` is `true` (the default) and cannot\noutlive the access's own expiry (at most\n`cmc.memberAccess.maxTtl`, 7 d by default). What the departing\nperson may still owe (confidentiality of what they read) stays\ncontractual. See `context/workforce-access-patterns.md`,\nPattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "CMCMR",
       "GA20",
       "GA21",
       "GA22",
       "GA23"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cmc.retryLoop.enabled",
       "cmc.memberAccess.maxTtl"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.16",
       "iso-27001.A.5.18",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.1",
     "title": "A.8.1 User end-point devices",
     "text": "Information stored on, processed by or accessible via user\nend-point devices shall be protected.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "End-point device security (laptops, phones, tablets) is endpoint-\nmanagement scope. Pryv's API access from end-points is mediated\nby access tokens + TLS, but the device itself isn't a Pryv\nconcern.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.4",
     "title": "A.8.4 Access to source code",
     "text": "Read + write access to source code, development tools and software\nlibraries shall be appropriately managed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Source-code access management is an operator IT concern (Git\naccess policies, CI/CD secrets, repository permissions). Pryv-\nthe-software's own source is public; the operator's app-side\nsource-code repo is theirs to manage.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.6",
     "title": "A.8.6 Capacity management",
     "text": "The use of resources shall be monitored + adjusted in line with\ncurrent + expected capacity requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv-side capacity\nsurfaces: per-core observability metrics (memory, CPU, latency,\nrequest volume); horizontal scaling via adding cores to the\ncluster (each handles its bound users + shared rqlite control\nplane). Operator's capacity-planning cadence + provisioning\nautomation sit on top.\n",
     "detail": "**Resource bounds inside the core (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47 and\n2.0.0-rc.50).** One client can no longer exhaust a core's capacity\nthrough a single call shape: a batch holds at most 1000 calls with\nits results bounded together (`limits.batch.maxTotalItems`)\n`[CEDB5]`, `[CEDB6]`; `events.get` paging is bounded and PostgreSQL\nresults are streamed through a cursor instead of loaded whole\n`[EGLV1]`, `[EGLC1]`; uploads are limited in parts, files\n(`uploads.maxFiles`) and size by default `[MPLM3]`, `[MPLD1]`;\nsocket.io namespaces exist only for user names and messages are\nbounded (`socketIO.maxMessageBytes`) `[SION1]`, `[SION4]`;\npreviews refuse images declaring more than\n`eventFiles.previewsMaxInputPixels` and render at most\n`eventFiles.previewsRenderConcurrency` at once `[PVPX1]`,\n`[PVRQ1]`; a crashing worker is replaced after a growing delay\n`[WRBO1]`. These protect capacity; sizing the cores, watching the\nmetrics and scaling stay yours. See\n`context/rate-limiting-and-dos-protection.md`.\n\n**Password checks and database time (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.87).** Password\nhashing and verification, OAuth client secrets included, run at\nmost `auth.passwordCheckConcurrency` at a time per API worker\n(default 2), with up to `auth.passwordCheckQueue` calls waiting\n(default 50, at most 10 s); beyond that the call is refused\nbefore anything is checked, so a flood of password checks no\nlonger takes the worker's CPU and thread pool from attachments,\nwebhook lookups and compression for every account `[CLIM1]`,\n`[CLIM2]`, `[CLIM3]`, `[CLIB2]`, `[PCLM1]`, `[PCLM2]`. On\nPostgreSQL, a statement issued while serving an API request is\nstopped after `storages.engines.postgresql.statementTimeoutMs`\n(default 30 s) and a transaction left idle is closed after\n`idleInTransactionTimeoutMs` (default 60 s); the request answers\n`503 api-unavailable` and one warning line is logged. A streamed\nread is limited per batch of rows, so a long download is not cut.\nAccount deletion, background jobs, boot-time schema work,\n`system.checkPlatformIntegrity` and the command-line tools run\nunlimited on a small separate pool: each PostgreSQL pool of a\nworker may open up to 2 more connections, so leave that headroom\nin `max_connections` (tests `[PGSS1]`, `[PGSI1]`, `[PGSI2]`,\n`[STMC1]`, `[MNSC1]`). Both apply to the workers of the clustered\nserver (`bin/master.js`). They bound how long one request holds a\nconnection and how much CPU password checks take; many slow\nrequests in a row are still for your edge layer to limit.\n\n**Per-account, per-access and per-connection ceilings (the release\nafter open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87; on by default, per API worker, `0`\nturns each off).** Authenticated calls running at once (HTTP, batch\ncounted once, socket.io) are capped per account\n(`limits.requests.maxInflightPerUser`, default 64) and per access\n(`limits.requests.maxInflightPerAccess`, default 32), so one shared\ntoken cannot take its owner's whole budget; past either the call\nanswers `429 too-many-requests` with `Retry-After: 1` without running\n`[APLM3]`, `[APLM5]`, `[APLM9]`. Calls without an access\n(`auth.login`, password reset) are not counted. Parameters nested\ndeeper than `limits.json.maxDepth` (default 64) or with an object\nholding more than `limits.json.maxObjectKeys` keys (default 10000)\nanswer `400 invalid-parameters-format` before the method runs\n`[APLM1]`, `[APLM2]`. On socket.io: connections per access\n(`socketIO.maxConnectionsPerAccess`, 20) and per account\n(`socketIO.maxConnectionsPerUser`, 100), refused at the handshake\nwith `too-many-requests` `[SIOL1]`, `[SIOL3]`; calls running at once\non one connection (`socketIO.maxInflightCallsPerConnection`, 16)\n`[SIOL5]`; scopes per connection (`socketIO.maxScopesPerConnection`,\n100; refused with `invalid-operation`, the whole `subscribe` adds\nnothing) `[SIOL6]`; a burst of access changes re-checks the open\nconnections at most once per second `[SIOL8]`. These are ceilings on\nconcurrent work, not request rates: per-token request rates stay at\nyour edge layer.\n\n**Stream tree, stalled readers and mail (same release; on by\ndefault, `0` turns each off).** A stream sits at most\n`limits.streams.maxDepth` levels deep (default 32, a move counts the\nmoved subtree) and an account holds at most\n`limits.streams.maxPerAccount` streams in its own store (default\n10000, trashed ones included); past either the write answers `400\ninvalid-operation`, also when an access creates a stream from a\npermission's `defaultName` `[STLM1]`, `[STLM2]`, `[STLM3]`,\n`[STLM6]`. An event carries at most `limits.events.maxStreamIds`\ndistinct stream ids (default 100, `400 invalid-parameters-format`)\n`[STLM4]`. What an account already holds stays readable. An HTTP\nconnection with no traffic either way for\n`http.responseIdleTimeoutMs` (default 120 s) is closed, so a client\nthat stopped reading no longer holds a database cursor and call\nslots `[RIDL1]`; keep it above your slowest call (websockets are\nnot affected). One access runs one streamed audit read at a time\nper worker (`limits.audit.maxConcurrentReadsPerAccess`, default 1);\na further read waits for a slot, oldest first, up to\n`limits.audit.maxReadWaitMs` (default 30 s), so parallel reads run\none after the other and succeed, and only a read left without a\nslot past the wait answers `429 too-many-requests` `[RIDL3]`,\n`[RIDL4]`, `[RIDL5]`. The mail\na caller can make a core send is capped per hour and per class\n(`services.email.maxPerHour`, default 500, registration mails apart\nfrom account mails) `[MLBG3]`; the per-address and per-account\nmail budgets are on A.8.21.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "CEDB5",
       "CEDB6",
       "EGLV1",
       "EGLC1",
       "MPLM3",
       "MPLD1",
       "SION1",
       "SION4",
       "PVPX1",
       "PVRQ1",
       "WRBO1",
       "CLIM1",
       "CLIM2",
       "CLIM3",
       "CLIB2",
       "PCLM1",
       "PCLM2",
       "STMC1",
       "MNSC1",
       "UNXS1",
       "APLM1",
       "APLM2",
       "APLM3",
       "APLM5",
       "APLM9",
       "SIOL1",
       "SIOL3",
       "SIOL5",
       "SIOL6",
       "SIOL8",
       "STLM1",
       "STLM2",
       "STLM3",
       "STLM4",
       "STLM6",
       "RIDL1",
       "RIDL3",
       "RIDL4",
       "RIDL5",
       "MLBG3"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/rate-limiting.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "limits.batch.maxTotalItems",
       "uploads.maxFiles",
       "socketIO.maxMessageBytes",
       "eventFiles.previewsMaxInputPixels",
       "eventFiles.previewsRenderConcurrency",
       "auth.passwordCheckConcurrency",
       "auth.passwordCheckQueue",
       "storages.engines.postgresql.statementTimeoutMs",
       "storages.engines.postgresql.idleInTransactionTimeoutMs",
       "limits.requests.maxInflightPerUser",
       "limits.requests.maxInflightPerAccess",
       "limits.json.maxDepth",
       "limits.json.maxObjectKeys",
       "socketIO.maxConnectionsPerAccess",
       "socketIO.maxConnectionsPerUser",
       "socketIO.maxInflightCallsPerConnection",
       "socketIO.maxScopesPerConnection",
       "limits.streams.maxDepth",
       "limits.streams.maxPerAccount",
       "limits.events.maxStreamIds",
       "http.responseIdleTimeoutMs",
       "limits.audit.maxConcurrentReadsPerAccess",
       "limits.audit.maxReadWaitMs",
       "services.email.maxPerHour"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "rate-limiting-and-dos-protection"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.14",
     "title": "A.8.14 Redundancy of information processing facilities",
     "text": "Information processing facilities shall be implemented with\nredundancy sufficient to meet availability requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Multi-core Raft replication\nmakes the platform DB (user-to-core index, shared settings,\ncertificates) redundant, so the cluster keeps routing and serving\nTLS when a peer fails. User data is not replicated between\ncores: the users homed on a failed core are unavailable until\nthat core, or its restore from backup, is back. Redundancy of\nuser data is yours to add under the storage engine (e.g.\nPostgreSQL streaming replication, replicated volumes). The\navailability target + redundancy depth is operator policy.\n",
     "detail": "Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 the replicated platform DB runs on\nrqlite 10.5.1: a node killed while taking a snapshot no longer\nrisks restoring stale pages into its copy (as under 9.x),\nsnapshot files are checksummed, a node stops on a node-local\nSQLite error instead of diverging, and the first write a follower\nforwards to a restarted leader no longer fails once. Upgrading a\ncluster is one-way for each node's data directory and needs the\nnodes upgraded back to back (followers first, never adding a node\nwhile versions are mixed): `open-pryv.io/INSTALL.md`, \"Upgrading\nthe bundled rqlite (9.x to 10.x)\".\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.23",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-restore",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.17",
     "title": "A.8.17 Clock synchronization",
     "text": "Clocks of information processing systems used by the organization\nshall be synchronized to approved time sources.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Clock sync stays your host's job (chronyd / ntpd): Pryv stores\nwhatever timestamp the host produces. Pryv makes a badly skewed\nclock visible at the two points where it breaks a core: a new\ncore whose clock differs from the cluster's is refused at join,\nand a TLS certificate outside the local clock's validity window\nis neither installed nor hot-swapped.\n",
     "detail": "Pryv's architecture is **core-affine**, every user's data\noperations resolve to one core (see\n`context/core-affinity-architecture.md`). Cores never need to\nagree on clock value or on cert validity with each other; the\ndangerous failure modes are all intra-core (one core's own\nclock vs its own loaded cert / its own audit-row timestamps).\n\n**Pryv's existing contribution to skew detection**: every API\nresponse carries `meta.serverTime` (Unix timestamp seconds;\n`components/api-server/src/methods/helpers/setCommonMeta.ts`).\nWebhook payloads include the same. Clients use this to detect\ntheir own clock skew vs the server.\n\n**Shipped** (open-pryv.io `5266b697`, released after\n2.0.0-rc.34; see\n`proposals/clock-skew-cluster-checks.md`): two intra-core\ncheckpoints. (1) Bootstrap join: before acking, a new core\ncompares its clock with the issuing core's (`meta.serverTime`\nof its API root, else the HTTP `Date` header) and refuses the\njoin beyond `--bootstrap-clock-skew-seconds` (default 30 s, `0`\ndisables); the join token is not used, so fixing the clock and\nre-running succeeds. (2) Certificate load: a certificate whose\n`notBefore..notAfter` window does not contain the local clock\n(tolerance `cluster.clockSkewSeconds`, default 30 s) is not\nmaterialized from PlatformDB nor hot-swapped into the workers,\nand a custom certificate outside its window is reported at boot.\nWhat stays yours: run a clock service on every host. Pryv does\nno periodic clock polling.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "core-affinity-architecture"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.18",
     "title": "A.8.18 Use of privileged utility programs",
     "text": "The use of utility programs that can be capable of overriding\nsystem and application controls shall be restricted and tightly\ncontrolled.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv-side privileged\nutilities: the `bin/*` CLIs (`bootstrap.js`, `migrate.js`,\n`dns-records.js`, `observability.js`, `backup.js`). Operator\nrestricts their execution to administrator accounts via host-OS\npermissions + sudo policy. The `auth.adminAccessKey`-bearing\nAPI surface is the runtime privilege channel; usage is\naudit-logged.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.2",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(a)(2)(ii)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "system-streams",
       "access",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.19",
     "title": "A.8.19 Installation of software on operational systems",
     "text": "Procedures and measures shall be implemented to securely manage\nsoftware installation on operational systems.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv ships as a single\nDocker image with SHA-pinned tag; the installation channel is\nreproducible. Operator's installation procedure (build\nverification, signature checking, change-approval gate) sits\non top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.21",
     "title": "A.8.21 Security of network services",
     "text": "Security mechanisms, service levels and service requirements of\nnetwork services shall be identified, implemented and monitored.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's external\nnetwork surface is the TLS-terminating HTTPS API + the embedded\nDNS server (when multi-core enabled); both are monitored via\nobservability. Inter-core mTLS is the internal surface. The\noperator's broader network-service portfolio (LB, WAF, VPN)\nsits outside Pryv.\n",
     "detail": "**General rate limiting / DoS protection stays operator-side**\n(reverse proxy / WAF / API gateway): general in-process\nthrottling was rejected because (1) multi-core load distribution\nmakes per-core counters mis-fire and (2) abuse signatures are\noperator-specific. Pryv contributes the **detection layer**\n(audit log + observability metrics + `accesses.delete`\nrevocation) and, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.47, **targeted\nin-code budgets** on the paths it can count correctly: failed\npasswords per account and per client address across all cores\n(`auth.passwordAttempts`) `[CEPB1]`, `[CEPI1]`; credential\nmethods refused inside batches and over socket.io `[CEDB1]`;\nlive `/reg/access` requests per address\n(`access.maxLiveRequestsPerIp`) `[RAI1]`; batch, paging, upload\nand socket.io message bounds `[CEDB5]`, `[EGLV1]`, `[MPLM3]`,\n`[SION4]`; and in 2.0.0-rc.50 an invitation-check budget\n`[IVCK1]`, a `webhooks.test` interval `[WHTT1]` and preview\nlimits `[PVPX1]`. Failed MFA second factors have had a\nper-account backoff since 2.0.0-rc.27\n(`services.mfa.attempts.backoff`), see A.8.5. The per-address\nbudgets read the client address through `http.trustedProxies`\nonly: behind your reverse proxy, list it there `[CEPI2]`. The\nembedded DNS server validates requests and bounds its TCP\nconnections (`dns.tcpMaxConnections`, 2.0.0-rc.46) `[DNR01]`.\nSince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.87, password checks run a bounded\nnumber at a time per API worker\n(`auth.passwordCheckConcurrency`, `auth.passwordCheckQueue`):\npast it the API answers `429 too-many-requests` and the OAuth\nendpoints `503 temporarily_unavailable`, both with\n`Retry-After`, and the refusal is never a failed attempt\n`[CLIM2]`, `[PCLM1]`, `[PCLM2]`; on PostgreSQL the database work\nof an API request is time-limited (see A.8.6). From the release\nafter 2.0.0-rc.87, each API worker also caps the calls running at\nonce per account and per access (`limits.requests.*`, `429\ntoo-many-requests`), the nesting and size of call parameters\n(`limits.json.*`, `400`), and socket.io connections per access and\nper account, calls per connection and scopes per connection\n(`socketIO.max*`) `[APLM1]`, `[APLM3]`, `[APLM9]`, `[SIOL1]`,\n`[SIOL3]`, `[SIOL5]` (see A.8.6). They bound concurrent work, not\nrequest rates. The same release closes an HTTP connection idle\neither way for `http.responseIdleTimeoutMs` (default 120 s), so a\nstalled reader no longer holds its call's resources `[RIDL1]`, and\nbounds the mail a caller can make a core send: registration codes\nper client address\n(`account.emailVerification.registrationCodesPerIpPerHour`, 10 an\nhour, `429 too-many-attempts`) `[MLBG1]`, verification mails per\naccount to distinct addresses\n(`account.emailVerification.addressesPerAccountPerDay`, 10 a day)\n`[MLBG2]`, and an hourly breaker per core counted apart for\nregistration and account mails (`services.email.maxPerHour`, 500),\nso a flood of registration codes cannot stop password resets\n`[MLBG3]`. Notices the platform sends on its own are not counted.\nThese budgets do not replace an edge layer for volumetric\ntraffic, per-token request rates and WAF rules. Full rationale +\noperator mitigation patterns:\n`context/rate-limiting-and-dos-protection.md`. Reference nginx +\nfail2ban configuration, verified against a running core (per-IP\nand per-token limits on the routes that matter, ban jails, limits\nper workload profile, a load test proving the limits fire):\n`customer-resources/rate-limiting.md` on the developer site.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "CEPB1",
       "CEPI1",
       "CEPI2",
       "CEDB1",
       "CEDB5",
       "RAI1",
       "EGLV1",
       "MPLM3",
       "SION4",
       "IVCK1",
       "WHTT1",
       "PVPX1",
       "DNR01",
       "CLIM2",
       "PCLM1",
       "PCLM2",
       "APLM1",
       "APLM3",
       "APLM9",
       "SIOL1",
       "SIOL3",
       "SIOL5",
       "RIDL1",
       "MLBG1",
       "MLBG2",
       "MLBG3"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/rate-limiting.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.passwordAttempts",
       "http.trustedProxies",
       "access.maxLiveRequestsPerIp",
       "socketIO.maxMessageBytes",
       "limits.batch.maxTotalItems",
       "uploads.maxFiles",
       "dns.tcpMaxConnections",
       "auth.passwordCheckConcurrency",
       "auth.passwordCheckQueue",
       "limits.requests.maxInflightPerUser",
       "limits.requests.maxInflightPerAccess",
       "limits.json.maxDepth",
       "limits.json.maxObjectKeys",
       "socketIO.maxConnectionsPerAccess",
       "socketIO.maxConnectionsPerUser",
       "socketIO.maxInflightCallsPerConnection",
       "socketIO.maxScopesPerConnection",
       "http.responseIdleTimeoutMs",
       "account.emailVerification.registrationCodesPerIpPerHour",
       "account.emailVerification.addressesPerAccountPerDay",
       "services.email.maxPerHour"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.20"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "observability-provider"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "rate-limiting-and-dos-protection"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.26",
     "title": "A.8.26 Application security requirements",
     "text": "Information security requirements shall be identified, specified\nand approved when developing or acquiring applications.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "For the operator running\nPryv as one of its applications, this compliance matrix IS the\ncatalogue of identified + specified + approved security\nrequirements Pryv satisfies. For the operator's own applications\nbuilt on Pryv, the requirements are their editorial work.\n",
     "detail": "Example of a requirement Pryv implements for you: content a user\nuploads cannot attack other users through the API origin. Since\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 an attachment whose declared type a\nbrowser executes or renders as a document (HTML, SVG and other\nXML, JavaScript) is served with `Content-Security-Policy:\nsandbox; default-src 'none'` next to `Content-Disposition:\nattachment`, on the token and the `readToken` paths alike\n(`open-pryv.io/components/api-server/src/middleware/attachment-access.ts`).\nUploads are not refused for their type. If your app displays HTML\nor SVG attachments, fetch the content and render it in your app's\nown sandbox: that part of the requirement is yours.\n\nA second example, in the sign-in flow: an authorisation request\n(`POST /reg/access`) no longer has a `REDIRECTED` outcome\n(open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.36, `62ab4f7e`, merged in\n`1aa22e1a`). That status let anyone holding a request key store an\nunvalidated URL that was then served to the authentication page\nunder a field such pages follow. It is now refused (`400\ninvalid-parameters`), no outcome post stores a `redirectUrl`, and\nthe poll never answers `REDIRECTED` `[MC04D]`. No shipped\nauthentication page sent it; if your own page did, it must stop\n(a request stays on the core that created it, and an account on\nanother core is served through the shared-secret hand-off\nbetween cores).\n\nFurther examples from the 2026 security review (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.49 and 2.0.0-rc.50; `context/code-security-review-2026.md`):\nevery JSON answer of the API carries `Cache-Control: no-store` and\n`Vary: Origin`, so neither a browser nor a shared cache keeps API\nanswers `[HTC1]`; a hosted proxy site refuses a path holding an\nencoded separator or a dot segment before it reaches the upstream\n`[HSPE1]`; query strings are parsed without letting a key shadow a\nbuilt-in object property `[QPR2]`. If you put a cache or CDN in front\nof the API, keep it honouring these directives.\n\nAnother, for outbound calls (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56): a URL a\ncounterparty supplies cannot make the server call an address it\nshould not reach. The cross-account, delegation and OAuth\nrevocation calls refuse, before any connection, a host that is or\nresolves to a loopback, private, link-local or otherwise reserved\naddress (unless listed in `cmc.allowedPrivateHosts`), plain\n`http:` and URLs carrying credentials, do not follow redirects and\nstop reading an answer past 1 MiB `[PFR1]`, `[PFR2]`, `[PFR4]`,\n`[PFR5]`, `[PFR6]`, `[CO22]`; a refusal names the host, never the\npath or a token `[PFR10]`, and a refused delivery is not retried\n`[CO21]`, `[RQ33]`. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.70 a client's\n`jwks_uri` key set, and since 2.0.0-rc.74 a client metadata\ndocument and its key set, are fetched through the same guard, https\nonly whatever `cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl` says, with the checked\naddress pinned to the connection, bounded size (64 KiB for a key\nset, `oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.maxDocumentBytes`, default\n16 KiB, for a document), a 5 s timeout and a budget of 10 document\nfetches a minute per host; a document URL naming a host of your\nplatform is refused before any fetch `[OCMD01]`, `[OCMD03B]`,\n`[OCMD03D]`, `[OCMD03G]`, `[OCMD03H]`, `[OCMDE17]`. Hosts listed in\n`cmc.allowedPrivateHosts` are allowed for these fetches too, so\nlist there only peers you would let any client name.\n\n**Adapter routes (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.73, off unless\n`adapterRoutes` is set).** The core forwards `/adapter/<name>/…`\n(and optional `/.well-known/<label>/adapter/<name>/…` prefixes) to a\nsidecar you run, before any API middleware: it authenticates\nnothing on these paths and adds no CORS, audit or rate limit, so the\nsidecar must authenticate every request and its port must not be\nreachable from outside the host. What the core does enforce: the\nupstream cannot be the platform or the core's own listener, an\nencoded separator, dot segment or `%00` in the path is refused\nbefore forwarding, bodies are capped (`maxBodyBytes`, default\n1 MiB), idle requests time out (`idleTimeoutMs`, default 60 s),\n`X-Forwarded-For` is set by the core and `X-Forwarded-Host` /\n`-Proto` are taken only from a trusted proxy, and an https upstream\nis verified against its own name `[ADRI03]`, `[ADRI06]`,\n`[ADRI09]`, `[ADRI13]`, `[ADRC03]`, `[ADRC08]`. Since rc.75, on an\naccount host (`<name>.<dns.domain>`) the core tells the sidecar\nwhich account the request addresses in `X-Adapter-Name` /\n`X-Adapter-Base`, always removing client-sent copies (from a\ntrusted proxy too), and answers `421 wrong-core` without contacting\nthe sidecar when another core serves the account `[ADRU3]`,\n`[ADRU4]`. These two headers are an address, not an identity:\nupgrade each core before its sidecar relies on them, and do not let\nan ingress route adapter paths around the core.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACTY",
       "MC04D",
       "HTC1",
       "HSPE1",
       "QPR2",
       "PFR1",
       "PFR2",
       "PFR4",
       "PFR5",
       "PFR6",
       "PFR10",
       "CO21",
       "CO22",
       "RQ33",
       "OCMD01",
       "OCMD03B",
       "OCMD03D",
       "OCMD03G",
       "OCMD03H",
       "OCMDE17",
       "ADRI03",
       "ADRI06",
       "ADRI09",
       "ADRI13",
       "ADRC03",
       "ADRC08",
       "ADRU3",
       "ADRU4"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/adapter-routes.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "cmc.allowedPrivateHosts",
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.maxDocumentBytes",
       "adapterRoutes"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.25"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.27",
     "title": "A.8.27 Secure system architecture and engineering principles",
     "text": "Principles for engineering secure systems shall be established,\ndocumented, maintained and applied to any information systems\ndevelopment activities.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's architecture is\ninformed by secure-by-design principles (per-user isolation,\nleast-privilege permissions, TLS in the core or at the proxy,\nsystem-stream privilege separation). The operator's own\nengineering team applies the same principles to app-layer code.\nPryv-side architecture documentation lives in public\nopen-pryv.io README + this matrix.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.25",
       "iso-27001.A.8.28"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.29",
     "title": "A.8.29 Security testing in development and acceptance",
     "text": "Security testing processes shall be defined and implemented in\nthe development life cycle.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv's CI runs the public\ntest matrix per commit (PG + SQLite modes; component-level +\nintegration tests).\nOperator's own application-layer security testing (SAST, DAST,\npen-test before release) is layered on top.\n",
     "detail": "**Security review of the platform code.** In 2026 (2026-06 to\n2026-10) the open-pryv.io maintainers reviewed the source surface by\nsurface for security defects; each finding was confirmed by a second\nreview, fixed with a regression test that now runs in the CI matrix,\nand each fix release was reviewed before merge. The fixes shipped in\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.40 to 2.0.0-rc.51. The public report,\n`SECURITY-AUDIT.md`\n(https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md,\npublished 2026-10-14), describes the method, the surface inventory,\nthe areas reviewed without a finding, and each finding with its fix.\nMethodology and the fix areas: `context/code-security-review-2026.md`.\nThis is security testing of Pryv's code, done by its maintainers; the\ntesting of your own applications, integrations and deployment (and any\nindependent penetration test your programme requires) remains yours.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.8.33",
     "title": "A.8.33 Test information",
     "text": "Test information shall be appropriately selected, protected and\nmanaged.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "When test environments\nuse real-or-derived PII, the same protections as production\napply. Pryv pattern: run test environments as separate Pryv\nclusters (independent bootstrap bundles + cluster CAs); the\ndata-residency primitive prevents accidental cross-environment\ndata flow at the user-binding layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.31"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.1",
     "title": "A.7.1 Physical security perimeters",
     "text": "Security perimeters shall be defined and used to protect areas\nthat contain information and other associated assets.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Physical perimeters are facility scope. Out of Pryv's software\nboundary; HDS Activity 1 hosters carry this control.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2",
     "title": "A.7.2 Physical entry",
     "text": "Secure areas shall be protected by appropriate entry controls\nand access points.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Physical entry controls (badge readers, mantraps, etc.) are\nfacility-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4",
     "title": "A.7.4 Physical security monitoring",
     "text": "Premises shall be continuously monitored for unauthorized\nphysical access.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Physical monitoring (CCTV, intrusion detection) is facility-\nside.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.10",
     "title": "A.7.10 Storage media",
     "text": "Storage media shall be managed through their life cycle of\nacquisition, use, transportation and disposal in accordance with\nthe organization's classification scheme and handling\nrequirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Storage-media handling\nat the Pryv layer surfaces only for backup media,\n`bin/backup.js` outputs go onto operator-managed media;\noperator's encryption + transport + disposal procedure applies.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.310(d)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.14",
     "title": "A.7.14 Secure disposal or re-use of equipment",
     "text": "Items of equipment containing storage media shall be verified to\nensure that any sensitive data and licensed software has been\nremoved or securely overwritten prior to disposal or re-use.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Physical decommissioning of equipment is operator-side. When\ndecommissioned hardware carried a Pryv deployment, the operator's\ndata-destruction procedure handles the user-data directories +\ndatabase files; Pryv has no role at the host-OS hygiene layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.7.10"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "5",
     "title": "Clause 5 Leadership",
     "text": "Top management shall demonstrate leadership and commitment with\nrespect to the ISMS by ensuring policy + objectives are\nestablished, integration of ISMS requirements into the\norganization's processes, availability of resources, ownership\nof communications, and oversight of management review.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Leadership commitment is the operator's top-management activity.\nNo software role; Pryv-side artefacts (audit, observability,\nthis matrix) inform management-review meetings but don't\nsubstitute for leadership decisions.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "9.1",
     "title": "Clause 9.1, Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation",
     "text": "The organization shall determine what needs to be monitored and\nmeasured; the methods for monitoring, measurement, analysis,\nand evaluation to ensure valid results; when monitoring shall\nbe performed; who shall monitor; when results shall be analysed\nand evaluated; and who shall analyse + evaluate the results.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes the data:\naudit log (control-effectiveness sampling), observability\nmetrics (operational + security KPIs). The monitoring programme\nstructure (what / when / who) is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "9.2",
     "title": "Clause 9.2, Internal audit",
     "text": "The organization shall conduct internal audits at planned\nintervals to provide information on whether the ISMS conforms\nto the organization's own requirements + this document's\nrequirements and is effectively implemented + maintained.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Internal-audit programme is\noperator-side. Pryv-side artefacts that internal auditors\ntypically review: the audit log itself (control-effectiveness\nsample), this compliance matrix (control inventory),\nopen-pryv.io release-process evidence (CHANGELOGs, tagged\nreleases, test matrix), and the 2026 code-level security\nreview of open-pryv.io with its fix releases (2.0.0-rc.40 to\n2.0.0-rc.51; public report `SECURITY-AUDIT.md`, published\n2026-10-14,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md;\n`context/code-security-review-2026.md`), which documents an\nevaluation of the platform layer, not of your ISMS.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "10.1",
     "title": "Clause 10.1, Continual improvement",
     "text": "The organization shall continually improve the suitability,\nadequacy and effectiveness of the ISMS.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Continual improvement is a programmatic operator activity.\nPryv-side improvements arrive via upstream open-pryv.io releases\n(which the operator integrates), but the organization's ISMS\nimprovement programme is theirs.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "10.2",
     "title": "Clause 10.2, Nonconformity and corrective action",
     "text": "When a nonconformity occurs, the organization shall react to\nthe nonconformity + take action to control + correct it;\nevaluate the need for action to eliminate the causes; implement\naction needed; review effectiveness; make changes to the ISMS\nif necessary.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "CAPA records can ride on\nPryv events on a `compliance/capa/*` stream with attachments;\nthe audit chain provides tamper evidence. The CAPA workflow\nitself (root-cause analysis, effectiveness verification,\nISMS-change decisions) is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "qms": [
       "qms/pryv/02-procedures/corrective-and-preventive-action.md"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.2",
     "title": "A.5.2 Information security roles and responsibilities",
     "text": "Information security roles and responsibilities shall be defined\nand allocated according to the organization's needs.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Role allocation is HR / organizational. No software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.3",
     "title": "A.5.3 Segregation of duties",
     "text": "Conflicting duties and conflicting areas of responsibility shall\nbe segregated.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv's permission model\nsupports segregation: distinct accesses with distinct\npermissions per role; system streams isolate privileged data.\nThe role-definition + duty-conflict analysis is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.6",
     "title": "A.5.6 Contact with special interest groups",
     "text": "The organization shall establish and maintain contact with\nspecial interest groups, security forums and professional\nassociations.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Industry-engagement programme is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.8",
     "title": "A.5.8 Information security in project management",
     "text": "Information security shall be integrated into project management.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Project-management methodology is operator-side. Pryv-side\nproject artefacts (this matrix, public open-pryv.io plans + GH\nProjects board for new features) demonstrate ISMS integration\non the upstream side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.9",
     "title": "A.5.9 Inventory of information and other associated assets",
     "text": "An inventory of information and other associated assets,\nincluding owners, shall be developed and maintained.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv's stream + event\nmodel gives a queryable inventory of all data assets stored in\nthe deployment (the data subject is implicitly the asset owner\nunder Art. 4 GDPR personhood). Operator's broader infrastructure\ninventory (servers, databases, logs, code repositories) is\nlayered on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.12"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "event",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.11",
     "title": "A.5.11 Return of assets",
     "text": "Personnel + other interested parties shall return all the\norganization's assets in their possession upon change or\ntermination of their employment, contract or agreement.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "For the technical\n\"asset\" of an access token, return = revocation\n(`accesses.delete`). For physical / off-line assets, return is\noperator-side. The audit log captures the technical-side\nreturn.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.6.5",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.21",
     "title": "A.5.21 Managing information security in the ICT supply chain",
     "text": "Processes and procedures shall be defined and implemented to\nmanage the information-security risks associated with the ICT\nproducts and services supply chain.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Supply-chain risk at the Pryv layer is now actively managed\nand CI-enforced (open-pryv.io master merge `9e2ee7ff`):\n`scripts/audit-prod-deps` fails every build on high or\ncritical advisories affecting the shipped (`--omit=dev`)\nnpm tree, with accepted advisories documented in a\njustified allowlist rather than silenced; a CycloneDX SBOM\nof the source tree is emitted on every CI run and scanned\nwith Grype (build fails on critical findings); the Docker\nbase image is digest-pinned and the rqlite download is\nchecksum-verified before unpacking; on release tags the\npublished image additionally carries its own CycloneDX\nSBOM, a keyless (OIDC) cosign signature, and a SLSA\nbuild-provenance attestation that pullers can verify.\nCommitted `package-lock.json`, `npm install\n--ignore-scripts` in CI, and GitHub Dependabot alerts\ncontinue underneath. Honest bound: the pinned base image\nstill carries OS-level CVEs that scanners surface (a\nslimmer-base migration is tracked as a follow-up), so the\nclaim is detection, gating and attestation, not a CVE-free\nimage. The operator's broader ICT supply-chain programme\n(vendor assessment, SLA reviews, contract clauses) sits on\ntop.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.19",
       "iso-27001.A.8.30"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.22",
     "title": "A.5.22 Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services",
     "text": "The organization shall regularly monitor, review, evaluate\nand manage change in supplier information security practices\nand service delivery.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "When the supplier under review is Pryv (open-pryv.io\nconsumed as a third-party platform), the upstream\nsupply-chain pipeline supplies the recurring monitoring\nartefacts: a runtime-dependency audit gate on every CI\nbuild, a CycloneDX SBOM emitted per CI run and per released\nimage, Grype scan results, and cosign-signed images with\nSLSA build provenance (open-pryv.io merge `9e2ee7ff`),\nalongside the CHANGELOGs and the public release process.\nReviewing those artefacts on your own cadence, and\nmonitoring every supplier other than Pryv, is your\nservice-management process.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.21",
       "iso-27001.A.5.19"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.24",
     "title": "A.5.24 Information security incident management planning and preparation",
     "text": "The organization shall plan and prepare for managing information\nsecurity incidents by defining, establishing and communicating\ninformation security incident management processes, roles and\nresponsibilities.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes detection\n+ scoping data (audit + observability) + containment primitive\n(accesses.delete) + substrate-vulnerability intake channel\n(`SECURITY.md` publishes a coordinated disclosure policy: a\nGHSA-based private flow with SLA + scope + safe harbor, and\nprivate vulnerability reporting is enabled on the published\nrepositories). The incident-management plan itself (roles,\nescalation, communications, lessons-learned) is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(6)(i)",
       "diga.A1.2.6"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained audit log strengthens forensic evidence (row could shift F:Evidence|Med → F:Evidence|High)",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.25",
     "title": "A.5.25 Assessment and decision on information security events",
     "text": "The organization shall assess information security events and\ndecide if they are to be categorized as information security\nincidents.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Event-vs-incident\nclassification is operator decision. Pryv-side data (audit row\npatterns, observability anomalies) feeds the assessment but the\ncategorization rule is operator policy.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.24"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.5.30",
     "title": "A.5.30 ICT readiness for business continuity",
     "text": "ICT readiness shall be planned, implemented, maintained and\ntested based on business continuity objectives and ICT\ncontinuity requirements.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "ICT-readiness Pryv\ninheritance: multi-core HA + backup-restore + cluster-replicated\nTLS certificates. The business-continuity objectives + testing\ncadence are operator policy.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.14",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-restore",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "iso-27701",
   "title": "ISO/IEC 27701, Extension to ISO/IEC 27001 for Privacy Information Management",
   "short": "ISO 27701",
   "type": "standard",
   "jurisdiction": "International (ISO/IEC)",
   "version": "ISO/IEC 27701:2019",
   "version_date": "2019-08-01",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.iso.org/standard/71670",
   "layered_on": [
    "iso-27001"
   ],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/iso-27701",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/iso-27701.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "5",
     "title": "Clause 5 PIMS-specific requirements extending ISO 27001",
     "text": "Organization shall apply the requirements of ISO/IEC 27001\ntreating privacy as an information-security concern; PII\ncontrollers and processors apply Annex A and/or B respectively.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "27701 extends the 27001\nISMS to cover PII handling specifically. Pryv contribution is\nthe same primitive set surfaced in the iso-27001 rows + the\nGDPR rows; 27701 simply combines them under the privacy-\ninformation-management label. The organization's PIMS-specific\nrisk treatment and statement of applicability sit on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.6.1.2"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2.1",
     "title": "A.7.2.1 Identify and document purpose",
     "text": "Organization shall identify and document the specific purposes\nfor which PII will be processed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Pryv pattern:\n`access.clientData.purpose` records the per-access purpose at\ngrant time, durable + auditable. The vocabulary of purposes\n(the organization's documented PIMS catalogue) is the operator's\neditorial work; Pryv carries each instance forward.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2.2",
     "title": "A.7.2.2 Identify lawful basis",
     "text": "Organization shall determine, document, and comply with the\nrelevant lawful basis for processing of PII.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "`access.clientData.lawful_basis`\nrecords the determined basis (consent, contract, legal\nobligation, etc.); for special-category PII,\n`clientData.special_category_basis` records the GDPR Art. 9\nparagraph or equivalent. Both travel with the access into the\naudit chain.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.6",
       "gdpr.Art.9"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.3.1",
     "title": "A.7.3.1 Determining and fulfilling obligations to PII principals",
     "text": "Organization shall determine and document its legal, regulatory,\nand business obligations to PII principals related to the\nprocessing of their PII.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv ships the technical fulfilment of the PII-principal-rights\nobligations: the subject (PII principal) holding a personal\ntoken reads everything via the standard API. The organization's\nresponse procedure (timeline, identity verification, content of\nresponse) is the policy half; Pryv responds in milliseconds.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.12",
       "gdpr.Art.15"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "stream",
       "event",
       "audit",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.3.4",
     "title": "A.7.3.4 Providing mechanism to modify or withdraw consent",
     "text": "Organization shall provide a mechanism for PII principals to\nmodify or withdraw their consent.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Withdrawal = `accesses.delete`; modification = `accesses.update`\nwith new permissions / clientData. Both are versioned and\nauditable; the prior consent state is preserved for §7\ndemonstrability. Cross-account (CMC) consent withdrawal uses\n`consent/revoke-cmc` for symmetric teardown, and since\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.36 the principal's own\naccept event records each withdrawal, whichever party and path\nended it (`content.withdrawal`, server-owned, never overwritten)\n`[CN58]`, `[CN59]`, `[CN60]`. See\n`context/cmc-consent-primitives.md`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "CN58",
       "CN59",
       "CN60"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.7"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "cmc-consent-primitives"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4.1",
     "title": "A.7.4.1 Limit collection",
     "text": "Organization shall limit the collection of PII to the minimum\nrelevant, proportionate and necessary for the identified\npurposes.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-stream permissions are the technical minimisation control;\nstream topology design determines the granularity. The operator's\ndecision of which streams a given app's access should touch IS\nthe limit-collection enforcement, expressed in `permissions[]`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4.7",
     "title": "A.7.4.7 Records of PII processing",
     "text": "Organization shall determine and securely maintain the necessary\nrecords in support of its obligations for the processing of PII.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same artefact set as GDPR Art. 30: access + clientData + audit +\nCMC + data-residency primitives constitute the records-of-\nprocessing register (purpose, basis, recipients, transfers,\nretention, security). Derivable per PII-principal per time\nwindow.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "UZEV",
       "TJ8S",
       "AA01"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/audit-setup.md",
       "guides/audit-logs.md"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.30"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "CMC",
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "B.8.4.1",
     "title": "B.8.4.1, Confidentiality",
     "text": "Persons under the processor's authority who have access to PII\nshall be subject to a confidentiality commitment.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The confidentiality commitment\nis an organizational artefact (employment agreements, contractor\nNDAs). Pryv's contribution: the audit log gives per-person\naccountability so the commitment is enforceable in practice\n(any breach is attributable to an access tied to a person).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "B.8.5.4",
     "title": "B.8.5.4, Records related to processing PII",
     "text": "Processor shall determine and maintain necessary records related\nto the processing of PII to support compliance with applicable\nobligations.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "When Pryv operates as processor (i.e., when the implementer is\nthe controller and the Pryv operator is distinct), the same\naudit chain documented under iso-27001 A.8.15 + iso-27701 A.7.4.7\nsatisfies the processor-side records-of-processing requirement.\nThe processor's specific obligations (subprocessor list, transfer\nregister) are operator-side artefacts.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "AT61"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.7"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4.2",
     "title": "A.7.4.2 Limit processing",
     "text": "Organization shall limit the processing of PII to that which is\nadequate, relevant and necessary for the identified purposes.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same primitive as A.7.4.1 limit collection, per-stream\npermissions are the technical limit on what processing each\naccess can perform. The \"adequate / relevant / necessary\"\nassessment per purpose is the controller's; the technical\nenforcement is permission-shaped.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.1",
       "gdpr.Art.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4.3",
     "title": "A.7.4.3 Accuracy and quality",
     "text": "Organization shall ensure and document that PII is as accurate,\ncomplete and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for\nwhich it is processed throughout the lifecycle of the PII.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`events.update` rectifies events (matching GDPR Art.16 mechanics),\nand the audit log records who rectified which event and when. For\n\"throughout the lifecycle\" proof of the values themselves, the\nevent version chain is the artefact, and it exists only on a\ndeployment with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by\ndefault; see `context/event-history.md`). The accuracy\ndetermination + correction workflow is the controller's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "PTU1"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "gdpr.Art.16"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4.5",
     "title": "A.7.4.5 PII de-identification and deletion at end of processing",
     "text": "Organization shall either delete PII or render it in a form which\ndoes not permit identification or re-identification of PII\nprincipals, as soon as the original PII is no longer necessary\nfor the identified purpose(s).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-user deletion via `system.users.delete` (engine-dependent\nbackup behaviour, same notes as GDPR Art. 17). Per-event /\nper-stream deletion lives alongside for partial-deletion needs.\nDe-identification (Safe Harbor / Expert Determination methods) is\nan application-layer transformation; Pryv stores the result.\n\"**Soon as the original PII is no longer necessary**\" is the\noperator's scheduled-retention obligation for records; Pryv\nships no TTL primitive for events and streams (whole accounts:\naccount auto-deletion since 2.0.0-rc.66, see detail); the\noperator composes `events.get toTime=` + `events.delete` +\naudit-log inactivity oracle in an external\nretention job (`context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`).\n`accesses.create {randomAlias:true}` reduces identification at\nthe access layer while processing continues: a platform-unique\nroutable alias replaces the username on that access, so what the\nserver returns to a counterparty holding it does not name the\nprincipal nor match it against another access. It is not an\nend-of-processing de-identification of the PII (the data stays\nlinked to the account). Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.69 the token\nis accepted under its alias only, so a counterparty who guesses\nthe username cannot confirm it with the token (earlier releases\naccepted it under every name of the account). At the end of\nprocessing, deletion stays the mechanism.\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`, see gdpr.Art.5 §1(e)). For whole accounts, \"no\nlonger necessary\" is enforceable by configuration: your\ninactivity preset (`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays`,\ndefault none) deletes plain accounts with an email address\n(`[ACST14]`) after that many days without use of their personal\naccesses (app accesses too only with\n`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.countAppUse`, since\n2.0.0-rc.81, `[ACST20]`), its clock starting the day it first applies\n(`[ACXP2]`), after reminder mails (`[ACXP3]`) and at least 7 days\nafter the first notice (`[ACXP8]`); the PII principal may also\nschedule their own account's deletion at a date or after a\nperiod, where self-deletion is allowed (`[ACST10]`). The deletion\nis `system.users.delete`'s, guards included (`[ADSW8]`).\nPer-record retention and de-identification stay as above.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "USAD",
       "ACXP2",
       "ACXP3",
       "ACXP8",
       "ACST10",
       "ACST14",
       "ADSW8"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine",
       "user-account.delete",
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.reminders.minNoticeDays"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.17",
       "gdpr.Art.4",
       "hipaa-security.164.310",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.514",
       "ccpa.1798.105"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "randomAlias",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-retention-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4.6",
     "title": "A.7.4.6 Temporary files",
     "text": "Organization shall ensure that temporary files created as a\nresult of processing of PII are disposed of (e.g., erased,\ndestroyed) following documented procedures within a specified,\ndocumented period.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Temporary-file handling is an operating-system / runtime concern.\nPryv-the-software doesn't write PII to ad-hoc temp files; the\noperator's host hygiene (tmpfs, /tmp cleanup, log rotation)\naddresses any temp-file footprints the runtime produces.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.4.9",
     "title": "A.7.4.9 Records of transfer of PII",
     "text": "Organization shall record transfers of PII to or from third\nparties and ensure cooperation with those parties to support\nfuture requests related to obligations to PII principals.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Cross-party PII transfers in Pryv go through accesses (typically\nCMC capability accesses or shared accesses). Each access's\n`clientData` records recipient + purpose + legal basis at grant\ntime; audit log captures each transfer event with timestamp.\nTogether they constitute the §164.528-style accounting record\nfor transfers specifically.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "AT61"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.30",
       "gdpr.Art.44",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.528"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.5.1",
     "title": "A.7.5.1 Identify basis for PII transfer between jurisdictions",
     "text": "Organization shall identify and document the relevant basis for\ntransfers of PII between jurisdictions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Per GDPR Art. 44 /\nSwiss nLPD Art. 34 mapping, the data-residency primitive\nconstrains where data lives; cross-jurisdictional transfers\nrecord the legal basis on the transferring access's\n`clientData.transfer_basis`. The jurisdiction-mapping\ndocumentation (which jurisdictions appear in your deployment,\nwhich transfer regime applies to each pair) is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.44",
       "gdpr.Art.46",
       "gdpr.Art.49"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.5.2",
     "title": "A.7.5.2 Countries and international organizations to which PII can be transferred",
     "text": "Organization shall specify and document the countries and\ninternational organizations to which PII can possibly be\ntransferred.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`auth.hostings` declares the hostings (and thus countries /\njurisdictions) where subjects' data may live; for CMC\ncross-platform sharing, the catalogue of trusted peer\ndeployments + their hostings is operator-managed. The\nStatement-of-Applicability entry for A.7.5.2 cites the\n`auth.hostings` config as the technical artefact.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "REGC",
       "RC01",
       "RC03"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.hostings"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "B.8.5.6",
     "title": "B.8.5.6, Disclosure of subcontractors used to process PII",
     "text": "Processor shall disclose to the customer in advance the use of\nsubcontractors before such subcontractors process PII; processor\nshall publicly publish a list of subcontractors, or make it\navailable on request.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Pryv-the-software has one\noptional subprocessor surface, the observability provider (New\nRelic adapter; default disabled). The operator's subcontractor\nlist typically includes: hosting provider, observability\nprovider when enabled, any backup-storage provider used by\n`bin/backup.js` outputs. The operator publishes the list per\ntheir B.8.5.6 commitment.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2.3",
     "title": "A.7.2.3 Determine when and how notice should be provided",
     "text": "Organization shall determine when and how notice shall be\nprovided to PII principals concerning processing of their PII.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Notice timing + form are\neditorial. Pryv preserves whatever notice is shown (in\n`access.clientData.privacy_notice` or dedicated\n`consent/notice-*` event) so the same content is auditable per\nprincipal per time.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.4",
       "gdpr.Art.12",
       "gdpr.Art.13"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "app-web-auth3"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2.4",
     "title": "A.7.2.4 Obtain and record consent",
     "text": "Organization shall obtain and record consent from PII principals\naccording to the documented processes.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Consent recording = `accesses.create` with permissions +\nclientData carrying the consent text; cross-account consent =\n`consent/request-cmc` events. The access keeps every previous\nversion; an event keeps its previous versions only with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default), so the §7\ndemonstrability requirement is structural for the access and,\nfor the request event, holds as long as your app does not edit\nit or history is on. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.38 the principal's\ncross-account accept records the channels the relationship got\n(`features`, resolved from the offer, which the accept may only\nnarrow) `[HA43]`, `[CD28]`, an account cannot record a consent to\nits own offer (`cmc-self-accept-forbidden`) `[HA46]`, `[CN67]`,\nand the server-written parts of the record survive a concurrent\nclient update `[ESR1]`. See `context/cmc-consent-primitives.md`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP",
       "HA43",
       "CD28",
       "HA46",
       "CN67",
       "ESR1"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.7",
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.4"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "CMC",
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "cmc-consent-primitives"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2.5",
     "title": "A.7.2.5 Privacy impact assessment",
     "text": "Organization shall assess the need for + implement a privacy\nimpact assessment whenever new processing of PII or changes to\nexisting processing are planned.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "PIA / DPIA is a written\nassessment artefact. Pryv contributes the inputs (audit +\naccess primitives describe the processing flow; data-residency\nprimitive describes where data lives). Cross-link to gdpr.Art.35\n+ swiss-nlpd.Art.22 for the regulator-specific DPIA mappings.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.35",
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.22"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "data-residency",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2.6",
     "title": "A.7.2.6 Contracts with PII processors",
     "text": "Organization shall have a written contract with any PII processor\nthat it uses, requiring the processor to implement appropriate\ncontrols.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Contracts are out-of-scope; see GDPR Art. 28 + HIPAA-Security\n§164.314(a)(1).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A.7.2.7",
     "title": "A.7.2.7 Joint PII controller",
     "text": "Organization shall determine respective roles + responsibilities\nwhere it acts jointly with one or more PII controllers.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Joint-controller arrangements\n(per GDPR Art. 26) get recorded on the relevant access's\n`clientData.joint_controller_arrangement` with a pointer to the\nwritten agreement. CMC's cross-platform access pattern is the\nnatural technical substrate for joint arrangements where each\ncontroller runs their own Pryv deployment.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "B.8.2.1",
     "title": "B.8.2.1, Customer agreement",
     "text": "Customer agreement between processor and PII controller shall\naddress the processor's processing of PII consistent with\nISO/IEC 27018:2019 + applicable laws / regulations.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Customer agreement = the DPA. Contractual, no software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "B.8.3.1",
     "title": "B.8.3.1, Obligations to PII principals",
     "text": "Processor shall provide the customer (PII controller) with the\nmeans to comply with its obligations to PII principals (right of\naccess, rectification, erasure, etc.).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The standard Pryv API (events.get / events.update / streams.get\n/ accesses.get / system.users.delete) gives the customer the\nmeans to fulfill each principal-rights obligation directly.\nThe controller wraps these in their subject-portal; the\nprocessor (Pryv operator) doesn't intermediate.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV",
       "PTU1",
       "USAD"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.1",
       "gdpr.Art.15",
       "gdpr.Art.16",
       "gdpr.Art.17",
       "gdpr.Art.20"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "B.8.4",
     "title": "B.8.4, Privacy by design and by default",
     "text": "Processor shall ensure privacy + data-protection design + default\nprinciples are implemented in processing of PII.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's architecture\nleans privacy-by-design (per-user isolation, least-privilege\npermissions, system-streams separation, audit by default). The\nprocessor inheriting these defaults satisfies B.8.4\nstructurally. See gdpr.Art.25 for the cross-link to the\ndetailed primitive mapping.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.25",
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.7"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "B.8.5.2",
     "title": "B.8.5.2, Records of PII disclosures to third parties",
     "text": "Processor shall record disclosures of PII to third parties,\nincluding what PII has been disclosed, to whom, and at what time.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "When the processor (Pryv operator) executes a third-party\ndisclosure (e.g., a CMC cross-platform share, a shared access\nto a counterparty), the audit log records the API call with\naccess reference; the access's `clientData.recipient` +\n`clientData.purpose` capture the \"to whom\" + \"for what\" fields.\nTogether they constitute B.8.5.2-compliant records.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "AT61"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.9",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.528",
       "gdpr.Art.30"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "mdr",
   "title": "Medical Device Regulation",
   "short": "MDR",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "EU + EEA",
   "version": "Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (consolidated, incl. 2023 amendments to transition periods)",
   "version_date": "2017-04-05",
   "canonical_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/745/oj",
   "layered_on": [
    "gdpr"
   ],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/mdr",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/mdr.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "Art.10",
     "title": "General obligations of manufacturers",
     "text": "Manufacturers shall ensure devices are designed and manufactured in\naccordance with the requirements of the Regulation; shall establish,\ndocument, implement, maintain, keep up-to-date and continually\nimprove a QMS that ensures compliance.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "MDR Art. 10 is the umbrella\nobligation tying every other requirement to the manufacturer's\nQMS. Pryv supplies the technical raw material that several QMS\nsub-processes draw on (audit log for design controls +\npost-market data; observability for system-status evidence;\nbackup-restore for data-integrity controls). The QMS itself is\nthe manufacturer's organizational artefact, see ISO 13485\nscope for that side.\n",
     "detail": "§10(1) compliance \"with the requirements of this Regulation\" is a\nprogramme. §10(9) requires the QMS cover at minimum: strategy for\nregulatory compliance, risk management, clinical evaluation, design\nand manufacturing, post-market surveillance, communication,\nvigilance reporting, management of CAPAs, monitoring + measurement\nof output. Pryv contributes inputs to several of these, none can\nbe discharged by Pryv alone.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.51",
     "title": "Classification of devices",
     "text": "Devices shall be divided into classes I, IIa, IIb and III, taking\ninto account the intended purpose of the devices and their\ninherent risks. Classification shall be carried out in accordance\nwith Annex VIII.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Classification is a regulatory decision by the manufacturer (with\nNotified Body involvement from class IIa upwards). Pryv is not a\nmedical device itself, when an implementer builds a device on\nPryv, the device's classification is determined by its own\nintended purpose. Pryv has no contribution and no implementer\nobligation arises from this Article alone.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.52",
     "title": "Conformity assessment procedures",
     "text": "Manufacturers of devices, other than custom-made devices, shall\nundertake an assessment of the conformity of those devices in\naccordance with the applicable conformity assessment procedures\nset out in Annexes IX-XI.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Conformity assessment (technical documentation + clinical\nevaluation + QMS audit by a Notified Body for class IIa+) is the\nmanufacturer's process. Pryv may appear in the technical\ndocumentation as a sub-system supplier, but the conformity\ndecision is the manufacturer's. No software contribution from\nPryv at this layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.61",
     "title": "Clinical evaluation",
     "text": "Confirmation of compliance with relevant general safety + performance\nrequirements set out in Annex I shall be based on clinical data\nproviding sufficient clinical evidence.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Clinical evaluation is the\nmanufacturer's regulatory artefact. Pryv's contribution is\noperational: if your device collects clinical data during the\nevaluation, Pryv stores it (events with stable class/format\nfrom data-types) and audit-logs its processing, making the\nclinical data set inspectable and reproducible.\n",
     "detail": "The post-market clinical follow-up (PMCF) plan under Annex XIV B\ndrives ongoing data collection. Pryv as the data backend gives\nyou a single, audit-trailed substrate for both the pre-market\nclinical evaluation file and the PMCF data feed.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "event",
       "stream",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.62",
     "title": "General requirements regarding clinical investigations",
     "text": "Clinical investigations on devices shall be designed and conducted\nto ensure rights, safety, dignity and well-being of subjects;\ndata shall be reliable and robust.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Subject protection in\nclinical investigations rides on the same Pryv primitives that\ncarry GDPR Art. 32, per-subject storage isolation, access\ncontrol, audit, encryption at rest, restoration. \"Reliable and\nrobust\" data is the manufacturer's burden; audit-logged +\nversion-preserved Pryv events are the substrate.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.32"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.83",
     "title": "Post-market surveillance system of the manufacturer",
     "text": "Manufacturers shall plan, establish, document, implement, maintain\nand update a post-market surveillance (PMS) system in a manner\nproportionate to the risk class and appropriate for the type of\ndevice.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "PMS data sources are\ntwo-fold: (1) operational telemetry of the device + backend\n(audit log + observability telemetry when enabled); (2) field\ndata from the device itself, captured as events. Pryv is the\nsubstrate for both. The PMS plan itself, its trend analysis,\nand the PSUR write-up under Art. 86 are manufacturer-side.\n",
     "detail": "Pryv's audit log gives you the \"what was processed, by whom,\nwhen\" timeline for the backend layer of the device. The\nobservability adapter (when enabled) gives system-availability\n+ error-rate metrics, useful PMS indicators. For device-side\nincident events (user-reported issues, on-device errors etc.),\nthe device pushes them as Pryv events on a dedicated stream.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.85",
     "title": "Post-market surveillance report",
     "text": "Manufacturers of class I devices shall prepare a post-market\nsurveillance report summarising the results and conclusions of\nthe analyses of the post-market surveillance data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The PMS report itself is an\neditorial artefact the manufacturer drafts. Pryv contributes\nthe data: audit log gives the backend activity summary; events\non the PMS streams give the field data summary. Composition of\nthe report is yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.86",
     "title": "Periodic safety update report",
     "text": "Manufacturers of class IIa, IIb and III devices shall prepare a\nperiodic safety update report (PSUR) summarising the results +\nconclusions of analyses of post-market surveillance data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Same Pryv contribution as\nArt. 85, with cadence increased per device class (annually for\nIIa+; available to competent authorities; for class III +\nimplantables, uploaded into Eudamed). The PSUR's analytical\ncontent remains manufacturer-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "event",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.87",
     "title": "Reporting of serious incidents and field safety corrective actions",
     "text": "Manufacturers shall report any serious incident involving devices\nmade available on the Union market, except expected side-effects\nwhich are clearly documented in the product information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The reporting decision + the\nreport itself are manufacturer-side. Pryv's audit log +\nobservability data make root-cause analysis tractable when\ninvestigating an incident, particularly when the incident's\nchain of causation touches the backend (e.g., a latency spike\ncorrelated to a clinical decision). The 15-day / 10-day / 2-day\nreporting timelines are operational.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "event",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.17",
     "title": "Annex I §17 Electronic programmable systems / software",
     "text": "Devices that incorporate electronic programmable systems, including\nsoftware, or software that are devices in themselves, shall be\ndesigned to ensure repeatability, reliability and performance\naccording to their intended use.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Annex I §17 is the General\nSafety + Performance Requirement (GSPR) most directly relevant\nto software medical devices. Pryv as the backend contributes to\nseveral §17 sub-clauses: §17.2 (development and manufacture in\naccordance with state-of-the-art principles), §17.4 (verification\nand validation, audit log enables it), §17.5 (interaction with\nmobile platforms, out of Pryv scope, app-side).\n",
     "detail": "Per §17 sub-clause:\n  - §17.1 Repeatability/reliability/performance, Pryv's audit log\n    + reproducible-deployment posture (Docker image + multi-core\n    HA) supports the manufacturer's V+V evidence.\n  - §17.2 State-of-the-art SDLC, IEC 62304 alignment is\n    manufacturer-side. Pryv's own release process (Dockerfile,\n    test matrix, CHANGELOGs) feeds the manufacturer's supplier\n    assessment.\n  - §17.3 Risk management throughout the software lifecycle,\n    ISO 14971-aligned; manufacturer-side. Pryv-side risk artefacts\n    (e.g., this matrix + the QMS) inform supplier assessment.\n  - §17.4 Verification and validation, audit log + the\n    compliance-matrix test-citation chain are concrete evidence.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "backup-restore",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.18",
     "title": "Annex I §18 Active devices / connected devices",
     "text": "Active devices and devices connected to them shall be designed in\nsuch a way as to remove or reduce as far as possible the risks\nrelating to electrical, mechanical or thermal hazards.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Annex I §18 covers physical electrical/mechanical/thermal hazards,\noutside Pryv's scope as a backend service. When the device\ndepends on Pryv for safe operation (e.g., a connected clinical\nmonitor), §18.4 + §18.7 (interoperability + connection-loss\nsafety) become operational concerns the manufacturer addresses\nat the device + integration layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.23",
     "title": "Annex I §23 Information supplied with the device",
     "text": "The instructions for use and label of a device shall comply with\ndefined requirements (§23.1 labels, §23.2 IFU content, §23.3\ne-labelling, §23.4 patient implant card content where applicable).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Labelling + IFU content is the device manufacturer's editorial\nartefact. Pryv has no role at the IFU-content layer. For\nsoftware medical devices that present the IFU in-app, the IFU\nversioning + acknowledgement record can ride on Pryv events\nwith `clientData.ifu_version`, but the IFU content is\nmanufacturer-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.27",
     "title": "Unique Device Identification (UDI) system",
     "text": "Manufacturers shall assign a UDI to their devices and place it on\nthe device label (or its packaging) before placing on the market;\nrecord the UDI in their internal device-file system; submit it\nto the UDI database (Eudamed UDI module).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "UDI assignment + Eudamed submission are manufacturer-side. Pryv\ndoesn't ship with a UDI (Pryv is not itself a medical device).\nWhen a device built on Pryv has a UDI, the manufacturer's UDI\nrecord may cite Pryv as a sub-system component but the UDI\nmanagement is theirs.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.93",
     "title": "Market surveillance activities (competent authorities)",
     "text": "Competent authorities shall perform appropriate checks on the\nconformity characteristics + performance of devices, including\nreview of documentation, physical / laboratory checks on\nadequate samples, follow-up of received vigilance information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Market surveillance is competent-authority activity. Pryv has no\nsoftware role. If an authority requests information about the\nPryv-backed device, the manufacturer's evidence pack (drawing\non this matrix + the audit log) is the substrate of the\nresponse.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.95",
     "title": "Measures required to deal with devices presenting an unacceptable risk to health",
     "text": "Competent authorities may require manufacturers to take all\nappropriate corrective actions where a device presents an\nunacceptable risk; including withdrawal, recall, restrictions\non availability.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "A recall / withdrawal\ndecision is manufacturer + authority side. Pryv contributes:\naudit log + observability data scope the affected user / device\npopulation (which subjects' devices were active when the risk\nwas identified); the access primitive gives the technical\nmechanism to disable the device's backend connectivity if\nremote disable is part of the corrective action; events on a\n`recall/*` stream carry the recall communication record per\naffected subject.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access",
       "event",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.84",
     "title": "Post-market surveillance plan",
     "text": "The post-market surveillance plan referred to in Art. 83 shall be\npart of the technical documentation specified in Annex II; details\nin Annex III.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The PMS plan document itself\nis the manufacturer's artefact (it lives in the technical\ndocumentation under Annex III). Pryv-side operational\ncontribution: when the plan calls for specific data collection\n(e.g., field-event reporting cadence, telemetry thresholds),\nthe event-stream + audit substrate carries the data flow per\nthe plan. The plan's content (criteria, methods, cadence) is\nmanufacturer-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "mdr.Art.83",
       "iso-13485.4.2.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A2.5",
     "title": "Annex II §5 Information supplied by the manufacturer",
     "text": "Technical documentation shall include a complete set of information\nsupplied with the device (labels, IFU, design history file\nsummary, post-market documentation references).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "The technical documentation\nfile (TDF) is the manufacturer's regulatory artefact. Pryv-side\nsupport: events on a designated `tdf/<device-id>/*` stream with\nattachments give a single, versioned, backed-up + audit-trailed\nhome for the file's contents. Cross-link to iso-13485.7.3.10\n(design + development files) preserves the QMS standard's\nparallel obligation.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-13485.7.3.10",
       "mdr.A1.23"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.5",
     "title": "Placing on the market and putting into service",
     "text": "A device may be placed on the market or put into service only if\nit complies with this Regulation when duly supplied and properly\ninstalled, maintained and used in accordance with its intended\npurpose.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Placing-on-market is the manufacturer's act and depends on the\ndevice passing classification + conformity assessment. Pryv has\nno role in the act itself.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.11",
     "title": "Authorised representative",
     "text": "Where manufacturer is not established in a Member State, the\ndevice may only be placed on the Union market if the manufacturer\ndesignates an authorised representative.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Authorised-representative designation is a contractual + Eudamed-\nregistration step for non-EU manufacturers. No software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.31",
     "title": "Registration of manufacturers, authorised representatives + importers",
     "text": "Manufacturers, authorised representatives + importers shall\nsubmit specified information to Eudamed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Eudamed registration is a regulatory submission. No software\nrole.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.55",
     "title": "Implant card and information to be supplied to the patient with an implanted device",
     "text": "Manufacturer of an implantable device shall supply with the\ndevice an implant card carrying device identification + patient-\nspecific safety information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Implant cards are physical artefacts (or digital equivalents\nissued at implantation). If a digital implant-card record lives\nin Pryv, the manufacturer puts it on a designated\n`implant-card/*` stream, but the regulatory burden remains\nmanufacturer-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.14",
     "title": "General obligations of importers",
     "text": "Importers shall verify that devices have been CE-marked + the\nEU declaration of conformity drawn up, manufacturer + authorised\nrepresentative are identified, and importer's name + registered\ntrade name + address + place of business / single registered\noffice + UDI are indicated on device labelling or accompanying\ndocumentation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Importer obligations are contractual + regulatory. No software\nrole.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.15",
     "title": "General obligations of distributors",
     "text": "Distributors shall act with due care + verify CE marking,\nEU declaration of conformity, language requirements, expiry\ndates, etc. Shall cooperate with manufacturers and competent\nauthorities + maintain a register of complaints, non-conforming\ndevices, recalls + withdrawals.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Distributor obligations are operational. No software role; if a\ndistributor uses Pryv to store its complaints + recall register,\nsee the iso-13485.4.2.5 control-of-records row.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "pipeda",
   "title": "Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (Canada)",
   "short": "PIPEDA",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "Canada (federal, private sector)",
   "version": "S.C. 2000, c. 5 (consolidated, incl. Digital Privacy Act 2015 amendments)",
   "version_date": "2001-01-01",
   "canonical_url": "https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-8.6/",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/pipeda",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/pipeda.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.1",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 1, Accountability",
     "text": "Organization is responsible for personal information under its\ncontrol and shall designate an individual or individuals who are\naccountable for compliance with the following principles.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Accountable-individual\ndesignation is HR / organizational. Pryv contributes the\nsubstrate the designated officer uses to demonstrate compliance:\naudit log, observability, this matrix. Equips the role; doesn't\nreplace it.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.24",
       "gdpr.Art.37",
       "iso-27701.A.7.2.1"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.2",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 2, Identifying Purposes",
     "text": "Purposes for which personal information is collected shall be\nidentified by the organization at or before the time the\ninformation is collected.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Per-access\n`clientData.purpose` records the identified purpose at the moment\nthe access is minted (which is \"at or before the time the\ninformation is collected\" for the access's scope). The purpose\nvocabulary is editorial.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "iso-27701.A.7.2.1"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.3",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 3, Consent",
     "text": "Knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the\ncollection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except\nwhere inappropriate.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Pryv's access primitive IS the durable consent record,\nversioned permissions + clientData (carrying the consent text +\nknowledge-of-purpose disclosure) together prove what was\nauthorised. Withdrawal is `accesses.delete` or scope-down via\n`accesses.update`; the version chain proves the timing. CMC\n`consent/*` events handle cross-account flows.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.7",
       "iso-27701.A.7.2.4",
       "ccpa.1798.120"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "CMC",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.4",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 4, Limiting Collection",
     "text": "Collection of personal information shall be limited to that which\nis necessary for the purposes identified by the organization.\nInformation shall be collected by fair and lawful means.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Per-stream permissions limit what each access can write,\ndata outside an access's scope cannot reach Pryv via that access.\nStream-topology design (separating purposes onto distinct\nsubtrees) gives the granularity for \"necessary for the\nidentified purposes\". The fairness + lawfulness of the\ncollection method is editorial.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.1",
       "ccpa.1798.140"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.5",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 5, Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention",
     "text": "Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes\nother than those for which it was collected, except with the\nconsent of the individual or as required by law. Shall be\nretained only as long as necessary for the fulfilment of those\npurposes.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Limit-use enforced by permissions; limit-disclosure enforced by\naccess scope to recipient. Retention has the same\nconfigurable engine-dependent erasure mechanics noted under\nGDPR Art. 17 + HIPAA-Security §164.310(d)(1): SQLite per-user\nfile deletion vs PG row deletion + backup rotation.\nAutomatic / scheduled retention enforcement is **operator-\nowned** for events and streams (Pryv ships no TTL primitive\nfor records; whole accounts are covered by account\nauto-deletion, see detail); the operator's external\nretention job composes `events.get toTime=<cutoff>` +\n`events.delete` + audit-log inactivity oracle,\n`context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`).\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`, see gdpr.Art.5 §1(e)). For the account level,\n\"retained only as long as necessary\" is a setting: your\ninactivity preset (`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays`,\ndefault none) deletes accounts unused for that many days, its\nclock starting the day it first applies (`[ACXP2]`), after\nreminder mails (`[ACXP3]`) and at least 7 days after the first\nnotice (`[ACXP8]`), and each individual may schedule their own\naccount's deletion. A preset covers only plain accounts with an\nemail address (`[ACST14]`, `[ADSW9]`); state it in your privacy\npolicy. Event-level retention stays your retention job.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "USAD",
       "ACXP2",
       "ACXP3",
       "ACXP8",
       "ACST14",
       "ADSW9"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine",
       "user-account.delete",
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.reminders.minNoticeDays"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "gdpr.Art.17",
       "ccpa.1798.105",
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-retention-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.6",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 6, Accuracy",
     "text": "Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and\nup-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is\nto be used.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "`events.update` rectifies events (matching GDPR Art. 16); the\nprior value is kept only on a deployment with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default), while the\naudit log records who rectified which event and when either way.\nThe \"necessary for the purposes\" determination is editorial.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "PTU1"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "gdpr.Art.16",
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.3"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.7",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 7, Safeguards",
     "text": "Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards\nappropriate to the sensitivity of the information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Multi-aspect safeguards\ninherited from the same primitive set as GDPR Art. 32 +\nHIPAA-Security § 164.312 + ISO 27001 A.8. The \"appropriate to\nsensitivity\" judgement (which subset to enable, how strictly to\nscope) is the operator's.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.32",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(a)(1)",
       "iso-27001.A.8.20"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "MFA",
       "backup-restore",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "End-to-end encryption reframes the safeguards posture for high-sensitivity health data",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=180707914&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C34"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.8",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 8, Openness",
     "text": "Organization shall make readily available to individuals specific\ninformation about its policies and practices relating to the\nmanagement of personal information.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Policy + practice text lives\non `access.clientData.privacy_notice` or as `consent/notice`\nevents, durably + per-subject + per-time recoverable. The\n`app-web-auth3` template is the customer-facing surface where\nthe policy typically appears. Drafting the text is editorial.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.12",
       "gdpr.Art.13",
       "ccpa.1798.130"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "app-web-auth3",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.9",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 9, Individual Access",
     "text": "Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence,\nuse, and disclosure of their personal information and shall be\ngiven access to that information. An individual shall be able\nto challenge the accuracy and completeness of the information\nand have it amended as appropriate.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Individual access is the same primitive surface as GDPR Art. 15 +\nHIPAA-Privacy § 164.524 + CCPA § 1798.100: subject holding a\npersonal token reads events, streams, accesses (with history),\naudit data via the standard Pryv API. Challenge-and-amend uses\n`events.update` for amendments + the disagreement-statement-as-\nevent pattern for denied amendments.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV",
       "PTU1"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.15",
       "gdpr.Art.16",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.524",
       "ccpa.1798.100"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "stream",
       "event",
       "audit",
       "data-types",
       "account-backup-tool"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Principle.4.10",
     "title": "Schedule 1, Principle 10, Challenging Compliance",
     "text": "Individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning\ncompliance with the above principles to the designated\nindividual or individuals accountable for the organization's\ncompliance.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Complaint-intake workflow\nstores each challenge as an event on a designated\n`compliance/challenges/*` stream with disposition tracking. The\naccountable-individual interaction + resolution workflow is\noperator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.530(d)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "s.10.1",
     "title": "Division 1.1, Mandatory breach reporting (Digital Privacy Act 2015)",
     "text": "Organization shall report to the Privacy Commissioner any breach\nof security safeguards involving personal information under its\ncontrol if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that\nthe breach creates a real risk of significant harm (RROSH).\nShall also notify affected individuals + maintain records of\nevery breach for at least 24 months.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Same primitive set as the\nparallel breach-notification regimes (GDPR Art. 33-34,\nHIPAA-Breach §164.402-404, Swiss nLPD Art.24): the shipped\n`bin/breach-scope.js` + audit log produce the RROSH-input\nartefact (records affected, methods invoked, streams in scope)\nin one command per compromised access; operator-side\nat-rest encryption may bear on the RROSH determination\n(HHS-equivalent safe-harbor reasoning, though RROSH is a\ndifferent test). The 24-month record-retention obligation rides\non Pryv events on a `compliance/breaches/*` stream.\n",
     "detail": "RROSH factors include sensitivity of the PI involved + probability\nthat the PI has been / will be misused, both informed by\nPryv-side data (audit row method + access reference + clientData\ncategorization). The decision itself + reporting + notification\ncontent + delivery are the operator's; record-keeping rides on\nPryv.\n\n**Notification delivery** (s.10.1 \"notify affected individuals\"),\nvoluntarily missing + operator-owned at the platform layer.\nPryv ships the identification primitive (audit log + the\nshipped `bin/breach-scope.js`); operator composes delivery\nvia their\nexisting CRM / mail / SMS pipeline. Per-recipient send-\nreceipts captured back as\n`compliance/breach-notification/sent-cmc` events satisfy\nthe 24-month record-retention obligation on the same Pryv\nevent chain. Full pattern in\n`context/breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.33",
       "gdpr.Art.34",
       "hipaa-breach.164.402",
       "hipaa-breach.164.404",
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.24"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "access",
       "event"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "breach-notification-delivery-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained audit log improves RROSH evidence chain (scoping + non-repudiation)",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "s.11",
     "title": "Right to file a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner",
     "text": "Individual may file with the Commissioner a written complaint\nagainst an organization for contravening a provision of Division\n1 or for not following a recommendation set out in Schedule 1.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Complaint-to-Commissioner is the individual's procedural right;\nno software role on the Pryv side. The organization's response\nfile (the underlying evidence) draws on the audit log + this\nmatrix.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "framing",
     "title": "PIPEDA + provincial regimes, applicability",
     "text": "PIPEDA applies federally; provincial private-sector privacy acts\n(BC PIPA, AB PIPA, Quebec Law 25) may apply in place of PIPEDA\nto organizations operating substantially within those provinces.\nImplementer determines which regime applies + may face multiple.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Applicability is a legal\ndetermination, not a software control. Pryv-side support: the\ndata-residency primitive lets you bind Canadian subjects' data\nto a Canadian hosting (per-province granularity if multiple\nCanadian hostings are configured), which simplifies the\nsubstantially-within-province analysis. Tracking the chosen\nregime per-deployment is operator-side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "soc2",
   "title": "SOC 2, AICPA Trust Services Criteria (Security, Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, Privacy)",
   "short": "SOC 2",
   "type": "standard",
   "jurisdiction": "United States (AICPA)",
   "version": "Trust Services Criteria (2017), with revised points of focus (2022)",
   "version_date": "2022-01-01",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.aicpa-cima.com/resources/landing/trust-services-criteria",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/soc2",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/soc2.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "CC1.1",
     "title": "CC1.1 Commitment to integrity and ethical values",
     "text": "The entity demonstrates a commitment to integrity and ethical\nvalues.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Integrity + ethics are a management-and-culture matter. Pryv has\nno software role at the values / code-of-conduct layer; your audit\nlog can later evidence whether workforce behaviour matched the\nstated values, but the commitment itself is yours to make and\ndocument.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC1.2",
     "title": "CC1.2 Board independence and oversight",
     "text": "The board of directors demonstrates independence from management\nand exercises oversight of the development and performance of\ninternal control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Board governance is organizational. No software contribution; this\nmatrix + the audit log feed the oversight pack the board reviews,\nbut the oversight function is yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC1.3",
     "title": "CC1.3 Management structures, reporting lines, authorities",
     "text": "Management establishes, with board oversight, structures,\nreporting lines, and appropriate authorities and responsibilities\nin the pursuit of objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Org structure + authority assignment are management artefacts.\nPryv enforces the *technical* half of \"appropriate authorities\"\nonce you've decided them (see CC6.3 least-privilege), but the\nreporting-line design itself is yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC1.4",
     "title": "CC1.4 Commitment to competence",
     "text": "The entity demonstrates a commitment to attract, develop, and\nretain competent individuals in alignment with objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Hiring + training + retention is an HR programme. No software\nrole.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC1.5",
     "title": "CC1.5 Accountability for internal control responsibilities",
     "text": "The entity holds individuals accountable for their internal\ncontrol responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv gives you the technical accountability substrate: every API\ncall is attributable to an access (accessId + accessSerial) in the\nper-user audit log, so \"who did what, when\" is recoverable when\nyou need to hold an individual to account. Defining the\nresponsibilities and the consequence process is your management\nactivity; Pryv supplies the evidence trail.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.16"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC2.1",
     "title": "CC2.1 Quality information to support internal control",
     "text": "The entity obtains or generates and uses relevant, quality\ninformation to support the functioning of internal control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv produces two streams of control-relevant information: the\nper-user audit log (application-level activity, attributable to an\naccess) and observability metrics (operational + security KPIs via\nthe pluggable provider). What you monitor and how you act on it is\nyour programme; Pryv supplies the quality data.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC2.2",
     "title": "CC2.2 Internal communication of objectives and responsibilities",
     "text": "The entity internally communicates information, including\nobjectives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary\nto support the functioning of internal control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Internal communication of objectives is a management activity. No\nsoftware role at the communication-content layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC2.3",
     "title": "CC2.3 External communication on internal control matters",
     "text": "The entity communicates with external parties regarding matters\naffecting the functioning of internal control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "For the slice of external communication that concerns the Pryv\nplatform itself, open-pryv.io's public release process is the\nchannel: tagged releases, CHANGELOG-v2 + CHANGELOG-v2-back, and\n(when shipped) the vulnerability-disclosure programme. You layer\nyour own customer / subprocessor / auditor communications on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.19"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC3.1",
     "title": "CC3.1 Specifies objectives with sufficient clarity",
     "text": "The entity specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable\nthe identification and assessment of risks relating to objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Objective-setting is your management exercise. Pryv has no role in\nauthoring objectives; the matrix supports the downstream\nrisk-to-control mapping once your objectives exist.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC3.2",
     "title": "CC3.2 Identifies and analyzes risk",
     "text": "The entity identifies risks to the achievement of its objectives\nacross the entity and analyzes risks as a basis for determining\nhow the risks should be managed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Your risk-assessment methodology and the specific findings are\nyours. Pryv contributes the inventory of technical controls (this\nmatrix, particularly the CC6 access + CC6.6/6.7 boundary +\ncryptography rows), when you identify a confidentiality /\nintegrity / availability risk, the matrix surfaces which Pryv\nprimitive addresses it, so control applicability is mechanical\nrather than judgemental.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.6.1.2"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC3.3",
     "title": "CC3.3 Considers the potential for fraud",
     "text": "The entity considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks\nto the achievement of objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv's audit log + observability metrics are the detection\nsubstrate for insider-misuse and anomalous-access fraud scenarios\n(every access is attributable; unusual read/write patterns\nsurface). The fraud-risk analysis itself, which scenarios matter,\nwhat thresholds trigger review, is your assessment.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC3.4",
     "title": "CC3.4 Identifies and assesses changes affecting internal control",
     "text": "The entity identifies and assesses changes that could\nsignificantly impact the system of internal control.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "For changes to the Pryv platform, open-pryv.io's CHANGELOGs +\ntagged releases announce what changed; the audit log shows when\nconfig-driven behaviour changed observably in your deployment. The\nchange-impact assessment process is yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.32"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC4.1",
     "title": "CC4.1 Performs ongoing and separate evaluations",
     "text": "The entity selects, develops, and performs ongoing and/or\nseparate evaluations to ascertain whether the components of\ninternal control are present and functioning.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv supplies the data an ongoing evaluation samples: the audit\nlog evidences control-effectiveness (e.g., that access scoping\nactually blocks out-of-scope reads), observability evidences\noperational health. You define the evaluation cadence and the\nsampling method.\n",
     "detail": "**A separate evaluation of the platform code.** The open-pryv.io\nmaintainers ran a code-level security review of the source in 2026\n(2026-06 to 2026-10); its confirmed findings were fixed with\nregression tests in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.40 to 2.0.0-rc.51, each\ndescribed in the release notes. The public report,\n`SECURITY-AUDIT.md`\n(https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md,\npublished 2026-10-14), lists each finding with its severity and fix\nrelease and the known residual risks. Cite it as a supplier\nevaluation of the software component; it does not evaluate your\ndeployment's controls, and it was not performed by an independent\nparty. See `context/code-security-review-2026.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.16",
       "iso-27001.9.1"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC4.2",
     "title": "CC4.2 Evaluates and communicates deficiencies",
     "text": "The entity evaluates and communicates internal control\ndeficiencies in a timely manner to those parties responsible for\ntaking corrective action.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv-side deficiency signals (audit anomalies, observability\nalerts) feed your deficiency-tracking process. CAPA-style records\ncan themselves ride on Pryv events on a dedicated stream. The\nevaluation + communication workflow is your procedure.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.10.2"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC5.1",
     "title": "CC5.1 Selects and develops control activities",
     "text": "The entity selects and develops control activities that\ncontribute to the mitigation of risks to the achievement of\nobjectives to acceptable levels.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Several of your control activities ARE Pryv primitives:\npermission-scoped access tokens (purpose limitation), system\nstreams (privileged-data isolation), encryption of operator\nsecrets at rest. You select which to deploy against which risk;\nPryv provides the activities ready-made rather than as something\nyou build.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.27"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC5.2",
     "title": "CC5.2 General control activities over technology",
     "text": "The entity also selects and develops general control activities\nover technology to support the achievement of objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "The technology general controls SOC 2 examines, logical access,\nauthentication, encryption in transit + at rest for secrets,\naudit logging, secure inter-core transport, are shipped Pryv\nprimitives, enforced at the API surface rather than left to your\nconfiguration discipline. The CC6 + CC7 rows below detail each.\nYour role is selecting and operating them.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.3",
       "iso-27001.A.8.24"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC5.3",
     "title": "CC5.3 Deploys control activities through policies and procedures",
     "text": "The entity deploys control activities through policies that\nestablish what is expected and procedures that put policies into\naction.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Policy + procedure authoring is your editorial work. Pryv enforces\nwhat the policies decide (access rules, encryption), but the\npolicy text and the operating procedures are yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.1",
     "title": "CC6.1 Logical access security over protected information assets",
     "text": "The entity implements logical access security software,\ninfrastructure, and architectures over protected information\nassets to protect them from security events to meet the entity's\nobjectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Logical access is enforced by Pryv at the API surface: every\nread/write is checked against the access's per-stream + level\npermissions, token-based authentication is the default, and MFA is\navailable via the mfa.* methods (on by default since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.14 with authenticator-app TOTP; each account holder\nenrols) `[MA15C]`, `[MA11A]`. System streams\nisolate privileged data (credentials, MFA state). Transport\nencryption is configured (in the core or at your proxy, see\nCC6.7). You define who gets which access; Pryv enforces it.\n",
     "detail": "**OAuth2 as a second logical-access path.** Alongside token +\nMFA authentication, Pryv ships a standards-based OAuth2\nauthorization-code + PKCE authorization server\n(`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8):\ndiscovery at `GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`,\n`GET /oauth2/authorize`, and `POST /oauth2/token`. PKCE is\nmandatory (S256 only); presented redirect URIs are validated by\nexact string match with a single loopback-port carve-out\n(RFC 8252 / 9700) and fragment-bearing redirect URIs are rejected\n(`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/src/clientRegistry.ts`). Client\nregistration is curated-only, the operator promotes an account\nto an OAuth client via `bin/oauth-client.js`; open self-service\nregistration (`POST /oauth2/register`) is deliberately disabled.\n\n**The OAuth2 surface since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.64.** Added and\ntested: token revocation (`POST /oauth2/revoke`, RFC 7009) and\nintrospection for clients registered `--can-introspect`\n(`POST /oauth2/introspect`, RFC 7662), OpenID Connect discovery,\nkey set and id tokens when `oauth.signingKeys` lists a key (rc.69)\n`[ORVK1]`, `[OXI01]`, `[OXD01]`; resource indicators (RFC 8707),\nrefused as `invalid_target` (rc.70) `[ORI03]`; token exchange for\nresource servers registered `--can-exchange` (RFC 8693, rc.73)\n`[OTX05]`; clients identified by a client metadata document URL\nwhen `oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode` is not `off` (rc.74, see\nCC6.2) `[OCMDE06]`. Since rc.74 the OAuth2 and discovery endpoints\nanswer CORS with their own policy (any origin, never credentials)\ninstead of the API's `[OACO1]`. Per-user addresses (rc.75) bind an\nauthorization to the account its address names `[OPUE2]`; with\n`oauth.perUserIssuer` (rc.77, opt-in) each account host is its own\nissuer `[OPIS4]`. The access-control effect of these is recorded on\nCC6.3 and `hipaa-security.164.312(a)(1)`.\n\n**Federated sign-in (SSO).** An account holder may also authenticate\nthrough an external OpenID Connect provider (`sso.*`, beta, off by\ndefault). It mints a normal Pryv session but is gated so an external\nidentity cannot claim an account whose email was never inbox-proved,\nMFA (when active) is still enforced, and the session token reaches\nthe auth app via a one-time shared secret, never a URL. Sign-ins and\nrefusals are recorded in the audit trail (`sso.login`, `sso.refused`).\n\n**Credential transmission to third parties.** When a credential\nmust be handed to a counterparty, the shared-secrets endpoints\n(`open-pryv.io/components/shared-secrets/`) replace URL-embedded\ntokens with a one-time random key: redeemable exactly once (with\natomic single-winner semantics under concurrent redemption),\nmandatory TTL, only the SHA-256 of the key's random half stored\nserver-side, payload scrubbed when the item leaves the pending\nstate (on redemption, on a signature mismatch, and on the first\nretrieval attempt after the TTL; expiry is enforced on access,\nnot by a background sweeper, so an untouched expired secret keeps\nits payload until something reaches it or you delete it),\noptional passphrase / HMAC signature on redemption. Browser history, referrer headers, and access logs\ntherefore stop carrying live credentials. A\n`secretSharing: forbidden` feature permission, inherited by\nchild accesses and not strippable via `accesses.update`, lets\nyou exclude designated access classes from minting shared\nsecrets at all.\n\n**Delegate-account access path.** Account delegation\n(`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) lets one account hold an\nowner-equivalent delegate token over another. It rides the same\nper-stream permission enforcement as any token, and its logical-\naccess guarantee is the non-forgeable teardown: a delegate can\nnever remove a delegation, and dissolving one requires a genuine\nlogin on the controlled account (a personal token with no\nforge-protected delegation marker). The `:_delegation:*`\nnamespace is plugin-owned and guarded (no user create/write/\ndelete; internal subtree read-guarded and excluded from wildcard\nreads); each delegate's actions are audited on the controlled\naccount. See `context/delegation-model.md`.\n\n**Privileged streams, by every spelling of an id** (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.56). The guards that isolate the account fields (the\nprimary email, written only through `account.update`; the\nnon-editable and hidden fields; the level caps on account-stream\npermissions), the delegation namespace and the plugin-managed\nregions of the cross-account (CMC) namespace judge the stream an\nid resolves to, whatever store-prefixed spelling a request uses,\nfor every token `[ASA1]`, `[ASA2]`, `[ASA6]`, `[CNRP6]`,\n`[CNRP7]`. Before this release a store-prefixed spelling was not\nrecognised by these guards, so the isolation held only for\nrequests using the canonical ids; in particular an access holding\n`contribute` on the email field could change the primary email\nthrough the events API.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "MA15C",
       "MA11A",
       "SHS02",
       "SHS09",
       "SHS13",
       "ASA1",
       "ASA2",
       "ASA6",
       "CNRP6",
       "CNRP7",
       "ORVK1",
       "OXI01",
       "OXD01",
       "ORI03",
       "OTX05",
       "OCMDE06",
       "OACO1",
       "OPUE2",
       "OPIS4"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/auth-oauth2.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "oauth.signingKeys",
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode",
       "oauth.perUserIssuer"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.15",
       "iso-27001.A.8.5",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(a)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "MFA",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "shared-secrets",
       "delegation"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "delegation-model"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "enhancement",
       "summary": "Reference TOTP / WebAuthn MFA plugins + AAL-tier mapping strengthen the CC6.1 authentication-strength evidence",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467852&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C78"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.2",
     "title": "CC6.2 User registration, credential issuance, and de-provisioning",
     "text": "Prior to issuing system credentials and granting system access,\nthe entity registers and authorizes new internal and external\nusers whose access is administered by the entity. For those users\nwhose access is administered by the entity, user system\ncredentials are removed when user access is no longer authorized.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The full credential lifecycle is Pryv primitives: registration\nmints an account; accesses.create issues a scoped credential;\naccesses.update modifies scope (writing the prior version to\nhistory); accesses.delete revokes; system.users.delete removes the\naccount entirely. Each stage lands in the audit log. The\nauthorization decision (who may register, what scope is\nappropriate) is your policy; the mechanism is shipped.\n",
     "detail": "**OAuth2 client credential issuance is curated.** For\ndelegated-app credentials, Pryv issues OAuth2 client identities\nonly through the operator CLI (`bin/oauth-client.js`, register /\nrotate-secret / list), not through open dynamic registration: the\ndiscovery document advertises no registration endpoint and\n`POST /oauth2/register` (RFC 7591 open mode) is intentionally\ndeferred, `oauth.clientRegistration.mode: curated` is the only\nsupported value and `open` is rejected. Each client carries an\nexact-match set of registered redirect URIs and, for confidential\nclients, a rotatable `client_secret`. The authorization decision\n(who becomes a client, which redirect URIs + scopes are\nappropriate) stays your policy; the issuance + rotation mechanism\nis shipped (`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/`, open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.8).\n\n**Operator-registered clients and their vetting (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.68 and 2.0.0-rc.71).** `bin/oauth-client.js\ncreate-registry` registers a client for an installed OAuth\nextension, with a mandatory subject type (`public` or `pairwise`,\nno default), audiences, lifetimes, an optional region and a\nsecret, `private_key_jwt` keys or none (public, PKCE). Since rc.71\na change to what an active client may do (redirect URIs, scope,\nkeys, auth method, audiences, allowed features, lifetimes) moves\nit to `review` until the operator approves it, and a client under\nreview or suspended is refused everywhere, the data API included\n`[OCLI19]`, `[ORF1]`. A rotated secret can keep the previous one\nvalid for at most 30 days `[OCAK14]`; logos are shown only from\nhosts listed in `oauth.logoHosts` `[ORF4]`.\n\n**Correction and opt-in: client metadata documents (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.74).** \"Curated only\" holds while\n`oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode` is `off`, the default. With\n`allowList` (hosts you list) or `any`, a client may identify itself\nby an https URL whose JSON document Pryv fetches: identity and\ndisplay come from the document, reach comes only from your\n`client` template (scope, audiences, subject type, lifetimes),\nnever from the document. Such a client can never hold a secret,\nintrospection, token exchange, allowed features or \"any audience\",\nand authenticates with `none` or `private_key_jwt` only\n`[OCMD01]`, `[OCMD05]`, `[OCMDE03]`, `[OCMDE06]`. The fetch is a\nguarded outbound call (see `CC6.6`), every fetch and refusal is in\nthe audit trail without the document body (`oauth.client.\nmetadata_fetched` / `metadata_refused`) `[OCMDE13]`, and the\nconsent screen must show the client's host next to its name.\n`mode: any` lets any party present a client to your users' consent\nscreen: prefer `allowList`, keep `deniedHosts` current. Open\nregistration (`POST /oauth2/register`) stays disabled in every\nmode.\n\n**Delegate-credential issuance + de-provisioning.** Account\ndelegation (`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) issues a\ndelegate an owner-equivalent personal token over another account\nthrough a controlled-account-initiated invite / accept handshake\n(the only no-credential step is the operator-admin-key-gated\ninvite); create-from-delegate can provision a fresh controlled\naccount at the same time. De-provisioning is authoritative and\nreserved to the controlled account: a delegate can never remove a\ndelegation, and detach is gated on a genuine login of the\ncontrolled account. Issuance and teardown are audited per\ndelegate on the controlled account (same-core + cross-core). See\n`context/delegation-model.md`.\n\nCredentials a delegate issues to apps for the controlled account\nfollow the same lifecycle: each is an ordinary app access on the\ncontrolled account, marked by the server as granted through the\ndelegation `[DCH01]`, and they are removed together with the\ndelegation: detach deletes every access granted through it, and\nnothing the account holder granted `[DCH12]`. So credentials\nissued under a delegate's authority do not survive the end of\nthat authority. In open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23.\n\n**Group accounts over CMC** (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53, release\ncommit `61fb28dd`, https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158).\nFor a team sharing one account, a member is registered and\nauthorized before any credential reaches them: the member's\nmembership request is accepted by an administrator of the group\n`[GA01]`, and only then can the member obtain, per patient, a\nshort-lived credential minted by the group's core and returned\nonce in the answer to the member's request, never stored, logged\nor retried `[GA10]`, `[MA50]`; asking again with the same\npermissions while it has more than five minutes left returns the\nsame access `[GA11]`, and any\nother caller is refused (`cmc-member-access-not-member`)\n`[GA12]`. When the membership ends, including when the delegate\nwho approved it is detached, the group's core deletes those\ncredentials on every patient account and records the outcome\n`[GA20]`, `[GA22]`, `[GA23]`. See\n`context/workforce-access-patterns.md`, Pattern 3.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "UZEV",
       "DCH01",
       "DCH12",
       "CMCGA",
       "GA01",
       "GA10",
       "GA11",
       "GA12",
       "GA20",
       "GA22",
       "GA23",
       "MA50",
       "OCLI19",
       "ORF1",
       "OCAK14",
       "ORF4",
       "OCMD01",
       "OCMD05",
       "OCMDE03",
       "OCMDE06",
       "OCMDE13"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/auth-oauth2.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "oauth.logoHosts",
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.mode",
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.allowedHosts",
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.deniedHosts",
       "oauth.clientMetadataDocuments.client"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.16",
       "iso-27001.A.5.18",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "system-streams",
       "audit",
       "delegation",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "delegation-model",
       "workforce-access-patterns"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.3",
     "title": "CC6.3 Role-based access, least privilege, segregation of duties",
     "text": "The entity authorizes, modifies, or removes access to data,\nsoftware, functions, and other protected information assets based\non roles, responsibilities, or the system design and changes,\ngiving consideration to the concepts of least privilege and\nsegregation of duties, to meet the entity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Least privilege is native: an access carries only the\nstream+level tuples it needs (none / create-only / read /\ncontribute / manage), so a credential cannot touch out-of-scope\ndata. Segregation of duties is expressed by issuing distinct\nnarrow accesses per role, with system streams isolating privileged\nfunctions. accesses.update / .delete cover modify + remove; access\nversion history is the review-evidence layer. Role definitions\nlive in your IdP / policy; Pryv records and enforces the resulting\naccess state.\n",
     "detail": "For workforce / role-scale deployments, Pryv composes with an\nexternal IdP / IGA system rather than implementing roles + groups\nitself, two integration patterns (group access + callerId audit\nsuffix; seed access + sub-access derivation) are documented in\ncontext/workforce-access-patterns.md. The IdP stays the source of\ntruth for identity; Pryv records the access state + per-individual\naudit trail. A third pattern ships in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.53\n(release commit `61fb28dd`,\nhttps://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/issues/158): members of a\nteam sharing one account each get, per patient, a short-lived\naccess minted by the group's core, limited to their team streams\nand to named data streams of the patient's offer, never beyond\nthe membership's expiry, unable to manage accesses, and deleted\nwhen their membership ends `[GA12]`, `[GA14]`, `[GA15]`,\n`[GA20]`, `[CMCMA]`. The membership itself is least privilege\ntoo: team streams only, `read` or `contribute`, no feature\npermission, never delegable `[GA02]`, no chat or alert channel\nto the group `[MB21]`, and a delegate administrator cannot\napprove their own membership `[MB34]`. Teams are streams and\nmemberships are consent relationships; there is still no role,\nrole-to-permission mapping or hierarchy inside Pryv (Pattern 3 of\nthe same note).\n\n**Least privilege when streams move** (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.56). A permission on a stream reaches its descendants,\nso a move could widen who reaches a subtree. An app or shared\naccess now moves a stream only with manage rights on every stream\nof the moved subtree, trashed ones included `[SMV1]` to `[SMV4]`,\nand no access can move a stream under its own descendant\n`[SMV10]`. Before this release a child granted to the moving\naccess at a lower level (`read`, `create-only`, `none`) moved\nalong into the target parent's inherited permissions, so the\n\"cannot touch out-of-scope data\" property above did not hold for\nstream moves.\n\n**OAuth2 revoke + refresh-chain teardown.** For delegated apps,\nthe durable consent behind an OAuth2 grant is a cross-account CMC\ndata-grant; revoking it (deleting the counterparty access) kills\nthe refresh chain, the next `refresh_token` exchange sees the\ndata-grant gone and fails `invalid_grant`, so no fresh access is\nminted (`open-pryv.io/components/oauth2/src/grants/refresh_token.ts`,\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.8). Access modification propagates the same\nway: narrowing the granted permissions on the data-grant narrows\nwhat the next rotated token can do; widening requires a fresh\nconsent, never a refresh.\n\n**Operator client revocation reaches live tokens.** Revoking a\ndelegated app (`bin/oauth-client.js revoke <clientId>`) no longer\nmerely blocks new grants while issued tokens live out their TTL:\nit writes a platform-wide tombstone and every core rejects that\nclient's existing access tokens at validation time within\n`oauth.clientRevokeCheckSeconds` (default 30 s), open socket.io\nconnections are swept and dropped too. So \"remove access for app\nX, everywhere, now\" is one operator command with a bounded\npropagation window (open-pryv.io `7b6321aa`). For DPoP-bound apps\nthe same is available per client key (`revoke-key <jkt>`,\nopen-pryv.io `4c0a5ade`).\n\n**Removal and modification reach live tokens (open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.64 to 2.0.0-rc.76).** Deleting a consent grant deletes\nthe app's live sessions and the accesses they created at once\n(rc.64; before, a live access token ran out its lifetime, up to\n`oauth.accessTokenTTL`) `[OE31]`. Narrowing a grant re-cuts every\nlive session at once (rc.68) and narrows the accesses sessions\ncreated, deleting those left with nothing (rc.70); a refresh never\nmints more than the grant now holds (rc.66) `[OSUB3]`, `[PMRG2]`.\nAn app ends a token itself with `/oauth2/revoke` (rc.69); a\nrefreshed token's predecessor expires after\n`oauth.refreshRetireGraceSeconds` (default 60 s) instead of living\nout its lifetime; a refresh refused for bad client authentication\nno longer uses up the refresh token, so a leaked refresh token\nwithout the client's credential cannot end the user's consent\n`[ORVK1]`, `[ORET1]`, `[ORL04]`. Suspending a client (or putting it\nunder review) stops its live tokens on the data API within\n`oauth.clientRevokeCheckSeconds` and its `client_credentials`\ngrant since rc.71 (rc.68 to rc.70 stopped neither) `[ORF1]`.\n`purge-grants <clientId>` deletes a client's grants, sessions,\ncreated accesses and refresh chains on a core (rc.71) `[ORGP1]`.\nSince rc.74 everything a revoked client was issued up to 5 s after\nthe revoke stays refused even if the id is registered again\n`[OCR02]`, `[OCMD18]`. Deleting an address alias withdraws the\ngrant that adopted it (rc.76) `[OPAL4]`.\n\nExpiry removes derived access too: a `shared` access managed by an\napp access can no longer outlive it (it inherits the app access's\nexpiry at creation, clearing that expiry is refused, and\nauthentication refuses a never-expiring shared access once its app\naccess has expired, `5d609bfa`), and a webhook stops firing and\nbecomes `inactive` once its access has expired (`3394b95f`), both\nin open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23.\n\n**Delegate-account access removal.** Account delegation\n(`open-pryv.io/components/delegation/`) is a deliberately BROAD,\nowner-equivalent grant, so where least privilege matters choose a\nscoped `app` / `shared` access instead; delegation is for the\n\"act as the account holder\" case. What CC6.3 relies on where full\ndelegation IS used is the removal + review half: each delegate's\nactions are audited per delegate on the controlled account\n(same-core + cross-core), and removal is authoritative and\nreserved to the account holder, a delegate can never remove a\ndelegation, and detach is gated on a genuine login of the\ncontrolled account (a personal token with no forge-protected\ndelegation marker). See `context/delegation-model.md`.\n\nLeast privilege also holds for apps a delegate authorizes on the\ncontrolled account: they receive a scoped `app` access with the\npermissions they requested, never the owner-equivalent token.\nSuch an access can be modified or revoked by the account holder\nor the delegate, and revoked by the app itself, like any app\naccess (revocation cascades to what the app created) `[DCH06]`, `[DCH08]`,\n`[DCH09]`, and is removed automatically when the delegation is\nremoved `[DCH12]`. In open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.23.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "AA02",
       "ACCP",
       "DCH06",
       "DCH08",
       "DCH09",
       "DCH12",
       "CMCMA",
       "GA02",
       "GA12",
       "GA14",
       "GA15",
       "GA20",
       "MB21",
       "MB34",
       "SMV1",
       "SMV2",
       "SMV3",
       "SMV4",
       "SMV10",
       "OE31",
       "OSUB3",
       "PMRG2",
       "ORVK1",
       "ORET1",
       "ORL04",
       "ORF1",
       "ORGP1",
       "OCR02",
       "OCMD18",
       "OPAL4"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "oauth.refreshRetireGraceSeconds",
       "oauth.clientRevokeCheckSeconds"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.15",
       "iso-27001.A.5.18",
       "iso-27001.A.5.3"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "audit",
       "delegation",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "workforce-access-patterns",
       "delegation-model"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.4",
     "title": "CC6.4 Physical access to facilities and protected assets",
     "text": "The entity restricts physical access to facilities and protected\ninformation assets (for example, data center facilities, back-up\nmedia storage, and other sensitive locations) to authorized\npersonnel to meet the entity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Physical access control (data-center entry, badge systems, media\nvaults) is facility scope, outside Pryv's software boundary. Your\nhosting provider carries this, an HDS- or ISO 27001-certified\nhoster typically inherits it from the underlying CSP and provides\nthe attestation you reference.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.5",
     "title": "CC6.5 Logical and physical protections over data destruction",
     "text": "The entity discontinues logical and physical protections over\nphysical assets only after the ability to read or recover data\nand software from those assets has been diminished and is no\nlonger required to meet the entity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Logical destruction is per-user: system.users.delete removes the\nuser's data from the live store; event- and stream-level deletion\ncover per-record needs. Whether destruction extends to backups is\nengine-dependent, SQLite stores one file per user (unlink =\ngone), PostgreSQL deletes rows but historical pg_dump artefacts\nretain them until rotated. Choose the engine that matches your\ndestruction policy; physical media sanitisation is your hosting\nprocedure.\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`, see gdpr.Art.17 and gdpr.Art.5 §1(e)). Whole-account\ndestruction is schedulable, by the account holder or by your\ninactivity preset, and runs through the same erasure as\nsystem.users.delete, guards included (`[ADSW8]`); each scheduled\nerasure is logged before and after, and kept as an audit row\nwhere `audit.onUserDelete: keep` (`[ADSW17]`); an erasure\ninterrupted halfway is completed at a later pass (`[ADSW19]`),\nand `maxDeletionsPerPass` caps a pass (`[ADSW12]`). The backup\nreach above is unchanged.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "USAD",
       "ADSW8",
       "ADSW17",
       "ADSW19",
       "ADSW12"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine",
       "audit.onUserDelete",
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.10",
       "gdpr.Art.17",
       "hipaa-security.164.310(d)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.6",
     "title": "CC6.6 Boundary protection against external threats",
     "text": "The entity implements logical access security measures to protect\nagainst threats from sources outside its system boundaries.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Every API request is token-gated, whatever the deployment. The\ntransport side of the boundary is configured: the core terminates\nTLS itself when `http.ssl.*` is set (with the built-in ACME\nintegration issuing, renewing and replicating certificates when\n`letsEncrypt.enabled` is set), otherwise it serves plain HTTP\n(default `http.ip` 127.0.0.1) and your reverse proxy terminates\nTLS. Inter-core Raft traffic runs over mTLS on a private CA once\n`bin/bootstrap.js` has written `storages.engines.rqlite.tls`\n(default `tls: null`, plain TCP), separating the control plane\nfrom the user-facing plane. Edge controls (WAF, firewall, rate\nlimiting) sit in your reverse proxy by design, see\ncontext/rate-limiting-and-dos-protection.md.\n",
     "detail": "The boundary also holds outbound (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56): a\nURL supplied by a counterparty cannot make Pryv call inside your\nnetwork. Cross-account deliveries, chat, revocations, scope\nupdates, delegation and OAuth revocation notices are refused,\nbefore any connection, when the host is or resolves to a\nloopback, private, link-local or otherwise reserved address\n(checked again at connect time), and redirects are not followed\n`[PFR1]`, `[PFR2]`, `[PFR5]`, `[CO22]`. The platform's own host\nnames are allowed; other private peers must be listed in\n`cmc.allowedPrivateHosts` `[PFR3]`. The same guard covers the key\nsets (`jwks_uri`, rc.70) and client metadata documents (rc.74)\nPryv fetches for OAuth2 clients, https only, size, time and\nper-host bounded `[OCMD03B]`, `[OCMD03G]`, `[OCMD03H]`; a host you\nlist in `cmc.allowedPrivateHosts` is allowed for them too.\n\nInbound, adapter routes (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.73, off unless\n`adapterRoutes` is set) open `/adapter/<name>/…` on every host the\ncore serves and forward it to a sidecar you run, without\nauthentication, CORS, audit or rate limiting by the core: the\nsidecar is part of your boundary and must authenticate every\nrequest, and its port must stay closed to the outside. The core\nrefuses traversal paths, caps bodies and idle time, sets the\nforwarding headers itself, and since rc.75 names the addressed\naccount in `X-Adapter-Name` / `X-Adapter-Base` (client copies\nremoved) or answers `421` for an account of another core\n`[ADRI03]`, `[ADRI06]`, `[ADRI09]`, `[ADRU3]`, `[ADRU4]`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ACMEORCH",
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "PFR1",
       "PFR2",
       "PFR3",
       "PFR5",
       "CO22",
       "OCMD03B",
       "OCMD03G",
       "OCMD03H",
       "ADRI03",
       "ADRI06",
       "ADRI09",
       "ADRU3",
       "ADRU4"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/adapter-routes.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled",
       "storages.engines.rqlite.tls",
       "cmc.allowedPrivateHosts",
       "adapterRoutes"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.20",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(e)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "access"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "rate-limiting-and-dos-protection"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.7",
     "title": "CC6.7 Restriction and encryption of information in transmission and movement",
     "text": "The entity restricts the transmission, movement, and removal of\ninformation to authorized internal and external users and\nprocesses, and protects it during transmission, movement, or\nremoval to meet the entity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Transmission is TLS once you configure where it terminates: in\nthe core (`http.ssl.*`, certificates from the built-in ACME\nintegration when `letsEncrypt.enabled` is set) or in your reverse\nproxy, with the core serving plain HTTP behind it. The core sets\nno TLS version of its own, so Node.js defaults apply (TLS 1.2\nfloor on the Node 24 the image runs). Pryv ships no intermediary\nthat could log or cache traffic. Movement is\nrestricted by the permission model, a credential only moves the\ndata its scope permits. Operator secrets at rest use AES-256-GCM\n(HKDF-derived per-key); bootstrap bundles for core-to-core movement\nare AES-256-GCM (scrypt). Bulk event-data at-rest encryption is an\noperator-side storage-layer choice (LUKS / SSE-KMS / customer keys).\nIf your proxy terminates TLS, set `hostedSites.<name>.hsts: always`\nso the sites the core hosts keep sending `Strict-Transport-Security`\n(open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34); see hipaa-security 164.312(e)(2)(ii).\nSince open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.56 the calls Pryv makes to a\ncounterparty (cross-account deliveries, which carry a data grant's\nendpoint, and the related notices) refuse plain `http:` unless\n`cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl` is set for a development or test\ncluster `[PFR4]`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACMEINT",
       "ATRENC",
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "HSHT",
       "PFR4"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "http.ssl.keyFile",
       "http.ssl.certFile",
       "letsEncrypt.enabled",
       "hostedSites.<name>.hsts",
       "cluster.allowInsecurePeerUrl"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.24",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(e)(1)",
       "hipaa-security.164.312(e)(2)(ii)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "access",
       "permissions"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC6.8",
     "title": "CC6.8 Prevention and detection of unauthorized or malicious software",
     "text": "The entity implements controls to prevent or detect and act upon\nthe introduction of unauthorized or malicious software to meet\nthe entity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Anti-malware / endpoint protection is a host-and-network control,\nnot shipped in Pryv. Pryv's contribution is detection-adjacent:\nserver-side event-type validation rejects malformed payloads at\ningest, the dependency-audit pipeline guards the software supply\nchain, and audit + observability surface anomalous behaviour. AV +\napplication-allowlisting on the hosts is your operator scope.\nOne prevention control is built in: since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.34 an attachment whose declared type a browser executes\nor renders as a document (HTML, SVG and other XML, JavaScript) is\nserved in a sandbox (`Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;\ndefault-src 'none'`), so an uploaded file cannot run script on\nthe API origin. It does not scan attachment content: uploads are\nnot refused for their type.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACTY"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.7"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "audit",
       "data-types"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC7.1",
     "title": "CC7.1 Detection of configuration changes and vulnerabilities",
     "text": "To meet its objectives, the entity uses detection and monitoring\nprocedures to identify (1) changes to configurations that result\nin the introduction of new vulnerabilities, and (2) susceptibility\nto newly discovered vulnerabilities.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv-side substrate-vulnerability detection now has an\nactive, CI-enforced feed (open-pryv.io master merge\n`9e2ee7ff`): a runtime-dependency audit gate fails every\nbuild on high or critical advisories in the shipped npm\ntree (accepted advisories live in a documented allowlist,\nnot silenced), a CycloneDX SBOM is emitted and\nGrype-scanned on every CI run (build fails on critical\nfindings), the base image is digest-pinned with the rqlite\ndownload checksum-verified, and release images are\ncosign-signed with a SLSA build-provenance attestation.\nDependabot alerts, CHANGELOG announcements, and a\nconfig-validation step that fails fast on malformed\nconfiguration at master start round this out; observability\n+ audit surface runtime anomalies. Base-image OS-level CVEs\nremain visible to the scanners (a slimmer-base migration is\na tracked follow-up); the image installs the Debian security\nupdates available at build time and no longer ships `curl`\n(2.0.0-rc.42) nor `npm` / `npx` (2.0.0-rc.50). Your own\nscanning cadence for the layers you add sits on top.\n",
     "detail": "**Vulnerabilities in Pryv's own code.** The dependency feed above\ndoes not see defects in open-pryv.io itself. Those were the subject\nof a code-level security review by the maintainers in 2026 (2026-06\nto 2026-10), fixed in open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.40 to 2.0.0-rc.51 (most\nof those release notes say \"upgrade promptly\" and list operator\nsteps); public report `SECURITY-AUDIT.md`, published 2026-10-14\n(https://github.com/pryv/open-pryv.io/blob/master/SECURITY-AUDIT.md).\nYour\nsusceptibility depends on the release you run: track the release\nnotes and `SECURITY.md` advisories and upgrade. See\n`context/code-security-review-2026.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.8",
       "iso-27001.A.8.9"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "code-security-review-2026"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC7.2",
     "title": "CC7.2 Monitoring for anomalies indicative of security events",
     "text": "The entity monitors system components and the operation of those\ncomponents for anomalies that are indicative of malicious acts,\nnatural disasters, and errors affecting the entity's ability to\nmeet its objectives; anomalies are analyzed to determine whether\nthey represent security events.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The pluggable observability provider gives system-level anomaly\nsignal (latency, error rate, request volume); the per-user audit\nlog gives application-level activity, attributable to an access.\nAnomaly-detection logic on the audit stream itself is a natural\nextension you build; the raw signal is shipped.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.16"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC7.3",
     "title": "CC7.3 Evaluation of security events",
     "text": "The entity evaluates security events to determine whether they\ncould or have resulted in a failure of the entity to meet its\nobjectives (security incidents) and, if so, takes actions to\nprevent or address such failures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Event-vs-incident classification is your decision. Pryv supplies\nthe evaluation inputs, audit row patterns, observability\nanomalies, but the categorisation rule and the response trigger\nare your policy.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.25"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC7.4",
     "title": "CC7.4 Incident response program",
     "text": "The entity responds to identified security incidents by executing\na defined incident response program to understand, contain,\nremediate, and communicate security incidents, as appropriate.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes the technical halves of incident response:\ndetection + scoping (audit + observability) and containment\n(accesses.delete revokes a compromised credential immediately).\nThe external intake channel for substrate-vulnerability reports\nis published in `SECURITY.md` (coordinated disclosure policy:\nprivate GHSA flow + `security-dev@` mailbox + SLA + scope +\nsafe harbor; private vulnerability reporting enabled on the\npublished repositories). The incident-response program itself,\nroles, escalation, communications, lessons-learned, is yours\nto define and rehearse.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.24",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(6)(i)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained / signed audit log strengthens forensic evidence during incident analysis (F:Evidence Med → High)",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC7.5",
     "title": "CC7.5 Recovery from identified security incidents",
     "text": "The entity identifies, develops, and implements activities to\nrecover from identified security incidents.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Recovery primitives: bin/backup.js + --restore rebuild a user from\nbackup, the recovery path for user data; a multi-core cluster\nreplicates the platform DB and TLS certs over Raft, so the other\ncores keep serving their own users when a peer fails (the failed\ncore's users wait for that core or its restore: user data is not\nreplicated between cores). The recovery-objective targets\n(RTO / RPO) and the drill cadence are your policy.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.14",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC8.1",
     "title": "CC8.1 Authorized changes to infrastructure, data, software, procedures",
     "text": "The entity authorizes, designs, develops or acquires, configures,\ndocuments, tests, approves, and implements changes to\ninfrastructure, data, software, and procedures to meet its\nobjectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv-side change evidence: tagged releases, SHA-pinned Docker\nimages, CHANGELOG-v2 + CHANGELOG-v2-back per release, an\nengine-agnostic forward-only schema-migration framework\n(bin/migrate.js, with autoRunOnStart), and a public CI test matrix\n(PostgreSQL + SQLite). Separate dev / test / prod environments are\nsupported via independent core deployments. The audit log records\nconfig-driven behaviour changes in your deployment. Your\nchange-approval workflow (windows, sign-off, rollback) sits on top.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.32",
       "iso-27001.A.8.31"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC9.1",
     "title": "CC9.1 Risk mitigation for business disruptions",
     "text": "The entity identifies, selects, and develops risk mitigation\nactivities for risks arising from potential business disruptions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Disruption-mitigation inheritance: multi-core HA + Raft\nreplication, backup-restore, cluster-replicated TLS certificates,\nand a clean cloud-exit path (re-issue the cluster onto new\ninfrastructure from a bootstrap bundle). The business-continuity\nobjectives and the insurance / contractual mitigation choices are\nyours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.14",
       "iso-27001.A.5.30"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-restore",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "CC9.2",
     "title": "CC9.2 Vendor and business partner risk management",
     "text": "The entity assesses and manages risks associated with vendors and\nbusiness partners.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Where Pryv is your vendor (open-pryv.io as a third-party,\nBSD-licensed platform), the public release process + CHANGELOGs +\nthis compliance matrix are the vendor-monitoring artefact set you\nreference. Your broader vendor-risk programme (assessment\ncriteria, SLA reviews, subprocessor inventory) sits on top.\n",
     "detail": "Supply-chain risk on the Pryv substrate is actively managed\nupstream: committed lockfile + Dependabot, a CI\nruntime-dependency audit gate, CycloneDX SBOM emission with\nGrype scanning, a digest-pinned base image, and\ncosign-signed release images with SLSA provenance\n(open-pryv.io merge `9e2ee7ff`). The SBOM + signature +\nCHANGELOG set is the vendor-monitoring artefact you cite\nwhen Pryv is the vendor under review. See CC7.1.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.19",
       "iso-27001.A.5.21"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.1",
     "title": "A1.1, Capacity management",
     "text": "The entity maintains, monitors, and evaluates current processing\ncapacity and use of system components (infrastructure, data, and\nsoftware) to manage capacity demand and to enable the\nimplementation of additional capacity to help meet its objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Capacity signal comes from per-core observability metrics (memory,\nCPU, latency, request volume); capacity grows by adding cores to\nthe cluster (each serves its bound users behind the shared rqlite\ncontrol plane). The capacity-planning cadence and provisioning\nautomation are yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.6"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "observability-provider",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.2",
     "title": "A1.2, Environmental protections, backup, and recovery infrastructure",
     "text": "The entity authorizes, designs, develops or acquires, implements,\noperates, approves, maintains, and monitors environmental\nprotections, software, data back-up processes, and recovery\ninfrastructure to meet its objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Backup + recovery infrastructure ships: bin/backup.js produces\nper-user backups (the only copy of user data Pryv makes),\nmulti-core topology replicates the platform DB and TLS certs over\nRaft so the remaining cores stay user-facing for their own users;\nuser data is not replicated between cores. Environmental protections (power, cooling,\nfire suppression) are facility-side; your hoster's certification\ncovers them. Backup cadence, retention, and offsite policy are\nyours.\n",
     "detail": "Two open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 changes to plan for. Backups taken\nbefore 2.0.0-rc.34 carry no high-frequency series data (on every\nseries engine, with no warning): take a new backup after\nupgrading. The replicated platform DB moves to rqlite 10.5.1\n(crash-safe, checksummed snapshot store; a node stops on a\nnode-local SQLite error); its data directory upgrade is one-way,\nso back up every node before the first start\n(`open-pryv.io/INSTALL.md`, \"Upgrading the bundled rqlite (9.x to\n10.x)\").\n\nOne open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.51 change to plan for: before that\nrelease, `bin/backup.js --incremental` overwrote the full backup it\ncontinued, so a directory that received incrementals restores only\nthe last delta. `--inspect <dir>` reports it `DAMAGED` and a restore\nrefuses it; take a new full backup into a new directory. Since\n2.0.0-rc.51 the incrementals form a chain next to the full backup,\nrestorable as of any run (`--through-run`); see\n`iso-27001.A.8.13`.\n\nOne open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86 change to plan for: a backup written\nby 2.0.0-rc.86 or later restores with that release or later, so a\nrollback plan to an earlier release starts a new backup chain in a\nnew directory. The same release checks every file of a run against\nthe run's manifest before restoring it, optionally verifies an\nEd25519 signature per run, and no longer leaves an account\nhalf-restored after a failed restore; see `iso-27001.A.8.13`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.13",
       "iso-27001.A.8.14",
       "hipaa-security.164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "backup-restore",
       "letsEncrypt-integration"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "A1.3",
     "title": "A1.3, Recovery plan testing",
     "text": "The entity tests recovery plan procedures supporting system\nrecovery to meet its objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv gives you a testable recovery path (restore a user from a\nbackup file into a clean core; fail a core and confirm a peer keeps\nserving). The recovery drill, scheduling it, evidencing the result,\nfeeding gaps back into the plan, is your operating procedure.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.13"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "backup-restore",
       "multi-core-mTLS"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "C1.1",
     "title": "C1.1, Identification and maintenance of confidential information",
     "text": "The entity identifies and maintains confidential information to\nmeet the entity's objectives related to confidentiality.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv lets you identify + isolate confidential data by stream\nlayout: dedicate subtrees per confidentiality tier and gate each\nwith a distinct permission scope, so confidential streams are\nreachable only by credentials granted them. System streams add a\nprivileged tier independent of your scheme; clientData / event\ntype can carry machine-readable classification labels. Masking is\nby projection (stream + permissions), not value transformation,\nsee context/data-masking-projection-vs-transformation.md. For\nthe account name, accesses created with `randomAlias:true` carry\nan alias in place of the username, hidden from the holder; since\nopen-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.69 the token is accepted under its alias\nonly, so a holder who guesses the username cannot confirm it with\nthe token.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.12",
       "iso-27001.A.8.11"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "event",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "randomAlias"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-masking-projection-vs-transformation"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "End-to-end (proxy re-encryption / BYOK) keeps confidential content opaque to the operator; the natural future confidentiality primitive",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=180707914&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C34"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "C1.2",
     "title": "C1.2, Disposal of confidential information",
     "text": "The entity disposes of confidential information to meet the\nentity's objectives related to confidentiality.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Confidential-data disposal uses the same per-user erasure path as\nCC6.5: system.users.delete for whole-account, event/stream\ndeletion for per-record. Backup reach is engine-dependent (SQLite\nper-user file vs PostgreSQL row + pg_dump rotation), pick the\nengine that matches your disposal commitment.\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66, `8521c8d5`), as\nunder CC6.5: whole-account disposal schedulable by the holder or\nby your inactivity preset, same erasure path, guards included\n(`[ADSW8]`), an interrupted erasure completed later\n(`[ADSW19]`).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "USAD",
       "ADSW8",
       "ADSW19"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.8.10",
       "gdpr.Art.17"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "PI1.1",
     "title": "PI1.1 Quality information about processing objectives",
     "text": "The entity obtains or generates, uses, and communicates relevant,\nquality information regarding the objectives related to processing,\nincluding definitions of data processed and product and service\nspecifications, to support the use of products and services.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The canonical event-type schemas (class/format JSON Schemas in the\ndata-types repo) are the machine-readable definition of \"data\nprocessed\", what each event type means and what shape it takes.\nYou extend the catalogue with your own types via the\nservice.eventTypes URL. The processing-objective specifications\nthemselves are your product definitions.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "data-types",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "PI1.2",
     "title": "PI1.2 Completeness and accuracy of inputs",
     "text": "The entity implements policies and procedures over system inputs,\nincluding controls over completeness and accuracy, to result in\nproducts and services that meet the entity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Input accuracy is enforced structurally at ingest: events.create\nand events.update run every payload through the event type's JSON\nSchema (ajv-draft-04), unknown types and schema violations are\nrejected with HTTP 400, no silent truncation or downgrade. This is\nthe structural-accuracy layer; semantic accuracy (is this the\n*right* blood-pressure reading) stays in your application. Tighten\nstructural strictness by declaring min/max/pattern in a custom\ncatalogue, see context/data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic.md.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-types",
       "event",
       "permissions"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-accuracy-structural-vs-semantic"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "PI1.3",
     "title": "PI1.3 Completeness and accuracy of processing",
     "text": "The entity implements policies and procedures over system\nprocessing to result in products and services that meet the\nentity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv's processing model is deterministic + attributable: the\naudit log is append-only by convention of its write path (no\nhash chain, see `proposals/audit-log-chaining.md`), an access keeps\nevery previous version, events.update snapshots the prior state\nof an event into version history only with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (the default keeps no event\nhistory; see `context/event-history.md`), and every mutation is\nauthorised by the permission model and recorded in the audit log.\nConcurrent writes do not silently drop data: since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.38 (merge `461f3c4c`) an update, a trash (a\nshared-secret event excepted) or an attachment deletion is applied onto the event as stored at write time\n(atomically on the built-in PostgreSQL and SQLite stores), so a\ntop-level field written meanwhile and not changed by the request\nis kept, server-written processing status included `[ESR1]`,\n`[ESR4]`, `[ESR5]`, `[ESR6A]`. The\nbusiness-logic processing your application performs on top is your\ncontrol responsibility.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ESR1",
       "ESR4",
       "ESR5",
       "ESR6A"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit",
       "permissions"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "PI1.4",
     "title": "PI1.4 Completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of outputs",
     "text": "The entity implements policies and procedures to make available or\ndeliver output completely, accurately, and timely in accordance\nwith specifications to meet the entity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Output delivery is deterministic: events.get / streams.get return\ncanonical serialisations; the audit log carries an integrity\nchecksum of the affected event when a method mutates one, so\noutput can be tied back to a verified state. Webhooks notify\nsubscribers of change (signal-only, the receiver fetches the\nauthoritative state via authenticated GET, so the delivered output\nis always the current canonical value). Delivery SLAs to your end\nrecipients are your specification.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit",
       "webhooks"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "PI1.5",
     "title": "PI1.5 Completeness and accuracy of stored information",
     "text": "The entity implements policies and procedures to store inputs,\nitems in processing, and outputs completely, accurately, and\ntimely in accordance with system specifications to meet the\nentity's objectives.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Storage integrity: event version history preserves prior states\non a deployment with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by\ndefault), the audit log carries the integrity hash of each event\nas created or updated (integrity is on by default), and\nbackup-restore provides a recoverable copy. Together these give an\naccuracy + completeness signal for stored data. Tamper-evidence on\nthe audit log itself (hash chaining) is a future primitive, see\nthe CC7.4 chain proposal. The recoverable copy is complete for\nhigh-frequency series only from open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.34 (earlier\noperator backups held no series data); the backup and restore\nround trip is tested (`[BKSR]`, `[BKEV]`). Incremental backups are\ncomplete from 2.0.0-rc.51: before it an incremental run overwrote\nthe full backup it continued and missed changes made while the\nprevious run was in progress; since then each run is kept next to\nthe full backup and the restore replays the whole chain `[BKC1]`,\n`[BKC2]`, `[BKC3]`. Since 2.0.0-rc.86 each run's manifest lists\nevery file with its size and hash, and a restore refuses a run with\na file added, removed, changed or cut short, so the recoverable\ncopy is checked for completeness and accuracy before it is used;\n`--inspect --verify-files` runs the same check without restoring\n`[BKSM1]`, `[BKSM2]`, `[BKIS3]`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "BKSR",
       "BKEV",
       "BKC1",
       "BKC2",
       "BKC3",
       "BKSM1",
       "BKSM2",
       "BKIS3"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-security.164.312(c)(1)"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "audit",
       "backup-restore"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P1.1",
     "title": "P1.1, Notice of privacy practices",
     "text": "The entity provides notice to data subjects about its privacy\npractices to meet the entity's objectives related to privacy. The\nnotice is updated and communicated to data subjects in a timely\nmanner for changes to the entity's privacy practices.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv gives you the surface to present notice: app-web-auth3 is the\nforkable consent / auth web page where notice text is shown at\nauthorization time, and the durable access record (with clientData)\ncan carry the notice version the subject saw. Authoring the notice\ncontent and keeping it current is your editorial obligation; Pryv\ncarries it through the consent flow and records what was presented.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.13",
       "gdpr.Art.14",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.520",
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.2"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "app-web-auth3",
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P2.1",
     "title": "P2.1, Choice and consent",
     "text": "The entity communicates choices available regarding the\ncollection, use, retention, disclosure, and disposal of personal\ninformation to the data subjects and obtains consent, as required,\nto meet the entity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The access IS the durable, versioned consent record: it carries\nthe granted permissions (the scope the subject agreed to), and its\nclientData holds the consent text / purposes / lawful basis. CMC\ncarries cross-account consent state transitions via typed\nconsent/* events. app-web-auth3 is the choice-presentation UX, and\nthe audit chain proves the consent state at any moment. You design\nthe choices; Pryv records and enforces them.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "ACCP"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.7",
       "iso-27701.A.7.2.4"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "CMC",
       "app-web-auth3",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P3.1",
     "title": "P3.1, Collection consistent with objectives",
     "text": "Personal information is collected consistent with the entity's\nobjectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Collection scope is bounded by the access's permissions, an app\ncan only write to the streams + levels it was granted (e.g.\ncreate-only on a specific subtree), so collection cannot silently\nexceed the agreed purpose. Defining the purpose and the minimal\nstream set is your data-model design; the boundary is enforced.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "gdpr.Art.6"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P3.2",
     "title": "P3.2, Explicit consent for sensitive personal information",
     "text": "Explicit consent for the collection, use, retention, disclosure,\nand disposal of sensitive personal information is obtained from\ndata subjects or other authorized persons, if required.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Sensitive data can be isolated in dedicated streams gated by a\ndistinct access whose clientData records the explicit-consent\nbasis; consent/* events capture the state transition with a\ntimestamp. The \"explicit\" UX (a separate, affirmative consent step)\nis yours to present; Pryv records it as a distinct, auditable\ngrant rather than folding it into general consent.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.9",
       "iso-27701.A.7.2.4"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "CMC",
       "system-streams",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P4.1",
     "title": "P4.1, Use limited to identified purposes",
     "text": "The entity limits the use of personal information to the purposes\nidentified in the entity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Purpose limitation is the permission model's core job: a\ncredential issued for purpose A (scoped to stream A) cannot read\nor write purpose-B data. The audit log evidences that uses stayed\nwithin scope. Mapping purposes to streams + accesses is your\ndesign; the enforcement is technical, not policy-on-paper.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "gdpr.Art.6"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P4.2",
     "title": "P4.2, Retention of personal information",
     "text": "The entity retains personal information consistent with the\nentity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Retention metadata (period, basis, scheduled disposal date) can\nride on event / access clientData so each record carries its own\nretention contract. Pryv ships no automatic TTL / expiry\nprimitive for records: enforcement of their retention schedule\nis an operator job (a scheduled sweep calling events/streams\ndelete); whole accounts are covered by account auto-deletion\nsince 2.0.0-rc.66, see detail. The retention\npolicy itself is yours; treat the absence of auto-expiry as an\noperator responsibility when you attest P4.2.\n",
     "detail": "For records inside an account this is **voluntarily missing +\noperator-owned** by design, the same classification as GDPR\nArt.5(1)(e) storage limitation. Pryv stays retention-policy-neutral:\nno TTL / auto-delete / scheduler primitive ships for events and\nstreams, so their automatic disposal is the operator's external\nscheduled job composing existing primitives (`events.get\ntoTime=<cutoff>` + two-stage `events.delete` + `streams.delete` +\n`auth.delete`, with the audit log as the inactivity oracle).\n`clientData.retention` is advisory metadata, not an enforcement\nhook; every retention deletion is itself audit-logged. Full\nrationale + the recommended operator retention-job pattern in\n`context/data-retention-operator-owned.md`.\n\nAccount auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`). For whole accounts, retention is a platform\nsetting: your inactivity preset\n(`account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays`, default none)\ndeletes plain accounts with an email address after that many\ndays without use (`[ACST14]`), with reminder mails (`[ACXP3]`), a\n7-day minimum notice (`[ACXP8]`) and a clock that starts the day\nthe preset first applies (`[ACXP2]`); holders may schedule their\nown deletion, `allowUserOptOut: false` keeps them from opting\nout of your preset (`[ACST8]`) and `userOverride: false` from\nchoosing another date or period (`[ACST9]`). `dryRun: true` lets\nyou measure a preset before arming it (`[ADSW13]`). Retention of\nrecords inside an account (events, streams) stays your scheduled\njob, which is why the row stays facilitated. When you attest\nP4.2, the preset's period is part of your stated retention\npolicy.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "ACXP2",
       "ACXP3",
       "ACXP8",
       "ACST8",
       "ACST9",
       "ACST14",
       "ADSW13"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "account.autoDeletion.inactivity.defaultDays",
       "account.autoDeletion.allowUserOptOut",
       "account.autoDeletion.userOverride",
       "account.autoDeletion.dryRun"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.7"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "clientData",
       "event",
       "backup-restore",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "data-retention-operator-owned"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P4.3",
     "title": "P4.3, Disposal of personal information",
     "text": "The entity securely disposes of personal information to meet the\nentity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Disposal uses the per-user erasure path: system.users.delete for\nwhole-account, event/stream deletion for per-record. Backup reach\nis engine-dependent (SQLite per-user file unlink vs PostgreSQL row\n+ pg_dump rotation), choose the engine that matches your disposal\ncommitment, same as GDPR Art.17.\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion (open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66, `8521c8d5`, see\nP4.2 and CC6.5): scheduled whole-account disposal, by the holder\nor by your inactivity preset, through the same erasure path,\nguards included (`[ADSW8]`), an interrupted erasure completed\nlater (`[ADSW19]`).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "USAD",
       "ADSW8",
       "ADSW19"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.17",
       "iso-27001.A.8.10",
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.7"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P5.1",
     "title": "P5.1, Data subject access to personal information",
     "text": "The entity grants identified and authenticated data subjects the\nability to access their stored personal information for review and,\nupon request, provides physical or electronic copies of that\ninformation to data subjects to meet the entity's objectives\nrelated to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Subject access is subject-runnable: the data subject holds their\nown credentials, so events.get / streams.get return their data\ndirectly (since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.84 their accesses.get also\nreports how much each access was used, as approximate lifetime\ncall counts that only the owner receives `[AUG1]`, `[AUG3]`, and\nsince rc.86 audit.getSummary counts their audited calls over a\nperiod `[ASM1]`, `[ASM4]`; see gdpr.Art.15), and the pryv-account-backup CLI produces a complete\nportable export, account, profiles, app profiles, streams,\naccesses (incl. revoked / expired + opt-in per-access version\nhistory), events (chunked + incremental), audit log, HF series\ndata points, webhooks, and attachments, with a per-file sha256\nintegrity manifest, with no operator dependency for routine\nrequests. The browser-based webapp flavour covers the read-side\ntext resources only; route subjects who need attachments / HF\nseries / webhooks to the CLI. See\ncontext/account-backup-coverage.md.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV",
       "AUG1",
       "AUG3",
       "ASM1",
       "ASM4"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.15",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.524",
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.4"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "account-backup-tool",
       "access",
       "event",
       "stream",
       "audit"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "account-backup-coverage"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P5.2",
     "title": "P5.2, Correction, amendment, or appending of personal information",
     "text": "The entity corrects, amends, or appends personal information based\non information provided by data subjects and communicates such\ninformation to third parties, as committed or required, to meet\nthe entity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Correction is events.update and account.update for profile\nfields; the audit log records who amended which event, when (not\nthe prior value). events.update keeps the prior value in version\nhistory, preserving the amendment trail, only on a deployment\nwith `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true` (off by default; see\n`context/event-history.md`).\nPropagation to third parties who hold a shared/CMC access can use\nwebhooks to signal the change. Judging the correctness of a\ncorrection request is your process.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "PTU1"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.16",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.526",
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.6"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "access",
       "audit",
       "webhooks"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "event-history"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P6.1",
     "title": "P6.1, Disclosure to third parties for identified purposes with consent",
     "text": "The entity discloses personal information to third parties for the\npurposes identified in the entity's objectives related to privacy\nand with the explicit consent of the data subject, if required.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Third-party disclosure happens by issuing a scoped shared / CMC\naccess, the disclosure is exactly the permissions granted,\nnothing more, and the access's clientData records the purpose +\nconsent basis. There is no out-of-band data-dump path; disclosure\nis always a tracked, revocable grant. Deciding the lawful purpose\nis yours.\n\nA grant is a set of streams, and what a stream carries can grow\nwith a Pryv release. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.44, a grant\nthat reads the account email stream\n(`:system:email`, shown as \"Read Email\") can also request, by\ntype, a read-only, server-derived `verification/email` event:\nwhether ownership of the primary address was proved, how, and\nwhen. Apps granted it earlier can request it without new consent;\nother addresses of the account are never disclosed. If your consent\ntext should say so, rename the field's `name` in\n`custom.systemStreams`.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "SIB01",
       "SIB11"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.6",
       "hipaa-privacy.164.502",
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.4"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "CMC",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P6.2",
     "title": "P6.2, Record of authorized disclosures",
     "text": "The entity creates and retains a complete, accurate, and timely\nrecord of authorized disclosures of personal information to meet\nthe entity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Every disclosure is a read against a shared / CMC access, and the\nper-user audit log records each access invocation with the\naccessId + accessSerial that made it, a complete, attributable\nrecord of who accessed what, when. Since open-pryv.io `07b6d3b6`\nthe *authorization* of a disclosure is recorded too: OAuth2\n`oauth.*` audit events capture the consent grant, the code\nexchange and every token issuance / refresh / revocation that\nunderlie a delegated-app disclosure. Since open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.73 a resource server that exchanges a user's token for\nits own is recorded in the subject's trail as\n`oauth.token.exchanged`, naming the resource server and the app\nwhose token it received `[OTX03]`, `[OTXE10]`; an introspection\n(which resource server asked about whose token) is in syslog\n(`oauth.token.introspected`, rc.69) `[OXI06]`. The audit-event-stream can\nsurface the same record into the subject's own streams. This is\nthe technical disclosure register; how long you retain it is your\npolicy. Since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.84 the account owner also gets,\nper access and per deletion record, approximate lifetime call\ncounts by method (`usage` on `accesses.get`, never returned to an\napp or shared caller) `[AUG1]`, `[AUG3]`, `[AUG4]`: a summary of\nhow much each recipient used its grant, not a substitute for the\nper-call record, which stays the audit log. Since rc.86\n`audit.getSummary` gives the owner the same audit log counted per\nhour, day or week for chosen accesses `[ASM2]`, `[ASM3]`: when each\nrecipient used its grant, still a summary of the record.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "AT61",
       "OE07",
       "OTX03",
       "OTXE10",
       "OXI06",
       "AUG1",
       "AUG3",
       "AUG4",
       "ASM2",
       "ASM3"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.528",
       "gdpr.Art.30"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P6.3",
     "title": "P6.3, Record of detected unauthorized disclosures",
     "text": "The entity creates and retains a complete, accurate, and timely\nrecord of detected or reported unauthorized disclosures (including\nbreaches) of personal information to meet the entity's objectives\nrelated to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The audit log captures access patterns (including failed /\nout-of-scope attempts), and observability surfaces anomalies, so a\ndetected unauthorized disclosure has a contemporaneous evidentiary\nrecord. Detecting that a disclosure was unauthorized (vs\nauthorized) is your assessment; Pryv supplies the raw trail.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "iso-27001.A.5.25",
       "hipaa-breach.164.408"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P6.4",
     "title": "P6.4, Third-party commitments for privacy",
     "text": "The entity obtains privacy commitments from vendors and other\nthird parties who have access to personal information to meet the\nentity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Vendor / subprocessor privacy commitments are contractual\nartefacts (DPAs, BAAs). No software role, though when the third\nparty's technical access is a Pryv shared/CMC access, the\npermission scope is a concrete, enforced bound on what they were\ngiven, which your DPA can reference.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P6.5",
     "title": "P6.5, Third-party unauthorized disclosure response",
     "text": "The entity obtains commitments from vendors and other third\nparties with access to personal information to notify the entity\nin the event of actual or suspected unauthorized disclosures, and\nthe entity responds to such notifications.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The third-party notification commitment is contractual and the\nresponse is your incident process (see CC7.4). No software role at\nthe vendor-commitment layer.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P6.6",
     "title": "P6.6, Notice of breaches and incidents to affected parties",
     "text": "The entity provides notification of breaches and incidents to\naffected data subjects, regulators, and others to meet the\nentity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes the scoping evidence a breach notice needs, the\naudit log ties a compromised access to the user + data it\ntouched. The shipped `bin/breach-scope.js` (accessId → user\nreverse-index + audit `recordCount` + `scopedStreamIds` query\nscope) automates \"who was affected, how many records, which\nstreams in scope\" in one command. Drafting and sending the\nnotifications within the regulatory deadline is your process.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.33",
       "gdpr.Art.34",
       "hipaa-breach.164.404"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": [
      {
       "kind": "feature",
       "summary": "Chained audit log raises forensic confidence in the breach-scope determination",
       "eta_release": null,
       "tracking_url": "https://github.com/orgs/pryv/projects/5?pane=issue&itemId=190467766&issue=pryv%7Copen-pryv.io%7C74"
      }
     ]
    },
    {
     "ref": "P6.7",
     "title": "P6.7, Accounting of disclosures to data subjects",
     "text": "The entity provides data subjects with an accounting of the\npersonal information held and disclosure of the data subjects'\npersonal information, upon the data subjects' request, to meet the\nentity's objectives related to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The accounting-of-disclosures answer is computable from the audit\nlog (which accesses read which data, when) plus the accesses list\n(who holds a grant). The audit-event-stream can expose this to the\nsubject directly. Packaging it into a subject-facing report on\nrequest is your workflow; the underlying record is complete and\nattributable. The reference account app (app-web-user-account\n0.34.0) gives the subject a self-service view of it: an Audit trail\ntab, linkable and filtered by app, access, date or kind of call,\neach row naming the access that made it (a revoked one included),\nand per-access lifetime call counts read from open-pryv.io\n2.0.0-rc.84 or later (app tests `[ACTV]`, `[TRLP]`). Its next\nrelease adds charts of that activity over a chosen period, counted\nby the core (`audit.getSummary`, open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.86; older\ncores fall back to counting the audit rows in the app).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AT01",
       "AT51",
       "AT61",
       "AT65"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "hipaa-privacy.164.528",
       "gdpr.Art.15"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "audit-event-stream",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P7.1",
     "title": "P7.1, Data quality, accuracy, completeness, relevance",
     "text": "The entity collects and maintains accurate, up-to-date, complete,\nand relevant personal information to meet the entity's objectives\nrelated to privacy.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Structural data quality is enforced at ingest by event-type schema\nvalidation (HTTP 400 on malformed input); subjects keep their data\nup-to-date via events.update / account.update (prior event values\nkept only with `versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`, off by\ndefault). \"Relevant\", collecting no more than the purpose needs,\nis bounded by the permission scope you grant. Judging semantic\naccuracy of a specific value is your application's responsibility.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5",
       "iso-27701.A.7.4.3"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-types",
       "event",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "P8.1",
     "title": "P8.1, Privacy complaint management and compliance monitoring",
     "text": "The entity implements a process for receiving, addressing,\nresolving, and communicating the resolution of inquiries,\ncomplaints, and disputes from data subjects and others and\nperiodically monitors compliance to meet the entity's objectives\nrelated to privacy. Corrections and other necessary actions\nrelated to identified deficiencies are made or taken in a timely\nmanner.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The complaint-handling workflow is yours, but Pryv supplies the\nmonitoring evidence (audit + observability) and can host the\ncomplaint / resolution records themselves as events on a dedicated\nstream with an attributable trail. This compliance matrix doubles\nas the periodic control-inventory you monitor against.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.12",
       "iso-27701.A.7.3.1"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "observability-provider",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  },
  {
   "id": "swiss-nlpd",
   "title": "Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (revised FADP / nLPD)",
   "short": "Swiss nLPD",
   "type": "regulation",
   "jurisdiction": "Switzerland (extraterritorial via Art. 3 for processing affecting CH)",
   "version": "SR 235.1 (revFADP / nLPD, in force 2023-09-01)",
   "version_date": "2023-09-01",
   "canonical_url": "https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2022/491/en",
   "layered_on": [],
   "curated": false,
   "url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/#/scope/swiss-nlpd",
   "markdown_url": "https://pryv.github.io/compliance-matrix/regulations/swiss-nlpd.md",
   "requirements": [
    {
     "ref": "Art.5",
     "title": "Definitions",
     "text": "Defines key terms, including personal data, sensitive personal data,\nprocessing, controller, processor. Sensitive personal data under\nrevFADP is broader than GDPR Art. 9, includes social-assistance\nmeasures and administrative or criminal proceedings + sanctions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "The same primitive\nmapping that handles GDPR Art. 4 carries here (event = personal\ndata, access = consent / authorization, etc.). The Swiss-\nspecific item is the broader \"sensitive personal data\"\ncategory: implementer responsibility to design the stream\nlayout so social-assistance / administrative-proceeding data\nsit on streams permissioned at the heightened-protection scope\nyou apply to it.\n",
     "detail": "Practical Pryv pattern: dedicate stream subtrees per sensitive-\ndata category (e.g., `health/`, `social-assistance/`,\n`criminal-record/`), and grant accesses with `permissions[]`\nrestricted to the smallest necessary subtree. Sensitive-data\nclassification of a category is a written editorial decision,\nPryv carries the classification but doesn't assign it.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.4"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "system-streams",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.6",
     "title": "Principles of processing",
     "text": "Processing must be lawful, in good faith and proportionate.\nPersonal data may only be collected for a specific purpose\nrecognisable to the data subject; data accuracy must be ensured;\ndata destroyed or anonymized when no longer needed.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same Pryv contributions as GDPR Art. 5: permissions enforce\npurpose-limitation technically; audit + access versioning give\nthe accountability artefact; events.update addresses accuracy\n(keeping the prior value only with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`, off by default). The Swiss-specific \"recognisability\" criterion\n(purpose recognisable to the subject at collection) maps to the\nconsent UX layer, where the purpose written into\n`access.clientData.purpose` should be the same purpose presented\nto the subject.\n",
     "detail": "Storage limitation: see Art.17-equivalent (GDPR Art.17 erasure;\nrevFADP Art. 32 §2 lit c on data destruction when no longer\nneeded). The configurable erasure mechanics from\n`gdpr.Art.17` apply equivalently.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "GLHP",
       "UZEV",
       "AA01"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.5"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.7",
     "title": "Data protection by design and by default",
     "text": "Controller must, from planning through implementation, ensure\nprocessing operations comply with the Act through suitable\ntechnical and organisational measures; default settings must be\nprivacy-protective.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv's architecture is\ndesigned to satisfy Art. 7's \"from planning through\nimplementation\" directive, per-user storage isolation, stream-\nscoped permissions, separate personal/app/shared access types,\nsystem streams for privileged data, audit-by-default. What\nstays on the implementer is the per-deployment default\nconfiguration (token scopes minted, retention chosen, notice\nshown at registration).\n",
     "detail": "Same principle as GDPR Art.25, which this row derives from. The\narchitectural commitments and the catalogue of Pryv defaults are\nin `context/privacy-by-design-and-default.md`.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.25"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream",
       "system-streams"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "privacy-by-design-and-default"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.8",
     "title": "Data security",
     "text": "Controller and processor must ensure data security through\nappropriate technical and organisational measures. Federal Council\nmay issue minimum requirements (Ordinance on Data Protection /\nOPDP).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Pryv contributes the\nsame multi-aspect technical baseline as for GDPR Art. 32: TLS\nin transit (letsEncrypt-integration); operator-side at-rest\nencryption; AES-256-GCM for at-rest operator secrets; stream-\nscoped permissions; MFA; multi-core HA via rqlite;\n`bin/backup.js` restoration. The OPDP minimum-requirements\ndetailing remains the operator's compliance verification work.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.32"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "permissions",
       "system-streams",
       "letsEncrypt-integration",
       "multi-core-mTLS",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "backup-restore",
       "MFA",
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.19",
     "title": "Information duty when collecting personal data",
     "text": "Controller must inform the data subject of any acquisition of\npersonal data (whether from the subject or from a third party);\ninformation must include controller identity, processing purpose,\nrecipients, transfer abroad.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Same mapping as GDPR\nArt. 13/14: notice text lives in\n`access.clientData.privacy_notice` (or a dedicated `consent/*`\nevent when CMC is in play), kept with every previous version on\nthe access (on an event, only with\n`versioning.forceKeepHistory: true`). The customer-\nfacing `app-web-auth3` template is the surface where the notice\nis typically shown. Pryv records what you presented;\npresentation itself is your editorial responsibility.\n",
     "detail": "revFADP Art. 19 unifies the GDPR Art. 13 (direct collection) and\nArt. 14 (indirect collection) into a single information duty.\nThe Pryv artefact set is the same, `access.clientData` +\nprovenance metadata on event.clientData when data didn't come\nfrom the subject directly.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.13",
       "gdpr.Art.14"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "app-web-auth3",
       "event"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.21",
     "title": "Automated individual decisions",
     "text": "Controller must inform the data subject of any decision based\nexclusively on automated processing that has legal effect or\nsignificantly affects the subject; subject has the right to\nexpress their view.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Automated decisioning is the\nimplementer's application logic, not Pryv's. What Pryv\ncontributes: the audit log lets you record when automated-\ndecision processing ran and on which input data, and `events`\nare the carrier for the subject's expressed view (e.g., a\n`decision/objection` event on a designated stream).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.22"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "event",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.22",
     "title": "Data protection impact assessment",
     "text": "Controller must carry out a data protection impact assessment in\nadvance for processing that may entail a high risk to the\npersonality or fundamental rights of the data subject.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "The DPIA itself is a written\nassessment artefact that you (the controller) produce. Pryv\ncontributes to its inputs: the data-residency primitive tells\nyou where each subject's data lives; audit + access-version\ndata describe the processing-flow technical layer with concrete\nartefacts; system-streams isolation gives a defensible \"scope\nof sensitive data\" boundary. The legal-side methodology + the\nwriting of the assessment remain yours.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.35"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "data-residency",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.24",
     "title": "Notification of data security breaches",
     "text": "Controller must notify the Federal Data Protection and Information\nCommissioner (FDPIC) of a data security breach that is likely to\nresult in a high risk to the personality or fundamental rights of\nthe data subject as soon as possible. Notification to the affected\nsubject only when necessary for their protection or upon FDPIC\nrequest.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "Same Pryv contribution as\nGDPR Art. 33: the shipped `bin/breach-scope.js` toolchain +\naudit data + access-version chain let you scope the breach\n(which subject, which streams in scope, by which access).\nThe Swiss-specific point: revFADP Art. 24 says \"as soon as\npossible\" rather than GDPR's 72-hour hard cap, but the FDPIC\n2025-02-06 guideline still expects \"immediately\" for high-risk\nbreaches. Plan your incident-response cadence to match either\nregime if you face both.\n",
     "detail": "The downstream subject-notification trigger differs from GDPR\n(revFADP Art. 24 makes it more conditional). Your incident-\nresponse decision matrix should encode: \"high risk to subject?\n→ notify FDPIC immediately + assess whether subject notification\nnecessary for their protection\". Pryv data feeds both the risk\nassessment (audit scope of access) and the safe-harbor\ndetermination (was the leaked artefact encrypted at rest?).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.33"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets",
       "access"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.25",
     "title": "Right to information (data subject access)",
     "text": "Any person may request information from the controller as to\nwhether personal data concerning them are being processed.\nController must provide the information necessary to enable the\nsubject to assert their rights, including processing purpose,\ncategories, recipients, retention, source, automated decisions.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same implementation as GDPR Art. 15: subject holding a personal\ntoken reads everything via the standard Pryv API (events, streams,\naccesses with history, audit, attachments) in the canonical\ndata-types JSON shape. revFADP Art. 25 §2 lists an extended\nminimum-information set (purpose, categories, recipients,\nretention, source, automated decisions), same artefacts as\nGDPR + a Swiss-specific \"source\" duty that maps to\n`event.clientData.source` when data wasn't from the subject\ndirectly.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "AA01",
       "EGSQ",
       "UZEV"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.15"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "stream",
       "event",
       "audit",
       "data-types",
       "account-backup-tool"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.28",
     "title": "Right to data portability",
     "text": "Data subject has the right to receive personal data concerning\nthem, which the subject has communicated to the controller, in a\ncommonly used electronic format. Right to transmit to another\ncontroller where feasible.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same implementation as GDPR Art. 20: `events.get` + `streams.get`\nreturn canonical JSON validated against `data-types` schemas.\nFor controller-to-controller transmission (§2), the CMC capability-\naccess flow mints a URL the receiving controller can read; no\noperational lift on the subject's side.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "EGSQ"
      ],
      "specs": [
       "EVENT.BASE",
       "STREAM.BASE"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.20"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "data-types",
       "CMC"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.31",
     "title": "Justification for processing sensitive personal data",
     "text": "Processing of sensitive personal data without consent requires an\noverriding private or public interest. Specific grounds are\nenumerated (medical care, social-assistance, statistics under\nconditions, etc.).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Same approach as GDPR Art. 9:\nlegal-ground determination is your programmatic decision; Pryv\npreserves the cited ground per access in\n`access.clientData.legal_ground` so the justification travels\nwith the technical authorization and lives in the audit trail.\nThe Swiss-specific enumeration (Art. 31 §2 list) drives the\nvocabulary your implementer uses for the `legal_ground` values.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.9"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.32",
     "title": "Communicating personal data, general rules",
     "text": "Controller must take appropriate measures to ensure personal data\nremain accurate; subject may request rectification, erasure, or\ndestruction of inaccurate personal data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Rectification and erasure: same mapping as GDPR Art. 16 + 17.\n`events.update` for rectification (with version preservation);\n`system.users.delete` for erasure (with the same engine-dependent\nbackup semantics noted under GDPR Art. 17).\n",
     "detail": "Account auto-deletion, since open-pryv.io 2.0.0-rc.66\n(`8521c8d5`, see gdpr.Art.17). The person can schedule the\nerasure of their own account, at a date or after a period\nwithout use, where your `user-account.delete` lets them delete\nit directly (`[ACST10]`, arming needs the password, `[ACST3]`),\nwith reminder mails before it (`[ACRM1]`); the erasure is the\nsame as `system.users.delete`, guards included (`[ADSW8]`).\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "PTU1",
       "USAD",
       "ACST3",
       "ACST10",
       "ACRM1",
       "ADSW8"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/account-auto-deletion.md"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "storages.userAccountStorage.engine",
       "user-account.delete"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.16",
       "gdpr.Art.17"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "event",
       "stream",
       "backup-restore",
       "account-auto-deletion"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.34",
     "title": "Disclosure of personal data abroad",
     "text": "Personal data may be disclosed abroad only if the receiving\ncountry guarantees adequate data protection or, in defined cases,\nwith appropriate safeguards (BCRs, standard contractual clauses,\nFederal Council approval).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "configurable",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The `data-residency` primitive is the technical control here:\nbind each subject's data to a hosting whose jurisdiction matches\nyour transfer regime. For CH data, route subjects to a CH\nhosting and Art. 34 is moot (no disclosure abroad). For\nlegitimate transfers (e.g., CH → EU with adequacy + appropriate\nsafeguards), the per-user `hosting` field exposes which\njurisdiction the data sits in, recoverable for audit.\n",
     "detail": "Cross-account / CMC disclosures across hostings inherit the\nsame control: the counterparty access's `apiEndpoint` reveals\nwhich hosting (= jurisdiction) the receiving deployment lives\nin; document the legal basis (adequacy decision, BCRs, etc.) on\nthe originating access's `clientData.cross_border_basis`.\n\n**Residency guarantee level**: core-level, enforced by\narchitecture (see `context/core-affinity-architecture.md`).\nCores share no event / stream / audit data; the data plane is\ncore-affine + the client ↔ core path is direct over TLS with\nno Pryv-shipped intermediary. A CH-assigned subject's data\nlives exclusively on the CH core. The CMC-counterparty\npattern is the one runtime case where a cross-jurisdiction\nread can happen (a foreign counterparty's client connects to\nthe CH `apiEndpoint`), and that's the moment the implementer\nrecords the Art.34 legal basis on the access.\n",
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "BUNDLEENC",
       "ACMEINT"
      ],
      "config_keys": [
       "auth.hostings"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.44",
       "gdpr.Art.46"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency",
       "CMC"
      ],
      "context_notes": [
       "core-affinity-architecture"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.35",
     "title": "Disclosure of personal data abroad, particular cases",
     "text": "Disclosure abroad without adequate protection requires one of\ndefined exceptions (subject consent, contract performance,\noverriding interests, etc.).\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Exception-based transfers\nrequire recording the legal basis. Pryv pattern: the access\nauthorising the disclosure carries the exception type in\n`clientData.transfer_exception` (e.g., `\"art_35_consent\"`,\n`\"art_35_contract\"`); the audit row at disclosure time anchors\nthe exception to the specific event(s) transferred.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.49"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.2",
     "title": "Material scope",
     "text": "revFADP applies to the processing of personal data concerning\nnatural persons by private persons and federal bodies. Does not\napply to natural persons processing personal data for purely\npersonal use, parliamentary proceedings, pending judicial /\nadministrative procedures.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Your Pryv deployment is\nfully in scope as automated processing of personal data. The\n\"purely personal use\" exception (§2 §1 lit a) doesn't reach a\nhosted Pryv deployment where you act as operator / controller\nfor others.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.2"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "event",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.3",
     "title": "Territorial scope",
     "text": "revFADP applies to facts that have an effect in Switzerland,\neven if initiated abroad.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "infrastructure",
     "overview": "Whether revFADP applies\ndepends on whether processing affects CH data subjects, not on\nwhere infrastructure lives. Pryv's data-residency primitive lets\nyou bind subjects to CH hostings explicitly when CH jurisdiction\nis the chosen regime, see Art. 34 for the cross-border transfer\nside.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.3"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.16",
     "title": "Disclosure of personal data abroad, principles (cross-link)",
     "text": "Personal data may be disclosed abroad only where the Federal\nCouncil has determined adequate protection or appropriate\nsafeguards are in place; see Art. 34 for the operative framework.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "awareness",
     "overview": "Framing row pointing at\nArt. 34 for the operative Pryv mapping and at GDPR Chapter V\n(Art. 44-50) for the parallel EU regime.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.34",
       "gdpr.Art.44"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.30",
     "title": "Justification of breaches of privacy",
     "text": "Personal-data processing that breaches privacy is unlawful unless\njustified by consent, overriding private or public interest, or\nlaw.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Same pattern as GDPR Art. 6,\njustification basis is recorded on the access's\n`clientData.legal_basis` (Swiss-specific vocabulary drawn from\nArt. 30 §2 list). Determination of which basis applies is your\neditorial / legal judgement.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.6"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.4",
     "title": "Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC)",
     "text": "The FDPIC supervises the application of data-protection\nlegislation by federal bodies and private persons; advises\nauthorities and private persons; investigates breaches +\nmakes recommendations + orders.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "The FDPIC is a regulator; no software role. When an FDPIC\ninvestigation involves a Pryv deployment, the audit log +\naccess-version chain are the evidence layer the controller\nprovides, but interaction with the FDPIC is the controller's\nlegal / regulatory process.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.23",
     "title": "Privacy by default",
     "text": "Controller shall, by default, ensure that personal-data processing\nis limited to the minimum required to fulfil the purpose, in\nparticular through appropriate technical settings.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "medium",
     "facilitation_mode": "primitive",
     "overview": "Pryv defaults lean privacy-\nprotective by construction: smallest-permission default is\n\"none\"; system streams isolate privileged data; per-user storage\nisolates subjects. The operator's deployment-time choices\n(token-scope defaults, retention policy, MFA-on) determine\nwhether the by-default posture is fully exercised.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.25",
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.7"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "permissions",
       "stream",
       "system-streams"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.26",
     "title": "Restriction of the right to information",
     "text": "Right to information under Art. 25 may be restricted, refused or\ndeferred where a law so provides, where overriding interests of\na third party require it, or where the request is manifestly\nunfounded.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "When a controller invokes\nArt. 26 to restrict / refuse / defer a DSAR, the rationale is\nrecorded as a `dsar/restricted` event on a designated stream\nwith `clientData.art26_basis` capturing the §1 letter (a / b /\nc). Audit log anchors the decision in time. Whether a given\nrestriction is justified is the controller's legal judgement.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.25",
       "gdpr.Art.15"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.33",
     "title": "Cross-border international cooperation",
     "text": "Federal Council may conclude international treaties on the\ncross-border exchange of personal data, including treaties on\nmutual data-protection cooperation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Treaty-level activity. No software role; no implementer\nobligation arises from this Article alone.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.9",
     "title": "Processing by a processor",
     "text": "Controller may entrust processing to a processor only if the\nprocessor undertakes to process personal data only as instructed,\nensures equivalent data security, and obtains controller approval\nfor any sub-processor engagement.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Same pattern as GDPR Art. 28:\nwhen the Pryv operator is a processor distinct from the\ncontroller, the DPA + sub-processor list are the operator's\ncontractual artefacts. Pryv's audit log enforces \"only as\ninstructed\" demonstrability; the observability-provider\nprimitive is the sole built-in subprocessor candidate (default\ndisabled).\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.28"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "encryption-at-rest-secrets"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.12",
     "title": "Register of processing activities",
     "text": "Each controller + processor shall maintain a register of\nprocessing activities (exceptions for SMEs whose processing\nposes low risk). Register content parallels GDPR Art. 30.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "implemented",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "high",
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Same primitive-set mapping as GDPR Art. 30: access + clientData\n+ audit + CMC + data-residency form the technical register\nsubstrate. Swiss-specific note: the SME exception (Ordinance on\nData Protection) drops register obligation for companies < 250\npersonnel processing low-risk data. The register substrate is\navailable regardless; whether it's required is operator-side\nlegal judgement.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "tests": [
       "UZEV",
       "TJ8S",
       "AA01"
      ],
      "docs": [
       "customer-resources/audit-setup.md",
       "guides/audit-logs.md"
      ],
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.30"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData",
       "audit",
       "CMC",
       "data-residency"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.17",
     "title": "Exceptions to the duty to inform",
     "text": "Information duty under Art. 19 may be waived where the data\nsubject already has the information, the processing is\nprovided for by law, the controller is bound by professional\nsecrecy, or providing information would be disproportionate.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Exception-applicability is the controller's legal judgement; no\nsoftware role. Where the exception applies, the controller's\nreasoning is documentable in `account.clientData.art17_basis`\nfor auditor questions.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.19"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.18",
     "title": "Information when collecting personal data, specific cases",
     "text": "In addition to Art. 19 baseline, controller shall provide\nadditional information when transferring abroad, when processing\ninvolves automated decision-making, and in cases involving\nsensitive personal data.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "storage",
     "overview": "Additional disclosures are\nstored alongside the baseline notice in\n`access.clientData.privacy_notice` (or as additional\n`consent/notice` events for clarity). The cross-border transfer\nelement ties to Art. 34; automated-decision element ties to\nArt. 21.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.19",
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.21",
       "swiss-nlpd.Art.34"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "access",
       "clientData"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.11",
     "title": "Codes of conduct",
     "text": "Professional, sector or trade associations may submit codes of\nconduct to the FDPIC; the FDPIC takes a position on the code.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Sector-level instrument; see GDPR Art. 40 for parallel framing.\nAdherence is recorded as one of the Art. 8 \"appropriate\nmeasures\" indicators on the deployment.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.40"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.14",
     "title": "Representative in Switzerland",
     "text": "A controller established abroad whose processing concerns\npersons in Switzerland on a large scale + regularly + with high\nrisk shall designate a representative in Switzerland.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Representative designation is a contractual / regulatory\nregistration step for non-Swiss controllers; no software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.15",
     "title": "Duty of the processor to inform the controller",
     "text": "Processor shall inform the controller of all data security\nbreaches without delay; cooperate with the controller in\nfulfilling obligations toward data subjects.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "facilitated",
     "pryv_effort_saved": "low",
     "facilitation_mode": "evidence",
     "overview": "When Pryv operator acts as\nprocessor, the breach-notification channel to the controller is\nthe operator's contractual commitment. Pryv's audit +\nobservability + access primitives give the operator the scoping\ndata needed for the notification; CMC's cross-platform messaging\nis a structured channel when both sides run Pryv.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {
      "derives_from": [
       "gdpr.Art.28",
       "gdpr.Art.33"
      ],
      "primitives": [
       "audit",
       "CMC",
       "observability-provider"
      ]
     },
     "planned_changes": []
    },
    {
     "ref": "Art.29",
     "title": "Information from official registers",
     "text": "Anyone may obtain information from official registers on the\nconditions provided for in special legislation.\n",
     "text_url": null,
     "coverage": "out-of-scope",
     "pryv_effort_saved": null,
     "facilitation_mode": null,
     "overview": "Public-register access is regulatory framing; no software role.\n",
     "detail": null,
     "technical": null,
     "draft": true,
     "reviewed_at": null,
     "applies_to_versions": "*",
     "evidence": {},
     "planned_changes": []
    }
   ],
   "excluded_items": []
  }
 ]
}
